Volume 188 — United States Reports

<p>ERROR TO THE SÜPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WYOMING.</p> <p>This was a petition originally filed in the District' Court of Laramie County, Wyoming, by Kelley against Rhoads, county assessor of the county of Laramie, to recover back certain taxes to the amount of $250 upon a flock of sheep owned by the plaintiff and in charge of a shepherd who was driving them through the State of Wyoming, from the then Territory of Utah to the State of Nebraska-.</p> <p>The case ivas finally presented to the District Court upon the following agreed statement of facts, upon which the court entered judgment in favor of the defendant, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State, 9 Wyoming, 352:</p> <p>“ Agreed Statement of Facts.</p> <p>. “1. John Kelley is now and was at all times mentioned in the petition filed herein a citizen and resident of the State of Kansas.</p> <p>“ 2. Oliver F. Rhoads was the duly elected, qualified and acting county assessor of the county of Laramie, State of Wyoming, frond the 7th day of January, A. D. 1895, until the 4th day of January, A. D. 1897.</p> <p>“ 3. Plaintiff at all times mentioned in the petition herein was the owner of the sheep mentioned in said petition, and that said sheep on or about the 29th day of October, A. D. 1895, were in the county of Laramie, in charge of James M. Teates, the agent of the plaintiff, who was driving and transporting said sheep through the State of Wyoming from the then Territory of Utah, to the State of Nebraska.</p> <p>“ 4. In driving said sheep in such manner it was the practice of the person in charge to permit them to spread out at times in the neighborhood of a quarter of a mile, and while so being driven the sheep were permitted to graze over land of that width. They were driven in some instances through large pastures, in other instances through the public domain and in other instances through pastures enclosed by fences. While being driven • from the western boundary of the State to Pine Bluffs station, they were maintained by grazing along the route of travel.</p> <p>“ 5. Said sheep were duly returned by plaintiff for taxation and assessed by the assessor and collector of taxes for the year 1895 in the county of Juab, Territory of Utah.</p> <p>“ 6. On the 29th day of October, A.. D. 1895, while the said herd of sheep were in charge of the agent of the plaintiff in the county of Laramie, State of Wyoming, the defendant, in company with S. J. Robb, deputy sheriff, of Laramie County, Wyoming, collected from said plaintiff’s agent the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars, (1250,) alleged to be taxes due for the current year 1895, and that before the collection of said tax, upon demand for the payment of tbe same by the said defendant, the plaintiff’s agent refused to pay the same, whereupon the said defendant said to the agent of plaintiff that the said defendant could or would take enough sheep and sell them, and from the proceeds retain the said amohnt of two hundred and fifty dollars, ($250,) with costs; whereupon the plaintiff’s agent, to prevent the seizure and sale of plaintiff’s property and the damage that would thereby accrue to plaintiff, paid the said defendant the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250).</p> <p>“ 7. It was a fact and defendant had knowledge of the fact •and was notified by plaintiff’s agent that said herd of sheep was being driven across the State of Wyoming to Pine Bluffs station for the purpose of shipment, and that the same were not brought into the State for the purnose of being maintained permanently therein.</p> <p>“ 8. At the time of the regular assessment of property for the purpose of taxation in the county of Laramie in the year 1895, plaintiff had no.property of any kind whatever in the county of Laramie, or in the State of Wyoming.</p> <p>“ 9. At the time the assessment of property in the county of Laramie for the year 1895 was equalized by the board of equalization of the county of Laramie, plaintiff had no notice of the time or place of meeting of said board of equalization, or that any assessment had been made against him for any purpose whatever within the State of Wyoming or the county of Laramie.</p> <p>“ 10. At the time the taxes for the current year 1895 were regularly and legally levied in the said county of Laramie, plaintiff had no property whatever in the county of Laramie or State of Wyoming.</p> <p>“ 11. Plaintiff has demanded of defendant a return to him of the amount of tax so collected from plaintiff’s agent, but defendant refused and still refuses to return to plaintiff the amount so collected.</p> <p>“ 12. The time consumed in driving said sheep from the western boundary of the State of Wyoming to Pine Bluffs station, in Laramie County, was from six to eight weeks, and by. the route followed the distance travelled was about five hundred miles.</p> <p>“13. The said taxes were assessed, levied and collected by the defendant without the action, authority or assistance of the board of county commissioners, or of any other officer or officers of Laramie County.</p> <p>“ 14. The said property so owned by the plaintiff had not been regularly assessed in any other county of the State for that, year and no taxes had been paid. thereon in any other county in the State.</p> <p>“ 15. That for the purpose of shipping said sheep it was not neCessary that they should be driven into the State of Wyoming, and that the railroad over which they were shipped could be reached from the point where , the sheep were first driven by travelling a less distance than was necessary to travel from the place where they were first driven to any point in the State of Wyoming.</p> <p>“ 16.' That at the time the two hundred and fifty dollars was paid to the defendant, it was paid without any protest other than appears in the other paragraphs of. this agreed statement of facts.” . '</p>

<p>The Supreme Court of the State of Texas having decided that the statute of that State, Acts of 1897, c. 129,. providing that certain lands may be sold at a specified price under certain conditions by the Commissioner of the General Land Office was not mandatory, but that it was discretionary with the Commissioner whether to sell such lands or not, no Federal •.question arises which this .court can consider in a proceeding brought to compel the Commissioner to convey certain lands under such act to a person offering-to purchase the same at the pric'e specified in the act.</p> <p>The constitutional inhibition against the impairment of contracts applies only to legislative enactments of the States and not to the judicial decisions or acts of the state tribunals or officers, under statutes in force at the time of the making of the contract, the obligation of which is alleged to have been impaired.</p>

