Volume 146 — United States Reports

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892), was a United States Supreme Court case decided on October 17, 1892. The case concerned a law passed in Michigan which divided the state into separate congressional districts and awarded one of the state's electoral votes to the winner of each district. The suit was filed by several of these electors chosen in the 1892 election, including William McPherson, against Robert R. Blacker, the Secretary of State of Michigan. It was the first Supreme Court case to consider whether certain methods of states' appointments of their electors were constitutional. The Court, in a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice Melville Fuller, upheld Michigan's law, and more generally gave state legislatures plenary power over how they appointed their electors.

This was an action of detinue brought November 8, 1886, in the Circuit Court of Bullock County, Alabama, by E. Yan Winkle and W. W. Boyd, copartners as E. Yan Winkle & Co., against Canty Crowell, to recover certain machinery belonging to and constituting a cotton-seed oil mill. The plaintiffs being citizens of Georgia and the defendant a citizen of Alabama, the suit was removed by the latter into the Circuit Court of the United States for the’ Middle District of Alabama.

Held: that the writ was not sued out or taken before July 1, 1891, and that it must be dismissed. . This was a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction' of the court below depended solely upon the diverse citizenship of the parties, and the writ of error was not sued out until July 3, 1891.

Motion to dismiss. The motion, entitled in the cause, was as follows: • “ Charles Soby, defendant in the cause above entitled, moves the court to dismiss the writ of error therein, for want of jurisdiction in this court to hear and determine the same. “This is a suit between two citizens of Connecticut, brought October 9, 1890, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Connecticut. by said Charles Soby against said Charles C.

Held: That the notices of the meetings in March were sufficient; (2) That, in view of the neglect of the importer to make any provision for the case being taken up in his absence, and of his clerk to appear and ask for a further postponement of the hearing, the court could not say that the appraisers acted unreasonably in proceeding ex parte, and in imposing the additional duties without awaiting his return.

This case arose out of the importation of certain stained glass windows containing effigies of saints and other representations of biblical subjects.

<p>APPEAL FROM 'THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES .FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

William D. Cross was found guilty for the second time upon an indictment, for murder in the - Supreme Court of the District of Columbia holding a criminal term and sentenced to death, the time of his execution being fixed for January 22, 1892.

Held: That N. had been guilty of laches and that the suit was brought too late; (-2) That the court would not entertain a bill to vindicate an abstract principle of justice, or to compel the defendants to buy their peace.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>error to the circuit court oe the united states for the SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: That no motion to exclude the deposition, or any part of it, having been made in the Supreme Court before decision, and it not appearing in the record that the Supreme Court in -giving its decision passed upon the question-of its admissibility, there was nothing in that decision to review in that regard; (2) That the action of the court on the motion for a rehearing presented no question for review by this court;…

Held: that this was reversible error. Dying declarations are admissible on a trial for murder as to the fact of the homicide and -the person by whom it was committed, in favor of the defendant. In this case, a few hours after the commission of the act, and while the wounded man was perfectly conscious,- the attending physician informed him that the chances were all against him, and that there was no show for Mm.

<p>In error to a state court, although it may not appear from the opinion of the court of original jurisdiction-, or from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State, that; either court formally passed upon any question of a Federal nature, yet, if the necessary effect of the decree was to determine, adversely to the plaintiff in error, rights and immunities in ' proceedings in bankruptcy, claimed by him in the. pleadings and proof, the jurisdiction of this 'court may be invoked on the ground that a right or immunity, specially' set up and claimed under the Constitution or authority of the United States, has been denied by the judgment sought to be reviewed.</p> <p>A bankrupt who purchases from his assignee in bankruptcy real estate to which he held the legal title at the time of the assignment is not thereby discharged from an obligation to account to a third party- for an interest in the land as defined- in a declaration of trust by thé bankrupt, made before the bankruptcy, but taxes title subject to that claim. ,</p> <p>Whether such relations existed between the bankrupt and such third party as prevented him from acquiring such absolute title, discharged from all obligations .growing out of the declaration of trust, is not a Federal question.</p>

Held: that it is competent for the legislature, consistently with the contract-clause of the Constitution, to declare that a party, adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction, in a case ex contractu, to pay a given sum with interest' until paid, at the rate then established, shall not be required to perform that judgment in all of its parts,' but may go acquitted ■ by paying less interest than that so fixed' both by…

<p>APPEAL EROM THE CIRCUIT' COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POE THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OP GEORGIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183 (1892), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the Extradition Clause allows a state to kidnap a fugitive residing in another state and forcibly return them to a state for a valid trial.

•APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS. On December 19, 1870, the firm of Harris & S.totesbury appealed to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for. the ■refunding of $67,385.85, internal revenue taxes claimed to have been erroneously assessed and collected from them. This claim was examined and rejected and notice thereof given to the claimants. An application for a rehearing was made and. sustained.

Held: requiring a foreign corporation, before doing business in the State, to file with the secretary of state a copy of its charter, with a resolution authorizing service of process to be made on any officer or agent engaged in its business within the State, and' agreeing to be subject to, all the provisions .of the statute, one of which is that the corporation shall not remove any suit from a court of the State into the…

<p>APPEAL EBOM THE SUPREME COUBT OE THE’DISTRICT OE COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The Washington and Georgetown Railroad Company filed its bill in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on October 23, 1884, against the District of Columbia and the Commissioners of the District, alleging that it was a corporation duly organized under the act of Congress'in that behalf;that under the act'of Congress of February 21, 1871, entitled “ Án act to provide a government for the District of- Columbia,” (16 Stat. 419,) the legislative assembly of the District passed an act, August-23, 1871, entitled-“An act imposing a license on trades, business and professions practised or carried on in the District of Columbia,” the twenty-sixth paragraph of the twenty-first section of which was in the words and figures following, to wit:</p> <p>“ The proprietors of hacks, cabs and- omnihuses, and street cars and other vehicles for transporting passengers for hire, shall pay annually as follows: Hacks and carriages, ten dollars ; one-horse cabs, six dollars; omnibuses, ten dollars; street cars, six dollars, or other vehicles capable of carrying ten passengers or more at one time, ten dollars.”</p> <p>And the fourth section, (omitting a proviso,) was.as follows: “That every person liable for licénse tax, who, failing to pay the same within thirty, days after the same has become due and payable, for such neglect shall, in addition to the license tax imposed, pay. a fine or penalty of not-less than five nor more than 'fifty dollars, and a like fine or penalty for every subsequent offence.” (Law’s Dist. Col. 1871, 1872, 1873, ,pp. 87;. 88, 97.)</p> <p>The bill further averred that, 'in • pursuance and execution of the provisions of said act, “the municipal authorities of the District of Columbia have at various times harassed and annoyed,'and still continue to harass, and annoy the officers and agents of the complainant in the discharge of their duties to the complainant and in their efforts to comply’ with the peremptory requirements of the charter of the company; and unless the said defendants shall be restrained by the injunction of this court they will probably continue to annoy and harass the said officers and agents,”</p> <p>It wras then alleged that at some time prior to August 28, 1877, the Commissioners of the District presented to the police court an information alleging violation of the act or ordinance, and seeking to have fines imposed upon the company for failure'to pay the license tax, and the court adjudged the complainant guilty and imposed a fine, from which judgment an appeal was taken to the Criminal Court of the' District, where the information was dismissed; that the judgment of the Criminal Court was final, and that no appeal could be taken therefrom; that afterwards, and some time' prior to April, 1882, another information with like charges and allegations was presented to the police court, upon which a like judgment was rendered and a like fine imposed; that from this judgment also an appeal was taken to the Criminal Court, and on April 4,1882, the information was dismissed by the District authorities.</p> <p>The bill also stated that on September 20, 1884, the municipal authorities caused two informations to be presented to the police court, each containing like charges and allegations as before, one of them being intended to cover the period from July 1, 1883, to July 1, 1884, and the other the period from July 1, 1884, to September 20, 1884, each of the informations complaining of the use by complainant of about one hundred street cars without having paid license therefor; that these two cases are now pending and undecided in the police court, “but the said municipal authorities threaten to proceed to judgment, and the complainant fears that said court will again render judgment against it and impose burdénsome and harassing fines upon it and issue harassing,and unlawful writs by way of execution of its judgment.” Copies of the informations accompanied and were made parts of the bill.</p> <p>The bill charged the invalidity of the license tax in question for various reasons therein set forth, and, among others, upon the ground of the repeal of the act of the legislative assembly, so far as stock corporations were concerned, by certain designated acts of Congress.</p> <p>The bill then alleged: “ That the complainant is now and has been* during the year 1884 running one hundred and six cars (106), sixty-four (64) of which are two-horse and forty-two (42) of which are one-horse cars. The complainant has always insisted that said tax was unlawful, and has refused to pay it ever since July, 1876, and if it shall be held to be a lawful tax the amount which would probably be computed and charged against the complainant by the said municipal authorities would, reach nearly, if not quite, the sum of fifty-two hundred dollars, besides interest, fines and penalties.”