Volume 178 — Atlantic Reporter, Third Series

The juvenile respondent, Joseph C., appealed from a May 22, 2015 judgment of the Family Court finding him delinquent for having committed first-degree robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. He contended that the state failed to submit sufficient independent evidence establishing the corpus delicti of the crimes charged and that, as a result, his confession should not have been considered by the trial justice. The Supreme Court found that the state had produced sufficient evidence, independent of respondent's confession, to establish the corpus delicti of the crimes charged. The Court also held that the trial justice did not misconceive or overlook material evidence in adjudicating the respondent delinquent on both charges and, accordingly, the trial justice did not err in relying on respondent's confession in reaching her decision and in adjudicating him delinquent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Family Court.

The defendant, city of Providence (defendant or the city), is before the Supreme Court on appeal from the entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, John Sauro (Sauro or plaintiff). The plaintiff suffered an injury to his right shoulder while performing his duties with the Providence Fire Department. Due to this injury, plaintiff was unable to return to work and was given an accidental disability pension by the city. After undergoing an independent medical examination, it was determined that plaintiff had recovered from the work-related injury, but could not resume service with the fire department due to unrelated physical and psychological illnesses. As a result, the city terminated plaintiff's accidental disability pension benefits. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief in the Superior Court, asking the trial justice to interpret section 17-189(8)(a) of the pension ordinance in plaintiff's favor. At the hearing, the trial justice interpreted the ordinance in plaintiff's favor and ordered the city to place plaintiff on a waiting list, as contemplated by § 17-189(8)(a), to return to service and to continue to pay plaintiff's accidental disability pension. The Supreme Court addressed the arguments of both parties and concluded that, based on plaintiff's extensive unrelated physical and psychological illnesses, he was neither "qualified" nor "prepared" to resume service in the fire department, as §17-189(8)(a) plainly requires, and therefore should not be placed on a waiting list or continue to receive an accidental disability pension. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, Elaine Jaffe, and the defendant, William Pournaras, are the two surviving children of Constantine W. Pournaras. The defendant appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and prohibiting the defendant from transferring assets of the decedent's irrevocable living trust into the decedent's estate. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, the Supreme Court determined that the Superior Court did not err in holding that the defendant's intended exercise of the limited power of appointment contained in the trust was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The plaintiff, David DiSano (DiSano), appealed from a Superior Court order that denied his petition to vacate an arbitration award and granted the petition brought by the defendant, Argonaut Insurance Company (Argonaut), to confirm the arbitration award, and its motion to quash the deposition subpoena of the dissenting arbitrator. DiSano argued that the arbitration award was irrational because the arbitrators, who found in favor of Argonaut, improperly calculated the offset amount to which Argonaut was entitled. Specifically, he maintained that it was error for the arbitrators to use the amount of workers' compensation benefits that he received for his hip replacement surgery to calculate the offset amount, because the majority had found that the hip replacement surgery was not causally related to the car accident that was the subject of the arbitration. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the hearing justice appropriately denied DiSano's petition to vacate the arbitration award. It concluded that the arbitrators did not imperfectly execute their powers in calculating the offset amount. Further, the Supreme Court held that, even if the arbitrators did err, an arbitration award would not be overturned for mere errors of law. The Court deemed waived DiSano's challenge to the grant of Argnoaut's motion to quash. Accordingly, it affirmed the Superior Court's decision to deny the petition to vacate the arbitration award and to grant the petition to confirm the arbitration award and the motion to quash the deposition subpoena of the dissenting arbitrator.

The plaintiffs—certain New Shoreham residents, taxpayers, and Block Island Power Company ratepayers—appeal a Washington County Superior Court hearing justice's decision to grant the motion to dismiss of the defendant, the Town of New Shoreham. The plaintiffs sought to challenge the defendant's purchase of two-thirds of the shares of the Block Island Power Company. The defendant moved to dismiss the case, arguing that: (1) the Superior Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction (2) the controversy was moot (3) the plaintiffs did not have standing to sue (4) the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (5) the plaintiffs' complaint violated Rule 8 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and (6) the plaintiffs violated Rule 19 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to join indispensable parties. The hearing justice granted the motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the present suit. The Court did not address the remaining arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.