Volume 134 — United States Reports

Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court determining that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen of a U.S. state from suing that state in a federal court. Citizens cannot bring suits against their own state for cases related to the federal constitution and federal laws. The court left open the question of whether a citizen may sue his or her state in state courts. That ambiguity was resolved in Alden v. Maine (1999), in which the Court held that a state's sovereign immunity forecloses suits against a state government in state court.

Held: That the suit against the auditor was, under the circumstances, virtually a suit against the State; (2) That, on the authority of Hans v. Louisiana, ante, 1, the suit could not be maintained against the State.

<p>The first eight of the Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the United States have reference only to powers exercised by the United States, and not to those exercised by the-States.</p> <p>The provision in Article III of the Constitution of the United States respecting the trial of crimes by jury relates to the judicial power of the United States.</p> <p>Article VI of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States respecting a speedy and public trial by jury; Articles V and VI respecting the right of persons accused of crime to be confronted with the witnesses; Article VIII respecting excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishments; and Article XIV respecting the abridgment of privileges, the deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law, and the denial of the equal protection of the laws, are not infringed by the statutes of Iowa authorizing'its courts, When a person violates an injunction restraining him from selling intoxicating liquors, to punish him as for contempt by fine or imprisonment or both.</p> <p>Proceedings according to the common law for contempt of court are not subject to the right "of trial- by jury, and are “due process of law,” within- the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.</p> <p>All the powers of courts whether at common law or in chancery may be called into play by tbe legislature of a State, for tbe purpose of suppressing tbe manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors when they are prohibited by law, and to abate a nuisance declared by law to be' such; and tbe Constitution of tbe United States interposes no hindrance.</p> <p>A District Court of a county-in Iowa is empowered to enjoin’ and restrain a person from selling or keeping for sale intoxicating liquors, including’ale, wine and beer, in tbe county, and disobedience of tbe order subjects thé guilty party to proceedings for contempt and punishment thereunder.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE OXROUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>Motion to dishiss or affirh. Tbe case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in view of the .scope of her evidence, not to have been erroneous. ' The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John J. Johnson and Mr. William G. Johnson, (with whom was Mr. William Stone Abert on the brief,) for plaintiffs in errojr. Mr. Enoch Totten, (with whom was Mr. William B. Webb on the brief,)-for defendants in error'. Me. Justice HaelaN . delivered the

<p>Time may be made of the essence of a contract, relating to the-purchase of realty, by the express stipulations of the parties; or it may arise, by ' implication from the very nature of the property ¿ or the avowed objects of the seller or the purchaser; and unless its provisions' contravene public policy, the court should giye effect to them according, to the real ' intention of .the parties. :</p> <p>But even when time.is made material by express stipulation, the failure of one of the parties to perform a condition within the particular time ■ limited will not in every case defeat his right 'to specific performance, if the condition be subsequently'performed, without unreasonable delay, ' and no .circumstances have intervened that woulfi render it unjust or inequitable to give such relief. The discretion which the court has to . decree specific performance may be controlled- by the conduct of the ' party who refuses to perform the contract because of the failure of the . other party to strictly Comply with it's, conditions.</p> <p>When a contract for the purchase of land provides that it shall’be forfeited if the vendee fails to pay any instalment of the purchase price at the time limited, the failure of 'the latter to make a tender of payment, in lawful money, of a particular instalment on the very day it falls due, will not deprive him of the right ifco have specific performance, if such" failure was superinduced by the conduct of the vendor, and if the vendee, without unreasonable delay, tenders payment, in lawful money, after the time so limited.</p> <p>A provision in the contract forbidding its modification or change except by entry thereon in writing signed by both parties, coupled with a provision that no. court should relieve the purchaser from a failure to comply strictly and literally with its conditions, has no application when the apparent cause of the failure to perform such conditions was the conduct of the vendor.</p> <p>If the vendor notifies the purchaser that he regards the contract as ■forfeited, and that he will not receive any money from him, the latter is not . required/as a condition of,his right to specific performance, to make' tender of the purchase price. It is sufficient if he offer in his bill to bring the money into court.</p> <p>A note for the purchase price of land is made payable at a particular time and at a particular bank. The payor is ready at such time and place to pay,' and offers to pay, but the bank has not received the note for collection; Held-,</p> <p>(1) The bank is not authorized to receive the money for the’ payee by reason simply of the fact that the note is payable there;</p> <p>(2) The tender of payment is not payment;' ;</p> <p>(3) A decree of specific performance should not become operative until the money is brought into court</p> <p>(4) The payee is not entitled .to interest unless it appears that the payor, after the tender, realized interest upon the'money.</p>