<p>EEEOE TO THE CIRCUIT COUET OF APPEALS FOE THE THIRD CIRCUIT.</p> <p>When the Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia suspended payment and its doors were closed there stood on the stock register ten shares in the name of the defendant in error. A call having been made by the Comptroller for the sum of the double liability, this suit was commenced to recover the amount. The defence was : First, that prior to the suspension of the bank the defendant had in good faith sold the stock standing in her name for a full market price, which had been paid her; second, that, in consummation of such sale, she had, by her agent delivered to the proper officer of the bank in its banking house, at the place where transfers were made, the stock certificate, with an adequate power of attorney to make the transfer, and requested that the stock be transferred; third, that the officer of the bank said that the transfer would be made as requested, and the defendant was ignorant of the ' fact that the officer had failed to discharge his duty; fourth, that as the defendant had done everything which the law required her to do to secure the transfer, she had ceased to be a stockholder, and was not responsible.</p> <p>In submitting the case to the jury the court instructed, First, that the presence of the name of the defendant on the stock register created a presumption of liability. This, however, the jury was informed, was not conclusive, but might be rebutted. Such rebuttal, the court charged, would result if it was proven that the defendant had made a Iona fide sale of her stock, and had, at the proper time and place, handed to the proper officer of the bank a power to transfer the same, although the officer of the bank had neglected to fulfill his duty in the premises. Second, after charging fully and accurately as to the proof essential to show a bona fide sale of stock in a national bank, the court, having during the trial applied a like rule in passing on the admissibility of evidence, instructed the jury if the evidence established that a sale of such character had been made whilst the bank was a going concern, the defendant would not be liable, because, unknown to her, the bank was, at the time of the sale, in fact insolvent. And the same principle was applied to the unknown insolvency of the person to whom the stock was sold. There was verdict and judgment for the defendant, which was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 107 Fed. Eep. 639; thereupon this writ of error was prosecuted.</p>

This case comes hereby virtue of a writ of certiorari directed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third pircuit. It is a suit in equity brought by a foreign receiver, in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to enforce the liability of stockholders, residing in Pennsylvania, of the Northwestern Guaranty Loan Company, a cornoration of Minnesota.

Held: as we understand its opinion, that property to be subject to taxation under the statute must be in the town. If it had been taken out to avoid taxation, it was subject to taxation when brought back. St. Louis v. The Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 , was also an interpretation of the state statute. The city of St. Louis had power to tax all property zoithin the city.

<p>The claim that section 2 of theact providing for the taxation of life estates, as construed by the highest courts of the State of Illinois, is in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the classification of life tenants is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies to life tenants the equal protection of laws because it taxes one class of life estates where the remainder is to lineals and expressly exempts life estates where the remainder is to collaterals or to strangers in blood, cannot be sustained.</p> <p>Inheritance tax laws are based upon the power of a State over testate and intestate dispositions of property, to limit and create estates, and to impose conditions upon their, transfer or devolution. This court has already decided in regard to this law that such power could be exercised by distinguishing between the lineal and collateral relatives of a testator, Whether the amount of the tax depends upon him who immediately receives, or upon him who ultimately receives, makes no difference with the power of the State. No discrimination being exercised in the creation of the class, equality is observed. Magoim v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.'S. 283, followed.</p>

Held: that, as whatever claim the New Jersey corporation had was based on the promise made directly to it upon a consideration furnished by it, it was not prevented from maintaining an action in the Circuit Court of • the United States for the Northern District of Illinois against such em-ployés and the Illinois corporation to restrain the employes from working for, or divulging such secrets to, the Illinois corporation…

Held: Although the company, held a patent for the land in controversy, the occupant was entitled under the local law to judgment if it appeared that he was equitably entitled to possession as against the company.

Held: That the obligations of the superintendent were not determinable by the law of bailment but by the terms of his bond, and lie could not escape responsibility for treasury notes that came to his hands and which were lost, unless such loss was attributable to overruling necessity or the public enemy; that their loss by reason of fire constituted no defence.

<p>There is no general right to a writ of error from this court to the courts of a State; nor does the mere fact that the action was brought under sections 2325 and 2326 of the Revised Statutes in support of'an adverse claim, entitle the defeated party to a writ of error to the state court.. There is but a special right to bring such cases, and such cases only, as disclose a Federal question distinctly ruled adversely to the plaintiff in error. Where no title, right, privilege or immunity of a Federal nature was set up and claimed, nor the validity of any Federal statute denied in the state court, nor the validity of any state statute challenged prior to the judgment of affirmance in the highest court of the State, on the ground of its repugnance to paramount Federal law, this court is not justified in taking jurisdiction.</p> <p>Generally speaking estoppel and res judicata present questions of local, and not of Federal, law.</p>

The case is stated in tbe opinion of the court. I. The debts, in question have no tangible situs within the State of New York. They were intangible, unidentifiable and incapable of physical situs, and were not subject to levy or sale, or to be replevied ; it was not necessary to take out letters of administration in New York to collect them. Toronto General Trust Go. v. O., B. dé Q. Railroad Go., 123 N. Y. 37, 47.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>This was an action begun July 13, 1880, by Sallie E. Hill-mon, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, to recover the amount of a policy of insurance, ($5000,) issued by the company March 4, 1879, upon the life of John ~W. Hillmon, her husband, in which the plaintiff was named as beneficiary. Plaintiff made the usual allegations of compliance with the.terms of the policy, and averred that the assured had died March 17, 1879, thirteen days after the policy was issued, and that, due proofs had been forwarded to the company. Other actions were also brought against the New York Life Insurance Company and the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, upon policies of insurance issued by them upon the same life, which actions were subsequently compromised.</p> <p>Defendant interposed a general denial, and for a.special de-fence set up in substance that on or before November 30,1878, John W. Hillmon, John H. Brown, Levi Baldwin and diverse other persons to defendant unknown, fraudulently conspiring to cheat and defraud defendant, procured a large amount of insurance on the life of Hillmon, to wit: $ 10,000 in the New York Life, by policy dated November 30,1878 ; $10,000 in the Mutual Life, by policy dated December 10,1878; and $5000 in the Connecticut Mutual Life, by the policy in suit, dated March 4,1879 ; that thereafter, in pursuance of such conspiracy, Hillmon, Brown and Baldwin falsely represented to defendant and others that said Hillmon had died, and th.at a certain dead body which they had procured was that of Hillmon, whereas in truth Hillmon “ was not and is not dead,” but has kept himself concealed under assumed names for the purpose of consummating the conspiracy.</p> <p>As a third defence the company set up a release by plaintiff of all her claims against it under the policies.</p> <p>Actions having been begun upon all three of these policies, an order was entered July 14,1882, consolidating them for trial. Two trials of the three consolidated cases resulted in disagreements of the jury.' On February 29, 1888, judgments in each were rendered for the plaintiff, which, upon writs of error, were reversed by this court and the cases remanded for a new. trial. 145 U. S. 285. The material facts of the case are fully set forth in that report, and will not be here repeated, except so far as .they are pertinent to the questions before this court for consideration. After two more trials of the consolidated cases, which resulted in disagreements of the jury, a compromise was effected between the plaintiff and the New York Life, which was followed by dismissal of the action against that company. Thereafter, and on January 9, 1895, an order previously entered consolidating the two remaining actions for trial was continued in force against the objection of each defendant, and the consolidated cases again came on for trial, resulting in separate judgments November 18, 1899, against both companies. To reverse this defendant sued out a writ of error from the Circuit Court of Appeals, and upon hearing in that court the judgment was affirmed with one dissent. 107 Fed. Kep. 834. The Mutual Life sued out a similar writ of error, but compromised the case before it was heard in the Circuit Court of Appeals.</p>

Held: is not indictable, either at common law or under the statutes of Pennsylvania. We therefore order him to be discharged.” In Allen's Appeal, 119 Pa.

Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company, 188 U.S. 239 (1903), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court found that advertisements were protected by copyright. The case is now cited for the proposition that commercial speech can be protected by copyright.

<p>APPEALS PROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>These are appeals taken from a decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, sitting as a District Court of the United States in admiralty, in a suit in prize brought by Ad<-miral Dewey in behalf of himself and the officers and crew of the naval forces on the Asiatic station, taking part in the battle of Manila Bay.</p> <p>May 1, 1898, Admiral Dewey, being then a Commodore in the-United States Navy, with a fleet under his command, engaged a Spanish fleet consisting of the Eeina Cristina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Antonio de UHoa, General Lezo, Marques del Duero, Argos,. Yelasco, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Mindanao, Manila and two torpedo boats, supported by shore batteries, submarine mines and torpedoes. At the close of the battle all these vessels were confessedly destroyed except the Manila, which was captured, and the Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba and Isla de Luzon, in respect of which the facts were these : Under the severe fire of the American fleet they steamed to a position of greater safety, and, after the battle, backed ashore, and when in shallow water their sea valves were opened and they settled on the bottom. They, and other armed vessels, were afterwards set on fire by a detachment from the United States fleet, in obedience to a signal from the flagship when the firing ceased. All captured vessels, not destroyed, were appraised and appropriated to the use of the United States, except one or more private vessels, which were restored to their owners, and not including the Don Juan de Austria, the Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon.</p> <p>May 3, 1898, Commodore Dewey took possession of the Cavite arsenal, containing a large quantity of naval stores and supplies, and some boats, and he also took possession of certain land batteries. Some of the property taken at the arsenal, besides that taken from the sunken vessels, was included in the appraisement.</p> <p>The protocol between the United States and Spain, signed August 12, 1898, provided as follows : “The United.States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition and’ government of the Philippines, . . . Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended.”</p> <p>About the first of September, 1898, an examination was made of the Don Juan de Austria, the Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon, and the commander-in-chief advertised for bids for raising, repairing and fitting them out. In October he contracted, on behalf of the United States, with a’dock company to effect this purpose. The work of raising the vessels was begun on October 29 and finished on November 24. They were then overhauled sufficiently to enable them to proceed to Hong Kong, where they were reconstructed and refitted, for use in the United States Navy, of which they became apart.</p> <p>Full report was made to the Navy Department in July, 1899, of the condition of each of these vessels, upon being raised, and> of the progress of reconstruction, including estimates of the value of the vessels when completed, exclusive of armament, and of the cost of raising, fitting out and repairing them. And an appraisement was made in that department of the three vessels when completed, giving the value, and the cost of repairs, from which it also appears that they were first commissioned in the United States Navy in 1900.</p> <p>Some of the other sunken vessels might probably have been raised to advantage, but no attempt was made to do so, though a small amount of property was taken from them for government use. They were all advertised for sale in September, 1898, but no bids were received.</p> <p>. Shortly after the battle, the commander-in-chief took possession for government use of some cascoes or cargo boats, and two floating derricks belonging to private parties.</p> <p>The treaty of'peace between the United States and Spain provided: “Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels,small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock, and materials and. supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and riaval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain.”</p> <p>' By virtue of this provision, so much of the public property captured at the Cavite arsenal, and elsewhere on land, remaining unused at the date of the exchange of ratifications, was subsequently restored to Spain.</p> <p>Actions were instituted for bounty under section 4635 of tbe Revised Statutes, on account of all tbe vessels other than tbe Don Juan de Austria, tbe Isla de Cuba, tbe Isla de Luzon and those enumerated in the appraisement, and bounty has been granted under that section for tbe destruction of those vessels. Dewey v. United States, 35 C. Cl. 172 ; S. O., 17S U. S. 510.</p> <p>July 20, 1899, this libel was filed against the Don Juan de Austria, the Isla de Cuba, the Isla de Luzon ; all the property taken from them and from the sunken vessels; all the vessels and other property taken afloat, and all the property captured ashore.</p> <p>The United States filed an answer denying that the Don Juan de Austria, the Isla de Cuba and the Isla de Luzon, the-property captured on board of them, the property captured on land, and the cargo boats were subject tó condemnation as prize. March 26, 1901, an intervening libel was filed by Edwin F. Stovell, on behalf of himself and the officers and crew of the Nanshan, to which an answer was filed by libellant. The case having been heard, a decree of condemnation and distribution was made November 5,1901, which adjudged the Islade Cuba, the Isla de Luzon and the Don Juan de Austria, and .the Manila and all other captured vessels named in the appraisement, except such as might have been returned to private owners, and all property captured upon or belonging to any of these vessels, or any vessels sunk or destroyed on May 1, 1898, to be lawful prize of war. All property captured ashore and all non-seagoing craft belonging to the arsenal, as well as all cascoes and the floating derricks not belonging to the King of, Spain, were held not to be prize, and as to such property 'the libel was dismissed. The Nanshan, and the Zafiro, a vessel in the same situation, were held not entitled to share in any of the prize propertyand the hostile fleet .was held to have been of inferior force to the vessels making the capture. An' appeal was taken by the United States, a.cross appeal by libellant, and an appeal by the intervenor.</p> <p>Errors were assigned:</p> <p>By the United States, that the District Court’ erred in holding (1) that the vessels of war raised and reconstructed for the navy, with guns, munitions, equipment, stores and other articles found upon them, were lawful prize of war for the benefit of the captors ; (2) as also guns, munitions, equipment, stores and other articles on board the Spanish vessels of war sunk or otherwise destroyed, and not restored.</p> <p>By libellant, that the District Court erred in holding (1) that the property captured at the naval station at Cavite was not lawful prize; (2) that the cascoes were not lawful prize.</p> <p>By the intervenor, in holding that the Nanshan (and with her the Zafiro) was not entitled to share in the prize property.</p>

Held: that as the salvage was not actually accomplished, there was no appropriation to its use by the Government in the meaning of the statute and the captors were entitled to bounty only and not to prize money. Held, that the disposition of the property taken from the vessel must follow the rule laid down in The Manila Prize Cases, ante, p. 254.

Held: or authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, pri-v- *308 ilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed by either party under such-Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority.” And this was reproduced in § 709 of the Kevised Statutes.

Held: or authority exercised, under the Constitution. If'the title of plaintiffs in error were protected by the treaty, still the suit did not arise thereunder, because the controversy in the state court did not involve the construction of the treaty, but the validity of the title of Mexican and Spanish grants prior to the treaty.

<p>A slip retained by the agent of a lottery which is the duplicate of a slip retained by the purchaser, indicating the numbers selected by him, is not a paper, certificate or interest purporting to be or to represent chances, shares and interest in the prizes thereafter to be awarded by lot in the drawings of a lottery commonly known as the game of policy within the meaning of the act of Congress of March 2, 1895, c. 191, 28 Stat. 963.</p>

<p>A franchise granted by the proper authorities of Indiana, for maintaining a ferry across the Ohio River from the Indiana shore to the Kentucky shore, is an Indiana franchise, an incorporeal hereditament derived from, and having its legal situs for purposes of taxation in, Indiana.</p> <p>The fact that such franchise was granted to a Kentucky corporation, which held a Kentucky franchise to carry on the ferry business from the Kentucky shore to the Indiana shore (the jurisdiction of Kentucky extending only to low water mark on the northern and western side of the Ohio River) does not bring the Indiana franchise within the jurisdiction of Kentucky for purposes of taxation. The taxation of tho Indiana franchise by Kentucky would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, iu violation of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>Quaere: Whether such taxation would be a burden on interstate commerce and make it inconsistent with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several States, not decided.</p>

Bigby, the plaintiff in error, claimed in his petition to have been damaged to the extent of ten thousand dollars on account of certain personal' injuries received by him while entering an elevator placed by the United States in its court-house- and post-office building in the city of Brooklyn, and asked judgment for that sum against the Government.

Held: That the suit was one arising under the Constitution and laws of ■ the United States, and was therefore one of which, under the act of August 13, 1888, c. 868, the Circuit Court of the United States could take jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of the parties.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p>

Held: allotted lands in that county, and within the former • Sisseton Indian Eeservation, which lands were allotted to those Indians under the provisions of the agreement of December the 12th, 1889, as ratified by the act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1035 , 1036, and more particularly under section 5 of the General Allotment Act of Congress approved February the 8th, 1887, 24 Stat. 389 ; and that the lands so allotted by…

Held: as upon an implied contract, to pay its value to the owner. United States v. Great Falls Manufacturing Company, 112 U. S. 645 , and 124 U. S. 581 . It has likewise been held that the United States may be sued in the Court of Claims for the use of a patent for an invention, the plaintiff’s right in which they have acknowledged.

United States v. Williams may refer to any of the following United States Supreme Court decisions: United States v. Williams (1880), 154 U.S., Appx. 652 (1880) United States v. Williams (1906), 188 U.S. 485 United States v. Williams (1929), 278 U.S. 255 (1929) United States v. Williams (1937), 302 U.S. 46 (1937) United States v. Williams (1951), 341 U.S. 70 (1951), holding that a federal statute against conspiracy to deprive an individual of rights under color of law applied only to the federal government United States v. Williams (1992), 504 U.S. 36 (1992), holding that the federal courts do not have the supervisory power to require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury United States v. Williams (1995), 514 U.S. 227 (1995) United States v.

<p>Where a sheriff after selling under an execution and before paying over to the judgment creditor, is enjoined in a state court by another creditor from so doing, and immediately after the state court has set the restraining order aside, and while the money is still in the hands of the sheriff, and within the time allowed for the return of the execution, and before it is returned, a petition in bankruptcy is filed against the judgment debtor, the money does not belong to the judgment creditor but goes, under section 67/ of the Bankrupt Act of 1898, to the trustee in bankruptcy.'</p>

On May 23,1898, the legislature of Massachusetts passed the. following act: “ Sec. 1.

Act No. 237 of the public acts of the State of Michigan (1899) directed the appointment of “a board of registration in medicine,” to hold two regular meetings at specified times in each year at the state capitol, and additional meetings at such times • and places as it might determine; required all persons engaging in the practice of medicine and surgery to obtain from such board a certificate of registration ; prescribed the conditions upon which such certificate should be…

<p>Where an order is made on Friday by the Supreme Court of the District of • Columbia in pursuance of the act of June 8, 1898, 30 Stat. 434, which requires publication of a notice at least twice a week for a period of not less than four weeks, two publications in each successive seven days, commencing on the day of the entry of the order, is sufficient. Such an order does not inquire two publications for four weeks, each of which , commences Sunday and ends Saturday.</p> <p>A party who in response to a published notice appears and goes to trial without objection or seeking further time cannot thereafter be heard to question the sufficiency of the notice.</p> <p>On a proceeding to probate a will in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia the burden of proof is on the caveators and if they fail to sustain this burden and but one conclusion can be drawn from the testimony, the trial court has power to direct a verdict. When that court has done so and its action has been approved by the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeals, this court will rightfully pay deference to such action and opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF INDIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME OOURT OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: to be mineral, although the act authorizing the lease of mining lands was passed before petroleum was discovered. See also Gird v. California Oil Company, 60 Fed. Rep. 531 . The same principle was extended in W. & C. Natural Gas Company v. De Witt, 130 Pa. St. 235 , to natural gas, which was said to be a mineral feres naturae.

<p>APPEAL' FROM THE CIECUIT COUET OF THE TOUTED STATES FOE THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.</p> <p>• . On August 3, 1893, James C. Starr and Samuel W. Allerton, citizens of the'State of Illinois, on their own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska, against the Chicago, Bock Island and Pacific Bail way Company ; George H. Hastings, Attorney General; John C. Allen, Secretary of State; Eugene Moore, Auditor of Public Accounts; Joseph E. Bartley, State Treasurer, and A. R. Humphrey, Commissioner of Public Lands, all of whom were officers of the State of Nebraska, and as such constituted its board of transportation, and William A. l)ilworth, J. M. Rountz and J. W. Johnson, secretaries of said board, and all citizens of Nebraska.</p> <p>The bill brought into question, under the Constitution and laws of the United States,,the validity of a certain act of the legislature of Nebraska, approved April 12,1893, entitled “An act to reguláte railroads, to classify freights, to fix- reasonable maximum rates to be charged for the transportation of freights upon each of the railroads in the State of Nebraska and to provide penalties for the violation of this act.” It was alleged that if the provisions of the act were put into effect, the earnings of the said railroad company from its business in the State would be materially lessened and would not pay the operating expenses thereof, nor yield any money from which the railroad property could be maintained, and would in effect work a confiscation thereof; that if the penalties imposed in the said act were enforced the entire property of the company would be taken away; that the plaintiffs were stockholders of the company, and had requested the officers and directors thereof to take proceedings to contest the validity of said act, but they had refused to do so. The principal prayers of the bill were that the company, its officers, agents and employés, should be restrained by injunction from adopting a schedule of rates to be charged for the transportation of freight on its road, according to'the terms'and provisions of the said act; and that the said board of transportation, and its members and secretaries, should bo enjoined from entertaining or determining any complaint, and from instituting or prosecuting any'proceeding or action to enforce the observance of the provisions of said act; and that the attorney general should in like manner be enjoined from bringing any proceedings by way of injunction or by other process or civil action or indictment -against said company for or on account of the non-observance by it of the provisions' of said act.</p> <p>Thereupon a, restraining order of the Circuit Court was issued, enjoining the railroad company, the board of transportation and its members and the said attorney general, as prayed for in the bill; said order was to remain in force until a formal motion for injunction or to set aside the order be made, heard and decided; and a bond was to be given in the sum of $10,000. This order was duly served upon each and every of the said defendants, together with process of subpoena.</p> <p>Afterwards, on the 2d day of September, 1893, a joint and several answer was filed by the said board of transportation, its members and secretaries. Therein it was averred that the said defendants were all agents and officers of the State of Nebraska, and had no personal or pecuniary interest whatever in the event of the suit, and were not proper parties thereto, but that said bill of complaint should have been brought against the State of Nebraska ; that the said State was the real party in interest, and that the State had not and did not in any way whatever consent to the bringing of the action, and had not and did not submit in any way to the jurisdiction of the said Circuit Court to hear and determine the matters complained of in said bill; and the defendants submitted that, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the courts of the United States were wholly without jurisdiction to try, hear and determine the several matters in difference charged and set forth in the bill of complaint; and that, under the Constitution of the United States and the constitution and laws of the-State of Nebraska, the complainants had a full and adequate remedy at law. The defendants further denied that the state legislation in question violated the provisions of the Constitution of the United States which forbid any State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law, or to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, or to pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract, or which interferes with commerce between the States.</p> <p>On October 3,1893, the complainants filed their replication to the answer.</p> <p>At and about the same time, and in the same court, certain stockholders of the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company, of..the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, and of the Union Pacific Railway Company, hied three other bills of complaint, in which the said railroad companies and the said persons comprising the board of transportation were defendants, and in which bills the same facts and circumstances were alleged and the same relief was prayed for as in the bill in the present case. All of the state officers appeared and answered by the same counsel, and alleged the same de-fences and contentions as were alleged in their answer in this suit. Those cases were put at issue, and after a large amount of evidence was put in, final decrees were rendered against the defendants, and, on March 1, 1898, the decrees of the Circuit Court were affirmed by this court. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466. No testimony was taken by either party in tlie present case, but it was agreed, while the other cases were pending, that the proofs taken in them should be accepted with the same force and effect as if taken in this case; that the case should not be further particularly proceeded in until the Supreme Court should have rendered its decree in the other cases, when a decree should be entered conformable to those entered by the Supreme Court in the other three cases.</p> <p>Meanwhile, Hastings, the attorney general when the-bills were filed, was succeeded in his office by Smyth, who by proper order was.substituted as defendant and appellant. Overlooking .or disregarding the existing preliminary injunction of the Circuit Court, and thafagreement that.this case should abide the result in the other cases, Smyth, as attorney general, brought an action in the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska against the said Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, alleging that the company, in violation of the act of April 12,-1893, at divers times had charged for the transportation of freight between points on its road in Nebraska rates in excess of those, fixed by the act, and claiming judgment for $310,-000, t be amount of penalties alleged to have accruéd.. The attention of Attorney General Sjnyth was then called to the injunction order of the Circuit Court, and he thereupon gave the counsel of the company to understand that before the expiration of his term of office he would dismiss said action. Relying upon the understanding and agreement aforesaid, the company.took no proceedings to enforce the said injunction and agreement.</p> <p>• On or about January 1, 1901, the said defendant Frank N. Prout succeeded the said Smyth in his office of attorney general, who declined to dismiss the said action in the Supreme Court of Nebraska. Whereupon the company filed its answer in the said action in due form, alleging the prior pendency of the action in the Circuit Court of the United States, and the existence, in full force and effect, of the injunction order of that court. No reply to this answer appears to have ever been filed, and thereupon, on or about February 15, 1901, the company moved the said court for judgment upon the pleadings, but the court denied said motion, upon grounds set out in its opinion. State v. Chicago, Rook Inland di Pacific Railway Company, 61 Nebraska, 545. No further proceedings have been taken in said action, and the injunction order of the Circuit Court remains unmodified and in full force and effect.</p> <p>On April 6, 1901, Starr and Allerton filed, in the Circuit Court of the United States, their supplemental bill, alleging the foregoing facts, and praying that the order and injunction previously issued upon their original bill be extended to and against the said Frank N. Prout, as attorney general, and that he be enjoined and restrained from further prosecuting the action brought in the name of the State of Nebraska against the railway company.</p> <p>To this supplemental bill Frank N. Prout filed a demurrer on the ground that the bill was against the defendant in his official capacity as attorney general of the State, and was against the State, and that therefore the court was, under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, without jurisdiction.</p> <p>Upon argument the demurrer was overruled, and the in june tion prayed for was issued. The order directing the injunction provided that if the defendant elected to stand by his demurrer and declined further to plead, a final decree should- go as in the case of Smyth v. Ames, and the defendant haying elected in open court to stand upon his demurrer, a final decree was entered comformable to that in Smyth v. Ames. From that decree the defendant Frank N. Prout appealed to this court.</p>

•APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO. This litigation was begun by- the appellee, in the District Court for the Second Judicial District of the Territory of New Mexico, within and for the county of Bernalillo. In the bill of complaint equitable relief was sought against the now appellants.

ON the 23d day of May, 1893, the Elmira National Bank of Elmira, New York, failed, and a receiver 'was shortly thereafter appointed. At the date of the failure, on the face of the ledger of the Chase National Bank of New York city, there was a balance to the credit of the Elmira bank which was paid with interest at six per cent, as previously agreed on. The receiver, at the time of this payment, asserted that he wais entitled to a larger sum.

A Tennessee corporation, styled the Commercial Publishing Company, brought this action in a court of the State of New York to recover from Samuel C. Beckwith a sum of money which, it was averred, belonged to the publishing company.

The findings' of the Court of Claims upon which it predicated the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the United States are as follows: “I. The claimant, Arthur B. Barringer, was from time to time employed as . a compositor in the Government Printing Office during the following periods : December 31,1895, to February 26-, 1896, inclusive; July 2, 1897, to July 31, 1897, inclusive; December 10, 1897, to July 16, 1898, inclusive; October 24, 1898, to…

Held: as to a purchasér of lands in 1885 (after the passage of the act of that year) and who from 1893 to December, 1897, (after the passage of the act of that year) had failed to make any of the payment;? due under his contract, that the act of 1897 was not repugnant to the Federal Constitution on the ground that it impaired the obligation of the contract, as there was no promise expressed in the legislation existing…

This case comes before the court upon a certificate from the U nited States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The certificate contains the following statement: “ In February and March, 1895, Rudolph Helwig, plaintiff in error, made three certain importations of wood pulp into the. United States, entering the same at the custom house at the port of New'York.

APPEAL FEOM THE DISTRICT COURT Op THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP MASSACHUSETTS. The appellant herein was appointed a trustee in bankruptcy by the United States District Court in Massachusetts on September 18,1900, and his bond was approved on the 21st of that month.

Held: that the covenant does run with the land, at least in an equitable sense; and where an insurance has been obtained, though by an assignee, and a fire has occurred, and the insurance money has been received, a court of equity has held that the insurance money should be applied for the benefit of those for whose protection the original covenant was made.” The cases of Vernon v. Smith, 5 Barn. & Ald. 1, 7; Thomas v.…

. The appellant in this case (being the complainant below) has brought it to this court by an appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana dismissing its complaint and ordering judgment for the defendants on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the action.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana.</p> <p>The same counsel appeared as in No. 103.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Montana.</p> <p>The same counsel appeared as in No. 103»</p>

<p>APPEAL FEOM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District, (which dismissed the bill of the railroad company,) directed that court •to give judgment in favor of the company, and from the judgment of the Court of Appeals an appeal to this court has been taken by the defendants below.</p> <p>The company brought this suit to obtain a judgment declaring the validity of an alleged lease to it for five years from the first day of August, 1897, and to compel the specific performance of an alleged contract to sell to it the same land mentioned in the lease and lying in the city of Washington, owned by the defendants as substituted trustees under'the will of the late Catherine Pearson, deceased, and to enjoin the defendants from continuing proceedings at law .which they had commenced to obtain possession of the premises, "and also to enjoin them from the prosecution of an action to recover damages for the use and occupation of the land by the railroad company. The facts are as follows :</p> <p>Catherine Pearson in her lifetime owned certain land, consisting of unimproved lots in the city of Washington, near , the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company’s depot, and lying on the line of its Metropolitan branch as subsequently constructed in that city. ■ After’ the decease of Mrs. Pearson, and on June 30, 1868, her . will was duly proved before the proper probate court in the District,. ..In it she devised the premises to trustees for the sole and separate use of her daughter, Eliza’ W. Patterson—</p> <p>“ During .the term Of her natural, life, and so that the same shall not be liable for the debts or subject to the control, contracts or engagements of her present or any after-taken husband ; to permit her by herself, or her special attorney appointed in writing, to be signed by her, to receive the annual income and profits of the same for her own sole, and separate use, her receipt or that of her attorney so appointed as aforesaid alone to be an acquittance to the person or persons charged with the payment of such income or any part of the same, and to the extent only therein expressed to have been paid — and if she please to occupy, possess and use for her own account, accommodation and convenience and that of her family any part of the property; real and personal, so held for her sepárate use and benefit, she shall be allowed to do so; and if at any time the said Eliza Patterson shall in writing, to be signed by her in the presence of and to be attested by a subscribing witness, desire the said Carlisle P. Patterson, William H. Philip and Walter S. Cox, or the survivors and survivor of them, to sell any part of the estate,.real and personal, held by them for her separate .use, for the purpose of changing the investment thereof, it shall be lawful for the said named trustees or the survivors or survivor of them to sell the same for such purpose' only, and to transfer and convey the absolute estate in fee therein, to the purchaser thereof; to receive the proceeds of any and every such' sale of the purchaser, who shall not be required to see to the application thereof; and to invest the same in such maimer as the said Eliza W. Patterson may require; and such new investment shall be held by the said trustees for the same use, trusts and purposes, and with'the same powers and authority, of sale and reinvestment asfis.-herein declared of and concerning the original trust,. subject.. and separate estate. , .</p> <p>“ And after the death of the said Eliza W. Patterson the said named trustees and their successors shall hold-the said trust;, - subject- and separate .estate, — original and subsequently acquired by sale and reinvestment — ¡-for the use and benefit, of- any child,.. or children, -of the said Eliza. W.s Patterson, and the issue ofany child or children of the said Eliza who ,may.die -leaving issyie-.in-, the lifetime of the said Eliza., and such issue shall take the share or portion of the: said-estate which their parent or parents would have taken had they .survived the. said Eliza. And if the, said Eliza W. Patterson shall die without leaving a child or children,’ or issue of any child or children, living at the time of her death,, the said trustees and their successors shall-hold the said trust, subject and separate estate for my right heirs.. And if it shall, happen that either of the said trustees shall die, or. .become incapable of acting, or shall refuse to act in the execution of-said trust, then and in every such case -the continuing trustees or trustee shall from time to time nominate some other person .or persons to be approved, by the said Eliza W. Patterson to. be trustee or trustees in the place and stead of the person or per- ‘ sons so dying, or becoming incapable or refusing to act,, and. shall convey and settle .the said- trust, subject and separate estate in such manner, that, the same shall be legally vested in such,continuing trustees or trustee, and spch person or persons so naméd and appointed to that office for the same uses, trusts and purposes, and with the same,power and,authority of administration, sale and- reinvestment as is hereinbefore declared of and concerning the said, trusts, subject and .estate, and the said new trustee or trustees shall have the same power to act in the premises in conjunction' with the continuing trustee or trustees, and as survivors of them,, as if they liad been originally, named trustee or trustees in the premises in this my last will- .and testament. -</p> <p>■ “ I do hereby nominate -and appoint Carlisle P.- Patterson,. William, II. Philip and W. S. Cox to,, be the executors, of .this-my last will and testament.”</p> <p>In 1872 the trustees under Mrs. Pearson’s will leased to the railroad company the land for five years, the lease containing a privilege to the railroad company to purchase such land during those five years on payment of $12,592. It also contained an agreement to renew the lease with the same covenants and privileges for another term of five years, or until the lessors were prepared-to convey the premises as agreed in the lease with a perfect title in fee simple.</p> <p>Prom the time of the first lease in 1872, and under various leases thereafter, the company occupied the land, constructed part of its branch line thereon, and paid rent therefor up to 1888. On January 30 of that year alease was made, which was signed by the trustees and by the president of the railroad company, though not by Mrs. Patterson. By the terms of that lease the premises were rented for five years from August 1,1887, at the same rent and with the same covenants as to renewal and for the sale of the lands as contained in the first lease of 1872. The company continued in the occupation of the premises under this lease for the five years mentioned therein. Upon October 17, 1892, the company still being in occupation of the land, another instrument was executed in the form of a lease, signed by but one of the trustees, and purporting to lease the land for five years from August 1, 1892, at the same rental as the lease of 1888, and with the same covenants to sell at the same price ($12,592,) and to renew the lease for five years, as contained in the lease of 1888. This lease was signed by Winslow, alone, he then being one of the substituted trustees, but Jay, another qf the substituted trustees, did not sign it, and, so far as appears, never saw it. These two substituted trustees had been duly appointed prior to or in the year 1883. The former' trustee, Judge Cox, had resigned in June, 1892, and it does not appear that his successor had then been appointed.</p> <p>The company retained possession of the property from August 1, 1892, up to August 1, 1897, and paid the amount of money mentioned in the paper of 1892, being at the same rate that had been paid since 1872, and as was provided in the lease of 1888. About the first of August, 1897, questions arose as to the terms of future occupation of the land. The trustees refused to execute any further lease, denied any obligation to renew it for any term, and said they preferred to sell, but refused to do so on the old terms, the land having in the meantime largely appreciated in value. In September, 1897, Mr. Winslow, in a letter to the company, said they were prepared to convey the property with a perfect title, and that they also preferred to execute such conveyance to any renewal of the lease. The company, however, prepared a lease, which provided for again leasing the land to it on the same terms for a period of five years, commencing on August 1, 1897, and this lease also contained a provision for a renewal for another five years, or until the lessors could convey the premises in fee simple to the company. This lease was never signed. Negotiations continued in regard to the matter, the company insisting it had the right.to a renewal of the lease by virtue of the instrument dated August 1,1892, while the trustees denied that contention, and though willing to sell, were not willing to do so at the price named in the former lease, as they said that the value of the • land had increased from $12,592 to over $30,000. During these negotiations and disputes the company retained possession of the land, and on or about February 1, 1898, (the dispute and the negotiations between the trustees and the company being still unsettled,) in accordance with the custom which it had followed during the running of the various instruments since 1872, of paying the rent semi-annually on the first days of February and August as it accrued, it sent the money that would have been due for rent, (if a lease were then in existence,) in the form of a money order payable to the order of Mr. Winslow, trustee of Eliza W. Patterson, and enclosed it in a letter addressed to Mr. Winslow, in care of Fisher & Co., agents, who sent it to Mrs. Patterson, as Mr. Winslow was then absent in Nicaragua as secretary of the Canal Commission. This money order was received by Mrs. Patterson, who thereupon wrote the following letter, under date of February 5, 1898, to one of the officers of the company:</p> <p>“Dear Sir: I returned to you a few days ago the draft which you sent me for the rent of my property on First street, Washington, by the railroad company of Balto. & Ohio of $377.77.' -The draft'was made' out'to Mr. Francis Winslow', triisteé, and I'could hot draw it, as Mr. Winslow in Nicaragua, and I could not send it so far away to him, fearing it might be lost! I therefore return if to you, with the request that you would sign it, as you-always have done heretofore, Cox, Jay & Winslow, trustees. Judge Cox & Mr! Jay are both here, so that they can sign it at onCe arid I can have the money. By giving prompt attention to this small' matter of business you will greatly oblige, "</p> <p>:■■■(( Eliza W. Patteesoet.”</p> <p>The' statement in this letter, that Judge Cox could sign the draft of order, was evidently a mistake, as his resignation had been accepted by the' court'years prior to the'date of the letter.</p> <p>The company afterwards 'sent' back the" draft, and,' under some arrangement between Mrs. Patterson and Fisher & Co.', which if does not appear was known by'the trustees, but which was* consented to by the' company, the same was' endorsed “ Francis Winslow, trustee, by Thomas J. Fisher & Co., attorneys,” and oh such endorsement the money on the' voucher was obtained from the company and received by Mrs. Patterson. ' ‘ '</p> <p>On August 1, Í898, the company sent a draft or money order for $877.77, the amount of rent which would have been due if there had been a valid lease in existence, the draft being sent to Mr. Winslow, trustee; which he declined to negotiate, and insisted that the rights of the company'had been terminated by his notice prior to and in September, 1897, and that since that time the company had-been occupying the property as tenants by sufferance.</p> <p>This voupher, and those which succeeded it, and which' were forwarded'to Mr. Winslow, as trustee, and made payable to his order, were retained' by'him until January, 1900, when they were returned' to the company and a check given for the aggregate amount under an agreement that its acceptance should be without prejudice to the rights of the respective parties añd their claims relating -to he leasing of the land or the renewal of the lease,-or ..to any question or matter connected therewith;</p> <p>The dispute between the parties continued, as also did the negotiations in regards to a settlement thereof, until sometime in March, 1900, when Mr, Winslow, Mr. Jay and the American Security and. Trust Company, the, substituted trustees, took proceedings against tlie company before- of dhe-peace to obtain possession, of .the. premises, based upon a notice to .quit, giveir under the statute. Judgnteht tinjg tees was rendered int htat case by default, and an appeal by the company, as provided for by law, was prosecuted, and was undetermined at the time for the commencement of this suit On August, 15, 1900, the substituted,- trustees also commenned an action against the company for the use and occupation of the premises fro, August 1, 1897, to April 16, 1900, claiming $6500, withn interest form the last name date. Soon thereafter the comany commenced this suit asking for a judgment that the company was entitled to a lease form August 1, 1897, for five years and also for a judgment for specific performance of the contract to sell, and obtained an injuction restraining the prosecution of both of the prceedings abbove mentioned.</p> <p>' The trial court held ithat ..there, had; j0qen pp.-yplid Jeptjja^jt-for a sale, and that there was then no valid lease in existence such as was required ,íe-he.,proyed ,.befpre a,cpurt;pf; equity would decree specific performance. The court expressed no opinion, as to,., the .effect of continued ;Qc.cupafdon alter: the-expiration of any lease' under the facts in the case with refer-, ence to the amount of the rental to be paid. That was a matter which i.t was.held.,could-be determined •-,pn--)the. lawi.si.deibf the court. A decree .>\yas..thei’efpre--enter%d dismissing theebilh and dissolving the injunction which had been granted.</p> <p>, The Courtl,of,.i^ppe<als,.reversed,, .-.the-, judgment ©Jmthe,-.trjal court,,,18. App,, D..( 4.38, dnd-xenaanded-fthe Gase,,--nncl.' ittits; opinion it;,was stn|e4 a?.|0líd'Ysvn ->-«■ mic</p> <p>"In view of what has been said, we are of opinion that unde the provisions of the lease of 1892, executed bt Francis Winslow, trustee, for and on behalf of the life tenant, Mrs Eliza W. Patterson, the appellant was and is entitled to one renewal of such' lease for the term of five years from and after the first day of August, 1897, upon the terms and conditions of said lease as to the rents to be paid therefor; and that during. the continuance of such term no suit for the dispossession of the appellant can be maintained. We are, also, of opinion that, for the time subsequent to the determination of said renewed lease for which the appellant shall require the use and occupation of said land, the appellant is entitled, and it is its duty to acquire the right to such use and occupation, under the exercise of the right of eminent domain conferred upon it by the act of Congress, by the ascertainment of the value of such use and occupation, and payment to the owners of the land of the just compensation so to be ascertained. And the bill of complaint in this cause máy be retained for the purpose of such ascertainment of value and just compensation: It follows that the decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dissolving the injunction granted in this cause and dismissing the bill of complaint, must be reversed, with costs; and that the cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to vacate said decree, to restore the injunction and make the same perpetual, and for such further and other proceedings as may be just and proper, according to law and in conformity with this opinion. And it is so ordered.”</p>

