Volume 161 — United States Reports

This was an action of assumpsit brought by the Hartford Deposit Company against the Chemical National Bank of Chicago and the receiver of the bank in the Superior Court of Cook County to recover damages for a failure to pay rent alleged to be due, under a written lease, from August 1, 1893, to April 30, 1894.

<p>APPEAL. FROM THE CIRCUÍT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>This was a bill in equity, filed January 20, 188V, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, by George Schild against George E. Belknap, Joseph Feaster, Christopher C. Wolcott, and Jesse Diamond, for an infringement of letters patent granted by the United States to the plaintiff on October 23,1883, for an improvement in caisson gates.</p> <p>The bill alleged that the defendants, with full knowledge and in violation of the plaintiff’s exclusive right, manufactured and used, and intended to continue to use, such caisson gates in the State of California; and that he had brought an action in the same court against the Union Iron Works of San Francisco, and on the trial of that action, and after he had waived other than nominal damages, recovered a verdict in the sum of one dollar, in August, 1886, and the validity of his patent and the-fact of infringement were thereby established.</p> <p>The bill prayed that the defendants be decreed to account for and pay over to the plaintiff all such gains and profits as had or might have accrued to them from purchasing or making or using such improved caisson gates; that any further damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the defendants’ infringement be assessed and ordered to be paid; that the defendants be restrained by injunction from making or using caisson gates containing the patented improvement; that the caisson gates, containing that improvement, and so manufactured, or purchased or in any manner obtained by the defendants, and n'oW in their possession, be destroyed or delivered up to the plaintiff; and for further relief.</p> <p>The defendants filed a plea to the whole bill, (called in the record-a “plea in abatement,”) alleging that the court “ought not to take cognizance of or sustain the aforesaid action,” for that the defendant Belknap was a commodore in the United States Navy, and commandant of the United States Navy Yard at Mare Island, California; that the defendants Wolcott, Feaster and Diamond were, respectively, a civil engineer in the Navy, an assistant naval constructor in the Navy, and an employé of the United States at Mare Island; that the only caisson gate which either of the defendants had any relation with, control over, or use of, within the State of California, ,was one constructed, manufactured and used by the government of the United- States and for their usa and benefit at the navy .yard at Mare Island, and was there built by the Union IroD Works, in pursuance of plans and specifications furnished by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, a board in the naval service of the United States, and was delivered by the Union iron Works to the United States, and used by the United States in the dry dock of that navy yard; and that neither the defendants, nor either of them, made or constructed the caisson gate in question, or used it for their own use and benefit, or ever had, or pretended to have, any interest in or claim upon it; but that they only operated and used it as the officers, servants and employés of the United States, ás a part of the navy yard, and for public uses of the United States, in the exercise of their sovereign and constitutional powers.</p> <p>The Attorney (General of the United States, appearing for this purpose only, filed a suggestion, (called in the record a “ plea to the jurisdiction,”) in which he stated that the caisson gate in question was planned and constructed by. the United States, and ever since its construction had been in the possession, control and use of the United States at the navy yard at Mare Island, and was' operated at the dry dock in the navy yard for naval purposes and the public defence, in the building and repairing of ships for the Navy of the United States; that the United States, through their officers and agents, charged with the possession, control and operation of that navy yard, had at all times been in possession, control and operation of the caisson gate as public property of the United States, for public uses, in the exercise of their sovereign and constitutional powers; and that the defendants, and each of them, never had anything to do with the construction, use or operation of the gate, or made any claim of right, title, possession, control or use of it, other than as officers and agents of the United States, and in obedience to orders of the naval department of. the government; and therefore, “ without submitting the rights of the United States to the jurisdiction of the court, but insisting that the court has no jurisdiction of the controversy, for that the said caisson gate and its use now is and at all times has been the property of the United States,” moved that the bill be dismissed, and all proceedings stayed and set aside.</p> <p>The case having been submitted to the court upon the plea of the deféndants, and the suggestion of the Attorney General, both were overruled.</p> <p>The defendants, Belknap, Feaster, "Wolcott and Diamond, then filed an answer,-admitting the grant of the .letters patent, denying the infringement, setting forth affirmatively the matters stated in their former plea, and alleging that neither these defendants nor the United States were parties to the action brought by the plaintiff against the Union Iron Works, or estopped by the judgment therein.</p> <p>A general replication was filed; and evidence was taken, by which it appeared that the validity of the plaintiff’s patent, and its infringement by the defendants* were subjects of conflicting testimony; that Mare Island and the works and dock thereon, including the caisson gate, belonged to the United States, and were held and occupied for them by their officers and employés;■ that the defendants respectively held the positions stated in their former, plea, and had no interest in the caisson gate, and nothing to do with it beyond operating it under the direction of the United States; that the gate was built in 1884, without ^ny agreement or license of the plaintiff, by the Union Iron "Works under its contract with the United States, and according to. plans and specifications furnished by the Bureau of Yards and Docks, and "Wolcott simply inspected the materials and workmanship; as the work progressed, to see if they were according to the contract; and that the gate had since been used by the United States, as part of- the dock in the navy yard aforesaid.</p> <p>After a hearing upon pleadings and proofs, the court made an interlocutory decree, adjudging that the patent was valid, and had been infringed by the defendants ; referring the case to a master, to take an account of the number of caisson gates made or used by the defendants, or either of them, in violation of the patent, and also of the gains, profits and advantages, arising or accruing to the defendants or either of them, and of the damages sustained by the plaintiff'; and ordering a perpetual injunction against the defendants and each of them, “ and their and each of their agents, servants, clerks and workmen, and all persons claiming or holding under or through them or either of them.”</p> <p>The master reported that one caisson gate to the dock in the navy yard at Mare Island, for the making and using of which the defendants had been adjudged to have infringed the plaintiff’s patent, had been made upon plans furnished by the plaintiff and modified by the government officials, and put in use in 1884; that the. cost of this gate was $60,000, and. the cost of the cheapest practicable gate, constructed on any other plan known to the defendants, would be at least $100,000, and therefore the gains, profits and advantages, which had arisen and accrued to the defendants from infringing the. plaintiff’s patent, amounted to $40,000 ; and that no damages, in addition to such gains, profits and advantages, had been proved.</p> <p>The court overruled exceptions taken by the defendants to the master’s report, confirmed his report, and- entered a final decree for the plaintiff for the sum of $40,000, with interest and costs. The defendants appealed to this court.</p>

Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court dealing with the concept of obscenity. In a decision written by Justice Harlan, the Court upheld the conviction of the defendant to 13 months hard labor and a fine of $1 for allegedly using the United States Postal Service to send material that was deemed "obscene, lewd and lascivious".

<p>If, after the Secretary of the Interior has decided a contest as to the right of preSmption to public land in favor of one contestant, and has granted a rehearing, but before the rehearing is had, Congress passes an act confirming the entry of that contestant, and directing that a patent issue to him, and a patent is issued accordingly, a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the Secretary to proceed to adjudication of the contest.</p>

This was an action of assumpsit, brought April 22, 1890, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, by Hermann Fortlage and others, aliens, partners under the name of A. Tesdorpf & Company, against Charles O. Harrison and others, citizens of Pennsylvania, partners under the name of Harrison, Frazier & Company, upon a contract in writing for the purchase of 2500 tons of sugar.

This was a petition for the assignment and setting off of dower in lands in the county of Carbon and Territory of Wyoming, filed April 1, 1889, in' the district court for that county,, and alleging that the plaintiff on February 7, 1887, intermarried with James France, then and until his death a 'resident and citizen of that county and Territory ; that he died August 21,1888, intestate, leaving the plaintiff his widow, and having been seized, during the marriage, of an…

Held: that a claim of no fixed amount, nor time or mode of payment; a claim which has *78 never received the assent of the person against whom it . is asserted, and which remains to be settled by negotiation or suit at law, can be so assigned as to give the assignee an equitable right to prevent the original parties from compromising or adjusting the claim on any terms that may suit them.” “We have no hesitation .in…

Held: that the defendant, having excepted to this instruction, and been convicted of murder, was entitled to a new trial.

This was an action brought by James Callaghan against the Union Pacific Railway Company, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado, to recover damages for injuries received by him through the alleged negligence of defendant.

This was a bill filed by the Western Union Telegraph Company January 2, 1891, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas against William M. Fishback, Henry B. Armistead, and Charles B. Mills, constituting the board of railroad commissioners for the State of Arkansas, and some forty-seven clerks of different counties in the State, in which complainant had lines of telegraph, alleging that the complainant was a corporation and citizen of New…