Held: that this was erroneous as it in effect directed the jury to find that the plaintiff was not entitled to regover; and, as the evidence was conflicting, that was a question to be determined by the jur^,.

Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court concerning the removal power under the Appointments Clause.

■ ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN- DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. In contract;'on a policy of insurance. Judgment .for defendant. Blaintiff sued out this writ of error. The-case is stated in tbe- opinion.

Held: that an appeal lay from that decree to the general term of the court. A trustee of real estate, after a court of equity, on his own motion, has discharged him and relieved him.of his trust and appointed another trustee in his place, has no remaining interest in the property which he can convey by deed.

Held: that the circumstances set forth in the complaint were of so peculiar a character, that a court of equity should be slow in denying relief upon the mere ground of laches, in bringing the suit. The court stated.the case as follows: This suit was brought.by the appellant on the 18th of July, 1887, in the District Court .of the Second Judicial District of Arizona, and was there heard upon demurrer to the complaint.

of the report: “ A court has power -to order entries of proceedings had by the court at a previous term to be made’ nunc pro tunc, but… Held: on writ of error to the Supreme Court, that the court had a right, on motion at a subsequent term, to amend its record by a statement of these facts, not only by the endorsement upon the bill, but by a •regular entry on the journal, that “ the grand jury returned into court the following true bills of indictment,” (naming the one…

Held: That as to all-persons .acquiring any. part of the 147 bonds with notice of the agreement with the New York house,, the 310 bonds held by .the latter wére entitled to' priority; (2) That holders who took them, without-notice of it, whether taking. originally from the company, or by purchase from one who took with'knowledge, were entitled to share with the New York house in’the distribution. ' The .í¿'Nevada and…

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>submitted on their brief.</p>

<p>Petition .for a writ' of habeas corpus.' ..Argued and submitted January 15,.1890. —</p> <p>submitted on their brief.</p>

Held: (11 The bill alleging that the land was formed bv “ impercentible de *179 grees,” the time during which the large increase was made being nearly 20 years, the averment must stand, notwithstanding the character of the river, and the rapid changes constantly going on in its banks; (2) Where a water line is the boundary of a given lot, that line, no matter how it shifts, remains the boundary; and a deed describing the…

This was an action against the City of Memphis, a munich pal corporation of Missouri, alleged to have been known and designated on the first day of March, 18TT,. as the town of Memphis, and styled the Inhabitants of the Town of Memphis. It was brought to recover the amount .of one hundred and thirty-eight coupons, each for eighty dollars, detached from certain railroad bonds purporting to have been issued by that town.

Held: that this legislation applied to limited partnerships formed under chapter 68 of .' the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas, adopted by an act passed March 17, ,- 1879. ’ • , An assignment by a .limited partnership consisting of one general partner *207 and one special partner, for the benefit of its creditors, may be executed by the general partner; and such assignment need not embrace the individual property of the…

Held: it was a suit against the State. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. William Alien Butler and Mr. W. W. Howe for plaintiff in error. • Mr. B. J. Sage and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse for defendant in error. Mr. W. H. Rogers, Attorney General of Louisiana, filed a brief for the same.

This was an action of ejectment brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, June 14, 1884, by Kowena Young, a citizen of Ohio, against John C. Deputron, a citizen of Nebraska, to recover certain premises in the petition named.