</p> <p>Complainant thereupon averred that unless the defendants were enjoined, irreparable injury to its business would result; that it was without adequate remedy at law; and that .inasmuch as the criminal court had decided adversely to the municipal authorities, “complainant ought to be protected from multiplicity of suits and harassing and annoying writs.”</p> <p>The prayers were for process, and for an injunction “ from prosecuting the said, actions in the said police court, or either of them, and also from instituting-any other like actions for like purposes in said court, and also from attempting in any manner, directly or indirectly, to collect said license tax mem tioned and described in the said twenty-sixth (26) paragraph of section twenty-one (21) of the said act of the legislative assembly of the District of Columbia, approved August 23, 1871, and also from charging up or entering upon the books of said municipal corporation against the complainant any sum or sums on account of said license tax,” and for general relief.</p> <p>The defendants demurred, and on November 23, 1886, the Supreme Court in special term rendered judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the-bill with costs. The demurrer. was decided by the special term upon the merits, and the validity of the • tax sustained. On appeal to the Supreme Court in general term, that court, without considering the merits, affirmed' the decree below dismissing the bill upon the ground that it was brought for the purpose of enjoining quasi criminal proceedings, and hence was beyond the jurisdiction of a court of equity. G Mackey, 570.</p> <p>From this decree an appeaFwas allowed to this court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>.This was an action to recover an alleged excess of duties exacted upon importations of dental rubber into the port of New York in 1885,</p> <p>The duty was assessed under the paragraph of Schedule N, of section 2502 of the Revised Statutes, as reenacted by the act of March 3, 1883, which reads: “ Articles composed of india-rubber, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, twenty-five per centum ad valorem.” 22 Stat. 488, 513, c. 121.</p> <p>The substance of the protests is stated in the record as follows: “ Upon certain ‘ india-rubber in sheets,’ claiming said goods to be entitled to free entry under the provisions in the free list for ‘india-rubber’ crude, act March 3, 1883; or, second, if deemed not crude, it is nevertheless not a manufactured ‘ article of rubber ’ in the meaning of the law, but is entitled to free entry under the proviso of sec. 2499 of said act as crude ; or, third, at no more than ’20% ad val., as a partially manufactured, non-enumerated article, under sec. 2513, áct March 3,1883, (see sec. 23.d, act March 2,1861, as to rubber in sheets,) and not at 25 % ad val. as charged by you.”</p> <p>■. The proviso of section 2499, and section 2513, thus referred • to, are:</p> <p>“Provided, That non-enumerated articles similar in material and quality and texture, and the use to which they may be applied, to articles on the free list, and in the manufacture of which no dutiable materials are used, shall be free.” 22 Stat. 491.</p> <p>. “ Sec. 2513. There' shall be levied, collected and paid on the importation of all raw or unmanufactured articles, not herein enumerated or provided for, a duty of ten per centum ad valorem; and all articles manufactured, in whole or in part, not herein enumerated or provided for, a duty of twenty per centum ad valorern.” 22 Stat. 523.</p> <p>Section 23 of the act of March 2, 1861, (12 Stat. 195, c. 68,) the free list, contains this item: “ India-rubber, in bottles, slabs or sheets, unmanufactured.”</p> <p>The paragraph of Schedule N of section 2502 of’ the act of March 3, 1883, under which the collector proceeded, is one of three, reading as follows :</p> <p>“ India-rubber fabrics, composed wholly or in part of indiarubber, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act, thirty per centum ad valorem.</p> <p>“ Articles composed of india-rubbet, not specially enumer-, ated or provided for in this act, twenty-five per centum ad valorem.</p> <p>“ India-rubber boots and shoes, twenty-five per centum ad valorem.”</p> <p>In the free list (section 2503) is to be found : “ India-rubber, crude and milk of.” p. 519.</p> <p>Upon the trial various exhibits of crude rubber, washed rubber, dental rubber and dental plates, were put in evidence, and the proofs established that these importations were' dental rubber, which was commercially so known and fit for dental purposes only. •</p> <p>It further appeared that dental rubber was crude rubber put through a masticator by which it was torn up and shredded into a state of pulp, sulphur and coloring matter added, and the mass rolled into sheets, cut into proper sizes and backed with linen to- prevent the pieces from sticking together; that the heat of the mill, or masticator, was not a vulcanizing heat, but sufficient to render the rubber elastic. The Circuit Court, Lacombe, J., refused to direct the jury to find for the plaintiff, but on the contrary directed a verdict for the defendant. There was a verdict and judgment accordingly, and plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The opinion of Judge Lacombe will be found in 37 Fed: Eep. 197.</p>