<p>PETITION FOR A REHEARING.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: and the court remarked : “ It can make' no difference if the plaintiff in execution is the purchaser, because, the question is not one of notice, but of the status of the execution.” In Steele v. Tutwiler, 68 Alabama, 107, 110, the Supreme Court of Alabama referred to Morgan v. Evans, 72 Illinois, 586, which ruled that an execution was not void but voidable where it issued on a dormant judgment after the time…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was a bill filed by Carey, a citizen and resident of New Jersey, and seven other persons, citizens and residents of New York and citizens of Great Britain, respectively, as stockholders of the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated, in ‘the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas, against the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, No. 1, a corporation created by and existing under the laws of the State of Texas and a citizen of that State, residing in the Eastern District; the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, No. 2, likewise a citizen of Texas and a resident of the eastern district; the Central Trust Company of New York, a citizen of New York; the Farmers, Loan and Trust Company of New York, as trustee, a citizen of New York; Nelson S. Easton and James Rintoul, as trustees, citizens, and residents of New York ; Benjamin A. Shepherd, trustee, a citizen of Texas; and many other persons and corporations, citizens of New York, Kentucky, Texas, and Louisiana ; to impeach and vacate a certain decree of the Circuit. Coürt éntered in the consolidated cause hereafter mentioned.</p> <p>The Houston, and Texas Central Railway Company was a corporation -and citizen of the State of Texas and a resident of the Eastern District of that State, owning a railway consisting of a main line from Houston to Dennison; a line from Hempstead to Austin, called the "Western Division; and a line from Bremond to Ross, known as the Waco and Northwest,ern Division; and a large quantity of lands acquired from the State. The property of the company was subject to the lien of seven mortgages, known as the Main Line first mortgage, Western. Division first mortgage, Waco and Northwestern Division first mortgage, Main Line and Western Division consolidated mortgage, Waco and Northwestern Division consolidated mortgage, Income and Indemnity mortgage, and General mortgage. The company made default January 1, 1885, in the payment of interest on its Main Line first mortgage bonds and its Western Division first mortgage bonds. On February 11, 1885, Nelson S. Easton, and James Rintoul, citizens and residents of the State of New York, trustees under the Main Line first mortgage and Western Division first mortgage, filed their two bills in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District' of Texas against the Houston and/ Texas Central Railway Company as a corporation and citizen of the State of Texas for the purpose of enforcing the trust provided in the mortgages, protecting the trust property, obtaining proceedings for the sale of certain lands covered by the mortgages, and for other relief; and prayed for an accounting, an injunction, a decree of sale of part of the trust property, and for a receiver. These suits were numbered 183 and 181 on the equity docket. The railway company appeared and answered these bills.</p> <p>On February 16, 1885, the Southern Development Company, a corporation organized under the laws of California and a citizen and resident of that State, in its own behalf and in behalf of all other persons similarly situated, who might intervene iu the suit to protect their own interests, filed its bill of complaint in the Circuit Court against the railway company as a corporation organized under the laws of Texas, alleging among other things that it was a creditor of the defendant for large sums advanced for supplies, labor, operating and managing expenses, and other necessary expenses, which defendant had promised to pay out of its earnings; that the indebtedness was in equity a charge upon defendant’s income and property; that there had been a diversion of the income and that by reason thereof a lien had resulted in complainant’s favor which it was entitled to have enforced. The bill alleged the absolute insolvency of the railway company and that loss and injury would be occasioned by a sale of the property in parcels, and prayed for the appointment of receivers and the payment of complainant’s claim out of the rents, revenues, and earnings of the property. The railway company appeared in this, suit, which was numbered 185, and on February 20, 1885, an order was made by the Circuit Court appointing Benjamin Gf. Clark and Charles Dillingham joint receivers of all the property, real and personal, of said company. On the succeeding twentieth of April, the Southern Development Company amended its bill, making Nelson S. Easton and James Rintoul, trustees; the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, a corporation and citizen of the State of New York; and Benjamin A. Shepherd, trustee, under the Income and Indemnity mortgage, a citizen of Texas and a resident of the Eastern District of that State, defendants thereto, and praying that accounts might be taken, liens and incumbrances marshalled, net earnings applied, and if the amounts realized should not be sufficient for the payment of the claim, that the property should be sold for that purpose. The railway company answered the bill on its merits, and the defendants Easton and Rintoul, trustees, filed demurrers.</p> <p>March 18, 1885, the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, a corporation and citizen of New York, filed its bill in equity in the Circuit Court against the railway company, which was numbered 188 on the equity docket, alleging that it was the trustee under the Waco and Northwestern Division first and consolidated mortgages, and the Main Line and Western Division consolidated mortgages; that the mortgagors had violated many of their agreements and that default had been made in the payment of interest; that the company was insolvent; that the suits hereinbefore mentioned were pending; that the trust property was in jéopardy ; and it prayed for an accounting, injunction and a decree of sale of part of the trust property and for a receiver of all the property of every description of the railway company, with the usual powers. The railway company answered this bill on the merits, June 22, 1885.</p> <p>The Circuit Court made three orders on May 7, 1885, in these cases: In No. 185, as to sales of lands and their proceeds, and directing the receivers to account; in Nos. 183 and 184, making that order applicable to those cases; and in No. 188, making the same order as to that case.