Volume 205 — United States Reports

Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Co., 205 U.S. 1 (1907), was a cause of action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate, Adam M. Schlemmer, while trying to couple a shovel car to a caboose.

Tinsley v. Treat, 205 U.S. 20 (1907), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that found while an indictment in a removal proceeding constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause, it is not conclusive, so evidence put forth by a defendant showing that no offense triable in the district to which removal is sought had been committed is admissible, and its exclusion is not mere error, but the denial of a right secured under the Federal Constitution.

Kessler v. Treat, 205 U.S. 33 (1907), was a decision in which the Supreme Court of the United States adjudicated allegations that prisoners were unlawfully imprisoned by Morgan Treat, the United States Marshall for the Eastern District of Virginia. In a one-sentence opinion written by Chief Justice Melville Fuller, the Court identified ten cases for which the Court entered the same decree as the one issued in Tinsley v. Treat. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented without writing a separate opinion.

Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907), was a United States Supreme Court case involving a Nebraska statute that prevented and punished desecration of the flag of the United States and prohibited the sale of articles upon which there is a representation of the flag for advertising purposes. Halter was charged under this law for printing the flag on the label of a bottle of beer, for which he was fined $50 plus the costs of the prosecution. The court upheld the law. More recent case law, Texas v. Johnson (1989) and United States v. Eichman (1990), holds that flag desecration is protected by the First Amendment.

Citizens' Sav. & Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 205 U.S. 46 (1907), was a suit brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, the Belleville & Southern Illinois Railroad Company, the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company (205 U.S. 46, 47), all Illinois corporations (to be hereafter called, respectively, the Illinois, the Belleville, and Terre Haute companies), and the United States Trust Company, a New York corporation. The last named corporation was never served with process and did not appear in the suit. The case presents a question as to the jurisdiction of the court below.

Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907), was a case concerning whether it is an appropriate exercise of the police power of the state to regulate the use of mining properties, and that mine owners are not deprived of their property, privileges, or immunities without due process of law, or denied the equal protection of the laws, by the Illinois Mining Statute of 1899, which requires the employment of licensed mine managers and mine examiners and imposes upon the mine owners liability for the willful failure of the manager and examiner to furnish a reasonably safe place for the workmen.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE THIRD DIVISION OF THE TERRITORY OF ALASKA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The general power of the States to control and regulate, within their borders, the business of dealing in, or soliciting orders for, the purchase of intoxicating liquors is beyond question.</p> <p>The purpose of the Wilson act, 26 Stat. 713, as a regulation of interstate commerce was to allow the States to exert ampler power as to intoxicating liquors when the subject of such commerce than could have been exercised before the enactment of that statute, which enabled the States to extend their authority as to such liquor shipped from other States before it became commingled with the mass of other property in the State by a sale in the original package.</p> <p>Since the enactment of the Wilson law, .which expressly- provides that intoxicating liquors coming into a State should be as completely under control of the -State as though manufactured therein, the owner of intoxicating liquor in one State cannot, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, go himself or send his agént into another State and, in defiance of its laws, carry on the business of soliciting proposals for the purchase óf such liquors.</p> <p>Although a State may not forbid a resident therein from ordering for his own use"* intoxicating liquor from another State it may forbid the carrying on -within its borders of the business of soliciting orders for such liquor although such orders' may only contemplate a contract resulting from final acceptance in another State. Vance v. W. A. Vandercoolc Co.', 170 U. S. 438, distinguished.</p> <p>The law of South Dakota imposing an annual license charged on travelling ■salesmen selling, offering for sale, or soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors in quantities of less than five gallons is not unconstitutional because repugnant, to the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>The highest court of South Dakota having 'held that the act imposing a license on travelling salesmen soliciting orders for intoxicating liquors is a police regulation and not a taxing act, it is within the purview of, and riot in conflict with, the Wilson act. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17, followed.</p> <p>104 N. W. Rep. 539, affirriied.</p>

. The Bethlehem Steel Company recovered a judgment in the Court of Claims (41 C. Cl. 19) for the sum of $21,000 against the appellant, from which judgment the United States, has appealed to this court.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.</p>

<p>Constitutional rights like others are matters of degree and a street opening statute which has stood for a long time will not be declared unconstitutional as taking property without compensation because in a particular instance the amount assessed under the strict- letter of the statute exceeded the value of the property, but the statute should be 'so interpreted, as is possible in this case, so that the apportionment of. damages be limited to the benefit.</p>

Held: then of course said court had jurisdiction, and even if under the practice of the Massachusetts courts, which does not appear, and the presumption would be against it, it was requisite to notify the -defendant of the motion for *143 judgment on the verdict, the failure to give such notice would be a mere irregularity and not a jurisdictional defect.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The Court of Claims filed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:</p> <p>“I. The claimant, Donn C. Mitchell, was enrolled in the - Volunteer Army, during the Spanish war, as second lieutenant of Troop E,.First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, on the 3d day of May, 1898. He1 served in the grade of second lieutenant until promoted to first lieutenant October 20, 1898. He was mustered out as'first lieutenant October 23, 1898. His entire service was within the limits of the United States.</p> <p>“II. While on duty as second lieutenant of the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry at Huntsville, Ala., during the Spanish war, claimant received the following order:</p> <p>“ ‘.Headquarters 1st Ohio Volunteer Cavalry,</p> <p>“. ‘Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala., August 24,1898.</p> <p>“‘Special Orders, L “‘No. 44. j</p> <p>“ ‘I. 1st Lieut. William D. Forsyth, 1st Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, having been ordered before a board for examination for appointment as second lieutenant in the Regular Army, is hereby relieved of the commancf of Troop E. He will turn over the property, funds, and records of the troop to his successor.</p> <p>“ ‘II. 2d Lieut. Donn C. Mitchell, 1st Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, is hereby appointed to the command of Troop E. • He will receipt ,to Lieut. Forsyth for the property and funds pertaining to the troop.</p> <p>“ ‘By order of Lieut. Col. Day:</p> <p>“ ‘ (Signed) A. C. Rogers,</p> <p>“ ‘Captain and Regtl. Adj. 1st Ohio Vol. Cav.’</p> <p>“This order was approved by the commanding general in the field in the following orders:</p> <p>“ 'Headquarters Fourth.Army Corps,</p> <p>“ ‘Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala., September 2, 1898.</p> <p>“ ‘ Special Orders,}</p> <p>“ ‘No. 97. f</p> <p>* * * . * * * $</p> <p>“ ‘II. It appearing from evidence that the following-named officers of the First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry have exercised the functions of commanders above that pertaining to the grades held by them from and after the dates set opposite their respective names, the assignment thereto contemplated by General Orders, No. 86, current series, Adjutant-General’s Office, is confirmed, namely:</p> <p>* * * * * * *</p> <p>“ ‘2d Lieut. Donn C. Mitchell,'as captain, from August 24th, 1898'.</p> <p>* * * * ^ * ' He *</p> <p>“ ‘By command of Major-General Coppingef :</p> <p>“ ‘ (Signed) . Clarence K. Edwards,</p> <p>" ‘Assistant Adjutant-General.’</p> <p>“Under these orders claimant exercised command of Troop E from August 26, 1898, to October 23, 1898, when he was mustered out with his regiment.</p> <p>“So much of G. 0. No. 86, A. G. 0., of 1898, as relates to the matter of pay for exercising a higher command, is as follows:</p> <p>General Orders, 1 “ ‘ Headquarter's of the Army,</p> <p>No. 86. ) “ ‘Adjutant General’s Office,</p> <p>“ ‘Washington, July 2, 1898.</p> <p>“ ‘ I. In section 7 of the act “ For the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States,” approved April 26, 1898, it is provided “That in-time of war every officer serving with troops operating against an enemy who shall • exercise, under assignment in orders issued by competent -authority, a command above that pertaining to his grade, shall be entitled to receive the pay and allowances of the grade appropriate, to the command so exercised.” :</p> <p>“ ‘The Attorney General has held .that this clause “was intended to apply to all instances where the troops of the United States are assembled in separate bodies, such as regiments, brigades, divisions, or corps, for the purpose of carrying on and bringing to a conclusion the war with Spain,” but that “all service, in the Army at the present time is not to be considered as operating against ah enemy. Troops and their officers on the western frontiers, performing the same service as garrisons which is requisite in time of peace, and in no wise considered a part of the Army assembled, to carry on the war with Spain, would not be within the meaning of the act.”</p> <p>“ ‘To entitle an officer to the pay of a grade above that actually held by him the assignment in orders under the clause cited must be by the written order of the commanding general in the field or the Secretary of War, and no pay or allowances of a higher grade than that actually held by an officer will be paid under this provision except when a certified copy, in duplicate, of such order, with statement of service, is filed with the paymaster. . . .</p> <p>■ “ General Orders, No. 86, was amended by General Orders, No. 155,. dated September 27, 1898, by striking out the above portion of the order, and on the same date Circular No. 18, promulgating this order, was amended by striking out the portion above quoted and inserting in lieu thereof the following language, to wit:</p> <p>“ 'To entitle an officer to the pay of a grade above that actually held by him under section 7 of the act of Congress approved April 26, 1898, he must be assigned in orders issued by competent authority to a command appropriate to such higher grade of troops operating against the enemy.’ (Circ. No. 39, A. G. 0., Sept. 27,-1898.) ■</p> <p>. ''At the time that he assumed and during the time that he exercised command of troop E he was the senior officer present with the troop.</p> <p>“The Treasury Department, from the decision of the Comptroller of March 31, 1899 (5 Comp. Dec., 641), to the decision of the court in the Humphreys case (38 C. Cls. R., 689) on May 25, 1903 (pp. 15-16), recognized this sort of orders, so subsequently confirmed, as sufficient authority for the higher pay. Under similar orders, subsequently affirmed, all officers were paid either by the Pay Department or by the Treasury Department in claims presented after the war.</p> <p>. “III. From August 26, 1898, to October 19, 1898, claimant was originally paid the rate due a, second lieutenant of cavalry, and from October 20 to October 23, 1898, he originally received the pay of a first lieutenant of cavalry. He subsequently filed á claim for additional pay for command of the •troop and was paid by the Auditor, for the War Department, October 30, 1899, the pay of a captain for the entire period from August 26, 1898, to October 23, 1898.</p> <p>. “ IV. On the 14th day of September/ 1898, a furlough of thirty days for said regiment was authorized under General Orders, No. 130, A. G. 0., 1898, and amendatory. circulars. The above-named claimant did not receive such furlough. From the beginning of the furlough to September 26, 1898, the said claimant was sick in Mount Carmel Hospital, Columbus, Ohio. From September 26, 1898, to the end of the furIpugh period he'was detained for duty and actually performed duty. During the whole furlough period he was at all times subject to the orders of his superior officers until final muster out. Claimant was first taken sick at Huntsville, Ala., before the furlough, but accompanied his regiment to the home. station at Columbus, Ohio, where he was placed in the hospital by officers of said regiment, the surgfeon being absent. While at the hospital claimant performed some military service by directing a clerk employed by him for that purpose.</p> <p>“V. If claimant is entitled to retain the pay already received by him, the amount due him as extra pay at the.rate due a captain, mounted, is $166.66.</p> <p>“If entitled to extra pay at the rate due a second lieutenant, mounted, the amount due is $125. .' . '</p> <p>“If entitled to extra pay and not entitled to retain the pay of a captain as stated in finding 3, there should be deducted from the extra pay allowed the sum of $79.44.”</p> <p>The court rendered judgment for the claimant in the sum of $166.66. • 41 C. Cl. 36. '</p>

This suit was instituted in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by the plaintiff in error, a.citizen of New York, against the defendant in error, a citizen of Massachusetts, individually and as trustee to H. C. Long & Company, composed of H. C. Long and Frank-A. Sanderson.

This appellee Brown was charged in the Superior Court of Lewis County, Washington, with the crime of murder and was acquitted.

<p>Where a claim is founded upon an open account or upon a contract, express or implied, and can be proved under § 63a of the bankruptcy act, if the claimant chooses to waive the tort and take his place with the other creditors, the claim is one provable under the act and barred by the discharge. The words in the fourth subdivision of § 17, “while acting as an officer, or in any fiduciary capacity,” extend to “fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation,” as well as “defalcation.” Crawford v. Burke, 195U.S. 176.</p> <p>183 N. Y. 267, affirmed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE .CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Edward H. Love commenced this suit in the District Court of Missoula County, Montana, to /have' Annie Flahive-, the holder of the legal title to a specified tract in that county, adjudged to hold it in trust,for him. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the District Court and, no amendment being asked, judgment was entered for the defendants. This judgment was affirmed by the Sm preme Court of the State (83 Pac.

<p>certiorAri to the circuit court of appeals for the second ’ . CIRCUIT’.</p> <p>The facts áre stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Where the bill is brought in the Circuit Court to quiet, and remove a cloud Upon, the title of land alleged to be within the State and District where the suit is brought, and the cloud is bashed upon tax sales made under,the authority of an adjoining State in -which defendants claim the land is situated, although the chief difference may be upon the question of fact as to the location of the boundary line between, the two States, if the construction of the act of Congress admitting one of the States to the Union and defining its boundaries is also in dispute the Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the case .as one arising under the Constitution or laws of the- United States. Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, distinguished.</p> <p>Under the acts of Congress of March 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 348, admitting Mjssissippi, and of June 15, 1836, 5 Stat. 50, admitting Arkansas' to the Union, the boundary line between the two States is the middle of the; main channel of the Mississippi River as it was in 1817, and at the point where Island No. 76 is situated it was at that time on the Mississippi side of that island which has never beefi within the State of Mississippi, notwithstanding attempts on the part of that State to exercise jurisdiction thereover.</p> <p>In this ease the court determined a controversy between private parties involving the location of the boundary line between two States favorably to the party in possession' of the land involved under the authority of the State actually exercising jurisdiction thereover, but expressed doubt as to whether courts should in such a case go further than the actual conditions rather than leave it to the other State, if dissatisfied, to bring • .a suit in its own name. '</p> <p>142 Fed. Rep. 787, reversed.</p>

The defendant in error, complainant below, brought suit in the Circuit Court' of the United States for the District of Idaho against the Empire State-Idaho Mining and Developing Company and the Federal Mining and Smelting Company, appellants herein.

Held: first, that the statute mentioned did not constitute a contract between the State and the railroad company, and, second, that if it did, the exemption granted by the statute was personal to the Brighton Railroad and did not pass-to the Rochester Railroad.- The case was remanded to the Supreme Court and a judgment entered pursuant to the. remittitur from the Court of Appeals, and by writ of error that judgment is…

Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907), was a 1907 ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in a tax case in which it determined that the Isle of Pines off the southern coast of Cuba was a "foreign country" for the purposes of tariffs under the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897, even though Cuba and the United States had agreed that the legal status of that island would remain undetermined until they settled the question by treaty.

<p>The State has undoubted power to prohibit foreign insurance companies from doing business within its limits, or, in allowing them to do so, to impose such conditions as it pleases.</p> <p>Where the state court decides that a foreign insurance company cannot recover assessments on a policy issued within the State because it has not complied with the statutory conditions imposed by the State, no Federal question is involved, and a request to find that'the state statute could not prevent the insured from going outside the State and obtaining insurance .on property within the State does not raise a Federal question, where the fact was otherwise, and the writ of error will be dismissed.</p> <p>140 Michigan, 344', affirmed. •</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.'</p>

■This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii, 17 Hawaii, 96, affirming an order of the third judge of the First Circuit Court in the Territory of Hawaii, which refused to confirm a sale of property made by a commissioner under order of court in a foreclosure suit brought' by William 0.

<p>While under § 6 of the Court of Appeals Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 828, a certiorari can only be issued when a writ of error cannot be, it will not be issued merely because the writ of error will not lie; but only where the casé is one of gravity, where there is conflict between decisions of' state and Federal courts,' or between those of Federal courts of different circuits, or something affecting the relations of this nation to foreign nations, or of general interest to the public.</p> <p>One who embezzles money from an estate forfeits his right to commissions, irrespective of whether he is or is not convicted of any crime in respect ■- thereto, and his conviction does not involve the pecuniary amount of the commissions which he forfeits by reason of the embezzlement; nor does -the fact that such commissions amount to over $5,000 give this court jurisdiction under § 233 of the Code to review the judgment of ' the Court of Appeals of' the District of Columbia affirming the conviction. The'rule that a writ of error does not lie from this court to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in a criminal case applies in such a case.</p> <p>Writ of error to review 27 App. D. C. 433, dismissed.</p>

■The Mercantile Trust Company, by this-writ of error, seeks to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, affirming, a judgment against it of the Supreme Court of the District for the sum of $8,468.

The respondent sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, directed to the agent and warden of the state prison at Sing Sing, in the State of New York, where he was confined, and pursuant to the terms of the writ the respondent was brought before that court in New York city, and after a hearing the court ordered his discharge. The agent and warden has appealed to this court from that order.

This is a bill in equity brought by the New York Cotton Exchange, a New York corporation, against appellant, a citizen of Tennessee, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, to enjoin him from receiving and using the quotations of sales made upon the Exchange. The case is here on questions of jurisdiction, and only a synopsis of the principal facts alleged is necessary.

<p>In an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii, tried by the court of first instance without a jury, where the Supreme Court of the Territory reversed the conclusions of law, but took the finding of fact as true, and those findings are not open to dispute, but the question for decision is definite and plain, there is no need to, send the case back for a statement of facts by the Supreme Court of the Territory, although one should have been made.</p> <p>Election is simply what its name imports; a choice shown by an overt act between two inconsistent rights either of which may be asserted at the will of the chooser alone. Transfer is different from election and requires acts of a different import on the part of the owner and corresponding acts on the part of the transferee.</p> <p>The fact that a party, through mistake, attempts to exercise á right to which he is not entitled does not prevent his afterwards exercising one which he had and still has unless barred by the previous attempt.</p> <p>The absolute liability for the price and putting that liability in the form of a note are consistent with the retention of title until the note is paid; and, in the absence of statute, a stipulation that the sale is conditional and the goods remain the property of the seller, until payment of a note given for the price is lawful and enforceable in replevin even where, as in this case, possession was given and additional security of mortgage bonds was required:</p> <p>16 Hawaii, 717, reversed.</p>

<p>■Under Equity Rule 92, where a part of the mortgage premises has been sold to the sovereign power which refuses to waive, its exemption from suit, the court can, all other parties being joined, except the land so conveyed and decree sale .of the balance and enter deficiency judgment for sum remaining due- if proceeds of salé are insufficient to pay the debt.</p> <p>A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends, and as this doctrine is not confined to full sovereign powers it extends to those, such as the Territories of the United States, which in actual administration originate and change the law of contract . and property.</p> <p>A Territory of the United States differs from the District of Columbia in that the former is itself the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow, although Congress may intervene, while in the latter the body of private .rights is created and controlled by Congress and not-by a legislature of the District.</p> <p>17 Hawaii, 82, affirmed.</p>

<p>Neither the fiction that personal property follows the domicil of the owner, nor.the doctrine that credits evidenced'by notes have the situs of the ’ latter, can be allowed to obscure the truth; and personal property may be taxed at its permanent abiding place although the domicil of the owner is elsewhere.</p> <p>Where a non-resident enters into the business of loaning money within a State and employs a local agent to conduct the business, the State may tax the capital employed precisely as it taxes the capital of its own citizens, in like situation, and may assess the credits arising out of the business, and the foreigner canno.t escape taxation upon his capital by temporarily removing from the State the evidences of credits which, under such circumstances, have a taxable situs in the State of then; origin. Loans made by a New York life insurance company on its own policies . in Louisiana are taxable in that State although • the notes may be ■ temporarily sent to the home office.</p> <p>115 Louisiana, 698, affirmed.</p>

<p>In the absénce of modification by statute the rule in respect to all courts whose records are brought for review to this court is that .errors alleged to have been committed in an action at law can be reviewed here only by writ of error; but this court has always observed the rule recognized by legislation that while an appeal brings up questions of fact as well as of law, on writ of error only, questions of law apparent on the record can be considered, and there can be no inquiry whether there was error in dealing with questions of fact.</p> <p>In reviewing judgments of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands the same rule applies as does in reviewing judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States that alleged errors of law not stated in the assignment of errors filed with the petition'for the writ of error will be disregarded unless they are so plain that under the provision in the thirty-fifth rule ' to that effect the court may at its option notice them, but this court will not subject the opinion of the court below to minute scrutiny to discover error of law when on the whole it is clear, as in this case, that the facts found by that court justify the judgment under review.</p>

Plaintiff in error brought an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky upon certain bonds and coupons purporting to have been issued by the defendant in error, one of thé counties of the State of Kentucky.

Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1907), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that witnesses are not required to establish a common law marriage, because an agreement to be married may be inferred from the circumstances of the relationship.

of March 3, 1891, providing .that in every case within its appellate jurisdiction a Circuit Court of Appeals may certify to this court any questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires instruction for the proper decision of such case. 26 Stat. 826, c. 517. Accompanying the certificate is a detailed statement of the case as disclosed by the evidence. It is well to give that statement in full.

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), was a First Amendment case. Before 1919, the primary legal test used in the United States to determine if speech could be criminalized was the bad tendency test. Rooted in English common law, the test permitted speech to be outlawed if it had a tendency to harm public welfare. One of the earliest cases the Supreme Court heard addressing punishment after material was published was 1907's Patterson v. Colorado in which the Court used the bad tendency test to uphold contempt charges against a newspaper publisher who accused Colorado judges of acting on behalf of local utility companies.

This is a writ of error to the Surrogate’s Court of the county of New York, State of New York, but its real purpose is to review a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State sustaining an order of the Surrogate’s Court, which imposed a transfer-tax upon certain estates arising under appointment by Laura Astor Delano, deceased. 176 N. Y. 486. Laura Astor Delano was the daughter of William B. Astor.

<p>error to the supreme court of the STATE OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

• This is a suit upon an accident policy of insurance issued' November 3, 1900, by the /Etna Life Insurance Company of. Hartford, Connecticut, upon the life of James Whitfield, a resident of Missouri. The policy specifies various kinds of injuries; also, the amount that will be paid by the company on account of such injuries respectively.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY, OF HAWAII.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This was a suit commenced in December, 1902, in the Supreme Court of New York for the County of Kings by Joseph -Vollkommer, Jr., as trustee in bankruptcy of the estate of Jacob Vogt, bankrupt, against Solon L. Frank and Samuel Frank, doing business as S. L. & S. Frank, and Jacob Vogt, to set aside an alleged chattel mortgage on certain horses, harness, wagons, etc., given by Vogt to defendants Frank, April 16, 1902, as fraudulent, and intended to hinder, delay and defraud…

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. ■</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory ck Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>

<p>On a certificate'from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>the United States for the District of Indiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, State of California.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Porto Rico.</p> <p>Dismissed, per stipulation, on motion of Mr. .Frederic D. Mc-Kenney for the appellees.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.</p>