Held: That the construction of the ditch was outside of the original con- ■ tract; (2) That the fact that it passed through the borrowing-pits did not modify that fact; (3) That the engineer had authority to agree with the contractors that they should be paid for it as excavation from the surface down; • (4) That it was right to leave it to the jury to determine whether such an agreement was made between the contractors…

<p>An officer in a corporation who is leading in its management, who is active in securing the passage of a resolution authorizing an: issue of preferred stock, who subscribes for such stock' and pays his subscription and takes his. certificate and votes upon it at shareholders’ meetings for over two years, and induces others to take such stock, cannot, when the company becomes insolvent; recover back the money paid by him on his - ■ subscription, on the ground that the statutes of the State only authorized an'issue of-general shares.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OE THE UNITED STATES FOB THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>I-n equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

’ This action was commenced in the Marine Court of the city of New York,'to recover $1687.51, alleged to be due plaintiffs, for á quantity of varnish, etc.,'sold and delivered to; defendants .between November 9, 1881, and May 15, 1882.

Held: and that the cloud be thereby removed; ” and for costs, and that execution issue therefor. This was the whole extent of the judgment and decree. Obviously in all this there was no adjudication affecting Hart.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES' FOB THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The casé is stated in the opinion,.</p>

Michael Gormley, the appellant, on the 5th day of March. 1.874, made a subdivision, into blocks and lots, of certain property within the limits of the village of Glencoe, Cook County, Illinois, entitled “ Gormley’s Addition to Glencoe acknowledged the plat before a justice of the peace; and had it certified to by the county surveyor, and duly recorded in the recorder’s office of said county. lie derived title to so •much of the property as is involved in this case under a…

Held: following the decisions of the courts of the State of New York in parallel cases, that this statute contemplates that the plaintiff shall be an áctual resident in the State, and that he does not become such by sending his family to the State of New York from another State, in which he and they were residing, with the intent that they should reside there, but remaining himself in the other State.

APPEALS PROM THE SUPREME COURT OP THE TERRITORY OP IDAHO.' The case, as stated by the court, was as follows: .These-cases depend upon the same principles of law, and' will be considered together. • _ - It appears from the record of the first one (No. 1133) that upon the petition of the appellant to the Supreme Court of thé Territory of Idaho, an alternative writ of mandamus was issued, stating substantially the following facts: The appellant was and is the president of the…

Held: in Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Hammond, to be fifteen years and not five years;- This view is made conclusive by the requirement of section 4887, that if there be more than one prior foreign patent, the United States patent shall be so limited as' to expiré at the same'time with that one of such foreign patents “having the<:, shortest term.” This means the foreign patent which, at the time the United States patent is…

Held: to be operated upon otherwise than' by' the opposite end; and we do hereby declare that the following, taken in connection with the accompanying drawings which form part of this specification, is a clear, full and exact' description of our invention and sufficient to enable those skilled in the art to practice it.

<p>When, by general law, a lien is given to a corporation upon the stock of' a stockholder in the corporation for any indebtedness owing by him to it, that lien is valid and. enforceable against all the world; and a sale of the stockholder’s stock to a person ignorant of the lien will not discharge it and thus authorize the purchaser to demand and receive a transfer of it so discharged.</p>

<p>APPEAL" EROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>IN equity. The case is stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Mr. A. 0. Salter filed a brief for same, citing: Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 351; Ow'r v. Breese, 81 N. T. 584; Phcmix Bamik v. Stafford, 89 N. Y. 405; Oole v. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73; Dwnlap v. Hawkins, 59 N.-Y. 342; Wiclces v. Glamke, 8 Paige, 161; Yam, Wyclc v. Seward, 1 Edw. Ch. 327; Wallace.v. P&nfield, 106 U. S. 260; Ili/nde v. ■Longworth, 11 Wheat. 199; Glarlc v. Killian, 103 TJ. S. 766; Smith v. Yodges, 92 U. S. 183; Graham v. Railroad Go., 102 U. S.148; Horback v. Hill, 112 U. S. 144; Pepper v. Garter, 11 Missouri, 540; Paphe v. Stanton, 59 Missouri, 158; Lerow v. Witma/rth, 9 Allen, 382; 8. G. 83 Am. Dec. 701; Pratt v. Curtis, 2 Lowell, 87; Herrmg v. Richards, 1 McCrary, 570; Hygert v. Remerschnider, 32 N. Y. 629 ; Todd v. Kelson, 109 N Y. 316; Matthai v. Heather, 57 Maryland, 483; Kimble v. Smith, 95 Penn. St. 69; Ha/rlcm v. MaglaugKlim,, 90 Penn. St. ■293 ; Curtis v. Fox, 47 N. Y. 301 ; Phillips v. Wooster, 36 N. Y. 412; ■ Walter v. Lame, 1 MacÁrthur, 275; Claflim v. Mess, 30 -N. J. Eq. (3 Stewart) 11; Babcocki v. Eckler, 24 N. Y. 623; Medsker v. Bonebrake, 108 U. S. 66 ; Baker v. Gil-man, 52 Barb. 26; Reed v. Woodmam, 4 Maine, 400 ; Lehm-berg v. Biberstein, 51 Texas, 457; Monroe v. Smith, 79 Penn. St. 459; Herring v. Richards, 3 Fed. Rep. 439; Pell v. Tredmebl, 5 Wend. .661; Hippe's Appeal, 75 Penn. St. 472; Kémpner v. Churchill, 8 Wall. 362; Fuller v. Brewster, 53 Maryland, 361; Washbamd v.. Washbamd, 27 Connecticut, 431; Seward v. Jackson, 8 ’Cowen, 430.</p> <p>Dudley v. Easton, 104 IT. S. 99; Warren v. Moody, 122 IT. S. 132; Adams v. Collier, 122 IT. S. 382; Young v.. Hermans, 66 N. Y. 374; Ca/rpenter. y. ifoe, 10 N. Y. 227; ATmy v. WSco», 11 Paige, 589 ; Samage y. Murphy, 34 N. Y. 508; S. C. 90 Am. Dec. 733; Smith y. Vodge 's, 92 IT. S. 183; Case v. Phelps, 39 N. Y. 164; Dunn v. Hornbeck, 72 N. Y. 80 ; Wallace y. Penfield, 106 IT. S. 260 ; Horback y. Hill, 112 IT. S. 144; Blermerhasset v. Sherman, 105 IT. S. 100; Schmidt y. Schmidt, 48 N. Y. Superior Ct. 520; Lent y. Howard, 89 N. Y. 169; Adair v. Lott, 3 Hill, 182; Coleman y. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17; Reynolds y. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Chew y. Hyman, 10 Bissell, 240; Kerrison y. Stewart, 93 IT. S. 155; Whelan y. Whelan, 3 Oowen, 537; Western Railroad v. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513; Vetterlein y. Barnes, 124 IT. S. 169.</p>

This was an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Court of Claims against the United States in favor of Kicbard M. Jones, for services rendered by him as a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western .District of North Carolina.

<p>ORIGINAL.</p> <p>.This was a petition for" a writ of pro úbition. The 'case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Where a case is tried by the Circuit Court without a jury, and it makes a special finding of facts, with conclusions of law, alleged errors of fact are not, on a writ of error, subject to revision by this court, if there ■ was any evidence on which Such findings could be made.</p> <p>Where .the .Circuit Court finds ultimate facts, which justify the judgment rendered, its refusal to find certain, specified facts, and certain propositions of law based on those facts, will not be reviewed by this court, on a writ of error, if they were either immaterial facts or incidental facts, amounting only to evidence bearing on the ultimate facts found.</p>

Held: that the release bound all the bondholders represented by the trustee; that it was properly brought before this court, though not found in the transcript of the record; that the appeal was the ■ appeal of the trustee; and that, on the motion of the appellee, it must be dismissed.

<p>In an action against a national bank in a Circuit Court of tie United States, if all the parties are citizens of the district in which the hank is situated, and the action does not come under section 5209 or section 5239 of the Revised Statutes, the Circuit Court has no jurisdiction; and, if it has taken jurisdiction ^.nd dismissed the bill upon another ground, its decree will he reversed and the causerremanded with a direction to dismiss the hill for want of jurisdiction.</p>

<p>An insolvent corporation, with large properties scattered in different States, having, for the purpose of keeping those properties together as a whole, assented to the filing of a creditors’ bill by three creditors, (the debts of two of them not having matured and no execution having been issued on that of the third,) and having assented.to the appointment of a receiver under that bill, and having for nine months lain inactive while the receiver was managing the property and assuming liabilities in reducing it to possession, cannot at' the expiration of that time, when the great majority of its creditors have become parties to the suit, and its property is about to be ratably distributed by the court among all its creditors, interpose the objection .of want of jurisdiction on the ground that á court of equity could not obtain jurisdiction when the plaintiff's creditors had plain, adequate and complete remedies at the common law, or that their debts had not been converted into judgments, or that no execution-had issued and been returned nulla bona — whatever weight might have been given to those defences if interposed in the first instance.</p> <p>The maxim that “he who seeks equity must do equity” is applicable to the defendant as well as to the complainant.</p> <p>Glood faith and early assertion of rights are as essential on the part of a defendant in equity as they are on the pai\t of the complainant.</p>

Motion to dismiss an appeal in equity upon the ground that “ the decree appealed from was not a joint decree, and imposed no joint debt, liability or obligation,” but that it was a series of distinct decrees against distinct parties, on distinct causes of action. The case is stated in the opinion. The cause was argued on its merits as well as on the motion to dismiss.

OF ’ NEW JERSEY,' ^ The case, - as stated by. the court in its opinion, was • as follows This was a writ of certiorari issued out of the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, on the 6th of November, 1882, at the instance of Henry S. Little, receiver of the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, a corporation of that' State, commanding Samuel I).

<p>When one of two defendants in a suit in equity demurs to the bill and the demurrer is sustained, and the other defendant answers, and the-bill is then dismissed, and the plaintiff appeals, and files an appeal-bond running to “ the defendants,” and the appeal is duly entered here within the prescribed time, this court has jurisdiction'of the appeal; and, if the defendant as to whom the bill was dismissed on demurrer does not appear, he may be cited in, and the court may then' proceed to hear and determine the-cause.</p> <p>When a mortgagee of real estate asserts in equity his rights as against a tax-sale of the éstate, alleged by him to have been .made collusively in conjunction with the mortgagor for the purpose of getting rid of the mortgage for the benefit of the mortgagor, he may either proceed against the purchaser alone, or against the purchaser and the mortgagor: and in any event it is not necessary for him to make tender of the payment of the amount of the tax for which the estate was sold.</p> <p>The provision in the constitution of Louisiana declaring a tax-title to be prima facie valid is intended to be applied to cases in which the tax-title is attacked for alleged informalities in the proceedings; but not to cases in which it is attacked for-fraud and collusion in effecting the sale.</p> <p>Austin v. Citizens’ Bank, 30 La. Ann. 689, approved and applied to this case.</p> <p>In foreclosing a mortgage in Louisiana, the mortgagor is entitled, in making up the amount of the judgment, to be credited with judgments against the mortgagee in another State whicl\ have been acquired by the mortgagor.</p>

Held: The court is authorized to put itself in the position occupied by the • . daughter when she made her will, in -order to discover from that standpoint, in view of the circumstances then existing, what she intended; .

This case was first beard at October term, 1886. On the 15th of November, 18S6, it was affirmed by a divided.court, and was reported in 119 U. S. 129, to which reference is made for the reporter’s statement of the case at that hearing, including the text of the New York statute and the agreed case.

<p>EEROB TO THE SUPEEME COUET CE THE STATE OE SOUTH GASOLINA.</p> <p>MotioN to dismiss. The court stated the case as follows :</p> <p>Sarah. J. Harris, a citizen of the State of South Carolina, died at her residence' in. that .State in December, 1885, leaving a last will and .testament bearing date September 11, 1885, and', her surviving, am only child, Mrs. Mary D. Blbunt, whose domicil was that of her husband, "William.H. Blount, in Wilson County, in the State of North Carolina. Mrs. Harris’ next nearest of kin was her sister, Caroline S. "Walker, mother of Julius H. Walker. By her will Mrs. Harris gave, .bequeathed, and devised her estate, real and.personal, which was- all situated in South Carolina, to her nephew, Julius H. Walker, (who was appointed executor,) in.trust for.Mary D. Blount “ for- and during the term of her natural life,” unless the trust were sooner executed, as provided in an item of the will not material- to be ^considered here, and upon the death of Mrs. Blount the estate was “ bequeathed and devised to the issue of the said'Mrs.-Blount, to- them- and their -heirs f oré ver, per stirpes and not per capita; and if the said Mrs. Blount die without -issue surviving her at the time of her death, then the samé is devised and bequeathed to .'such person or persons and in such proportions as the said Mrs. Mary Delia- Blount may .cppoint by her last will and testament duly executed, to the said appointees and their heirs forever.” Mrs. Blount died at her home in -North Carolina, without issue, in April, 1886. She left a will dated March 16, 1886, providing that “ all my ^estate, both real and personal, whether legal or equitable, I deWse^ Bequeath and absolutely give unto my beloved hus-' • band, to his only use and behoof, and hereby direct the trustee appointed by the last will and testament of my deceased ■mother, Mrs. S. J. Harris, of' Columbia, in the State of South-Caroliria, to execute all such needful conveyances and releases as may effectually divest his title as such- trustee, and convey the property and effects, to him devised by said last will- of Mrs. S. J. Harris, to my said husband, W. II. Blount, to him and his heirs absolutely.” This will was duly .admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Wilson County, North Carolina, on the. 26th day of April, 1886, the order of that court finding from the evidence of the subscribing witnesses that the paper writing propounded’ “ is the last will and téstament of NT. Delia Blount, and' that the same was duly executed by said M. Delia Blount.” Letters testamentary issued June 3, .and an exemplification of the probate proceedings was duly filed and admitted to probate in the proper Probate Court-in South Carolina, in accordance with the statute in that behalf, which provided: “If a will be .regularly proved .in any foreign court, an exemplification of such will may be admitted to probate in this State upon the' exemplification and certificate of the judge of the . court of probate ; and the exemplification shall also be evidence of the devise of land in this State where the title of lands comes in question:” Gen. Stats. So. Car.-1882, ’■p. 549, § 1875..</p> <p>William H. Blount instituted an action on the equity side of the Court of Common Pleas in Bichland County, South Carolina, against Julius H. Walker, who fiad qualified as executor and was in possession as trustee, and Mrs. Caroline S. Walker, setting forth the deaths of Mrs. Harris and Mrs. Blount and the wills, and claiming the entire estate of Mrs.- Harris as the appointee by Mrs. Blount’s will; alleging demand upon the trustee and executor, and refusal;"and demanding judgment -that he be adjudged to be the owner of said estate ;' that Walker be required to account; and for- general, relief. Walker answered,-submitting; under the advice of counsel, the question to. the court' “ whether the will of M. Delia Blount is a. valid execution of the p'ower conferred upon her by the will of Sarah J. Harris, and whether said will of Mrs. Blount has been' duly executed so as to pass the property of said Sarah J. Harris in the hands of this defendant?’ Mrs. Walker also answered, claiming to' be entitled to the whole estate of Mrs. Harris as her sole., heir after the death-of Mrs., Blountj and alleging that Mrs.- Blount’s will was not executed as requiréd by the laws of South Carolina, and was notj therefore, a valid •execution of the power. • .</p> <p>The cause was heard by the judge of the Court of Common Pleas, who found, among other things, “that Mrs. Blount’s wiil was duly proved in the Probate Court of North Carolina, in the county-in.which she resided, and a proper exemplification undér the laws of South Carolina was admitted to probate in Bichland County on the 19th May, 1886. . The Court of Probate of North Carolina is, under the laws of North Carolina, a court, of general jurisdiction in all matters testamentary. The exemplification of the judgment of that court, establishing this will, was properly proved according to the acts of Congress. Mrs.' Blount’s will is not executed according to the laws of South Carolina. The question to be determined is whether Mrs. Blount’s will is a valid execution of the power contained in Mrs. Harris’ will. It is conceded in the argument, and is undoubtedly sound, that the appointee, under a power like the one under consideration, takes» under the instrument creating the power, and not under the instrument of appointment. And in.this case Mrs. Harris’ will expressly .conveys the property to the appointee under the power. The only requisite required by 'Mrs. Harris’ will for the execution of this power, is that the same shall be by ‘will duly executed; ’ and in this case that formality has been complied with, and is shown by the judgment of -the court of her domicil.” And it was “ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the power is well executed, ■ and the plaintiff is entitled to the property set out in the complaint and in the hands of the defendant Julius H. Walker.”