</p> <p>January 21,1886, Easton and Rintoul, trustees in the two mortgages involved in Nos. 183 and 184, citizens of the State of New York, filed two other bills in equity for the foreclose ure and sale of the railway property covered by those mortgages; that to foreclose the Main Line first mortgage was numbered 198, and that to foreclose the Western Division first mortgage was numbered 199. In No. 198 complainants made the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company and Benjamin A. Shepherd, a citizen and resident of Texas, and trust.ee under the Income and Indemnity mortgage, defendants, and as to the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company averred that as trustees under the mortgages or deeds of trust, “ hereinafter described, that company would be found benefited by, and it is to their advantage that, the judgment and relief hereinafter prayed for, or some part thereof, should be granted to your orators. That said property covered by the said first mortgage on said main line, as well as all the other property, assets, and effects of said railway company, being now in the hands of this court, by the receivership existing in respect of the same, and your orators thereby being required by law to institute this action in this court and to come before this tribunal, in order to reach the property in its possession, and to obtain its rights concerning the same, and all the parties interested in the property covered by said mortgage on the main line, as well as all the other mortgages and property of said railway company, being now before the court in said actions hereinbefore described as Nos. 183, 184, 185, and 188, on the equity docket of this court, the said Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company may and should be made a party defendant in this cause irrespective of its citizenship. And said corporation should be brought in as a defendant herein by the order and direction of this court, and should be bound by the judgment and proceedings herein.”</p> <p>The record does not show that this company was made a defendant or appeared at this stage of the proceedings.</p> <p>In No. 199 the same parties were joined as defendants and a like averment made as to the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company. Process was issued under both of these bills against the railway company and Shepherd, trustee, and duly served upon them. Thereafter, and on April 24, 1886, the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court for the foreclosure of the general mortgage, which was numbered 201. The railway company was made sole party defendant, and the bill prayed for a sale of all the property of the railway company to satisfy the mortgage - debt. Process was issued and served.</p> <p>On May 26, 1886, an order was entered by Mr. Justice Woods and the Circuit Judge in the six suits upon the mortgages, whereby it was ordered, adjudged and decreed that no further proceedings should be taken in causes Nos. 183, 184, and 188, without notice to the railway company, and that causes Nos. 198, 199, and 201 should be consolidated under No. 198, under the name and style of “Nelson S. Easton and James Eintoul, Trustees, and the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, Trustee, against The Houston and Texas Central Railway Company and Benjamin Shepherd, Trustee, consolidated cause; ” that, in said cause Easton and Eintoul should stand as complainants, as trustees under the mortgages made by the defendant railway company, dated respectively July 1, 1866, and December 21, 1870; that the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, expressly assenting thereto, should stand as complainant, as trustee under the mortgages made by the railway company, dated, respectively, June 16, 1873, October 1,1872, May 1,1875, and April 1,1881; that Shepherd should stand as defendant, as trustee under the mortgage made by the railway company, dated May 7, 1877; that the bills filed in causes Nos. 198,. 199, and 201 should stand as bills in the consolidated cause, and might be amended by either complainant, as it might be advised, and that any party might file an answer to any original or amended bill; and that in case any one or more of the bills filed by the complainants, in the causes consolidated, should be finally dismissed, the remaining bill or bills should continue to stand as the bill in such consolidated cause. On the same day an order was made in said •consolidated cause No. 198, appointing Nelson S. Easton, James Rintoul, and Charles Dillingham, receivers of all the property of the railway company, and directing Clark and Dillingham, as receivers in No. 185, to immediately transfer ■and deliver all said property to the receivers so appointed. May 27, 1886, and after the possession of all the property in •controversy had passed into the hands of Easton and Rintoul and Dillingham, as receivers, the court made a decree dismissing the bill of the Southern Development Company in No. 185 for want of equity, and declared and directed that “ all said property being now in the custody of the court, and such custody and control being continuous, the entry of this decree •shall operate ipso facto a transfer of the legal custody of said property from said Clark and Dillingham to the said receivers in No. 198.” Yarious amendments were subsequently filed.</p> <p>The railway company answered in consolidated cause No. 198, September 3, 1886. The Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company, though cocomplainant in the consolidated cause, answered the bills of Easton and Rintoul, trustees, August 2, 1886.</p> <p>On April 30, 1888, Shepherd, trustee, with leave of court, filed a cross-bill in No. 198 to foreclose the Income and Indemnity mortgage, and the railway company answered admitting the truth thereof. .</p> <p>On May 1, 1888, the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company filed bills in the nature of cross-bills, with leave of court, to foreclose the Main Line and Western Division consolidated mortgage and the Waco and Northwestern Division consolidated mortgage. The railway company answered these bills May 2, 1888, and the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company answered Shepherd’s cross-bill on the same day. All the mortgages were thus under foreclosure except the Waco and Northwestern Division first mortgage.</p> <p>On May 4,1888, the court made its decree of foreclosure and sale in consolidated cause No. 198. The property was sold under the decree September 8, 1888, at Galveston, Texas'. The property covered by the Waco and Northwestern Division first mortgage was purchased subject to that mortgage by George E. Downs for $25,000, and all the residue of the property of the railway company was sold to Frederick P. Olcott, president of the Central Trust Company, for $10,580,000. The sale was duly confirmed December 4, 1888.</p> <p>On December 23, 1889, Carey and others, as stockholders, of the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, filed their bill in the Circuit Court for.the vacation of said sale and decree; and an amended bill February 18, 1890. The contents of these pleadings are largely set forth in Carey v. Houston & Texas Railway, 150 U. S. 170. The gravamen of the bill was that the decree was entered through collusion and fraud.' Briefly, the bill alleged that prior to Í883, defendant. Huntington, who, with his associates, controlled the Southern Development Company, formed a syndicate with them for the purpos'd^of acquiring, in his own interest and in the interest of that company, and of the Southern Pacific Company, the control of the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company in such manner that the railway might be run solely in the interest of the syndicate and the Southern Pacific Company, the rights of the stockholders being effectually shut out and barred. The bill further alleged that in January, 1885, the holders of the first mortgage bonds presented their coupons for payment, and it was fraudulently contrived by Huntington and. his associates so that the coupons were cashed and secretly taken up by the Southern Development Company, without notice to the holders thereof; that thereupon that company commenced suit against the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company in the Circuit Court, and in February, 1885, the appointment of receivers was procured in that suit, the order being made with the consent of the railway company through its solicitors; that subsequently defendants Easton and Rintoul, trustees, filed, their bills in the Circuit Court for foreclosure, and the Farmers’ Loan and Trust Company filed its bill, which said bills were numbered 198,199, and 201, and the causes were by consent consolidated as No. 198; that the suit of the Southern Development Company was dismissed, and thereupon. receivers of the railway company were appointed in the consolidated cause, the company through their counsel consenting. It was also averred that in none of the mortgages was it provided that the failure to pay interest upon any of the bonds should be taken to precipitate the maturity of the principal, nor did they provide for nor permit the sale of the railway prior to the maturity of the principal of the bonds; and that the answer of the railway company in said suits expressly denied that the principal sum of the bonds had become due or demandable, and averred that the court had no power to decree a sale of the railway prior to the maturity thereof or prior to the sale of the lands covered by the mortgages.</p> <p>The bill then set up an agreement for the reorganization of the railway company, and .alleged that in pursuance thereof and of the scheme mapped out, complainants in the consolidated causes applied for and on consent procured to be entered the decree of May 4, 1888, for the foreclosure of the mortgages, and a sale of the property, and the sale followed accordingly.</p> <p>The bill charged that “ the said decree was and is absolutely invalid and void and beyond the power of the court to grant; that there was no foundation for said decree or jurisdiction in the court to award it, and that the same wag. entered by consent and agreement and without any investigation or adjudication by the court, but was the result of agreement simply, and was procured, as complainants allege on information and belief, by collusion'and fraud on the part of said Huntington and his associates and the directors and officers of said Houston and Texas Central Bailway Company, and was and is a part of the scheme to acquire possession of said railway in the interest of said Huntington gnd the said Southern Pacific Company without regard to the rights or interests of the holders. Of the stock of the said company No. 1 and in direct disregard of the provisions and terms of the mortgages; that the defences interposed that the principal of the mortgages had not become due and that the said railway could not be sold without a sale first of the lands and the other defences interposed were substantially abandoned and withdrawn as part of the said wrongful and fraudulent scheme herein referred to; that the said defences were never submitted to the court for adjudication or determination, nor was evidence heard or offered to sustain the same, but' the decree was the result of the agreement which the bondholders had made with the said Southern Pacific Company and Central Trust Company, and the rights of the stockholders were not considered or protected by any of the parties to the record in said cause, nor submitted to the court for adjudication or investigation, nor were the stockholders in any way advised or permitted to be informed of the transaction herein complained of.”</p> <p>It was further averred that the decree fixed no amount due, and no amount which the company was required to pay to redeem, and that it contradicted the provisions of the mortgages.</p> <p>The organization of a company styled the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, designated in the bill as No. 2, after possession under the sale was acquired, for the purpose of operating the railway, was then set up, and the terms on which the stockholders of the original company were informed September 1, 1889, they could participate in the new company, which required payment of an enormous and unnecessary assessment, and constituted an attempt to ■compel the stockholders of company No. 1 to turn over their ¡stock to Huntington and his associates, etc. The prayer of the bill was that the decree rendered by the court May 4, 1888, in the consolidated cause, be vacated and set aside and adjudged to be, fraudulent, collusive, illegal, and void, and that, complainants be permitted to intervene and become parties ■defendant in said suit, and be heard and defend the same; that the sale of the railway and lands of the Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, No. 1, under said decree be vacated and set aside, and the said railway and lands be-restored to the possession of the receivers; that defendants be enjoined temporarily and perpetually from delivering or recording any mortgage upon the property of the company referred to in said decree, and from issuing, alienating or parting with any of the shares of stock of the new or reorganized Houston and Texas Central Railway Company, No. 2, or any bonds secured by mortgage upon any property claimed to be possessed by said company, or any stock or bonds issued or intended to be issued pursuant to the reorganization agreement; and for general relief.</p> <p>The principal defendants at first demurred, and then answered the bill, denying the allegations upon which complainants sought to impeach the validity of the decree of the Circuit Court in the foreclosure proceedings and the other, transactions referred to. Complainants filed replications. A motion for an injunction pendente lite was denied. 45 Fed. Rep. 438.</p> <p>The cause came on for final hearing on the pleadings and proofs November 16, 1892, and the Circuit Court entered a final decree dismissing the bill as to all the defendants with costs. 52 Fed. Rep. 671.</p> <p>• Complainants prayed two appeals from this decree, one to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the other to this court. The appeals were allowed, citations issued and assignments of errors filed. On motion of appellees, the appeal to this court was dismissed November 13,1893. Carey v. Houston <& Texas Central Railway, 150 U. S. 170. The case on the appeal taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals was .heard by that court, Circuit Judge McCormick presiding, and on June 5, 1894, being one of the days of November term, 1893, a decree was rendered affirming the decree of the Circuit Court.</p> <p>May 2, 1895, a petition was presented to Circuit Judge McCormick, praying the allowance of an appeal from the decree to this court, which on the same day was allowed by an order in writing upon the petition, and at the same time a citation was signed, and a cost bond approved. The petition for appeal and the order allowing the same and the bond and an • assignment' of errors were all filed May 2, 1895, in the office of the clerk of the . Circuit Court of Appeals. The record was filed here June 4, 1895, and appellees now move to dismiss the.appeal.</p>