Held: on the evidence sét forth in the bill of exceptions, that the Avord “bonnet” in the act of March 3, 1883, was not sufficiently broad to cover the goods in question, unless it was made so by having affixed to it at the time Congress passed the act some peculiar, technical, trade meaning, Avhich coupled it, in the minds of' the legislator’s, with those particular goods or goods similar to them; and that there was no…

ORIGINAL. This was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The application was made by "William Douglass Cross, a person indicted and convicted of murder in the District of Columbia. Some previous movements in' this case had been before the court in Cross v. United States,• 145 TJ. S. 571, and Cross v. BurTce, ante, 82.

. This was an action brought in the Superior Court of Halifax County, North Carolina, by the Wilmington and Weldon Eailroad Company, to restrain the sheriff of that'county from collecting certain taxes assessed on so much of a branch road of the plaintiff, known as the Scotland Neck branch, as lay therein, and on that part of the plaintiff’s road which formerly constituted the Halifax and Weldon Eailroad, and the rolling stock used with said roads.

Held: (1.) The decision and award of the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims was conclusive as to the amount to. be paid on the . claim, but not as to the party entitled to receive it; and the claim was property which passed to the assignee in insolvency, under the assignment to him, although it was made prior to the decís-. ion of the Court of Commissioners; (2.) The claim and its proceeds were assets within the…

This was a petition to the Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The facts were stated by this court as follows:. On the 30th day of May, a.d. 1892, the appellant, Edward W. Hallinger, presented a petition to the Circuit Court of the United States.for the District of New Jersey, wherein, and in a copy of the record of the proceedings in the Court of.

.ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS. The plaintiff in error, Benson, was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, jointly with one Mary Bautzahn, for a murder alleged to have been committed at the Fort Leavenworth Military Beservation, within that district, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

Held: that “they admit of no doubt that all which could under .the law become the property of the United States or could be sold by virtue of a decree of condemnation and order of sale, was a right to the property seized, terminating with the life of the person for whose act it had been seized.” This decision was rendered at the December term, 1869, of this court.