</p> <p>Defendants appealed from this decree' to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which on the 23d day of April, 1888, reversed the judgment of the - Circuit Court. The court held that the power was not well executed, for the reason that Mrs. Harris had by her will conferred a power which the donee could only exercise “by'her last will and testament duly executed”’ which meant a will duly executed according to the laws of South Carolina, which this will was not; and the court said: “This paper was doubtless a valid will in Notth Carolina, sufficient to pass any property which Mrs. Blount was entitled to in her own right in that State; and any personal property which she owned, anywhere, and was, therefore, no doubt, properly admitted to probate there, as well as here, upon the exemplification under the statute. But the question here is, not whether Mrs. Blount has made a will disposing of her owm property,.but whether the paper propounded as such is a valid execution of the power conferred by the will of Mrs. Harris; and for the reasons above stated \ve do not think it is.” Blo'tmb v. Wallcer, 28 So. Car. 545. The cause was remanded, and subsequent'proceedings taken in the Court of Common Pleas, and another judgment rendered by the Supremé Court upon the question of who was or were entitled to take upon the failure of Mrs. Blount to make a valid appointment; but it is not claimed here that any federal question arose thereon.</p> <p>To the judgment of the Supreme Court a writ of error was sued out from this court.</p> <p>Under Hev. Stat. § 906, it was held- by this court that the “faith and credit ” spoken of are not limited to the form of the record and are not satisfied by its admission as a record, but that the same effect must be given to the record in the courts of the State where "produced as in the courts of the State from which it is taken. " Mills v. Duryee, 7 Oranch, 481; Lelamd v. Wilkinson, 6 Pet. 317; Grctpo v. -Kelly, 16 Wall. '610.</p> <p>The true test of jurisdiction over state courts is not whether the record exhibits an express statement that a federal question was. presented, but whether such a question was decided and decided ■ adversely to the federal right. • The form and mode in which it was decided are of minor importance. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S.' 432. ,</p> <p>In brief, our position is: (1) That the decision of the state court necessarily involved the question whether the wifi of Mrs. Blount was her “last will and testament,duly executed;”</p> <p>(2)' That the judgment of the probate court of North Carolina is conclusive of this, and that whether in the decision of the state court it has given this judgment the samé force ' and effect as it has in North Carolina is” the federal question.</p> <p>And that it is immaterial whether the state court has decided the. judgment void, or evades a decision on the ground of '^obstruction.</p> <p>■ The jurisdiction having attached, each party is entitled to be heard on the merits. As said by this -court in Baltimore <£t Ohio Railroad v. Maryla/nd, 20 Wall. 648: “Where the federal question has been raised arid has been decided against plaintiff in error in a state court, jurisdiction of this court attaches and the case must be heard on the merits,” although' the state court placed its decision on another ground that does not present a federal question. Both parties are entitled to be heard in this; court' on the ■ soundness of the decision of the federal questiori, on its sufficiency to control the judgment in the whole, case, and on the sufficiency of any other point decided to affirm the judgment, even if the federal question was erroneously decided. •</p>

<p>ERROR TO TH3Í SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>Motioks to dismiss os to . AKFiRM. The case is stated in ihe opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION IN OPINION FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW •YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the bonds sued upon by the plaintiff in error are void. Upon questions similar to the issues in this suit .the decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of a state are entitled to great, and ordinarily decisive weight. There being on the face of the bonds sue<;l upon an entire want of power to issue them, no reference need be made to the doctrine-ttf estoppel.

This was a petition to quiet title, filed January 27, 1882, in the district court for Lancaster County in the State of Nebraska, by Little and more than seventy others against Giles, Burr and Wheeler, and the children of Jacob Dawson.

Held: That the subject matter of the cross-bill was germane to that of the original bill. The statutes of Illinois, relating to suits by infants, are not to be interpreted to mean that no suit in the name of an infant, by next friend, can be entertained, unless such next friend is selected by the infant.

<p>APPEAL FBOM THE CIECUIT COUET OF THE UNITED STATES FOE THE WESTEEN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>In equity. Decree dismissing the bill. The plaintiffs appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>