Held: first, that the owners of- shares of stock in the Bank of Commerce were thus liable for ad valorem taxes to the city of Memphis; and, second, that the bank was liable for ad valorem taxes to the city for the years 1892 to 1894, inclusive, on its surplus and undivided profits.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: does not transfer to the purchaser the franchise to be a corporation, but only the right to reorganize as a corporation, subject to the laws, constitutional and otherwise, existing at the time of the reorganization. Memphis & Little Rock Railroad v. Railroad Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609 .

<p>A state statute granting to a company incorporated by it “ all the rights and privileges ” which had been granted by a previous statute of the State to another corporation, does not confer upon the new company an exemption from taxation beyond a defined limit which was conferred upon the other company by the act incorporating it.</p> <p>The ruling of the highest court of a State, in a suit to recover taxes alleged to be due, concerning the effect to be given to a former judgment of the same court as to the liability of the same parties to pay similar taxes previously assessed, is not subject to review by this court.</p>

This suit is similar to those which precede, and is brought for the collection of taxes against the corporation, plaintiff in error, or its stockholders. It was tried upon aii agreed statement of facts.

Held: that the-organization of the corporation having been made subsequently to the adoption of the constitution of 1870, and of its coming into force, ' the Corporation was subject to the provisions of that instrument regulating taxation.

Held: that the Home Company wa6 not subject to the provision respecting taxation in the charter of the Memphis Life Company. The plaintiffs beiow sought by this bill to recover certain taxes against the Home Insurance Company, or its shareholders, under the general revenue laws of the State, at a greater rate than the plaintiffs in error claimed they are liable to pay.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

Held: that as the work was done in pursuance of a valid contract, of which the city and the District received the benefit, and as the required assessment had not been made, through the failure of the city and the District, the District became liable, and the certificates were valid obligations against it.

This was a pi’oceeding on behalf of the United States, instituted by direction of the Attorney General, in the Court of Private Land Claims, under the third clause of section eight of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 539, 26 Stat. 854.

This was a bill brought by Caleb W. Durham, under the provisions of section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, to obtain a decree authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to issue a patent to him for an improved drainage apparatus for buildings.

<p>The decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, made in an action to-recover on bonds issued by the State in 1868, that the constitution of 1868, (in force when the bonds were issued,) giving the Supreme Court of the State jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but providing' that its decision should be merely recommendatory, to be reported to the legislature for its action, had been repealed by an amendment to the constitution made in 1879 which forbade the general- assembly to assume or provide for the payment of debts incurred by authority of the convention of 1868, or by the legislature that year or in two sessions thereafter unless ratified by the people at an election held for that purpose, and that the court-was without jurisdiction to render judgment of recommendation on a claim against the State whose validity was thus denied by the state constitution, did not in any way impair the obligation of contracts entered into by the State when the constitution of 1868 was in force.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

The complainant below was Christeina Murphy, who sued in her own right and as executrix and trustee under the will of Peter Pippert, her deceased father.

Held: whether that grant was from the State or from a private person. . Judgment affirmed.

This case is before us on appeal from a judgment of tbe Court of Claims, dismissing the claimant’s petition.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>' On July 8,1891, appellants, as claimants, filed their petition in the Court of Claims under the act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, 26 Stat. 851, to recover the sum-of eleven thousand eight hundred dollars, the value of certain personal property charged to have been taken and destroyed by the Bannock.and Piute Indians during the month of June, 1818, in Happy Talley, in the State of Oregon. Subsequently they filed an amended petition. ' In that it was alleged that the Bannock and the Piute Indians were “in amity with the United States” at the time of the taking and destruction of the property; that they were “ chargeable for said depredation and under an obligation to pay for the same by reason of the provisions of the treaty of July 3, 1868, between the United States and the Shoshone (Eastern Band) and the Bannock tribe of Indians; ” and further, that petitioners “ presented their said claim to the Hon. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, No. 4915, July 21, 1888, for payment, but the same has not been returned or paid for.” A traverse having been filed by the government, the case was submitted to the court, which, on February 21, 1893, made a finding of facts, and thereon entered judgment dismissing the petition. 28- C. 01. 141. The seventh finding of fact was as follows:</p> <p>“ From these facts, the court finds the ultimate fact, so far as it is a question of fact, that the tribes or bands of Piute and Bannock Indians were not in amity with the United States at the time the depredations complained of were committed.”</p> <p>From the judgment thus entered in favor of the defendants the claimants duly appealed to this court.</p>

These cases have so much in common that they may be considered together. Each is the record of the conviction of the plaintiff in error in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of á violation of section 5480, Eev. Stat., as amended by the act of March 2,1889, c. 393, 25 Stat. 873. In neither record is preserved the testimony given on the trial, or the charge to the jury.

In July, 1879, Marietta M. Parker sued the District of 'Columbia to recover damages for an injury to her person, alleged to have been suffered from stepping into a certain “deep and dangerous hole” in the sidewalk of one of the streets of the city of "Washington. The declaration contained all the essential averments necessary to fix liability on the corporation.

Held: that .under such circumstances the purchaser was estopped to insist Upon the statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not in writing and were made without consideration ; and that there was a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity, founded upon its general right to relieve from the consequences of fraud, accident or mistake, which might be exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for…

This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error for want of jurisdiction, or to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina upon the ground that the writ' of error was sued out for delay merely, and the question upon which jurisdiction depended was so frivolous as not to need further argument.

On July 21,1890, George W. Cochran filed, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, a bill of complaint against Isaac L. Blout, trustee, James P. Eyon, and Julius Lansburgh, whereby he sought a decree, in the nature of a decree for specific performance, to compel Lansburgh to convey to him an undivided one third equitable interest owned by Lansburgh in a certain square or tract of land in the city of Washington, and Blout and Eyon to join in said conveyance as…

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, Gordon McKay, as trustee for the McKay Sewing Machine Association, and a eitizen of the State of Rhode Island, filed a bill of complaint against' Frank ~W. Smith and others, citizens of the State of Massachusetts, doing business as copartners in the firm name of Smith, Stoughton & Payne.

Held: that the bonds originally issued were binding and subsisting obligations of the county, and having been recognized as such by the county authorities by lifting them with new bonds under the refunding act, those funding bonds were valid and binding obligations upon the county in the hands of a bona fide holder for value before maturity.

Mason filed Ms bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a discovery and an accounting by Harvey Spalding as to certain fees collected by the defendant, in which Mason claimed a one fourth interest. The persons joined with Spalding in this court are the sureties upon an appeal bond given by Spalding at the general term, upon the affirmance of a judgment in favor of Mason,' having entered judgment against all the parties who executed the appeal bond.

Held: that the Unauthorized voluntary act of the plaintiffs could not be said, as matter of law, to have been ratified by defendant by his mere retention, without complaint, of an account and statement rendered to him ‘ ‘ that said change had been made,” or,, in other words, that plaintiffs had made a new purchase for his account.

<p>An examination of the statutes of the United States relating to the construction of a railroad from the Missouri River to the Pacific Ocean, especially the acts of July 1,1862, c. 120,12 Stat. 489, and July 2,1864, c. 216, 13 Stat. 356, shows that every subscriber to the Union Pacific Railroad Company must be deemed to have become such upon the condition, implied by law, that he should not be personally liable for the debts of the corporation.</p> <p>It is equally clear that Congress intended to grant national aid to all the corporations constructing that connecting line'of railroad iipon terms and conditions applicable alike to all, with no purpose to make discriminations against any one part of the line, and that the imposition of a liability upon the stockholders of the Central Pacific Railroad Company for the debt of that corporation, arising out of the bonds which it received from the United States, when no such liability was imposed upon the Union Pacific Railroad Company on account of like bonds received by it, is entirely inconsistent with that equality.</p> <p>The United States has no claim .against the stockholders of the Central Pacific Railroad Company on account of the bonds issued to that company by the United States to aid in the construction of its road.</p> <p>This adjudication is not to be taken as deciding that the stockholders of the Central Pacific Railroad Company either can or cannot be made liable for its debts to the United States in some other way than under the Pacific railroad acts and by the acceptance of the United States bonds to aid in the construction of the road; nor whether the adoption of the California corporation as an instrument of the national government in accomplishing a national object, exempted its stockholders from liability, under the constitution and laws of California, to ordinary creditors.</p>

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

In the District Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, November term, 1895, Dan K. Swearingen was indicted, under the provisions of section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, for depositing in the post office of the United States, at Burlington, Kansas, to be conveyed by mail and delivered to certain named persons a certain publication or newspaper, entitled “ The Burlington Courier,” dated September 21, 1894, and containing a certain article charged to be of an…

This was an action brought by Nora O’Brien against the Union Pacific Bailway Company, in the Circuit Court for the District of Colorado, to recover damages for the death of her husband, John O’Brien, who was in the employment of the defendant as a locomotive engineer, running on the South Park division of the company’s line, and was killed by the derailment of his engine.

Held: that the Delaware was grossly in fault. The Supervising Inspector’s rules, so far as they require whistles to be used, ought to be construed in harmony with the International Code, and, as applied to vessels upon crossing courses, they mean that when a single blast is given by the preferred steamer she intends to comply with her legal obligation to keep her course, and throw upon the other steamer the duty of…

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p>

Held: that such a variance was not material in this case. Stenographers’ minutes of evidence are not records. The plaintiff in error was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York, for the crime of perjury, alleged to have been committed upon the trial of an action between the United States and one John Matthews, impleaded with others.

Held: that as his government was the real party *503 interested, the appeal was properly prosecuted by him; and as the construction of the treaty was drawn in question, it was properly taken to this court. The order of the District Court requiring the petitioners to enter into recognizances for their appearance to answer its judgment was rightly made.

This was a garnishee proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas for Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The record of that court shows the issue in favor of Alpheus Beall, on a judgment recovered by him against Abraham O. Tinstman, of an attachment execution, dated June 9, 1888, and service thereof accepted by the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Kailroad Company, as garnishee, June 15, 1888.

Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), was a United States Supreme Court decision, which dealt with the transportation of wild fowl over state lines. Geer held that the states owned the wild animals within their borders and could strictly regulate their management and harvest.

Held: under the evidence, not to be liable, the case should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the court below, but the jury should be instructed to find for the defendant. For these reasons I am unable to concur in the opinion of the majority.

The relief sought by appellant in the lower court was to have the New Mexico Mining Company, to whom certain letters patent were issued by the United States for a Mexican mining grant, declared a trustee for his benefit to the extent of a one fourth interest in the land covered by said letters patent. The Territorial District Court held that the statute of limitations barred the suit, and therefore dismissed the bill.

At J une term, 1894, of the District Court for tbe District of Minnesota, held at Saint Paul in the third division of the district, the grand jury for the district presented, on July 20, 1894, two indictments against George W. Post on section 5493 of the Revised Statutes for subornation of perjury on February 3, 1894, at Duluth in the fifth division.

<p>error to the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: however, by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn that “to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer,” although “if the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear,…

Held: that these findings justified the further finding of that court that “from said facts the court finds the ultimate fact to be that the claimaint’s testator did not perform the services for the United States in good faith for the purpose of enforcing the criminal law,” and the judgment entered thereon in favor of the United States. The case is stated in the opinion.

This was a bill in equity, styled a petition, originally filed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, (hereinafter called the L. & N. Co.,) the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Railroad Company (hereinafter called the Chesapeake Co.) and several subordinate corporations tributary to the latter, to enjoin the L. & N. Co. (1) from acquiring the control of, or operating, the parallel and competing lines of railroad known as the…