Volume 21 — Federal Reporter

<p>1. Removal of Clouds fjrom Title—Rule in Arkansas.</p> <p>It is the established doctrine of the supreme court of Arkansas that a court of equity has jurisdiction of a suit to remove a cloud from title to land when the claim or lien which constitutes the cloud purports on its face to be valid, and the defect in it can be made to appear only by extrinsic evidence, and there is no adequate remedy at law. In the application of this rule, that court holds the jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff is the holder of the legal title and in possession, or the land is unoccupied; and that when the plaintiff’s title is equitable, or a junior legal title with prior or superior equities, the jurisdiction exists without regard to the question of possession.</p> <p>2. State Decisions—Federal Courts Follow, when.</p> <p>Where the decisions of the supreme court of a state on the subject of titles to land, or the mode of acquiring or quieting titles thereto, are settled and uniform, they are accepted by the federal courts as conclusive evidence of the law of 1he state on that subject, and have a binding force as nearly equivalent to a positive statute as judicial decisions can have.</p> <p>3. Same—State Statutes and State Decisions.</p> <p>Stale statutes relating to the removal of clouds from title to land are obligatory upon the federal courts, and a uniform and stable body of judicial decisions on that subject, from the court of last resort of the state, is equally obligatory.</p> <p>4. When Equity has Jurisdiction to Remove Cloud.</p> <p>“ Whenever a deed or otlior instrument exists which may be vexatiously or injuriously used against a party after the evidence to impeach or invalidate it is lost, or which may throw a cioud or suspicion over his title or interests, and he cannot immediately protect or maintain his rights by any course of proceeding at law, a court of equity will afford relief by directing the instrument to be delivered up and canceled, or by making any other decree which justice and the rights of the parlies may require.”</p> <p>5. Same—Statute not Necessary.</p> <p>It is highly probable some of the statutes assuming to confer on courts of equity jurisdiction to remove clouds from title had their origin in a misconception of tiie inherent jurisdiction of such courts. They do not confer a more extensive remedy than exists by virtue of the customary jurisdiction of chancery courts. They may regulate the mode of proceeding and form of decree, but they are not necessary to the exorcise of the jurisdiction.</p> <p>6. Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263.</p> <p>The case of Orton v. Smith, 18 How. 263, examined, and shown not to decide anything contrary to the principles here announced.</p> <p>7. Tax Deed—Its Value as Evidence.</p> <p>In Arkansas a tax deed is pruna facie evidence of the regularity of the tax proceedings leading up to the deed. The act declaring the deed should be conclusive evidence of the regularity of the previous proceedings, was held to be unconstitutional by the suprome'oourt of the state.</p> <p>8. Warrant to Collect Tax—Assessor’s Oath.</p> <p>The failure of the assessor to authenticate the assessment roll by his oath, as required by law, and the fact that no warrant for the collection of the tax was issued to tiie collector by the clerk, as required by law, are Irregularities that vitiate tiie tax sale and deed.</p> <p>9. Rights of Purchaser at a Void Tax Sale.</p> <p>In Arkansas the purchaser of land at a void tax sale may recover the taxes, interest, penalty, and costs of advertising charged on the land at the time of sale, and all subsequent taxes paid by him, with interest, and the statute creates a lien on the land in his favor for these amounts.</p>

In Equity. Demurrers to bills. Both bills allege an assignment by an insolvent debtor of all his assets to a single creditor, with the purpose of giving the assignee an undue preference over other creditors, and of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the latter. In the first case, the assignment was in the form of a chattel mortgage, but was not, it is alleged, intended to operate as such, but as an assignment.

This was an action on tlie case by E. H. Doming & Co. against the Norfolk & Western Eailroad Company, and was tried without 'a jury before the Hon. William McKennan and William Butleb. The following facts were found: First. Tlie Norfolk & Western Railroad Company, the defendant, is a corporation owning and operating a line of railroad extending from Bristol, Tennessee, to Norfolk, Virginia.

<p>1. Jurisdiction—State Court—Federal Court—Conflict—Arrest of United States Marshal by State Court Process.</p> <p>A state court lias no jurisdiction to interfere with a marshal of the United States in his execution of the process of a United States court.</p> <p>2. Same—Proper Course to be Pursued.</p> <p>If, under a writ-of replevin, the marshal, by virtue of the writ, seizes property supposed to be that of the defendant, which, in reality, is the property of another, it is not within the jurisdiction of the state court to arrest him for executing the process of the United States court, but the real owner must come into the United States court and by an ancillary process have his claim to the property determined against the plaintiff in the suit, in whose behalf the process of the court has been awarded.</p> <p>.3. Same—Court of the Remedy.</p> <p>The parties are to seek their remedy in the court whose officer is alleged to have offended, but he cannot be arrested by any other court of concurrent jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. Same—Seizure of Property Held under Process of State Court.</p> <p>A court of the United States has not jurisdiction to take into its possession property which has.been seized and taken into the possession of a state court by any process of that court.</p>

<p>On Writ of Error.</p>

<p>’1. Internal Revenue Tax—Legacy and Succession Duties—Vested Intkkests.</p> <p>The (>stato of a person who, at. the time of the passage of the act of congress of June 80, 1864, had already become entitled to and invested with an estate in fee iu certain lands, subject to his father’s life-estate, does not come within the operation of that act.</p> <p>2. Same—Retroactive Operation not to be Given Law.</p> <p>A retroactive operation is not to be given by construction so as to subject persons to a tax upon iniorests they may have acquired years before the act of June JO, 1864, was passed.</p>

<p>Patent—Coes Wrench—Collins Company v. Coes, 5 Ban. & A. 548, Overruled.</p> <p>The application to the bar of the Coes wrench, for the purpose of securing and supporting the step and resisting the strain, of a nut already in use for the same purpose on the Hewitt or Dixie wrench, lacks the novelty of invention requisite to support a patent, within the decisions of the supreme court at the last term, which, in effect, overruled the decision of this court in the suit of the Collins Company v. Coes, 5 Ban. & A. 548.</p>

