Volume 155 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The plaintiffs, Charles S. Faber, M.D., and Karen M. Faber (collectively, plaintiffs), appeal from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Francine A. McVay, Wickford Insurance Agency, Inc., Lauren Albright, Mastors & Servant, Ltd., Judith Gordon, and Marketing Associates Insurance Agency, Inc. (collectively, defendants), on the plaintiffs' claims of insurance malpractice. The Superior Court granted summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the limitation period was tolled under the discovery rule found in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-14.1(2). The Supreme Court held that the operative date of discovery for purpose of § 9-1-14.1(2) is the date that the plaintiffs discovered or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the wrongful conduct of the tortfeasor, as opposed to the date when damages were incurred as a result of the alleged wrongful conduct. The Court was satisfied that the plaintiffs should have discovered the alleged insurance malpractice through updates that were sent in December 2002 and February 2006 that the plaintiffs declined to read. Therefore, the Court determined that the three-year limitation period had elapsed before the plaintiffs filed their action in August 2009. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court

This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, which certified a question to the Supreme Court in accordance with Article I, Rule 6(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. The certified question reads as follows: "Does Section 28-5-7(6) of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act, R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq. ('FEPA'), provide for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer and, if so, under what circumstances?" The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that G.L. 1956 § 28-5-7(6) does not provide for the individual liability of an employee of a defendant employer. The Court remanded the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island for further proceedings.

The petitioners, the Preservation Society of Newport County and Newport Catering, Inc., d/b/a Glorious Affairs, Ltd., sought review of a decision of the respondent, the City Council of the City of Newport (the Council), denying two jointly filed applications for victualing licenses. On appeal, the petitioners contended that the Council impermissibly relied upon zoning considerations as its basis for denying their applications for victualing licenses they further argued that, pursuant to the Code of Ordinances of the City of Newport, the Council was required to consider only health and/or safety issues in deciding whether to issue or deny the licenses. The Supreme Court, after a careful review of the entire record, held that the Council in 2014 failed to provide factual findings and legal grounds to support its decision denying the petitioners' applications for victualing licenses. That Council was also in derogation of its responsibilities for its failure to have pointed to any meaningful evidence in the record of health and/or safety concerns—which are, pursuant to § 5.72.020 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Newport, required to be the focus of such licensing decisions. Accordingly, the Court directed the present Council to issue victualing licenses to petitioners forthwith, absent any compelling evidence of significant health and/or safety issues.

The defendant, Nigel Nichols, appealed his Superior Court convictions for two counts of first-degree murder, one count of felony assault, and three counts of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. All charges stemmed from the senseless and inexplicable shootings of David Thomas, Domingo Ortiz, and Dwayne Thomas on December 6, 2009, which resulted in the deaths of David Thomas and Domingo Ortiz. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in admitting certain evidence at trial and in denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. In addition, the Supreme Court also concluded that the trial justice's findings with respect to a peremptory challenge were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

The defendant, Michael Giard, appealed from an adjudication of a violation of a deferred sentence. On appeal, the defendant contended that "the hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously" in determining: (1) "that Mr. Giard touched [the complaining witness] inappropriately" and (2) "that Mr. Giard assaulted [the complaining witness] in reasonable proximity to April of 2010" because, in the defendant's view, neither determination was supported by the evidence. The defendant further argued that the hearing justice erred in finding the complaining witness's testimony to be credible and in overlooking inconsistencies among the testimonies of the complaining witness and that of her mother and her aunt with respect to when various events took place. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the credibility of the witnesses or in adjudicating the defendant to be a violator of his deferred sentence. The Court reasoned that the hearing justice's determinations were based on a plausible foundation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The appellant, Lend Lease (US) Construction (Lend Lease), appealed from the January 13, 2016 grant of summary judgment to the third-party defendant, Rossi Electric Company, Inc. (Rossi), in Newport County Superior Court. It further appealed from the denial of its cross-motion for summary judgment. Lend Lease contended that the hearing justice erred in granting Rossi's motion for summary judgment and in denying Lend Lease's motion for summary judgment due to the fact that Rossi was required to defend and indemnify Lend Lease under the terms of the contract between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the plain and unambiguous language of the contract at issue did not require Rossi to indemnify and defend Lend Lease if Lend Lease was the sole negligent party. The Court further held that, because the issue of which parties in the case were negligent was an issue of fact, it was error for the Superior Court to have granted Rossi's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case to that tribunal for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion.