Volume 2 — Federal Reporter

<p>Local Taxation for Benefit of Railroad Corporation — Statute» Construed. — The charter of a railroad company enacted in 1865, authorized the corporate authorities of any city, town, or county, to subscribe to its capital stock, issue bonds therefor, and levy a tax of not to exceed one-twentieth of 1 per cent, per annum on the taxable property of the municipality to pay same. A subsequent act, passed in 1868, authorized subscriptions by townships, in pursuance of a vote of the people, to the stock of any railroad company, building or proposing to build a railroad into, through, or near the township voting the subscription, and authorized taxes to be levied to meet the payments on account of such subscriptions. Held, that to pay the bonds issued under the latter act, the respondents were bound to levy whatever tax was necessary for that purpose, and were not restricted to one-twentieth of 1 per cent, per annum.</p> <p>Contract — Laws in Force when Contract was Made — Subsequent Legislation. — Laws in force when such bonds are issued, and which provide for fixation to pay them, enter into the contract between the bond holder an! the state, and as against the former such laws cannot bo repealed. Otherwise as to acts enlarging the taxing power passed after the issue of such bonds.</p>

<p>Corporate Bonds — Notice—Agency.—A purchaser takes corporate bonds at his peril, where he has notice that an authorized agent is disposing of such bonds to him for an unauthorized purpose.</p> <p>Same — Same—Officer of Corporation. — In the absence of notice, such purchaser may presume that an officer Í3 acting within the scope of his authority when acting as the agent of such corporation.</p> <p>Married Woman — Notice to Husband. — In transactions relating to her separate estate, a married woman is only bound by notice given to her husband in so far as he acts as her agent.</p> <p>Cestui Que Trust — Notice to Trustee. — Notice to a trustee is not notice to the cestui que trust, where the trustee has no official relation to the transaction in controversy.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — Foreign Insurance Company — Rev. St. i 739 — Ex Parte Soholdenberger, 96 U. S. 369. — A foreign insurance company is subject to the jurisdiction of a circuit court in a district other than that of which it is an inhabitant, when, in accordance with the statutory provision of the state in which such district is situated, it has duly authorized an agent of the company in that state to acknowledge service of process in such state for and on behalf of the company, and has consented that the service of process upon such agent shall be taken and held to be as valid as if served upon the company aecordiag to the laws of that or any other state or country.</p>

<p>Removal — Necessary Party to Sott — Savings Bank — Act of March 3, 1875. — An action was brought by a widow residing in New York to recover moneys deposited by ber late husband, as trustee, in a New York savings bank. On petition of the bank, under a statute of the State, (Laws 1875, c. 371, p. 401,) the alleged executor of the decedent, resident in Connecticut, was made a party defendant. The bank subsequently put in an answer, setting up that it could not ascertain wliicn of tha two claimants was entitled to the moneys; averred its readiness to pay them to the person lawfully entitled thereto; asked for a stay of proceedings until a legal represen tative of the estate of the decedent should be appointed and made a party to the action ; and prayed that, when all the parties necessary to render the judgment of the court a protection to it should have been brought in, such parties might inter-plead and settle their rights among themselves, and that such bank might pay the moneys into court to await the final determination of the action, and be stricken out as a party to the action, and its liability for the said moneys thereupon cease. Held, that until the moneys had been paid into court, and its liability for the deposit had ceased, the bank was a necessary party to the suit; and, therefore, under the circumstances of the case, the cause could not be removed from the state court under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875.</p>

<p>Bm for Discovery — Special Demurrer. — A special demurrer to part • of a bill must point out with certainty the part demurred to.</p> <p>Same — Interrogatories.—Interrogatories are not to be framed and limited upon the theory that everything stated in the bill is precisely and in every detail true.</p> <p>Same — Prayer, for General Relief. — A prayer for general relief is a prayer for any relief the court can give, except by injunction, upon the facts averred in the bill.</p> <p>8ame — Demurrer.—A demurrer relies merely upon matter apparent on the face of the bill.</p> <p>Same — Interrogatory—Answer.—It is the special office of an exception, ana not of a demurrer, to raise the question whether an answer to an interrogatory is sufficient.</p>

<p>Demurrer — Notice of Hearing.</p>

Motion to dissolve injunction. This was a bill in equity filed in a state court by the corporation plaintiff against its president, to restrain him from selling certain stock which had been transferred to him by the corporation, and held by him under a written agreement as collateral security for the repayment of a loan of $10,000, made by him to the corporation, with power of sale in case of default in repayment of the loan.

This was an action against the collector of customs to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted upon an importation of oranges. The verdict was for the plaintiff, subject to a point of law reserved by the court as to the proper construction of schedule “M,” § 2504, Eev. St. 476, under which the duties were levied.

<p>Demurrer to Bill.</p>

<p>Motion to remand.</p>

<p>Bah,road — Mortgage—Preferred Stockholders. — It is a general rule that the stockholders of a railroad are only to be paid after the claims of other lien holders, and where they come forward and insist upon hav ing a priority of payment over mortgage creditors, a specific lien beyond nil doubt should be shown to exist in their favor.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Duress—Assignee without Notice. — Duress is not available, as a defence upon the foreclosure of a mortgage, where the note and mortgage were purchased before maturity, for value and without notice.</p>

<p>Negotiable Instruments — Early Blank Indorsement — Subsequent Indorsers. — The holder of a negotiable instrument who makes an early blank indorsement, payable to himself, does not thereby discharge all subsequent indorsers.</p> <p>Same — Accommodation Indorsers — Attorney Pee. — Accommodation indorsers are liable for the payment of a stipulated attorney fee in case suit should be instituted for the payment of the note.</p>

<p>Common Cabeieb — Limitation of Liability — Refusal to Disclose Value of Goods. — A statute of the state of Illinois, which prohibits a common carrier from limiting its common law liability, does not prevent such carrier from limiting its liability where the shipper refused to inform the carrier of the value of the goods at the time they were shipped.</p>

Assumpsit by the owners of the ship Eclipse against the Tudor Company, upon the following account annexed to the writ: “For 7 days’ demurrage, at $127.37per day, $892.99.” This was amended at the trial to nine days’ demurrage, at the Bame rate, $1,148.13. On the sixth of July, 1878, the plaintiffs, through Mr. Burt, a broker of Boston, chartered the ship, which was then building at Bath, to the defendants, to carry a cargo of ice from Wiscasset, Maine, to Madras and Calcutta.

Defendant was indicted and found guilty as a wholesale dealer in malt liquors, who had not paid the special tax required by the act of congress.

<p>Indian— Spirituous Liquors — Rev. St. § 2139. — The disposition of spirituous liquors to an Indian, under the charge of an Indian agent, who has abandoned his nomadic life and tribal relations, and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people, violates section 2139 of the Revised Statutes.</p>

<p>TEAVELisra Merchants — License Tax — Subd. 2, § 10, Art. 1, and Subd. 8, { 8, Art. 1, oe the Constitution. — A statute of Nevada provided that “ every traveling merchant, agent, drummer or other person selling, or offering to sell, any goods, wares or merchandise of any kind, to be delivered at some future time, or carrying samples and selling, or offering to sell, goods, wares or merchandise of any kind similar to such samples, to he delivered at some future time,” should obtain alicense, andpay$25 a month for the same. The statute further provided that any person without such license, “ so offering any goods, wares or merchandise for sale, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined in any sum not less than $50 nor more than $500.” Held, (1) that said statute did not violate subd. 2, § 10, art. 1 of the constitution, prohibiting the states from laying imposts or duties on imports; (2) that such statute did not violate subd. 3, § 8, art. 1 of the constitution, conferring upon congress power to “regulate commerce among the several states.”</p>

<p>Motion to vacate order.</p>

<p>Partition — Widow’s Dower — Lien.—In proceedings in partition a recognizance or mortgage given for the principal of the widow’s dower is but collateral; the lien is independent of such security, being created by the law itself.</p>

Hearing on bill, answer and proofs. This was a bill in equity to restrain the alleged infringement of a patent. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

In Equity. Bill in equity for infringement of a patent (No. 22,787) to Porter Dodge, granted February 1, 1859, for an improved airtight stove, made of a double course of slabs or panels of soap-stone, held together by an iron frame. The application was prepared and signed December 26, 1856; a model was filed on the next day; the application was filed February 14, 1857. In 1877, Judge Shepley entered a decree for the complainant. See Henry v. Francestown Soap-Stone Co. 9 Off.

<p>Suit in Equity on final hearing upon pleadings and proof.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Seamen’s Wages — Rev. St. 4546 and 4547. — The procedure authorized by sections 4546 and 4547 of the Revised Statutes, in relation to seamen’s wages, is a summary and cumulative remedy given to seamen, which they may pursue at their option; but they are not thereby deprived of the right in the first instance to the ordinary admiralty process against a vessel, upon a direct application to the court or judge.</p> <p>Admiralty Jurisdiction — Ferry-Boat.—A steam ferry-boat, plying between two points on the opposite sides of the Ohio river, within the same state and county, is subject to admiralty jurisdiction.</p>

<p>■Collision — Steamer and Vessel — Uncertainty as to Course or Ves. sel. — When the lights of a sailing vessel are fluctuating, a steamer must in due time slacken her speed, and if necessary stop and hack, and neither proceed nor change her course until the course of the sailing vessel has been ascertained.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Tug—Negligence—Dowdallv. The Pennsylvania Bailhoad Co., 13 Blatch. 403. — A tug is not chargeable with negligence in not knowing of a hidden projection, dangerous to her tow, at a landing place selected by such tow, and which, from its evident actual use as a landing place for such a tow, it was reasonable to infer was suitable for the purpose to which it was put.</p>

<p>AromtAi/rr — Colusión.—In a collision between a steamboat and a schooner, the steamboat is alone in fault where it was clearly proved that the schooner kept her course on her port tack for at least a mile, until the collision, showing her port light, and that the steamboat, without observing it, changed her course at least twice after she came in sight, for some reasons not fully explained, probably in consequence of seeing other vessels; and that the steamer was negligent in her lookout, and did not observe the schooner till she saw her red light on her starboard bow, and so close that it was too late to avoid a collision, although she then rung to stop and slow.</p> <p>Same — Same—Vessel Keeping Heb joubse. — “ The cases in which a vessel is bound to disobey the positive rule which requires her to keep her course on meeting a steamer, and in which she is chargeable as a fault for not doing so, are very rare indeed, if any such case ever occurs.”</p> <p>*Same — Same—Failure to Show a Flash Light — Rev. St. § 4234. — Section 4234 of the Revised Statutes, which requires a sailing vessel, in the night-time, to show a light on that “ point or quarter ” towards which a steam vessel is approaching, applies only to a case where the close vicinity of a steamer is such that it can be said that she is approaching some particular point on the sailing vessel. A vessel, therefore, is not in fault for a failure to comply with this provision, where the showing of a flash light would not have aided in avoiding the collision.</p>

<p>Shipping Broker — Services in Procuring Crew — Failure to Secure Payment Before Yessel Left Port — Lien.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Lien of Material-Men by State Law. — W. & Co., machinists and steam-fitters, did work upon a steamboat in Norfolk, Ya., to the amount of $117. The boat was afterwards, and without payment of this bill, sold to parties in New York; whereupon W. & Co. filed a libel against her in the eastern district of New York for their bill</p> <p>Held, that they were material-men, whose claim was a lien upon the vessel by the laws of the state of Virginia, and that such a lien is enforceable in admiralty in the state of New York.</p>

<p>Usury — Question of Fact. — Any agreement, device or shift to reserva or take more than the law permits for use of money loaned is usury, and whether by such means more than the legal rate of interest has been contracted for is a question of fact to be collected from the whole of the transaction as it passed between the parties.</p> <p>Same — Agreement for Insurance in Lender’s Company. — A transaction whereby a party, in order to secure a loan of money, contracts to pay 12 per cent, per annum interest, the maximum rate allowed by law, and also as a part of the same transaction, and in consideration of such loan, agrees to take from the party loaning the money a policy of insurance, and to pay premiums thereon, is usurious under the statute of Nebraska,</p> <p>Same — Payment of Insurance Premiums. — Payments made in such a case, under the name of premiums on the insurance policy, must be regarded as paid on the loan; the insurance contract, made as it was to cover usury, being held void.</p>

<p>Lease — Part Performance. — A. lease which, has not been reduced to writing, but has been acted upon and partly performed, will be considered as binding as if signed.</p> <p>Same — Ultra Vires — Ratification by Stockholders. — Under section 152, p. 204, Statutes of Nebraska, a railroad company in that state cannot make a valid lease of its property and franchises for the term of its charter, without the same being ratified by its stockholders; but when the same have been used for a time under such void agreement, the company, or those representing it, may recover a just compensation for the use of such property during the time it is so used.</p>

<p>Covenants of Warranty — Defences.—In an action lor breach of covenant of warranty, the defence that the covenant sued upon was a joint one, and that it was sued upon as several, can be made under an answer denying there is anything due.</p> <p>Deed — Statement of Consideration. — The statement of the consideration in a deed is prima facie only, and may be rebutted.</p> <p>Same — Estoppel—Waste.—One who has given a deed of lands with covenants of warranty is estopped from denying that the grantee is the owner, and cannot complain of waste committed by such grantee.</p> <p>Warranty — Covenant—Damages.—In an action for breach of covenant of warranty the measure of damages is the consideration money, with interest.</p>

<p>Action at law, tried before the court without a jury.</p>

<p>Assignments — Right to Contest. — Assignments for the benefit of creditors in the state of Minnesota are simply regulated by statute. The assignee is mere trustee, and the legality of the assignment may be contested by a creditor in the federal court.</p> <p>Same — Fraudulent Intent — How Shown. — The validity of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, as affected by fraudulent intent, is to be determined by the intent of the assignor, and his contemporaneous fraudulent acts are evidence of such intent.</p> <p>Same — Fraud.—Facts in this case held to show a fraudulent intent on. the part of the assignor, and the assignment void.</p>

<p>Cause tried before the court without a jury.</p>

<p>Voluntary Conveyance — Effect of. — A voluntary conveyance, without consideration, will vest an absolute title in the grantee, subject only to the rights of creditors.</p> <p>Curative Act — Deeds.—The act of February 28, 1877, (Minn.,) legalizing deeds executed in another state according to the laws of such state, is a valid “healing statute,” and as to a deed covered by it operated to validate the same, and pass the legal title, except as to intervening rights.</p> <p>Deed — Insufficient to Pass Legal Title. — A deed in Minnesota executed in another state according to the laws thereof, but insufficient under the laws of the state where the lands are situate, will operate aa a transfer of the equitable rights of the grantee.</p>

<p>Will — Oodicil—Construction.—A testator is presumed to have used words in their natural sense, and where he has attached a codicil to his original will the two are to be construed together, and the will is not to be regarded as revoked by the codicil unless such appears to be the intention</p> <p>Same — Same.—Certain specific devises in a will held not to have been revoked by a subsequent codicil.</p>

<p>Impobts — Withdk AWAij From Wake house Duties on — ReuicjuidaTION OE.</p>

The case was submitted to the court upon the following agreed statement of facts: On June 19, 1876, B. L. D. Evans, the defendant, was twice indicted for passing counterfeit money, Nos. 1,313, 1,314. On May 30 and 31, 1878, he was tried by jury in one case on a plea of not guilty, resulting in a mistrial.

<p>Bankruptcy — Cross Demands for Accommodation Paper Between Bankrupts — Adjustment of — What Provable.</p>

<p>Fraud — Omission to Communicate Facts. — Whether omission to communicate a fact will be considered a fraud depends on the circumstances of the particular case and the relations of the parties.</p> <p>Same — Insufficient Evidence. — Evidence upon the question of fraudulent representations considered and held insufficient to prove fraud as alleged.</p> <p>Same — Right to Relief on Other Grounds. — Where the fraud alleged in the bill as the sole ground of relief is not proven, a party is not entitled to relief upon other grounds.</p>

<p>Assignee — Recovery of Property Transferred in Fraud of Bankrupt Law. — To entitle an assignee in bankruptcy to successfully attack a preference given to a creditor, as being in fraud of the bankrupt law he must bring himself entirely within the statutory provisions.</p> <p>Preferring Creditors. — There is nothing essentially immoral or dishonest in preferring one creditor to another, or in concealing the fact.</p> <p>Same — Concealment of Preference. — While it is the doctrine in equity that statutes of limitations, cannot be invoked to carry out a fraud, still such principle has no application to a case under the bankrupt law where a creditor, having secured a preference, keeps the same concealed from other creditors.</p>

<p>Petition in review of order of the district court.</p>

<p>Husband and "Wife — Fraudulent Conveyance to W-'ke. — A wife cannot allow tlie husband to use and appropriate her property as his own for years, and incorporate a part of his own means into it, and then, upon a conveyance of the whole from her husband, make valid claim to it as against his creditors.</p>

<p>Judgment — Lien op — Dormant Execution. — Under the laws of New York the lien of a judgment, except as against bona fide purchasers for value and subsequent judgment creditors, attaches to the goods and chattels of the debtor from the time the execution is issued to the sheriff to be executed, though no levy is made, and such lien does not become dormant merely by virtue of instructions to the sheriff to delay his levy.</p> <p>Assignee in Bankruptcy — Takes Subject to Add Liens. — An assignee in bankruptcy takes the property subject to all existing liens, and cannot avail himself of a claim that an execution was dormant at the time of the assignment, if the bankrupt could not.</p> <p>Judgment by Default — Motion to Vacate — Submission to Jurisdiction. — An application by a defendant in an action against whom a judgment by default has been entered, for a vacation of the same, and for other relief, and procuring a stay of proceedings until the hearing and determination of such motion, is such a submission to the jurisdiction of the court as will cure all defects of jurisdiction to the person of such defendant.</p> <p>Fraud — Waiver of Right to Relief. — Complainant’s assignor in bankruptcy held to have waived its right to relief on the ground of fraud before its adjudication in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Illegal Preference — Burden of Proof — Creditor’s Knowledge.— The burden of showing that a creditor of a bankrupt has acquired an illegal preference is upon the assignee seeking to avail himself of that fact. He must show, by a fair preponderance of proof, that the debtor was insolvent, or in contemplation of insolvency, that the security was designed to give a preference, and that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe the insolvency, and knew the security was designed as a preference.</p> <p>Same — Insufficient Evidence to Charge Creditor. — Evidence in this case considered, and held insufficient to charge a creditor, who had obtained a preference for her claim, with reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time.</p> <p>Execution — Lien—Lew after Bankruptcy Proceedings are Commenced. — Where the lien of an execution attached before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the fact that the levy was not made until after-wards is immaterial.</p>

<p>Appeal from district court.</p>

<p>Billiabd Tables — Design Patent — Subsequent Mechanical Patent. — A design patent for a particular style of billiard table, granted more than two years before a mechanical patent for a similar table was issued, does not render the latter void.</p> <p>Same — Bevelled Sides — Utility.—A billiard table having the broad side rails bevelled or inclined inward, so as to give the player opportunity to get his knee under the table, and so constructed as to be cheaper than the curved or ogee form, has sufficient utility to support a patent.</p> <p>Same — Evidence Showing Prior Use. — Evidence in this case showing that tables similar to those described in the patent were in use in this country many years prior to the patent, the hill is dismissed.</p>

<p>Patents — Knitting Machines — Want of Novelty — Infringement.— Certain patents of complainants for “improvements in knitting machines” considered, and held not void for want of novelty, and that certain machines manufactured by defendants were infringements thereon.</p>

<p>Copyright — Giving False Notice op. — Section 4963, Revised Statutes, imposing a penalty for impressing a notice of copyright upon books etc., for which no copyright has been obtained, is only applicable where such notice is so impressed or inserted in an article copyrightable under section 4^52, Revised Statutes.</p> <p>Same — Subject oe — Pattern Prints oe Balloons. — Prints of balloons and hanging baskets, with printing on them for embroidery and cutting lines, showing how the paper may be cut and joined to make the different parts fit together, and not intended as a mere pictoral representation of something, are not copyrightable.</p> <p>Same — Pleading—Complaint.—Where an article mentioned in the complaint for falsely using a notice of copyright may or may not be within the statute, it should be averred to be within it. It must appear that defendant is liable if the complaint is true, not merely that he may be.</p>

<p>Patent — Description in Prior Patent or Publication. — A patent, or printed publication to defeat a patent subsequently obtained must describe the invention so as to enable one skilled in the art to which it belongs or pertains to construct and use it.</p> <p>Same — Subsequent Patentee — A subsequent patentee can acquire no right in the devices of a former patentee included in his machine.</p> <p>Same — Foreign Patent eor Same Invention. — Where a patent for the same invention has been granted in a foreign country, prior to the one allowed in this, the patent here will run 17 years from the date of the issuance of the foreign patent.</p> <p>Same — Injectors eor Steam Boilers. — Claims of certain patents for improvements in injectors for boilers determined.</p>

<p>Patent — Evidence of Use of Simxlab Aeticles at Time of Patent__ Evidence of the manufacture and use of an article similar to that covered by the patent, at the time of its issuance, held proper, as tending to shew what was in existence at the time, though knowledge had not beén pleaded.</p> <p>8ame — Self-Closing Faucet. — Defendant’s patentfor self-closing faucet, where the valve is lifted against a spring by a stem, with projections near the valve working against inclines under the shell, held, not an infringement upon one where the valve is pushed downwards from its seat against a spring by a screw turned by hand, with a swivel to prevent turning the valve with the screw, which lets the valve back when the-screw is released.</p>

<p>Patent — Bill for Infringement of Several Patents — Plea to Whole Bill — Practice.—Where a bill was filed for the infringement of several patents, to which a plea that said patents were not connected in one mechanism, or conjointly used, was interposed, general replication made, and proofs thereon taken, held, that as the plea did nothing but deny an averment in the bill, the complainant was entitled to recover, if it appeared that the defendant’s structure embodied in it an invention covered by only one of said patents.</p> <p>Equity Pleading — Plea—Bad in Substance. — Plea to the whole bill in this case averring that the several patents set forth in the bill are for separate and distinct inventions, not in point of fact connected together in use or occupation, and not in fact conjointly embodied in any mechanism manufactured by defendant., held, bad in substance.</p>

<p>Patent — Improvement in Clothing — Metal Rivets at Edge ov Pocket Opening. — The use of metal rivets, or eyelets, in fastening the end of seams in clothing, at pocket openings, so as to receive the strain from pressure within, keep the same from coming upon the threads of the seam and prevent ripping, is a patentable invention.</p>

<p>Patent — Action fob Infbinqement — Party Complainant. — An action for the infringement of a patent must be brought in the name of the real and beneficial party in interest.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Damages eor Personal Injuries — Stowage—Duty of Owner. — Where a ship’s crew stowed dunnage in the between-decks, held up by braces overhead, and one pile broke away and fell, causing personal injury to a man who was assisting in trimming the cargo of grain then going into the ship, and an action was brought by the man for damages, held, that the ship was liable for the personal injuries caused by the insufficient and careless manner of stowing the dunnage.</p>

<p>Carriers of Passengers — Liability of. — Carriers of passengers are not insurers of the safety and lives of their passengers, hut are bound to the exercise of the utmost knowledge, skill and vigilance.</p> <p>Steamboat — Explosion of Boiler — Negligence.—The explosion of the boiler of a steamboat causing injuries is prima facie evidence of negligence.</p> <p>Negligence — Insufficient Evidence to Rebut. — Evidence in this case considered, and held not sufficient to remove the presumption of negligence arising from the fact of the explosion of the boiler of the boat.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Duty or Tow — Liability or Tug — It is the duty of a tow to be steered properly, to follow in the wake of the tug, and do all that nautical skill requires for the proper management of such tow. Where a vessel being towed carried so much sail that the tug could not, at the critical moment of her entering the harbor, control her either as to course or headway, held, that it should not be liable for damages sustained by such vessel in consequence thereof.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Collision—Damages Allowed. — In consequence of a collision between libellant and defendant, caused by the negligence of the defendant, libellant was obliged to put into port for repairs, by reason of which she lost 11 days’ time in making repairs and waiting for a rise in the river sufficient to float her tows; having, by the delay, lost the benefit of the rise existing at the time of collision. Ueld, that the owner was entitled to recover as damages — (1) The amount of the repairs ; (2) the loss sustained by reason of his failure, in consequence of the collision, to deliver certain coal contracted and in tow; (3) demurrage during the time the boat was delayed in undergoing repairs.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Charter-Party — Breach or — Broker—Damages.— A charter-party stipulated that a vessel should be consigned to certain brokers free of commission; penalty for non-performance, estimated amount of freight. The only benefit to a broker in case of such consignment would have been a probability of employment to procure for the vessel an outward freight, but he would have acquired no legalright to render such service. There was a breach of the charter-party in the consignment of the vessel to a broker other than the one stipulated. Held, that the mere loss of a probable opportunity for employment was too uncertain and speculative a damage on which to base a claim for such breach by the broker named in the charter-party.</p>

<p>miralty — Salvage from Fibe. — A tug that had brought up to a pier and witliin reach of the fire department a barge loaded with alcohol, upon which fire had broken out, held, entitled to salvage, but not as upon derelict property.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Practice—Vacating Order — Appearance.—A motion will not be entertained to vacate, for irregularity, an order made seven years previous and with notice.</p>

<p>Judicial Sale — Order of Confirmation. — An order of confirmation of a judicial sale may cure all irregularities in the course of the proceeding, but can add nothing to the authority of the officer to make it.</p> <p>Same — Denial of Motion to Vacate order of Confirmation— Estoppel. — A party is not estopped from bringing an action to set aside a judicial sale made without authority, by the fact that the court may have overruled the motion to set aside the order confirming such sale.</p> <p>Same — Same—Presumption—Court of Equity. — Where a motion made in a state court of Nebraska, five years after a judicial sale, for a vacation of the order confirming the same, was denied, and no ground for denial appeared in the record, held, that it would be presumed to have been denied because made too late for the court to grant such relief, but that it was not too late for a court of equity to grant such relief as party was entitled to.</p> <p>Judgment — Enforcement and Satisfaction. — In the absence of stat. utory regulation no one but a party, or his attorney or agent, can satisfy a judgment, or direct its enforcement by execution.</p> <p>Same — Sheriff—Has no Control over Judgment. — A sheriff has no interest in or control over a judgment, which may include his fees, that will authorize him to enforce it. If same is settled or discharged he must look to the plaintiff or his attorney for his fees.</p> <p>Same — Clerk—Issuing Execution. — A clerk has, no authority, in tl absence of statutory regulation, to issue execution without the direction of the plaintiff or his attorney.</p> <p>Same — Satisfaction of — Attorney cannot Cancel. — An attorney who has given a release and satisfaction of a judgment cannot, without the consent of the other, cancel the same, and authorize an execution to issue.</p> <p>Execution Sale — Sheriff’s Power. — In making an execution sale a sheriff acts by virtue of a power, and if no power exists nothing passes.</p>

<p>Compromise — Agreement for Enforcement of. — It would seem that where an agreement is*made for the compromise of litigation, involving a great number of details, some not within the subject-matter of the suit, specific performance thereof cannot be compelled upon an interlocutory application.</p> <p>Parties — Transfer by Complainant of his Right — Rights of Assignee — Dismissal__Complainant in this action having, before answer, transferred all his rights and interest therein to defendant Straw, and constituted him his attorney, irrevocable, to prosecute, compromise, etc., such action, held, that the defendant Straw is entitled, if he so desired, to a decree dismissing the hill, without costs.</p>

<p>Promissory'Note — Collateral Security — Holder for Value. — Th« holder of a promissory note, taken as security for a pre-existing debt, is a holder for value, and entitled to be protected as such.</p>

<p>Bridges — Mississippi and Missouri Rivers — Section 2, Act of Congress of July 25,1866 — Passageway Between Piers — Width of. — Section. 2 of the act of congress of July 25,1866, authorizing the construction of bridges across the Mississippi river and across the Missouri river at Kansas City, construed as requiring that the passage way for vessels between the piers of any draw-bridge built under said act shall be 160 feet wide in the clear, measured by a line running directly across the channel, and at right angles with the piers of the bridge. Where a bridge is built diagonally across the river, a measurement along the line of the bridge is not the proper measurement.</p> <p>Same — Same—Grant, When no Protection — The fact that a bridge has been constructed under said act of congress does not render it a legal structure, except in so far as it conforms to the terms and limitations of the act. If the powers granted by the act were exceeded, or were exercised in a manner different from that provided in the grant of authority, the grant will be no protection.</p> <p>Same — Bridge Constructed with too Narrow a Passage Way — Passing Vessel — Liability of Owner. — Although the width between the piers of such a bridge may be less than the act of congress requires, yet • this will not render the owner of the bridge liable for damages to a passing vessel unless the unlawful structure caused or contributed to the injury.</p> <p>Same — Same—Sunken Pontoon Contributing to Vessel’s Injury.— Where it was alleged that a sunken pontoon, placed and kept in the channel by the defendant, had caused a change in the current of the river which had thrown plaintiff’s vessel over against a pier of defendant’s bridge, and that the accident was the result of two causes combined, to-wit, the presence in the channel of the pontoons and of the bridge pier, both unlawful structures, held, that these facts being established plaintiff could recover.</p> <p>Navigable Streams — Wreck in — Change of Current — Liability of one Causing. — Those navigating the river are under no obligation to to remove wrecks which may be made in the ordinary and proper course of navigation, but he who, for his own benefit, uses any part of a navigable river, is liable in damages to any party injured, if such use causes a change in the ordinary course of the channel.</p> <p>Same — Same—Duty to Remove. — If defendant had a right to keep the pontoon in the river in connection with the bridge, and it was sunk by unavoidable accident, defendant was entitled to a reasonable time in which to raise and remove it, but was not at liberty to leave it in the channel for an indefinite period.</p> <p>Collision — Contributory Negligence — Instruction as to. — An instruction to the effect that if the plaintiff has proved the facts necessary to make out his case he must recover, “unless unskilfulness or neglect on the part of plaintiff in handling his boat caused or contributed to the collision,” held, a sufficient charge on the subject of contributory negligence.</p> <p>Navigable Stream — Obstruction in — Party not Entitled to Noticb to Remove. — A person who places an obstruction in the navigable channel of a river is not entitled to notice to remove the same, or to abate the nuisance caused thereby.</p> <p>Vessel — Collision with Bridge — Measure of Damages. — The true rule of damages in suit for injuries done to a vessel by collision, is that the plaintiff shall recover the loss necessarily incurred in repairing the injured vessel, and also for the use of the boat during the time necessary to make the repairs and fit her for business.</p>

<p>Demurrer to Bill.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Creditors Mat Combine to Purchase Property. — The creditors of a mortgagor may fairly combine to purchase the property of the debtor at mortgage sale, and other creditors are not, by such combination, deprived of the right to bid at such sale.</p> <p>Bill to Vacate Decree and Sale — "Want of Equity. — Bill in equity in this case not showing the complainant clearly entitled to all the relief claimed, and as he may, on proper petition and showing, be ad. miíted as a party to the original suit, the bill in which he seeks to attack the decree and sale is dismissed.</p>

<p>Insurance — Explosion Caused bt Fire — Condition nr Policy. — The destruction of a building by an explosion caused by a fire is a loss by fire within the meaning of a provision in the policy of insurance providing that the company shall not be liable for any loss or damage caused by explosion of any kind, unless fire ensues, and then for the loss by fire only.</p>

<p>Husband and Wipe — Wine’s Separate Property — Gift.—Facts in thi3 case considered,’ and held that certain property conveyed to the wife under the will of her father, and held in trust for her by his executors, which by arrangement was by them transferred to the husband, was not intended as a gift to him.</p> <p>Same — Same—Sale op Beal Estate to Husband. — The transfer to the husband of certain real estate as part of such property, held, to have been a sale, and not held by him as trustee for the wife.</p> <p>Same — Claim on Wipe Against Husband’s Bankrupt Estate. — Wife held entitled to prove her claim for such property against the husband’s estate in bankruptcy, and also entitled to interest thereon.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Provable Debts. — Every debt recoverable, either at law or in equity, is provable in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Trust Property — Person Taking with Notice. — Any person receiving trust property with notice of its character takes the same subject thereto, and is chargeable therewith a3 trustee.</p> <p>Same — Use op by Trustee, in his Partnership Business — Liability Created. — Where an administrator, a member of a partnership, used the funds of the estate in the firm business, and the other partners had notice thereof, held, that the firm and its members became jointly and severally liable for such funds.</p> <p>Same — Same—Proop op Claim by Administratrix de bonis. — Where in such case the administrator died, and an administratrix de bonis was appointed in his place, and the firm of which the former administrator was a member became bankrupt, held, that she might prove the claim for such fund against both estates.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Equity Practice — Petition for Rehearing — Verification of. — A petition for a rehearing, on the ground of newly discovered, evidence, which is signed by the petitioner’s solicitor and is verified by him, to the effect that petitioner is a corporation and he is its solicitor, and that such petition is true of his best knowledge, information and belief, is not sufficient. It must show, by some positive testimony, that the evidence, with the use of reasonable diligence, could not have been procured in time for the former hearing, and so the court may judge if reasonable diligence was used.</p> <p>Patent — Action for Infringement — Practice Where Patent Has Been Held Valid in Another Suit. — After a patent is adjudged valid in one action, it may always be shown in another suit against a different defendant, and even in an application for preliminary injunction, in such suit, that the right claimed in the new suit was not fairly in controversy in the former action, or that material facts were not known or considered when the former suit was tried, or that there are relevant matters which were not adjudicated therein.</p> <p>Court — Acts Only Between Parties and as to Actual Issues. — Courts take proofs and render decisions only between parties litigant and as to actual issues.</p>

<p>Patent — Assignee — Bill for Infringement — Infringements Before Assignment. — A bill filed by the assignee of a patent for infringement thereof set forth the infringement while owned by the assignor, an assignment in hwc verba of the patent to the plaintiff, and “ all the' right, interest and claim for and to the past use of said invention and improvements under the said letters patent,” and, in addition to praying for an injunction and for an increase of damages “in addition to the profits and gains to be accounted for by the defendant,” contained a prayer for “ such other and further relief as shall be agreeable to equity,” held, sufficient to entitle complainant to recover for infringements before, as well as after, the assignment to him.</p> <p>Same — Saving in Cost — Profits.—Savings in cost by infringement of patent are recoverable as profits in an action for such infringement.</p> <p>Same — Device Useful Only to Postal Department. — The fact that a patented device can be used only in the postal service of the United States will not prevent the recovery of damages by the patentee for an infringement thereof by a postmaster.</p> <p>Same — Liability of Postmaster Using. — Nor does the fact that the postmaster, who infringed such patent, by making use of such device, turned the moneys saved by its use over to the government, affect his personal liability to such patentee for such infringement.</p> <p>Same — .Jurisdiction of Circuit Court. — Circuit courts of the United States have jurisdiction of all questions arising upon the title to a patent, and to recover for an infringement of it under the laws of the United States.</p> <p>Same — Assignment of. — All interests in patents are assignable in writing, and a purchaser thereof has a right to rely upon the title as appearing from the records of the patent office.</p> <p>Same — Assignment of Property not Exempt from Sale on Execution. A conveyance by a party of all his property, excepting such as is exempt by law from levy and sale under execution, will not pass the title to a patent, though it may operat. ■ upo . a chose in action for past infringement.</p> <p>Equity — Parties to Proceedings. — It is not important in equity proceedings, for every purpose, that all the parties to the controversy should he upon opposite sides in the formal pleadings.</p> <p>Patent — Adjustment of Damages. — Eights of different parties to the damages allowed for certain infringements adjusted and determined.</p>

<p>Patent — Combination — New Elements — Mat be Specially Protected. — A patent for a combination of new elements with, old may secure the new elements by themselves, as well as the combination.</p> <p>Same — Boring Heads — Use op After Expiration of Patent — Injunction. — An injunction restraining the use of certain patented boring heads, manufactured during the term of the patent, is not violated by the use of such heads made after the expiration of the patent, in connection with propelling machinery, not patented, made during its term.</p>

<p>Patent — Bill to Enjoin After Expiration of Patent — What Must be Alleged. — A hill to enjoin the use of a patented device, after the expiration of the patent, must allege that the defendant is using machines manufactured during the existence of the patent, or that the orator fears such use.</p>

<p>Patent — Infringement enjoined during Term — Not Entitled to Discharge upon Expiration. — A party who, during the term of a patent, has been enjoined from using a machine infringing thereon, is not, upon the expiration of such patent, entitled to be relieved from such Injunction as to a machine manufactured during its existence.</p>

<p>Patent — Purchaser op mat belt on Record Title. — So long as he acts in good faith, the purchaser of a patent has a right to rely upon the apparent record title, the same as in the case of real estate.</p> <p>Same — Bona Fide Purchaser — Insufficient Plea. — A plea by a defendant who claims the rights of a dona fide purchaser of a patent, which alleges that he purchased for a “good and valuable consideration,” U insufficient, but the consideration should be set forth in amount, and in traversable form, so that plaintiff may traverse it if- he choose, and the court see that it was adequately valuable.</p>

<p>Patent — “Improvement in Machines for Closing Seams of Mbtahlw Cans ” — Re-issue—Infringement.</p>

<p>Wharfage — Leen for — Ex Paute Easton, 5 Otto, 68, Discussed. — Construction to be given to tiie decision of the supreme court in Ex parts Easton, 5 Otto, 68, in the case of a boat or vessel belonging to the state in which the wharf is situated, considered, and views expressed by district court in this case dissented from.</p> <p>Same — Vessels Coming from Without the State — Inter-State Commerce — Oh. 405, Laws N. V., 1875. — Chapter 405, p. 482, Laws of New York, 1875, and the acts of which it is amendatory, in so far as they authorize a charge for wharfage, in the case of certain boats coming from without the state, additional to that allowed to be made in the case of boats of the same character engaged exclusively in navigating waters within the state, is invalid, as an unlawful taxation of inter-state commerce, and the lien attempted to be given for such wharfage charges cannot be enforced.</p> <p>Same — Lien Under Statute — Right Independent of Statute not Decided. — The libel in this case claiming for wharfage solely under the laws of New York, and the only evidence being as to the statutory right and lien therefor, and it being held that there is no valid statute fixing any rate that can be charged, the questions of a reasonable compensation, and the right of a wharf owner to a general maritime lien therefor are not decided.</p>

<p>Salvage — Excessive Allowance. — Double or excessive salvage is not allowable, except where the circumstances are such as to warrant it.</p> <p>Same — Agreement to pat Excessive Amount — Not enforceable.— Where a steamer, with no passengers and a cargo not perishable, was temporarily disabled, but in no present peril, and a passing vessel refused to render any assistance towards towing her into port except upon an agreement for a sum, under the circumstances, unjust and unreasonable in amount, which was finally assented to, held, that such agreement would not be enforced, and the aiding vessel would be allowed only an amount proper, considering the circumstances and the risks attendant thereto.</p>

<p>Claim for Storage.</p>

<p>Charter Party — “ Customary Dispatch ” in discharging Cargo — Demurrage — A charter-party provided that the vessel to be loaded with lumber should have “customary dispatch” in discharging her cargo at New Y ork, and fixed the demurrage for each day’s detention by the default of the charterers. Beld, that such “dispatch” meant in accordance with or consistently with all known and well-established usages of the port; that charterers were bound to find her a berth where the cargo could be discharged with “customary dispatch,” and without interruption during customary hours, and was liable for the detention, at the agreed rate of demurrage, caused by failure so to do.</p>

In Admiralty. This was a libel in rem to recover damages for a breach of contract made by the master of the propeller Ira Chaffee to carry a certain boiler from Detroit to Oscoda. The boiler was never actually put on board the propeller, nor delivered to her master, as master, although he received it on behalf of the schooner Louisa, on which it was laden and carried to Oscoda.

<p>Vessel — Un seaworthiness of — Defective Limbers. — A vessel sent upon a voyage with, her limbers in such defective condition as to prevent the water coming in at a leak, opened during the voyage, from passing to the pumps, until a large quantity of water had collected in the hold, is unseaworthy, and liable for the damage caused to the cargo by the presence of such water.</p> <p>Same — Payment of Loss by Underwriters — Not an admission that loss was not Caused by Vessel’s Unseaworthiness. — Payment of a loss by the underwriters in such case is no admission by them that such loss was not caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel.</p>

<p>Bill of Lading — Delivery on Wharf — Liability of Vessel. — A bill of lading provided that the goods should be at the risk of owner, consignee or shipper as soon as delivered from the tackles of the steamer at her port of destination. The evidence showing a discharge of the goods upon the wharf at such port, and that they were afterwards taken away by the drayman of the party to whom they were directed, though not the one for whom they were intended, held, that the liability of the vessel had ceased.</p>

<p>Charter-Party — Guaranty of Vessel's Capacity. — A charter-party guaranteed the vessel to be able to stow and carry, on the draft of water allowed by the surveyors of the board of underwriters, at least 1,000 tons dead weight. A survey indicated that the capacity to so stow and carry on such draft was but 925 tons. Held, that the charterers were not bound to accept and load such vessel.</p>

<p>Contract — Capacity to Contract — Law to Govern. — Where a contract is made in one state, to be performed in another, the capacity of the parties to make the contract is, as a general rule, to be determined by the law of the plaee where it is entered into.</p> <p>Sails — Agreement to Marry — Nephew and Aunt. — Where a contract for marriage between nephew and aunt was entered into in Alabama, where such marriages were declared incestuous, upon the trial of an action for a breach of such contract in New York the court charged that, if the parties could lawfully marry in New York, and by the terna of their promises they were to be fulfilled by a marriage in New York, the agreement was valid, and damages for the breach of such contract recoverable. Held, erroneous.</p> <p>Marriage — Validity op — Generally, a marriage valid at the place of solemnization is valid every where.</p> <p>Same — Place op Performance. — It is not the mere place of solemnization of a marriage ceremony, but the plaee where the parties are to be domiciled, that is to be deemed the place of performance of the marriage contract.</p> <p>Same — Nephew and Aunt — Contract to Marry. — While, under the laws of the state of New York, a marriage between nephew and aunt may not be voidable for consanguinity, it by no means follows that an agreement to marry between parties so related will be tolerated, or damages be permitted to be recovered for breach thereof.</p>

<p>Insurance — Equitable Owner — Insurable Interest.— A party in possession of insured, premises, under a valid subsisting contract for purchase of the same, is the equitable owner, and has an insurable interest therein.</p> <p>Same — Same—Representation as to Ownership. — It is not a breach of warranty of ownership for such party, upon an application for insurance of such property, to represent that it is his property, although he may not have paid the entire amount of the purchase money.</p> <p>Same — Conditions in Policy — Representation.—A policy of insurance contained a provision that if there was any false representation by the assured as to the condition, situation, or occupancy of the premises, omission to make known every fact material to the risk, * * * or if the property should be sold or transferred, or any change take place in the title or possession, whether by judicial decree, legal process, voluntary transfer or conveyance, or if the assured was not the unconditional and sole owner, or if his interest was not fully stated, the same should be void. The assured was the vendee in possession, under contract of sale; the policy was also made payable to vendor, to the extent of his interest. In an action upon the policy by such vendor, held, that it was not a misrepresentation for such vendee, in applying for such insurance, to represent himself as the owner of such premises.</p> <p>Same — Change in Occupancy. — Nor was it a “ change of title or possession” for him to have the same occupied by tenants, instead of himself ; but that the change thereby contemplated referred to the possessory right, and not mere occupation.</p> <p>Same — Proofs of Loss — Waiver of Defects in. — Imperfections in preliminary proofs are deemed waived by a repudiation of any liability under the policy to the person entitled to demand payment.</p>

<p>Insurance — Proposition for, Cancellation of Bisk — Conditional Acceptance. — An insurance agent proposed as to a certain risk to cancel the policy in whole or in part, place the risk in another company named, or return the premium. The agent of the insured returned the policy to him, directing that the risk be placed in the company named. The insurance agent wrote “ cancelled” upon the policy, but before reinsuring, the building was destroyed. HM, that as the condition upon which the cancellation was authorized had not been complied with, the insurance company could not insist upon the attempted cancellation as relieving it from liability.</p> <p>Family — Definition of. — A family is a number of persons living together in one house and under one management or head. No specific number is requisite to constitute such family, nor is it necessary that they eat in the same house.</p> <p>Insurance — Condition as to Occupancy. — A policy of insurance upon a building used as a summer hotel provided that a family should live in it throughout the year. It was destroyed by fire in November, and at the time of its destruction two men servants and employes of the insured were staying therein, taking their meals at an adjoining hotel, and working around the premises. Held, sufficient to support a verdict for plaintiff.</p> <p>Same — Same—Instructions.—Instructions as to whether such condition was complied with held proper.</p> <p>Same — Statements made to Agent at Time of Insurance. — Evidence of what was said to the insurance agent at the time of the insurance, as to how the house had been occupied the previous year, held competent, as aiding to arrive at the intention of the parties and true interpretation of the contract.</p>

<p>Adverse Possession — Division Line. — Where one claiming title by virtue of a deed, describing the land according to the United States survey, took possession, marked the dividing line, and occupied thereto exclusively, claiming title as to the true boundary, held, that, although such line was not the true one called for in the deed, the possession was adverse, and, when continued long enough, a bar.</p> <p>Acquiescence — Division Line. — Acquiescence in a dividing line for a period equal to that fixed by the statute of limitations for gaining title by adverse possession, binds the party acquiescing to that line.</p>

The petition states the following facts, viz.: The plaintiff, a citizen of Omaha, was the father of James Sullivan, who, on the twelfth day of July, 1872, was killed by the negligence of defendant, the Union Pacific Railroad Company; that at the time of said killing said James Sullivan was hired by plaintiff to defendant at two dollars per day. Plaintiff sues to recover wages at that rate during the minority of the deceased, about four years.

<p>Bankruptcy — Assignee—Action by, to Vacate Conveyance. — In an action by an assignee in bankruptcy to vacate a conveyance made by the bankrupt as being in fraud of creditors, the burden of proof is upon him to prove such fraud clearly and decisively.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same—Sufficiency of Evidence. — Evidence in this case held insufficient, as against the sworn answers of defendants, to show a conveyance made by a bankrupt to have been in fraud of creditors.</p> <p>Action to Vacate Conveyance — Relief Denied. — Prayer that one of defendants be required to pay amount of a certain note to complainant as assignee, and that the other defendant be required to surrender the same to complainant, denied; it appearing that the holder of such note was dead, and the maker thereof had a valid set-off to the same, and it had been adjusted between the parties.</p> <p>Same — Parties.—In an action by an assignee in bankruptcy to set aside a conveyance made by the bankrupt upon the ground the same is fraudulent as to creditors, the bankrupt is not a proper party.</p>

<p>Patent — Two Tears’ Public Use. — Use of machine hy a patentee In his business for more than two years before applying for a patent, and by workmen under no pledge of secrecy, though the general public were not permitted to visit the shop where it was being used, is such public use as will vitiate the patent therefor.</p> <p>Same — Same.—To constitute public use actual knowledge of an invention need not have been derived by any one interested to practice it It is sufficient if one or more persons, not under a pledge of secrecy, saw the invention practiced, or even might have seen it had they used their opportunities, provided it was, in fact, practiced in the ordinary way after being completed.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Assignee — Rights Acquired. — An assignee in ’bankruptcy, except as to property attacked within tke prescribed time before tke commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, and tkat transferred by conveyances fraudulent and void, takes tke property of tke estate subject to all equities, liens and encumbrances existing against it in the hands of the bankrupt, and takes no greater interest than the bankrupt himself had.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Assignment op Claim to Confer — Fraud—'Validity of Judgment. — The formal assignment of a cause of action to another person, citizen of another state, for the purpose of bringing suit in his name and thereby conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit court that it would not otherwise possess, is a fraud upon the court; but if the defendant in such action, knowing the fact, fails to raise the objection, and the court assumes jurisdiction in the premises, the judgment rendered therein will be valid.</p> <p>Same — Same—Assignee in Bankruptcy. — Where, in such case, the defendant is subsequently declared a bankrupt, the fraud in obtaining the judgment is not one that the assignee or creditors can complain of.</p> <p>Assignee — Fraud of Bankrupt.- — An assignee in bankruptcy is not estopped by the fraud of the bankrupt, but the fraud that he can act upon must be one detrimental to the rights of creditors.</p>

<p>.BANKRUPTCY — CORPORATE STOCK — -FAILURE OR ASSIGNEE TO SECURE Certificates — Action Against Corporation. — A person at the time of liis being adjudged a bankrupt was the owner of a share of stock in a corporation. Subsequently he fled from the jurisdiction, taking tlio certificate with him, and the assignee in bankruptcy had good reason to believe that it was at all times thereafter beyond tlie jurisdiction, fie demanded a transfer of the same on the books of the corporation, and the issuance oí a new certificate, tendering a sufficient bond of indemnity. They refused to comply. Held, that the refusal was without justification, and tho assignee had an appropriate remedy by bill in equity against the corporation.</p>

<p>Injunction — Motion to Dissolve — Special Notice — Former Decision Affirmed.</p>

<p>Railroad — Carriers—Cannot do Express Business. — Railroad companies, as common carriers, are not authorized to carry on an express business.</p> <p>Bxme — Same—Bights of Express Companies. — As such carriers they ara bound to provide for those doing an express business over their road reasonable and necessary facilities for such business, and to all upon equal terms. They cannot insist upon the exclusive right to do such business over their lines of road, nor grant such right to one express company to the exclusion of others, but are bound to carry for every one offering to do the same sort of business upon the same terms.</p> <p>Express Company — Bailroad refusing to Carry for. — Where an express company had, under special contract, been for many years engaged in that business over the system of roads controlled by defendants, and had built up a large and valuable business, and established valuable connections, all of which would be much depreciated if defendant should be allowed to refuse to further allow it to carry on such business over its line of road, held, that for that reason an injunction restraining such action might be granted</p>

<p>Insurance — Oral Application — Force-Pump—Continuing Warranty. True construction of the insurance policy in this case held to be an agreement to insure, according to the policy, and not the plan, the building shown upon a written plan used and referred to in making an oral application for insurance; and the fact that a force-pump was marked -on such plan did not create a continuing warranty that any particular kind of pump should always be maintained ready for use.</p> <p>Same — Continuing Warranty. — To make words used in an application for insurance in the present tense a continuing warranty for the future, it would seem from the weight of authority that the fact referred to should he an important one, as the employment of a watchman, and if it is not important it will not he deemed such warranty.</p> <p>Same — Same—Oral Statement op Pact. — Where the contract of insurance is in writing it would seem that an oral statement of fact in regard to the risk in the application could not be construed into a continuing warranty.</p> <p>Insurance — Increase op Risk. — If there is a single change in a building the jury are to say whether there is an increase of risk; hut where there are two or more changes, one of which increases the risk, it is no answer to the forfeiture provided in case of increase of risk, to sty that something else diminishes it.</p> <p>Same — Same.—An insurance policy provided that the policy should he void if there was any increase of risk from means within the control of the insured. Held, that such condition referred to some permanent change purposely undertaken, and not to something the result of mere negligence on the part of the assured, such as neglecting to have a pump repaired, etc.</p> <p>Same —Mill—Building becoming Unoccupied. — A condition in an insurance policy upon a mill providing that the insurance shall he void if the premises become unoccupied, refers to something more than a mere temporary suspension of work in the mill; and where, insuch case, work had been stopped for five days, the mill, in the meantime, being used for the storage and delivery of goods requiring daily visits by one or two persons, held, that the policy was not void.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Partnership—Conditional Sale. — F. and defendant entered into partnership, P. furnishing $1,500 in cash and defendant $4,500 in goods. Subsequently they dissolved, P. taking the stock and giving defendant notes for his interest, then two-thirds; defendant’s share ta remain as his property until the notes were paid, and all goods purchased in the meantime, in place of those sold, to be substituted to title of defendant. Subsequently, P. becoming embarrassed, defendant, to protect himself, bought the stock, paying something more than his debt, and, within two months thereafter, F. was declared a bankrupt. In an action against defendant, byF.’s assignee, held, that defendant was liable to such assignee for the value of one-third of the original stock on hand, one-third of all that had been purchased with proceeds of original stock, and all of the stock purchased by P. from his own resources, including goods bought on credit and not paid for.</p>

These were rules to remand causes to the state court. The record showed that the above suits were commenced in the court of common pleas of Schuylkill county, Pennsylvania, on September 5,1874. Defendants appeared by counsel, but no declaration was filed, or any further proceedings taken, until November 17, 1879, when defendants filed petitions for the removal of the causes to the United States circuit court.

<p>Mortgage — Interest on Debt after Due — Insurance Pbesoums paid by Mortgagee — Allowances to Mortgagee.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Concealment of Property — Indictment for. — An indictment under the bankrupt law for wilful and fraudulent concealment of his goods by the bankrupt alleged such concealment soma months after the adjudication, “ all then and there the property” of him, the said bankrupt. Held, that the failure to allege specifically that the property concealed was the property of the bankrupt, at the timé of the adjudication in bankruptcy, was a formal defect.</p> <p>Indictment — Defects in. — A particular intent which, by the statute, makes an acta crime is matter of substance, but mistakes in expressing the substance of a crime, if the meaning can be understood, will be looked upon as formal defects.</p>

<p>Vendor and Vendee — Vendee’s Eight to Possession of Land.— Where land is vacant, and a contract ior its transfer is silent as to possession, and the vendee has fully performed on his part, and it only remains for the vendor to make the necessary conveyance, his rights are fixed, and there is an implied agreement or license that the vendee may at once take possession and have the use of the land.</p> <p>Same — Liability of Vendee for Taxes. — A vendee in such case should pay his proportion of taxes thereafter assessed upon such land, and it is no defence against such obligation that the vendor refused to convey to him, but conveyed to another against whom a decree for specific performance has since been entered.</p> <p>Same — Same—Voluntary Payment of Taxes by Trustee. — Where lands which a vendee was entitled to have conveyed to him, were transferred by the vend or to another, who was subsequently held to be trustee for such vendee, and decreed to convey to him, held, that taxes paid by such trustee to protect the title subsequently conveyed to vendee was not a voluntary payment, and he was entitled to reimbursement therefor although the decree of the state court under which such conveyance was made ordered a conveyance “free from encumbrances executed or suffered.”</p>

<p>Municipal Bonds — Petition to Issue to Invest in Railroad Stock— SUEEICIENCT OP — CHAPTER 907, LAWS N. Y. 1869, AS AMENDED BY CH. 925, Laws 1871. — The verification of a petition, under chapter 907, Laws N. Y. 1869, as amended by chapter 925, Laws 1871, for the issuance of bonds by a municipal corporation to be invested in the stock or bonds of a railroad corporation, is a part of such petition, and if such petition and verification, taken together, state the necessary facts required by statute, the county court to whom it is addressed will have jurisdiction.</p> <p>Same — Same—“ Tax Payees.” — Where a petition and verification in such case uses the words “tax payers” it will be deemed to include owners of non-resident lands taxed as such.</p> <p>Same — Bona Fide Holder — Estoppel.—Where a municipality had issued its bonds, under such statute, and invested them in railroad stock, which it retained, and had for a long time paid interest on such bonds, held, that it was estopped, as against a bona fide holder for value of interest coupons thereon, from questioning the validity of such bonds or coupons, but their conduct was a direct ratification of the acts of those who had issued them.</p>

<p>A case of considerable public importance was recently tried in the United States circuit court for the southern district of New York before Judge Shipman and a jury. It was brought by A. T. Stewart & Co. against E. A. Merritt, collector of the. port, to recover duties alleged to have been exacted from the plaintiff in excess of the lawful duties on certain importations of Alexandre’s kid gloves.</p> <p>The gloves were invoiced entered at a valuation of 42 francs per dozen, but the local appraiser raised the value for the purpose of assessing duty thereon to 52 francs per dozen, and thus the importers incurred a penalty of 20 per centum ad valorem upon the assessed value, the latter being 10 per centum over the invoice value.</p> <p>The importers were dissatisfied with the action of the local appraiser, and expressed their dissatisfaction in writing to the collector, who thereupon, in compliance with the requirements of section 2930 of the United States Revised Statutes, appointed a merchant appraiser to act with one of the general appraisers upon a reappraisement of the gloves. The appraisers were unable to agree, and made separate reports to the collector, who adopted the report of the general appraiser, and determined the dutiable value of the gloves to be 49 francs per dozen, while the merchant appraiser had reported that the dutiable value was only 42 francs per dozen. The importers, having been required to pay duties at the rate of 50 per centum ad valorem on the value thus ascertained and determined by the collector, protested against the exaction, and appealed to the secretary of the treasury, and subsequently brought suit.</p> <p>Upon the trial of the suit the plaintiffs sought to introduce testimony as to the fair foreign market value of the gloves, but the counsel for the defendant objected to such testimony, and maintained that an appraisement regularly made was, in the absence of fraud, conclusive against the importer upon the question of the foreign market value of the gloves.</p> <p>After hearing full arguments on both sides, Judge Shipman rendered the following decision.</p>

<p>Surety — Insurance Agent — Application of Moneys Bemitted — Bestbaining Bnfobcement of Judgment. — An insurance agent, by requirement of the company for which he was acting, gave a bond for the faithful performance of his duties, and an accounting of moneys received. At the time of giving such bond he was delinquent to said company on account of past transactions. Such agent afterwards made remittances to the company, directing that they be applied upon past transactions. A judgment at law having been recovered against the sureties on the bond, a bill was filed by them to restrain its enforcement, claiming that the remittances made were from current business, after the bond was given, and should be applied upon such account. Held, that to entitle complainants to the relief prayed, it must appear that the moneys remitted were in fact from current business, and that the company had knowledge of that fact when it received and applied the money on account of former transactions, as directed, and proof not sufficiently showing this, the bill should be dismissed.</p>

<p>Patent — Improvement in Shoes — Gore Flaps — Infringement.</p>

<p>Patent — Improvement in Spurt Protectors — Motion to Open Case to Admit other Defences — Insufficient Affidavit.</p>

<p>County Bonds — New Bonds in lieu of Old — Failure of County to carry out Agreement — Proper Remedy. — Bonds were issued by a county, under an act of the legislature, making it obligatory on the county to levy an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on the bonds as it accrued, and the principal at maturity. Afterwards, the county proposed to the holders of such bonds that if they would scale them 25 per cent., and take new bonds for the reduced sum, the county would annually levy and collect a sufficient tax to pay the interest on the new bonds as it accrued, and the principal at maturity, and that if it failed to do so the holders of the new bonds should be restored to all their rights under the old bonds. New bonds were issued under this agreement, but the county failed to pay the interest thereon, and by reason of the terms of the act under which they were issued could not levy a tax for that purpose. Held, an action at law could be maintained on the original bonds, and that a bill in equity, not seeking for any discovery, would not lie.</p> <p>Surrender of valid Evidence of Indebtedness for one that is invalid — Effect.—Where a valid evidence of indebtedness issued by a county is surrendered by the holder to the county, and a new evidence of debt issued therefor, which is invalid, the legal rights of the creditor are not affected thereby</p>

This suit is on the official bond of the defendant Ambrose, as clerk of the United States circuit court, for failing to make return of all his fees and emoluments. The defendants answered that the attorney general required him to give the bond sued on containing a condition not required by statute, and that said bond having been thus extorted under color of office was void.

<p>United States District Judge — Power to administer Oaths._1. A judge of a district court of the United States has the power to administer oaths in matters arising in his court, or coming before him as a judicial officer of the United States. Such power is incident to his judicial office.</p> <p>Same — Oath on Clerk to Accounts with Government. — 2. The administration by such judge to a clerk of a United States court of the oaths required to be made to his accounts with, and returns to, the government, is such a matter, and is within his power to administer oaths.</p> <p>Clerk’s Accounts — Oath to — Perjury.—3. Whether the sworn statements required to be made by a clerk of a United States court, in his accounts with, and returns to, the government, are “ declarations’’ or “ certificates,” within section 5392 of the United States Revised Statutes punishing perjury, guare.</p>

<p>in Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>Equity — Practice—Motion to attach for Contempt of Injunction. A patent fora lemon-squeezing machine was sold to O. by F., the inventor, who thereafter still made and sold machines a little different. A suit for infringement being brought, and a temporary injunction granted against F., he devised an improvement on O.’s machine, and obtained a patent for it. A motion to attach F. for contempt of the injunction being made, held, that the question between two patents, raised by this second invention, could not be brought up by this motion, although the device was made after the injunction was issued, and the issuing a patent for it forbids the calling it a mere colorable device to avoid the patent of O., without a hearing had and decision made upon that question.</p>

<p>Patent — Prior Use.</p>

<p>Judgments — Binding Effect of. — Judgments and decrees are conclusive evidence of facts only as between parties and privies.</p> <p>Patent — Improvement in Skirt Protectors — Construction of.— There being no evidence in this case impeaching the prima facie effect of the patent involved, being one for improvement in skirt protectors, it is construed with reference to prior existing devices to ascertain its scope.</p>

<p>Patent — Device Patentable. — A device which is merely the result of' mechanical shill is not patentable.</p> <p>Same — Same—Rubber Window Cleaners. — A device for cleaning windows, consisting of a handle or holder, with an elastic or rubber strip attached to one edge, with a tubular rubber bearing or support therefor,, embodies nothing but mechanical skill and is not patentable.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Collision—Failure or1 Vessel to keep good Lookout and avoid a Vessel entitled to hold her Course. — Evidence considered, and the collision complained of in this case held to have been caused by the failure of defendant to keep a proper lookout, and in not keeping out of the way of the libellant’s vessel, entitled to hold her course.</p>

In Admiralty. Exceptions to answers and motion for decree pro confesso» This was a libel by James H. Todd against the bark Tulchen in rem filed September 26, 1879, setting forth that while the vessel was lying at a wharf on the Delaware river at Philadelphia her master employed a firm of ship carpenters to line the vessel for grain who in turn employed libellant as a journeyman to assist in the work.

<p>Charter-Party — Demurrage—All possible dispatch. — A vessel was loaded with laths, in New Brunswick, for New York, under a charter specifying that she was to be loaded “with all possible dispatch.” She was compelled to await her turn for cargo, and was thereby detained five days, and was also detained by tide, and also at the place of discharge. Suit being brought for the demurrage, held, that demurrage could be allowed only for the detention in loading, upon the evidence.</p> <p>A provision of charter-party for loading “ with all possible dispatch” construed.</p> <p>The case of The Mary E. Taber approved and followed.</p>

<p>Draft — Agreement to accept — Conditions — Must be complied with. — Where an agreement was to pay the draft of J. B. & Bro,, with bills of lading attached, held, that to make the promissor liable thereon there must be a literal compliance with the conditions, and the presentation of a draft drawn by A. D. B. & Bro., or one unaccompanied by bill» of lading, was not sufficient compliance, although the names J. B. & Bro. and A. D. B. & Bro., were used by the same firm interchangeably, and the property represented by the bills of lading to be attached came into the possession of the promissor.</p> <p>Conditional Contract — Action to enforce — Burden of Proof.— In an action to enforce a special and conditional contract, the burden is on the plaintiff of showing an actual compliance with the conditions imposed.</p> <p>Draft — Agreement to accept — When must be presented. — Where no time is specified within which a draft agreed to be accepted shall be presented, it must be presented within a reasonable time.</p> <p>Same — Unreasonable Delay in presentation. — Delay of more than a year in the proper presentation of a draft agreed to be accepted, is unreasonable.</p>

<p>Removal of Cause — Delay in filing Record — Remanding.—The only necessary consequence of failure to file the record of a case removed from a state court, under the act of March 3, 1875, by the first day of the next term after the application for removal, or within 20 days after such application, is to create a liability on the bond. Unnecessary delay, amounting to laches, in filing such record, prejudicing the other party, may be ground for remanding the case; but the party is not entitled for such cause, as matter of right, to have it remanded. Delay in filing record in this cause held not sufficient ground for remanding cause to state court.</p>

<p>Federal Court — Jurisdiction—State Statute directing that Action shall be in State Court. — The fact that a state statute may provide that all actions of a particular character arising within its limits shall be brought in a certain state court, will not affect the jurisdiction of federal courts in sueh actions, otherwise competent.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same.—A state statute provided that guardians might be licensed to mortgage the estate of their wards, but that foreclosure of such mortgages should only be made by petition to certain state courts. Held, that mortgagee was not thereby precluded from bringing action for the foreclosure of such mortgage in the federal courts, the citizenship of parties and amount involved being sufficient to confer jurisdiction.</p>

<p>Coupons — Payable to Bearer — Assignee op Cause op Action. — The holder of a coupon payable to bearer is not an a°ssignee of a cause of action within section 1, act March 3, 1875, (18 TJ. S. St. at Large 470.)</p> <p>Demurrer — Facts relied upon in support op, not pleaded. — Questions raised in argument as the ground of demurrer ought not to be disposed of on a demurrer to a complaint failing to make averment of facts in the cause which it is claimed vitiate the proceeding. They can only be disposed of when developed on the trial.</p>

<p>Constitution —Disinterment of Chinese. — The statute of California making it an offence to disinter or remove from the place of burial the remains of any deceased person without a permit, for which a fee of $10 must be paid, does not violate subdivision 3 of section 2, article 1 of the constitution of the United States, providing that “ congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.”</p> <p>Bame. — Nor does it violate subdivision 2 of section 10, article 1, providing that “no state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any impost or duties on *■ * * exports.”</p> <p>Bame. — Nor is it in conflict with the fourteenth amendment, which prohibits any state from denying to “ any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”</p> <p>Bame. — Tbeaty with China. — Nor does it violate the fourth article of the treaty with China, called the Burlingame treaty, which provides that “ Chinese subjects in the United States shall enjoy entire liberty of conscience, and shall be exempt from all disability or persecution on account of their religious faith or worship.” 16 Stat. 740.</p> <p>Bame. — The act is a sanitary measure within the police powers of the state, and as such is valid.</p> <p>A Corpse is not Property, and the remains of human beings carried out of the state for burial iu a foreign country are not exports, within the meaning of the clause of the national constitution prohibiting the laying of imposts or duties by tbe state upon exports.</p>

<p>These actions were founded upon policies of insurance against fire issued by the defendants to the plaintiff upon Washburn Mill A, Minneapolis, Minn. The defence was that the loss was occasioned by an explosion, and, therefore, fell within the exceptions given, at length in the following opinion. A jury was waived, and the cases submitted to the court upon the proofs:</p> <p>The evidence established the fact that a destructive fire had commenced and had been burning some minutes, when it communicated with an explosive material in the mill, known as flour dust, causing an explosion which destroyed and consumed the entire premises.</p>

<p>Motion for new trial.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Application foe Discharge — Objections to — Creditors CONSENTING INSUFFICIENT IN YALUE — INTEREST ON Hr.ATM— Proof of Debt — Rejection of — Failure to keep proper Books— Judgment by Default — Effect of — Secondary Evidence.</p>

<p>Patent — Improvements in Form op a Patented Machine — Machín» Different in Form, but Producing the Same Results.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Negligence.—A ship coming up to a pier in the harbor of New York, in tow of a tug, was necessarily allowed to strike the side of a schooner, lying at the pier, in swinging into her berth. The touching was foreseen by those on the schooner, as well as on the ship, and fenders were put out. The schooner’s rail was broken in and her side badly damaged, and the owner libelled both the ship and her tug. Held, that the tug was not liable, but the ship was liable for negligence, in olacing her fender imm-operly, for the damage to the broken rail.</p>

<p>Homestead — Married Woman — Contract- for Mortgage before Marriage. — A contract for the loan of money upon mortgage security will not defeat the wife’s right of homestead, under the statute of Iowa, upon the subsequent marriage of the mortgagor before the execution of the mortgage.</p>

The original suit was a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage upon the Central Railroad of Iowa. In the course of the proceedings a receiver was appointed to operate the road, and while the road was in his hands one A. McKay was injured, as is claimed, by the negligence of the receiver’s agents, engaged in running a train of freight ears.

<p>Demurrer to amended replication.</p>

<p>Pleading — Contract Containing Mutual Conditions. — In an notion for the breach of a contract containing mutual conditions, performance or readiness to perform must be averred by the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Contract — Fraud — Ratification. — Inexcusable delay will operate ae a ratification of a fraudulent contract.</p>

<p>Indictment — Duplicity — Circulars Concerning Lotteries — Bey. St. ? 3894. — An indictment is not bad for duplicity which, charges that on a certain day a certain number of circulars concerning a certain lottery were deposited at the post-office to be sent by mail.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same—Same.—An indictment is bad for duplicity which charges that on a certain day, and on each secular day between that day and another day named, and on each secular day between that time and another subsequent time mentioned there were deposited in the post-office a certain number of circulars concerning a certain lottery for the purpose of being sent by mail.</p> <p>Same — Same—Surplusage—Where two distinct offences are each set out in adequate terms, an indictment is had for duplicity, and neither allegation can he rejected as surplusage.</p>

<p>Indictment — Murder—Manslaughter.—Key. St. §§ 5359, 5341,1035.</p>

Bill in equity by the assignee in bankruptcy of John Ramsey against Walter S. Kneedler to recover the value of property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed by the bankrupt to respondent, and subsequently sold by the latter. An answer was filed denying the fraud, and the case was referred to an exai ■ 'ner to take testimony.

<p>Bankruptcy — Composition—Bankrupt Act, f 29. — The amended sections of the bankrupt act, relating to composition, are within the purview of section 29 of the bankrupt act.</p>

Exceptions to. the report of a master appointed to state an account of the profits realized by defendants by reason of an infringement of. complainants’ patent, and also to assess the damages caused by such infringement.

<p>Patent — Improvement in Overshoes — Water-Proof Flaps — Infringement.</p>

<p>Patent — Privies to Interference — Improvement in Coffee & Spice Mills.</p>

<p>¡Patent — Improvement in Coffee Mills.</p>

<p>Patent — New Parts in Patented Combination — Infringement.—It is an infringement to use in combination any of the new parts of a patented combination.</p>

<p>Patent — Infringement—Computation of profits.</p>

<p>Patent — Improvement in Dissolving Xyloidine foe use in the Abes,</p>

in Admiralty. Exceptions to report of commissioner appointed to report as to the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of a vessel under admiralty process. The brig E. A. Barnard was registered at St. Andrews, New Brunswick, and sailed under the British flag, but was owned by her master, S. P. Willeby, who resided at Philadelphia. In the spring of 1879, upon the return of the vessel from a voyage to the Mediterranean, she had extensive repairs made to her at Philadelphia.

<p>Admiralty — Maritime Service. — The removal of ballast from a foreign vessel, while ia port, for the purpose of putting her in condition to receive cargo for an intended voyage, constitutes a maritime service.</p>

<p>Admiralty — Maritime Service. — The weighing, inspecting and measuring of the cargo of a vessel constitutes a maritime service.</p>

<p>Chinese Treaty — Constitution.—The statute of California prohibiting all aliens incapable of becoming electors of the state from fishing in the waters of the state violates the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, also articles 5 and 6 of the treaty with China, and is void.</p>

Motion to Eemand. This suit was originally brought to the September term, 1878, of the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri, and it could have been tried at that term if the issues had been joined and the parties had been ready. At that term the defendants interposed a demurrer to the petition, which was argued and submitted, and taken under advisement by the court.

<p>Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>Mortgage — Future Advances. — A mortgage given to secure future advances, at a time when no indebtedness existed, is valid.</p> <p>.Debtor and Creditor — Application op Money. — Where money has been received in part payment of a running account, and no specific application has been made of the same, a chancellor can, in his discretion, apply such money to that portion of the account which rem:iins unsecured, without regard to the order of time in which the indebtedness for the several items of account was incurred.</p> <p>Mortgage — Decedent’s Estate — Proop op Debt. — Proof of a debt against the estate of a deceased mortgagor, and receipt of a dividend from the assets of the same, does not extinguish a mortgage given to secure a part of such debt.</p>

In the matter of the petition of J. B. Gfrinnell, asking an order restraining the master from reporting on accounts of Grinnell, ex-receiver, which had been made and previously reported upon.

This was an indictment, under section 5440 of the Bevised Statutes, for conspiracy against the government. One Lewis had died at Hoboken, devising the greater part of his estate to his executors, in trust, to be applied by them to the reduction of the national debt incurred in the war with the rebellion. Jane H. Lewis had filed a caveat to the will containing this devise, and had adduced a large mass of testimony to prove that she was the widow of the testator.

On demurrer to an indictment under, section 5438, U. S. Bev. St. for making, as clerk of a United States court, false claims against the government.

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Sur exceptions of the Dollar Savings Bank to register’s report disallowing attorney’s commission.</p>

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Sur petition of G. I. Davis for amendment of return to order of sale, etc., and rule to show cause.</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Mortgage—Fraudulent Preference.</p>

<p>Patent — Date of Invention — Burden of Proof. — When the applicacation fails to take the date óf the invention hack of the date of the patent, and the defendant makes out prior knowledge and use by-others, beyond any fair or reasonable doubt, as the law requires, the burden is shifted on to the plaintiff to show invention or discovery by the patentee still prior to that time.</p> <p>Same — Amendment of Application — Authority of Attorneys. — The former attorneys of a-deceased inventor have no authority to amend an application for letters patent, unsupported by the oath of the personal representative of the decedent.</p> <p>Same — Same—Same—Pleading.—Such objection need not he specifically set forth in the answer, in the absence of a statutory requirement.</p>

Final hearing on pleadings and proofs. Bill in equity on patent for an “improvement in horse hay rakes,” granted to J. H. Shireman, October 8, 1867, and re-issued to J. E. Wisner, as his assignee, December 11, 1877.

<p>Patent No. 221,721 Sustained, and Heed not to Ihebismm the Oxazu of Patent No. 220,126.</p>

<p>Loading Cargo — Duty of Master. — It is the duty of a master, when fully cognizant of the facts, to determine when the vessel has taken as much cargo at a wharf as is prudent, in view of the depth of the water, although the cargo is being loaded by the shippers.</p>

<p>In Admiralty.</p> <p>Collision between the steam-tug Conroy and barge “E,” and the schooner Dexter.</p>

<p>Negligence — Boat in Tow of Tug — Landing Barge. — A tug cannot expose a boat in its tow to any unnecessary peril in the course of the voyage, while leaving a barge in its tow at an intermediate landing.</p> <p>Same — Liability of Tug-Boat Pilot. — A tug-boat pilot must ordinarily be held to be able to anticipate the action of the wind and sea on boats in his charge.</p> <p>Same — Contributory Negligence — Master of Boat. — The master of a towed boat is not chargeable with contributory negligence in acquiescing in the exposure of such boat to an unnecessary peril by the tugboat pilot, unless the danger about to be incurred is very obvious.</p>

In Admiralty. This was a libel filed by the owners of the schooner R. P. Mason to recover damages sustained in a collison with the schooner Bertie Calkins, on Lake Michigan. The case made by the libel was this: On the first of May, 1874, the Mason sailed from Manistee for the port of Milwaukee. At 10:30 o’clock v. m., and after the vessel had cleared Point Au Sable, her course was laid S. S. W. for Milwaukee.

<p>Collision — Facts Determined.</p>

<p>Bill op Lading — Delivery op Cargo — “ Quantity and quality unknown” — Burden op Proop. — Where wheat was shipped to Prance by several parties under bills of lading, specifying that the quantity and quality of the wheat was unknown, and suit was brought for nondelivery of the whole amount, held, that the burden of proof was on the libellants to show the quantity of wheat delivered in Havre, and their case must fail for lack of evidence — the claimants of the ship showing that all the wheat shipped was delivered, and the bills of lading surrendered by the consignees.</p>

<p>Collision — Anchor Light — Burden or Proof. — In a case of collision the libellant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a necessary light was set and burning.</p>

<p>Petition against Proceeds.</p>

<p>Bemotal. — A suit brought in a court ol the state oí Nevada, by a citizen of California against a citizen of England, may be removed into the circuit court under act of March 3, 1875.</p>

<p>Corporation — Indorsement—Condition—Waiver.—A breach of the condition does not- relieve a corporation from liability upon a conditional indorsement, where performance of such condition has been duly waived.</p> <p>Garnishment — Trustee—Receiver.— The earnings of a railroad are attachable in the hands of a trustee, although they came into his possession as the receiver of a connecting railroad.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction — State Statute. — The fact that an action is wholly founded upon a state statute does not necessarily defeat the jurisdiction of the circuit court.</p>

<p>Mortgagor and Mortgagee — Injury to Security. — 'Where the mortgagor is insolvent, a mortgagee may maintain an action lor aa unauthorized injury to the mortgage security.</p>

<p>In Equity. Hearing on pleadings and proofs.</p>

<p>Taxation — Collection—Injunction—Jurisdiction.</p>

•Case stated between R. D. Wood & Co., plaintiffs, and Fergus Gr.

<p>Fbaud — Cor vex arce — Married Woman. — A conveyance to a married woman in fraud of her husband’s creditors is valid as to a subsequent creditor with notice.</p> <p>—Same—Married Woman — Trust.—Such conveyance will not create a trust in the wife for tue benefit of her husband.</p>

<p>Rent — Distress—Goods of Stbastger — Auctioneer.—Tlie goods of z third person on the premises of an auctioneer for the purpose of sale, are not liable to distress for rent, even although the auctioneer may have made advances thereon for which he may have a lien.</p>

<p>Register — Summons—Trustee Under Section 43 oe the Bankrupt Act. — A register in bankruptcy bas no power, on the mere application of creditors, to issue a summons for the examination of a trustee, or for the production by him of the books and papers mentioned in the summons, where such trustee has been duly appointed under section 43 of the bankrupt act.</p>

<p>In Equity. Bill for infringement of two patents.</p>

<p>Salvage — Apportionment—Decree.—It is proper to direct an apportionment of a salvage recovery before it is paid out of the registry.</p> <p>Same — Notice to Crew — Duty of Libellant__Where the crew have not received the usual notice by publication to come in and make claim upon the vessel attached, or upon the fund in court, it is incumbent upon the libellant, when not acting in the interest of such crew, to bring them in or have them duly notified to come in for the purpose of making the apportionment.</p>

<p>Golhsion — Libel—Essential Avebments — Admiraltt Bule S3.</p>

<p>Sontraot — Parties—Railroad—Directors.—A contract between a railroad and a construction company is void where any of the directors of the railroad are members of the construction company.</p> <p>Bake — Estoppel—Ratification.—The stockholders of the railroad ara not estopped by long acquiescence in such contract, nor can the same be ratified by a board of directors composed in part of members of the construction company.</p> <p>Bake — Equitable Relief — Public Policy. — Public policy will not permit a court to grant equitable relief under such contract, where it further appeared, upon the face of the contract, that each director of the railroad received a pecuniary consideration for entering into the contract.</p>

<p>Taxation — Gas Companies — Statute of Illinois. — The legislature of the state of Illinois intended by the act of March 13, 1872, § 3, clause 4, as amended by the act of May 13, 1879, to except all manufacturing companies, except gas companies, from a capital stock tax.</p> <p>Same — Same—Constitution of Illinois. — The legislature of the state of Illinois can constitutionally assess and tax the capital stock of gas companies, while it exempts the stock of purely manufacturing companies from such taxation.</p>

<p>Like Insurance — Policy—“Die by bis own Hand.” — A. man does not “ die by Ms own band,” within the meaning of a clause in a life insurance policy, although he puts an end to his life, if impelled to the act by an insane impulse which he has not the power to resist, or commits the act without a knowledge, at the time, of its moral character, and its sonsequences and effiects.</p> <p>Insanity. — “ In law a man is insane when he is not capable of understanding (1) that a design is unlawful, or that an act is morally wrong; or, (2,) understanding this, when he is unable to control his conduct in the light of such knowledge.”</p>

<p>Bankruptcy — Composition Proceedings — Contingent Liability— Stockholder. — A stockholder’s contingent liability will not be discharged by composition proceedings where the bankrupt has not included such liability in his statement of debts.</p>

<p>Patent — Prior Use of Invention.</p>

<p>Patent — Inception of Invention. — “ A patentee whose patent is assailed upon the ground of want of novelty may show, by sketches and drawings, the date of his inceptive invention, and if he has exercised reasonable diligence in perfecting and adapting it, and applying for his patent, its protection will be carried back to such date.”</p>

<p>Infringement — Suit by Married Woman. — In. the southern district of Mew York a married woman is not disqualified by reason oí coverture from bringing and maintaining a suit in her own name, without joinder of her husband, for the infringement of a patent within the state of Mew York.</p>

<p>Patent for Coffee Polishing. — The first claim, of a patent being abandoned at the trial, and no defence being made to the averment of infringment of the second claim, held, that a decree must be given against the defendant for infringement of the second claim.</p>

<p>■Collision — Burden op Pkoop. — The burden is on a steam-boat to clearly prove that the luffing of a sloop would have saved a collision made imminent by the negligence of such steam-boat.</p>

Í» Admiralty. FACTS FOUND BY THE COURT. 1. A collision occurred between the American schooner Newell B. Hawes, owned by the libellants, and the British •steamer Sarmatian, at about 5 :45 in the morning of November 29, 1878, in the waters of Chesapeake bay, five miles or thereabouts north by west from Cape Henry. The night was-, clear, but a slight haze rested on the water. 2. The schooner was a small craft, chiefly employed in the-oyster trade.

<p>Collision — Negligence—Bate op Spee®,</p>