Motion to dismiss. On behalf of the motion it was stated that the suit was originally brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Ohio, by the Adelbert College against •the Toledo, Wabash and Western Eailroad Company and other defendants, including the plaintiffs appellants; that on the 2d of December, 1890, petitions for its -.removal to the Circuit Court of the United States were filed by each of the. present appellants on the ground that, “ from prejudice or…

ORIGINAL. No number. The petitioner filed her petition in this court, making the following averments: I. That theretofore, on the 25th day of September, 1891, The Myers Excursion and Navigation Company filed its petition in the District Court of the United States, as owners of the barge Pepublic, for a limitation of liability, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked Exhibit A, and the usual monition was ordered by said District Court. II.

Held: that the approval of a commissioner’s account by a Circuit Court of the United States, under the act of February. 22, 1875, 18 Stat. 333 , c. 95, regulating'fees.and costs, was prima facie evidence of the correctness of its items, and “in the absence of clear and unequivocal proof of mistake on the part of the court it should be conclusive.” That case is not decisive of the present one, because it appears that the…

Held: That the deed from Balloch to Hooper of February 25, 1880, was given to better secure Balloch’s indebtedness to the Life Insurance Company (2) That that company believed in good faith that Hooper was authorized, as holder of the legal title of record, to raise money on the property, and secure its payment by deed of trust; (3) That there was nothing in the relations between Hooper and Balloch which would prevent the…

Held: that there was substantial error in this proceeding and the judgment of guilty must be reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. A. H. Garland and Mr. H. J. May for plaintiff in error. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for defendant in error.

This was a bill in equity for the infringement of letters patent number 224,923, issued February 24,1880, to Joseph "W. Kenna, for a new and useful improvement in a combined child’s chair and carriage.

Held: that, under that state of things, the terms of the charter-party constituted the implied agreement of the parties in the actual use made of the vessel, in everything except-as to the disputed clauses; that neither party could found any claim against the other upon the clauses which the other always refused to accept, because, in the face of such refusal, no agreement to those clauses could be implied; that the…

Held: in terms excludes equity causes therefrom, and the jurisprudence of the United States has always recognized the distinction between law and equity as under the Constitution matter of substance, as well as of form and procedure, and, accordingly, legal and equitable claims cannot be blended together in one suit in the Circuit Courts of the United States, nor are equitable defences.permitted.

This action was brought under an act of the legislature- of the State of New Jersey, to recover damages for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, caused by the neglect of the defendant. The facts claimed to be established were substantially ■these.

APPEAL PROM THE QIRCUIT • COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP MISSOURI. This was a bill to restrain the infringement of letters patent No. 224,991, granted to Alexander W.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ’ THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The case is, stated in the opinion.</p>

321, 0.1A9, to prevent the unlawful occupancy of public lands.

Held: that the decree of June 9, 1885, was not a final judgment. If a court make a decree fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties and thereupon refer the case to a master for a ministerial' purpose only, and no further proceedings in court are contemplated, the decree is final;' but if it refer the case to him as a subordinate coui't, and for a judicial purpose, the decree is not final.

Held: in a contest between two railroad companies, that no formal selection was necessary to give them to the one having the older grant, as against the other company. St. Paul & Pacific Railroad v. Northern Pacific Railroad, 139 U. S. 1 .

Held: that the bank was. entitled to recover the proceeds from M. The bank had a lien upon, and a pledge, of, all the cattle. The transfer of the bill of lading was a transfer of the ownership of the cattle covered by it. There was a verbal mortgage or pledge to the bank of the two car loads, and G. represented P., and through him the bank.

Held: there was no evidence admitted or offered which sufficed, to sustain the allegation that the transactions between Harper and Preston & McHenry were of a gambling character. Hence, if those allegations had been permitted to stand in Lloyd’s answer, there was no evidence to support them, and he was not injured by the order of the court in striking them out.

Held: that this was broad enough to sustain the decree, irrespective of the decision of a Federal question, if any such arose.

Held: that the question whether due faith and credit were thefeby denied to the judgment was a Federal question, of which this court had- jurisdiction on writ of error.

Held: that the defendant could not set up the failure to make the mortgage as invalidating the assignment.