Held: that such provision should not be construed as a complete overthrow of the canon of construction adopted by the Supreme Court of Illinois in regard to exemption of property from taxation. These cases, between the same parties, come here by writs of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, which held certain property of the plaintiff in error not exempt from taxation. 189 Illinois, 439.

Held: That in the absence of any statute making the assessment upon shares a lien on the real estate and of any averment that the company owned any real estate, no cloud upon title is made apparent. (2) That the statute of Indiana provides a proceeding for the recovery of taxes wrongfully assessed, and as it does not appear that such statute has been repealed, an adequate remedy at law exists.

<p>Vessels more than five miles apart held not to be within signal distance so as to be entitled to share in prize under the circumstances of this case. Vessels not within signal distance are not “vessels making the capture” within Rev. Stat. § 40.30, although they may have contributed remotely to this result. They cannot be taken into account in estimating the relative force of capture and prize. In estimating the relative strength of the captured and capturing vessels, the means possessed by the captured vessel, and not the use made of them,must be considered.</p>

<p>The company defended an action on a policy of life insurance on the ground that statements of the insured as to his use of liquor and spirits in the application and in the declaration to the medical examiner were false and amounted to a breach of warranty; but it appeared that the warranty did not extend to the medical declaration; the jury were instructed that if they found either that before the insured made application he drank liquors either freely or to excess, or at the time that he made the application he had a habit of drinking liquor, they were to find for the company, the declaration and the application thus being put on the same footing; the jury found for the plaintiff; Held,that the jury must be taken to have found categorically that all of the answers were correct, and the question whether they were warranties or not became immaterial, and the verdict could not be reviewed except for improper instructions duly excepted to.</p>

<p>EREOK TO THE SOPEEME COUET OF THE STATE OF AT.A RAMA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in an action in which other holders of paper made by Cross and Martindale sought to obtain the proceeds of sale of the property assigned, that it was not error to admit testimony that Mar-tindale had stated that the earlier assignment had been made to secure the bank generally for Cross’s liability thereto. The case is stated in the

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Yirginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas.</p>