<p>Patents por Inventions—Graham Fire-Extinguisher—Special Act op Congress op June 14, 1878, Granting Patent to Heirs—Constitutionality —Efpect op—Patent Sustained.</p> <p>The act of congress approved June 14, 1878, relieving the heirs of William A. Graham from all disabilities preventing them from renewing or reviving an application filed by Graham in 1837 for a patent for a novel method of extinguishing fires, held to be“a constitutional exercise of the power of congress ; and held, that the patent Ho. 205,942, granted July 9, 1878, to Graham’s administrator, was properly issued in pursuance of the authority given by that act of congress. Reid, that the intention of congress was to allow the original application of Graham to be revived, and that this intention is sufficiently expressed in the act, and that the novelty of the invention for which the patent was .granted.is to he tested as of the date of original application filed in 1837. Held that, at the date of his application, Graham was the first discoverer that carbonic ■acid gas and water, when condensed in a sufficiently strong vessel, would propel itself by its own elasticity in a sufficient stream to a sufficient distance to be a useful agent for extinguishing fires, and that he describedjnoth a portable and a fixed apparatus by which his method could be applied with beneficial results. Held, that the claim in the patent granted to his administrator for this method or process of extinguishing fires is valid. Held, that the defenses ■set up against the patent—that it was granted for several distinct inventions, that the specifications are deceptive and misleading, and that it covers a different claim from that set forth in the application—are not valid objections.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Reissue Ho. 9,881.</p> <p>The third claim of reissued patent JSTo. 9,881, September 27, 1881, to Joseph. Harris, held void, because the reissue was after 14 years’ delay, and after adverse rights had accrued.</p> <p>2. Same—Reissue Ho. 3,243.</p> <p>The first claim of reissued patent No. 8,24.3, granted December 22,1868, to T. 15. Stewart, if construed to cover the combination of two tubes fitting one within the other without flanges, and neither made oblong in shape, is void for want of novelty, if for no other reason.</p> <p>3. Same—Infringement—Lioensb.</p> <p>In a case in which the complainant, suing for infringement of his patent, does not proceed to enforce remedies under a license granted by him, but treats the license as no longer in force, a purchaser from the supposed licensee is not estopped from denying the validity of the patent; and in no case is a mere purchaser from a licensee estopped from denying the validity of the patent in a suit against him for infringement.</p>

<p>1. EQUITY'—Practice—Rule 88,—Rehearing.</p> <p>Rule 88 of the equity rules prescribed by flie supreme court of the United States, provides for a rehearing after a final decreo of an appealable character.</p> <p>2. Same—Interlocutory Decrees.</p> <p>Interlocutory decrees remain under the control of tlie court and subject to its revision until the whole matter in controversy is disposed of by final decree.</p> <p>3. Same—Effect of Supreme Court Decision after Intf,rj,ocutory and before Final Decree.</p> <p>W hen, after an interlocutory decree, and before a final decree in a case, the supreme court renders a decision affecting the case, this court will make its final decree in accordance with tlie decision of the supreme court, and as if that decision had been made before any decision in the case.</p> <p>4. Patents for Inventions—Reissues—Requisites for.</p> <p>Where, by an application for the reissue of a patent, it is sought merely to enlarge a claim, a clear mistake and inadvertence must be shown, and a speedy application for its correction, without unreasonable delay, must be made.</p> <p>5. Same.</p> <p>Where, by the reissue of a patent, it is sought merely to enlarge a claim, a patentee cannot wait, until other inventors have produced new forms of improvement and then apply for an enlargement embracing the new forms.</p> <p>6. Same—Delay in Reissue of Patent—When Court to Decide Unreasonable.</p> <p>Where it, is apparent, from a comparison of the patents, that a reissue is made to enlarge the scope of the patent, the court may decide whether the delay m obtaining the reissue was unreasonable, and the reissue void.</p> <p>7. Same—Infringement of Patents—Bill, when Dismissed.</p> <p>Where a reissue of a patent is sought merely to expand its claims so as to embrace structures brought into use between the time of the issuing' of the original and the time of the application for the reissue, and which were not infringements of the claim of the original, there being no proof of mistake or inadvertence, tlie right to a reissue is lost by a delay of more than 12 years, and, the reissue being made and suit, brought for the infringement thereof, the bill will be dismissed.</p> <p>8. Same—Death of Inventor—Effect on Reissue of Patent—Assignee— Rights of—Rev. St. $ 4895.</p> <p>After the death of the inventor, a reissue of the patent may be obtained upon application made, and a corrected specification signed by the assignee, under Rev. St. { 4895.</p>

<p>Patents for, Inventions.</p> <p>Wooster v. Handy, ante, 61, followed. Bill dismissed.</p>

<p>Patent—Earlier Publication—Definiteness.</p> <p>A patent is not invalidated by statements in an earlier publication, unless these statements are full and definite enough to inform those skilled in the art how to put into practice the invention now patented.</p>

<p>x. Patent—License—Breach of Condition—Complainant at Fault—Equity</p> <p>In an action growing out of the alleged failure of the defendant to act up to the terms of a license, granted him by the complainant, to sell a protected article, if the complainant refuses to fulfill any of his obligations in matters of substance, under the license, a court of equity will not interfere to assist him in compelling the defendant to observe the obligations upon his part.</p> <p>2 Same—Condition to Prosecute Infringers—How it is Executed.</p> <p>One of the conditions of a license being that the complainant should prosecute all unlicensed persons who should sell imitations of the article licensed, if the action of the complainant was such that it resulted, practically, in stopping infringements, he fulfilled the spirit and meaning of his obligation to the defendant to use reasonable diligence in prosecuting unlicensed sellers.</p> <p>3. Same—Old and New License—Election—Estoppel.</p> <p>A condition in a license being that if any license should be thereafter granted under the patent, the terms and conditions of which should be more liberal to the licensee than those “herein contained,” the defendants were to be entitled to receive the benefits of the additional advantages; if, upon such a case arising, the complainant gave the defendants the option of deciding whether they should have a new license or keep the old one, and the defendants elected to Tefusethe new license, they cannot be heard afterwards to allege that its terms were more advantageous to them. They cannot, instead of accepting the new license, cum onere, insist on determining what part they will accept and what part reject.</p> <p>4. Same—Promise in the Alternative.</p> <p>A promise in the alternative puts the alternative in the election of the promisor, unless there is something to take it out of the general rule.</p> <p>5. Same—Ambiguous Document—Bule of Construction.</p> <p>When both parties have acted upon a certain construction of an ambiguous document, that construction, if in itself admissible, will be adopted 'by the court.</p>

<p>Patent Law—Lesohot Patent Stone-Drills—Annular Stock—Convex Borins Bar.</p> <p>The intent of the patentee having been to apply for and obtain a patent for an annular stock, and not for a tool that did not leave a core, and the specification and the claim having been framed so as to describe the annular tool and no other, there was in the original patent, according to modern decisions, no error which had arisen through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, nor was there any defectiveness or insufficiency in the specification.</p>

<p>Shipping—Charter-Party—Bilí, oe Lading—Embezzlement by Master— Fruit Cargo—Gold Count—Usage op Trade.</p> <p>A vessel was specially chartered for a lump sum to make a voyage from Baltimore to the Bahama islands, the charterers to furnish “ ballast out and a cargo of fruit back.” A sum in gold coin was given by charterers to the master, for which he gave a hill of lading, “ freight as per charter-party.” On the voyage out the master left the ship, having embezzled the money. He,Id, that under the charter-party the owners did not contract for the safe carriage of gold coin, and that the bill of lading was given without authority. Held, further, that the alleged usage in the fruit, trade with the Bahamas to send out in the vessel gold coin with which to purchase the return cargo was not proved to be such a usage as would bind a specially chartered vessel as carrier of the gold, and that in this case the master received the gold as bailee of the charterers.</p>

<p>1. Pleading and Practice—Common-Law Forms of Action—North Carolina.</p> <p>Although tlie old forms of actions at common law have been abolished by the constitution and statutes of North Carolina, and a civil action substituted as a remedy, in all cases at law and in equity the old distinctions must be kept in view in giving redress.</p> <p>2. Same—Action against Corporation—Equitable Rights of Private Persons in Corporate Property.</p> <p>The qrawimen of the action being a tort alleged to have been committed by the defendant corporal ion alone, the action is properly brought, and can be maintained against the corporation without- tiie joinder o£ private individuals who claim to lie the equitable owners of the properly held and employed by the corporation. Such individuals might be made liable by way of adoption and ratification of the wrong done by tlieir agents, but they are not necessary parties to this action.</p> <p>3. Removal op Cause—Non-Resident Defendant .by Consent.</p> <p>Whether, afier action brought in a state court, (the necessary parties being residents of the same state,) a non-resident—admitted by consent as a defendant—can have a removal to a federal court, queere.</p> <p>4. Same—Distinct Cause of Action.</p> <p>To entitle a party to a removal, under section 2 of the act of March 3, 1875, a. 137, there must exist a distinct, cause of action in the suit, in respect to which all the necessary parties on one side are citizens of different states from those on the o tlior.</p> <p>5. Same—Separate Controversy Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137.</p> <p>The word “controversy” is employed in the statute, March 3,1875, c. 137, and a “separate controversy” is not identical in signification with a “separable cause of action.” There may be separate remedies against several parties for the same cause of action, blit there is only one subject-matter involved. ¡Separate controversies, within the meaning of the statute, are separate causes of action, cither of which might be sued on alone.</p> <p>6. Same—Remedies—Separate Defendants.</p> <p>When a person has been injured by the tortious acts of several parties, he has for the injuries sustained ono cause of action against all; but he may seek his remedy by suing any or all the wrong-doers. If, in an action against one, lie has judgment, he cannot afterwards prosecute a joint action, because the prior judgment is, in contemplation of law, an election on his part to pursue his several remedy.</p> <p>7. Same—Action at Law—Equitable Rreirr—Materiality.</p> <p>To ■constitute a controversy in an action at law there must be allegations on one side and denials on the oilier, making an issue either in fact or in law. An equitable right claimed by an individual in the property of the corporation sued is not material when that property is not the subject-matter in controversy at law.</p> <p>8. Bamf. — Practice in North Carolina—Civil Actions—Law and Equity— Practice in Unitf.d States Courts.</p> <p>According to the liberal mode of proceeding in civil actions in North Carolina parties' may assert equitable rights and have them enforced in the same action ; but this is not allowable in the federal courts, whore legal and equitable causes of action and defense cannot be blended.</p> <p>9. Same — Election by Plaintiff as to Defendant — Subsequent Defendants.</p> <p>Election of remedy is a right which the law gives a plaintiff in action of tort, and tiffs right cannot properly lie embarrassed by subsequently made defendants raising new and independent issues in the pleadings.</p>

Motion to Remand. The complainant, in March, 1879, insured the life of Edmund W. Raynsford, in the sum of $10,000, by a policy made payable to his executors, administrators, or assigns. The insured resided at Providence, Rhode Island, and died there in January, 1883. The defendant Champlin, a citizen of that state, was duly appointed administrator of liis estate, and subsequently took out ancillary letters of administration in this state.

<p>1. Riparian Rights—Grant or Lands under Water.</p> <p>Exclusive riparian rights do not attach, as a matter of course, to a grant of lands under water. Whether they do so or not depends upon the express terms of the grant, or upon the intent of the parties as shown by prior use, by the object of the grant, or by other circumstances from which the intent may be inferred. In the absence of an express grant of the right of wharfage, and of any manifest intent to convey it, no exclusive right of wharfage passes as incident to a grant by the state of land under water, below high-water mark, in a harbor or navigable stream.</p> <p>a. Same—Intervening Street—New York Act or 1813.</p> <p>An intervening public street between private owners and the exterior fine of the water front, prevents the acquisition of riparian rights by the owners on the opposite side of the street; and the act of 3813 of the legislature of New York, in providing for laying out such an exterior street, and that the upland owners, on filling in the “intermediate spaces ” should he owners of the lots so filled in, negatives intention to confer riparian rights on such owners; the right of wharfage under said act being conditioned upon such owners’ building the wharves as directed by the pity.</p> <p>3. Same—Wharves.</p> <p>Where the city, under the legislative act of 1813, is entitled to the wharfage along the wharves built by it, its rights are exclusive, so far as is necessary to the full enjoyment of the use of the wharves and slips up to the line of the bulk-head, and any rights of the owners of lots along the bulk-head line are subordinate to those of the city or its lessees. The act of 1857, dispensing with any exterior street, did not enlarge the intent of the act of 1813 as respects any riparian rights in the owners of “intermediate spaces” filled in.</p> <p>4. Same—Injunction—Ferry.</p> <p>An injunction to restrain the prosecution of a work, like a new ferry, of great public convenience and utility, should not be granted at the instance of a private party alleging threatened damage, except his right and his injury be clear.</p> <p>6. Same—Case Stated.</p> <p>The defendant being about to erect new ferry structures, under authority from the state and the city, in the slip between Twenty-second and Twenty-third streets, East river, occupying nearly half thg slip in width, at a distance of 145 feet from the bulk-head, far'below the original high-water mark, on motion by plaintiff for injunction as obstructing his riparian rights along the hulk-head as hitherto exercised, held, that no exclusive riparian rights were established in the plaintiff, and that all the access which he could legally claim was still left him, and the injunction was denied.</p>

<p>1. Lessor and Lessee — Title of Lessor—Lessee Charged with Notice of Bights of Lessor.</p> <p>A lessee is charged with full notice of the terms of a grant of the leased premises to his lessor, and his rights are subject to those terms, unless subsequently released or extinguished.</p> <p>2. Same.</p> <p>Where a grantee acquires wharfage rights in the premises, his lessee, as against the grantor, may exercise similar rights, subject only to the terms of the grant to his lessor; and aside from those terms, only the lessor could ques tion the lessee’s right to an easement over the remaining lands granted to the. lessor.</p> <p>3. Same—Injunction—Lessee’s Rtght to Continuance of.</p> <p>Where a lessee is in possession of valuable wharfage privileges, ho has a right to a continuance of an injunction to restrain the cutting off of those privileges until his legal rights are compensated for under the act of 1871, requiring the dock department of the city to make such compensation.</p>

<p>1. Taxation of National Bank Shares by State—’Act of Legislature of New York—Laws 1883, Ch. 345—Validity.</p> <p>The legislature of a state cannot validate a tax which is prohibited by the laws of the United States; but it is competent for it to sanction retroactively such proceedings in the assessment of a tax as they could have legitimately sanctioned in advance.</p> <p>2. Same—Act of New York Legislature of 1881, On. 27J.—The Defect in that Act.</p> <p>In the act of 1881, c. 271, Laws New York, the fatal vice was the denial of an opportunity to those assessed to be heard and permitted to obtain the deductions and corrections allowed by the general system of assessments.</p> <p>S. Same—Validating Acts.</p> <p>The general rule has often been declared that the legislature may validate retrospectively any proceedings which they may have authorized in advance; and it is immaterial that such legislation may operate to divest an individual of a right of action existing in his favor, or subject him to a liability which did not exist originally. In a large class of cases this is the paramount object of such legislation.</p> <p>4. Same—Validating Act—Payment of Taxf,s in Advance of Opportunity to be Heard.</p> <p>If it was within the power of the legislature to provide for the collection of a tax by a system which requires the tax-payers to pay in advance of an opportunity to be heard, but, permits them to have a subsequent hearing and to obtain restitution, if restitution ought to bq made, the validating act was constitutional.</p> <p>5. Same—Summmary Methods of Dispossession under Taxation—Otherwise in Judicial Proceedings.</p> <p>In judicial proceedings due process of law requires a hearing before condemnation, and judgment before dispossession; but when property is appropriated to or under the power of taxation, different considerations from those which prevail between individuals obtain. It is not indispensable that a hearing be secured before assessment or before collection of tlio tax; but it is sufficient if reasonable provision is made for a hearing afterwards, a correction of errors, or a restitution of the tax or part of a tax unjustly imposed.</p>

Action to Recover Possession of Real Property. Motion for a new trial. This action is brought to recover the possession of two parcels of land situate in Yamhill county, Oregon, and for the rents and profits of the same during their detention from plaintiff.

<p>1. Contract — Guaranty —Heating Apparatus—■Alteration op Proposed Building.</p> <p>Under a contract by which tlie manufacturers of a steam-heater and ventilator introduced such an apparatus into a building in course of erection and guarantied its efficient working, they should not be held liable under their guaranty if the design of the building, as submitted to them, was afterwards altered, without their consent, so as to materially change the proposed location of windows, fire-places, chimneys, etc,., or so as to substantially change the construction of the apparatus itself, thereby reducing the heating power of the apparat us.</p> <p>2. Same—Aeglect op Plaintiff.</p> <p>After the introduction into a building of a steam-heating and ventilating apparatus tlie manufacturers of the latter should not be held liable, under a guaranty of its efficient working, if the proprietor of the building or his servants neglect to fire the furnace to a sufficient intensity, or omit other acts necessary in that connection.</p> <p>, 3. Same—Fact foe the Jury.</p> <p>In an action based upon the guaranty of the manufacturers of a steam-heating apparatus for its efficient working, the jury is to decide upon how far a change, in the construction of the building affected the efficiency of the apparatus, and also whether a lack of such efficiency was caused by the neglect of the plaintiff or his servants to fire the boilers sufficiently, or otherwise properly manage the apparatus.</p> <p>4. Same—Measure of Damages.</p> <p>The measure of the plaintiff’s damages, if the defendants have broken their contract to heat his building with their apparatus, is the difference between the value of the apparatus in its alleged defective condition and what its value would have been if it had met the requirements of the contract.</p> <p>5. Same—Efficiency—Plaintiff’s Fraud.</p> <p>If the fact be that the apparatus placed in plaintiff’s building by defendants in all substantial respects fulfilled the requirements of the contract, and the architect or superintendent fraudulently or in bad faith withheld from defendants a certificate to that effect provided for by the contract, or if the certificate was withheld on account of gross mistake on the part of the superintendent, or failure on his part to exercise an honest judgment upon the question of the sufficiency of the apparatus, then the defendants would be entitled to recover the balance of the contract price, although the certificate is not produced.</p> <p>6. Same—JHow Plaintiff Affected by Recovery of Counter-Claim.</p> <p>When, pending the trial of a cause, the plaintiff, by whom alone the suit was commenced, amends his pleadings so as to admit a co-plaintiff, so that a recovery of damages is sought in favor of them both, in the event of a verdict against them the recovery upon the defendants’ counter-claim will go against both the plaintiffs.</p>

Prior to the filing of the petition the bankrupts were charged as indorsers on a note for $1,500, made by one Gaylord. After the filing of the petition, the claimant, who was the holder of the note, received a payment of $500 thereon and a new note similarly indorsed for the balance, $1,000. The register found that this transaction was a payment of the $1,500 note which was thereupon given up.

In September, 1880, the assignees of the above-named bankrupts presented to the court a petition representing that the bankrupts had fraudulently concealed and withheld from them $10,500 in money, besides a large amount of merchandise. The petitioner’s prayer is for an order directing the bankrupt to pay over said sum and return said merchandise.

<p>Patent—Unstamped Article—Innocent Infringer—Section 4900, Rev. St.</p> <p>In the case of a patented article which does not bear the required stamp or label, recovery shall not be had upon infringements occurring while the infringer is ignorant of the patent, under the conditions stated in section 4900, Rev. St., but shall be limited to inf ring-men ts arising after notice.-</p>

<p>1. Patent Law—Improvements in Trunks—Taylor’s Invention.</p> <p>Examination of Taylor’s patent for improvement in trunks—alleged to have been infringed—and comparisons made willi patents of others in the same line, and defendants adjudged to be infringers.</p> <p>2. Same — Separate Inventions Unconnected cannot be Embraced under , one Patent.</p> <p>A patent is not valid which is for several distinct and separate inventions not connected in design or operation. The question whether the requisite.conneotion exists among such is often a perplexing one, however, and must be ieft largely within the discretion of the head of the patent office.</p> <p>3. Same—Disclaimer—Taylor Patent.</p> <p>It being extremely doubtful whether the Taylor patent is not obnoxious to the objection that it is for several distinct inventions a disclaimer of all claims in the patent, except that in controversy, duly filed in the patent office, is required as a condition to granting the relief prayed in the hill.</p> <p>4. Same—Omission of Stamped Word “Patented.”</p> <p>• When a patented article is so small that it is difficult to stamp upon it the word “patented,” with the date of the patent, the requisite is answered by such a stamp or label being placed upon the packages in which the articles are shipped.</p>

<p>Collision — Sailing Vessels — Negligence of Lookout — Obscuration of Lights—Change of Course in Keeping Full and By.</p> <p>Where a collision occurred in a foggy or hazy night at sea, between the bark F. going east and sailing free, and the bark J. A. coming west, close-hauled, and sailing full and by, and their courses were nearly opposite, and they collided nearly end on, the F. having seen the other’s red light when about one-third of a mile distant, and at once ported, and then saw both lights, and after-wards the green light only, when the J. A. was two or three lengths off; and the J. A. saw no light at all on the F. until about the moment of collision, when the green light was seen: held, that the change in the appearance of the J. A.’slights was caused by her own change of course in following the variations of the wind; that the F.’s green light must have been in view when one-third of a mile off, and failure to see it must be held proof of inattention and neglect of the lookout, his testimony not being had; that if the F.’s green light had been seen, as it ought to have been, the J. A. would have been bound to keep her course strictly, instead of following round with the wind, and hence her change of course was a fault contributing to the collision. Held, also, that the red light of the F. ought to have been seen long before the collision, and being eagerly looked for and not visible, and being placed aft near the taffrail, where it was liable to be obscured by the sails, or by the swell of the ship forward, or other obstructions, it must be deemed to have been either obscured or improperly screened, and for this the F. was also held in fault, and the damages were divided.</p>

<p>1. Collision—Tow—River Navigation.</p> <p>In passing an established harbor, like Blizabethport, New Jersey, on the border of a narrow stream, tugs with large tows, which require the use of nearly the whole channel, are bound to take extraordinary precautions in giving notice of their approach, and to give, if needed, effective aid to vessels unwarily coming to anchor in places of clanger; and such vessels, on receiving actual notice of approaching danger from such tows, which are in the habit of passing, are also bound to take immediate measures to get out of harm’s way.</p> <p>2. Same—Vessel at Anchor—Fault.</p> <p>Where one of a fleet of 21 canal-boats came in collision at Blizabethport, New Jersey, at about 2 a. m., with a schooner which arrived there and came to anchor about 10 p. m., about 100 feet off the dock, in a place dangerous from such passing tows, held, both in fault.</p>

<p>1. Municipal Debt in Excess of Constitutional 'Limit — County Bonds (Indiana) in Aid of Gravel Loads—County Liability.</p> <p>County bonds, issued under tlio laws of Indiana for the construction of gravel roads, notwithstanding the, special provision made for payment by assessments upon lands within two miles of tho improvement, constitute a county indebtedness within the meaning of the amendment of March .14, 1881, to the state constitution, which forbids and declares void any debt of any political or municipal corporation in excess of 2 per centum on the taxable property within such corporation.</p> <p>2. Same-Power of County Boards—Public Improvements—Private Benefits.</p> <p>Under the gravel-road laws of Indiana, which require the proposed improvement to be of public utility, county boards may issue bonds which shall constituí e a general county liability io construct such roads, though tho benefits may inure mainly to a particular district or to individuals.</p> <p>3. Same—Void Bonds — Lego very of Money Paid for—Identification not Necessary.</p> <p>In an action for tho recovery of money paid to a county for a void issue of bonds, it is no obstacle to the granting of relief that the money has been commingled with other moneys and cannot be indent!fled, if the proper amounts can bo ascertained.</p>

<p>1. Uniformity of Assessment and Taxation—Special Law on Such Subject.</p> <p>An act which provides for the taxation of mortgages on land in no more than one county, there being mortgages on land in more than one county, is void for want of the uniformity required by section 1 of article 9 of the constitution of the state, and also because it is contrary to section 23 of article 4 of said constitution, which forbids special legislation on that subject.</p> <p>2. Taxation of Mortgages.</p> <p>The act of 1882, Soss. Laws, 64, is the first and only act providing for the taxation of mortgages as things or property; but prior to that time a solvent debt, whether secured by mortgage or not, was taxable as personal property.</p> <p>3. Unconstitutional Provision in Act.</p> <p>When an act contains an unconstitutional provision which renders it void, and the act can stand and be executed without it, according to the general purpose of the legislature, such clause may be stricken out by the court,, and the act considered as if it had never been inserted; hut not otherwise.</p> <p>4. Tax—Illegal for Want of Uniformity.</p> <p>A tax may be illegal for want of uniformity that is tho necessary consequence of the law providing for it, or the misconduct of those charged with its administration; but so long as such uniformity is not the direct result of the law it cannot be held invalid on account of it, and the remedy, if anv. must be confined to the illegal proceeding under it.</p> <p>5. Statute—When Special.</p> <p>A “ special” act affects a part only of the subject to which it relates, and whether an act is considered “public” or “private” is not relevant to the question of whether it is “ special ” or “general.”</p>

<p>1. Setting Aside a Verdict—Cause—Test.</p> <p>If tlie evidence introduced during- tlie trial of a ease was such that it would have been tlie duty of the court to set aside a verdict in favor of a defendant as contrary to the evidence, if such verdict had been rendered by the jury, then it was the duty of the judge to direct a verdict for the plaintiffs.</p> <p>2. Sale—W abranty—Express and Implied—Kigiit oe Action.</p> <p>The rights and remedies of a purchaser are not affected by the question whether a cause of action arises out of a breach of a contract by the vendor to deliver an article of a specified quality, or out of a breach of a representation which is collateral to the contract, or out of such a breach when the representation or warranty is implied instead of being express.</p> <p>3. Same—Liability—Duty of Vendee.</p> <p>A manufacturer of steel having, in obedience to several orders from a customer, furnished the latter with steel of a certain quality, if, upon receipt of a subsequent order from the same customer for the same article, he supplies an inferior quality, he is liable upon liis undertaking that tlie steel was of the quality ordered, and such liability is not lessened by the fact that the customer did not avail himself of liis opportunity to test the steel before using it.</p> <p>4. Same—Quality—Legitimate Presumption.</p> <p>If there is a warranty of kind and quality, the purchaser has a right to assume the warranty to bo true, and therefore he may sell with like warranty, and defend suits for the breach, and recover of the vendor.</p>

<p>1. Pleading—Sufficiency of Answer.</p> <p>An answer which clearly puts in issue the material allegations of the complaint is sufficient. It need not controvert immaterial matter.</p> <p>2. Mining Law—Adverse Claim.</p> <p>In a suit brought under Bov. St. § 2326, to determine the right of possession to an adverse mining claim, the title of each party to the disputed premises is brought in question, and each party must make proof of his title thereto before he can ask a judgment in his favor.</p> <p>3. Same—Better Title.</p> <p>In such suit the better title must prevail, and judgment be for the party establishing that better title.</p> <p>4. Same—Failure of Proofs.</p> <p>Where neither party establishes title to the ground in controversy, judgment cannot bo for either party, and the suit must be dismissed.</p> <p>5. Same—Presumptions of Fact.</p> <p>In suits of this nature no presumptions of fact as to title arise. Title, right of possession, or forfeiture are facts to be established by the evidence.</p>

<p>1. ImlAED UONTRACT.</p> <p>Whenever one person does work or service for another with his consent, and there is no agreement as to compensation, the law implies a contract, to pay what the same is reasonably worth; but when the circumstances of the case clearly repel the idea that the work or services were done with the expectation of payment being either made or received, no such contract will be implied.</p> <p>2. Case tn Judgment.</p> <p>The plaintiff acted as attorney for the defendant and amalgamated corporations engaged in loaning money in Oregon and Washington, under written instructions as to his duties and responsibilities. It was his duty to examine titles to real property offered as security for loans, for which he was permitted to charge the borrowers specific foes. He was also to aid and advise the corporations generally in all matters affecting their interests, hut for this service no compensation was expressly provided. The foes received from borrowers were no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered them. Under these circumstances the plaintiff acted as the sole and general counsel and adviser of the corporations for Some years, without making any charge or rendering any account of his services, or receiving any intimation from the corporations that they did not expect to pay him for them. Upon being sued to recover the reasonable value of these services, the corporations claimed that it was “understood ” that the plaint: If was to perform these services gratuitously, or in consideration of the fees received from borrowers. Held, (1) that the mere understanding of either party to the contract, was no part of it, and did not bind the other, and that there was nothiug in the circumstances of the case, or the conduct of the parties, sufficient to prevent or. repel the legal implication of a promise by tbe corporations to pay tlie plaintiff what bis services were reasonably worth; and (2) that the plaintiff, not having kept any accodnt of his services, and being unable to prove any specific items, ought not to recover more than a reasonable annual retainer therefor.</p>

<p>Action of Debt on Bond.</p>

<p>1. Chinese Restriction Acts — Certificate of Collector of Port — Evidence.</p> <p>With reference to Chinese laborers re-entering the United States after having once left, congress did not intend, in the amendatory act of July 5, 1884, that the certificate of the collector of the port, required by section 4 of the original statute, should be produced by such Chinamen as had departed from the United States before it would have been possible to obtain the certificate from the collector. The presentation of such a certificate gives the Chinese a prima facie privilege to return, but the privilege may rest upon evidence other than the certificate, bearing upon the facts it would have proved.</p> <p>2. Same — Chinese, Other than Laborers, En Route to United States on July 5,1884.</p> <p>Chinese, other than Chinese laborers entitled under the treaty with China, and not prohibited from entering the United States by the restriction acts, who left China or other foreign country before July 5, 1884, on their way to enter the United States, are now entitled to enter, upon such satisfactory evidence as was recognized as competent and sufficient before the amendatory act of July 4, 1884.</p> <p>3. Same—Certificate—Good Only to Admit Individual Described in It.</p> <p>The certificate required of returning Chinese cannot entitle the wife or children of the holder to enter with him. There must be either an independent certificate for each, or else the certificate issued to the husband or father must contain also a certificate of the facts required, both as to the wife and each minor child sought to be introduced.</p>

<p>On Motion for Instruction to Jury.</p>

<p>Trade-Mark—Foreign Publishes—American Assignee—Use of a Name—• Eight of Action.</p> <p>Tlie publisher of “ Chatterbox,” in England, having assigned the exclusive right to use and protect that name in this country, the assignee may maintain his action against any other person who undertakes to publish hooks under that name in tlie United States.</p>

<p>Proceedings in Rem—Stevedore Service.</p> <p>The services of a stevedore are necessary to the general business of the transportation of tbe cargo, and contribute to the rewards of capital employed in maritime service. They should be regarded as maritime service, and the stevedore furnished with a remedy against the vessel.</p>

<p>Motion to Demand Cause.</p>

In Equity. This cause is now before the court upon objections to certain cross-interrogatories propounded to the defendant, Litchfield. The motion is “for an order of reference of the cross-interrogatories, and the objections thereto, to a master of the court, to examine them, and report upon the sufficiency and validity of the complainant’s objections to the same.”

<p>1. National Banking Law—Liability of Stockholder—Purpose of the Law.</p> <p>It was the intention of congress by its act (Iiev. St. § 5151) to make tlie excess of tlie cost of the stock of a national bank, up to tlie par value, an asset of tbo bank, 1o be resorted to in the event of insolvency, or a guaranty fund, (so to speak,) In case the property of a bank is insufficient to pay its debts. Whoever becomes a stockholder assumes this liability as an element of his contract.</p> <p>2. Same—Liability of Persons Holding Stock in a Representative Capacity.</p> <p>Section 5152, Rev. St., was designed to protect persons who hold stock in a representative capacity from any personal liability, and only makes the funds in the hands or under the control of such representative liable.</p>

<p>Mineral Land—Issue oe Patent Excepting—Intrusion by Claimant—Collateral Attack on Patent.</p> <p>On June 27, 1867, under tlie acts of congress of July 1,1862, and July 2, 1864, a patent, regular on its face, was issued for the N. E. of section 17, township 9, range 9 E., Mt. Diablo base and meridian, to the Central Pacific Kailroad Company, to aid in the construction of its road. The patent expressly excepted all mineral lands, should any be found within the tract conveyed, but there was nothing to indicate that any part of such land was mineral land. In 1873 the company conveyed the land to M., who entered into possession, oo-' cupied, fenced, built upon, and cultivated the land until 1877, when he sold it to C., who also went into possession and cultivated and used the land. In 1881 L. entered upon a part of the land, against the will of 0., and, claiming that it was mineral land, took up a mining claim thereon. Held, that L. could not, by this unlawful intrusion, initiate a right to a mining claim, and that the patent was conclusive when collaterally called in question; following Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 513, and Steel v. Smelting Co. 106 U. S. 447; S. C. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 389.</p>

<p>Creditor’s Bill.</p>

<p>Action at Law.</p>

<p>Imperfect Record.</p> <p>Case will not be heard upon an incomplete transcript of record</p>

<p>1. Life Insurance Policy—Invalid Change of Designation.</p> <p>A person wlio effects a policy of insurance upon tlie life of another for the benefit of the iatter’s wife, which by its terms becomes a paid-up policy after the payment of two annual premiums, cannot, after such premiums have been paid, surrender the policy, without the consent of the beneficiary, by an arrangement with the insurer. In such case, the wile can recover the amount for which the policy is a paid-up one, by the terms of the policy, upon the death of her husband.</p> <p>2. Same—Premium—Promissory Note.</p> <p>If a party who effects an insurance upon another’s life for the benefit of the latter’s wife passes to the insurer his promissory note for the premium, instead of paying the premium in money, the insurer is under no obligation to the beneficiary to enforce the notes against the maker, any more than he would have been to receive them originally instead of the money for the premiums. Accordingly, if, when the notes are paid, the payment, by an arrangement between the parties to the notes, is applied to a different purpose, such payment does not inure to the benefit of the beneficiary in the policy as a payment of the premium.</p> <p>3. Same—Pkoof of Death—Estoppel.</p> <p>Where a policy provided for due notice and proof of the death of the insured and of the just claim of the assured, and the insurer had paid the amount of the policy to a party not entitled by law to its benefits, he having presented proofs of the death of the insured to the insurer, and afterwards the rightful beneficiary made proof by affidavit of the death of the insured and the just claim of the assured, a general objection by the insurer to the sufficiency of the proofs is not'good.</p>

<p>1. "Written Contract—Parol Contract to Modify—Estoppel.</p> <p>If, according to a written contract, one party was to transfer—upon specified conditions—certain shares of stock to another, who, upon receiving such transfer, was to pay therefor a specific sum of money, the latter party cannot be permitted to show by parol that he was not to acquire an unqualified right to the stock so agreed to be delivered to him, or that lie did not assume an absolute obligation to pay for it at the price fixed.</p> <p>2. Same—Parties—Alleged Agency—Estoppel.</p> <p>A party who contracts as a principal will not be permitted to show, in the absence of mistake, fraud, or illegality, that he contracted as an agent in a controversy between himself and the other contracting party, and the knowledge of the other contracting party does not ailect the rule.</p> <p>3. Law and Equity—Common-Law Rule Emphasized by Judiciary Act.</p> <p>Though courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law upon all controversies involving fraud, they will not ordinarily exercise it when the parties have an adequate remedy at. law. Section 16 of the judiciary act (Rev. St. $ 723) is intended to emphasize the existing rule, and to impress it on the federal courts.</p> <p>4. Same — Misrepresentations—Value of Property—Adequate Remedy at Law.</p> <p>Where the cause of action is for fraudulent misrepresentations affecting the value of property sold, and no relief is claimed except by way of damages, and no discovery is asked, and no complicated accounting is involved, á bill in equity will be dismissed upon the ground that the remedy is at law.</p>

<p>1. Property in a Street-Bed—Dedication—-Power oe Attorney—Estoppel.</p> <p>A power, of attorney to sell and convoy does not imply authority to the attorney to dedicate or give anj- part of the principal’s property to the public; but, when the power is expressly to dedicate, the owner is estopped to deny the act of his agent.</p> <p>2. Same—Vacation by City—Waiver oe Reserved Rights.</p> <p>In the event of a street, previously dedicated to the city of Chicago, being vacated by an ordinance of the common council, such vacation to continue sc long, and so long only, as the ground shall be used for railroad purposes, a subsequent resolution, declaring the vacation absolute, is sufficient to operate as a waiver by the city of its reserved rights in the premises, notwithstanding the fact that, the latter resolution was passed by a majority rather than two-thirds of the aldermen elected.</p> <p>3. Same—Conditional Vacating—Eeeect.</p> <p>When the city of Chicago assumes to vacate, even conditionally, a street previously dedicated to it, it loses all title with which it was vested by the act of platting.</p> <p>4. Same—Title—Abutting Lot-Owner—Reversion.</p> <p>By the vacating by the city of Chicago of a street previously dedicated to it, the title 1o the ground does not pass to the abutting lot-owner, but to the original owner of the land.</p>

<p>Action to Recover Internal Revenue Tax.</p>

<p>Patent—Suspender Ends.</p> <p>The suspender ends made conformably to Schirmer’s patent of June 27, 1876, do not infringe the patent oí Shenliold.</p>

<p>Patent—Improvement in Railroad Progs.</p> <p>The second claim o£ reissue palent No. 8,914 requires the point of the “ frog ” to be constructed as direel eel in the body of the patent. The U iron, as a mode of connecting the point and wing rails, was in public use and well known before the complainant claims to have been the inventor thereof.</p>

This is a bill in equity to restrain the respondents from the infringement of the complainant’s patent for an improvement in cans for the transportation of cream and milk, and for an account of profits and damages.

<p>Towage—Negligence—Loss oe Barge.</p> <p>The tow-boat Three Lights, having three barges in tow, on her way down the Monongaliela river, and being unable to pass under the Smithfiold-street bridge at Pittsburgh, on account of high water, tied the said barges to the pier of the Tenth-street bridge, left them there, and returned up the river to bring down other tows, such being the custom of the river. One of these barges afterwards, while so tied up, was sunk by a collision with the tow-boat Bob Connell. Held, tlial no want of reasonable diligence was shown on the part of the Three Lights, and that there are no grounds for holding the said tow-boat responsible for the loss of the barge.</p>

<p>Demurrage—Oarg o—Trace oe Discharge—Delay—Rmsponsibjmty.</p> <p>In a bill of lading for empty petroleum barrels there was a condition in regard to demurrage, and thereafter tlie words “all other conditions as per charter-party,” which charter-party contained the provision that “the cargo should be discharged in the same berth where the rails should be discharged.” In an action for demurrage against consignees, who, upon arrival of vessel, did not provide a “ lighter,” the wharf-owners objecting to receive petroleum barrels, held, that the libelant was not at fault, because, in selecting a placo for the delivery of the cargo in conformity with the contract of tlie parties, ho selected one which was not altogether convenient for the respondents; that the lay days began to run after the ship reached the berth to which she was directed by the consignees of the rails; and that tho detention of the ship was caused by respondents’ delay.</p>

<p>Collision—Contradictory Signals.</p> <p>Libel for damages received in a co'lision, alleged to have occurred through the fault of the respondent in blowing contradictory signal whistles. The court investigates the conflicting testimony, and awards the damages as asked.</p>

<p>On Application for Injunction.</p>

In those proceedings tlio original bill and cross-bill were filed to foreclose a railway mortgage of the Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Railway Company to the Rarmors’ Loan & Trust Company, to secure the bonds of the former company. Bald mortgage covered the entire property of the said Missouri, Iowa & Nebraska Company.

<p>Fraud—Executor—Purchase ov Mortgaged Property—Resulting Trust.</p> <p>An executor who negotiates a mortgage upon part of his decedent’s estate, to provide funds for a child and devisee of such decedent, cannot afterwards purchase the mortgage land under foreclosure proceedings and hold it for himself. The quality of his estate therein will be a resulting trust for the benefit of the child for whom the mortgage was made.</p>

<p>1. Trade-Name—Right of Corporation to Acquire—Infringement by Another Corporation.</p> <p>A corporation may acquire a property right to the use of a name other than, its original corporate name as a trade-mark, or as incidental to the good-will of a business, as well as an individual; and if it has acquired such a right, it cannot be deprived thereof by the assumption of such name subsequently by another corporation, whether the latter selects its name by the act of corporators who organize under the general laws of the state, or the name is selected for it in a special act by a legislative body.</p> <p>2. Same—Priorty—Evidence—Injunction—“Goodyear Rubber Company”— “Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co.”</p> <p>Upon examination of the evidence in case at bar, held, that the “ Goodjmar Rubber Company ” was entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from using the name, “ Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co.”</p>

<p>Trade-Marks—State Laws.</p> <p>The rights and remedies concerning trade-marks generally depend upon tho laws of the states, common or statutory, and not upon the laws of the United Slates.</p>

<p>1. Mortgage—Mortgagee Mon-Resident — United States Circuit Court— Degree.</p> <p>A mortgagee, resident in a state other than that of the mortgagor, may file Ms bill for foreclosure in the United Stales circuit court, and obtain a decree, upon case shown.</p> <p>2. Same—Redemption by Judgment Creditor—Rules of Court.</p> <p>A judgment creditor may redeem premises from a sale under judgment or decree of a United States court by suing out execution upon his judgment in the ordinary manner, placing his execution in the hands of the proper officer to execute, and paying the money needed to redeem in the hands of the clerk of the United States court, together with tho commissions of the clerk for receiving and paying the money.</p> <p>3. Same—Payment oe Money to Sheriee.</p> <p>Under the system of the United States court, payment of money into the hands of the sheriff is no redemption of premises sold under decree of foreclosure passed by that court, when the United States court has, by its rules, provided that the redemption money shall be paid to its clerh.</p>

<p>Decision op Court op Co-ordinate Jurisdiction—Atlantic & Pacific Railway Company—Rioiit to Dividends.</p> <p>As it has been decided by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in an action brought by the Pacific Railroad (of Missouri) to recover, among other things, the dividends agreed to be paid to its stockholders by the defendant in the lease between the two corporations, that the right of action for tho dividends is in tho corporation and not in the individual stockholders, this court, in a suit upon the same lease, brought by one of the stockholders to recover part oí tho same dividends, follows that decision, and judgment for defendant is ordered.</p>

<p>Practice and Procedure—Remitting Part of Verdict—When Allowed— Right of Appeal.</p> <p>A trial court, in a meritorious case, will not allow a plaintiff to remit a part of the amount for which a verdict has been rendered, when such reduction will deprive the defendant of an opportunity to have the decision reviewed in an appellate court.</p>

<p>Demurrer to special answer, and motion to strike out a portion as immaterial.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction of Circuit Court—Suit against Foreign Corporation—Where Brought — Act of 1875, § 1 — Waiver of Exemption — Appointment of Agent, upon Whom Process mat be Served.</p> <p>The act of congress prescribing the place where a person may he sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, which he may waive; and when a foreign corporation, in pursuance of the laws of a state in which it carries on business, designates a person upon whom process may he served, it thereby consents to be sued in lire district embracing such state, and waives the exemption granted to it under the act of congress.</p>

<p>1. Principal and Agent—Insurance—Agent Ordered to Oa.ncel Policy— Default of Subagent or Broker.</p> <p>' Where an insurance company had ordered S., its agent, to cancel a policy ■which he had written, the policy containing a stipulation lor its cancellation, and a loss occurred to the company through the failure to have the policy canceled, in an action by the company against S., held, that S. was not relieved from liability by showing liat he had directed the broker, who placed the insurance with him, to have the policy canceled. The broker, in procuring the cancellation, was the agent of S.s and S. was responsible for the broker’s default.</p> <p>2. Same—Custom—Brokers.</p> <p>In such action it is incompetent, for the purpose of so relieving S. from liability, to prove a custom to procure the cancellation of policies through the broker placing the insurance with the company’s agent.</p> <p>3. Same—Charge of Court—What Amounts to Negligence.</p> <p>In such action it was not error to charge the jury that, if the broker called at the place of business of the insured and finding him absent made no inquiry whether any one present was authorized to receive for the insured the unearned premium, when in fact such a person was present, and there was no other step taken to effect a cancellation until a loss occurred, the broker was guilty of negligence, for which S., the defendant, was liable.</p> <p>4. Reasonable Time—Question of Law, when.</p> <p>What is a reasonable time, is always, where the facts are undisputed, a question exclusively for the court.</p>

<p>Contract—Action by Stranger—Demurrer.</p> <p>Defendant entered into a written contract with the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway Company to construct a certain portion of its road, stipulating, among other things, that he “ would pay all claims against him, or against any subcon tractor under him, for services and labor performed or materials furnished in said work, and to pay, or cause to be paid, all claims growing out of said work, whether against him or any subcontractor under him, for trespass and injury to lands, * * * and all claims for provisions and supplies, and bills for board of men and teams engaged upon said work, and all similar claims; said damages to be estimated and paid as specified in the preceding clause,” which provided that “ the resident engineer should have the right to estimate the amount of such damages, and to pay the same to the owner or occupant of said property or land, deducting on his first estimate the amount paid from the value of the work done.” Another clause provided that “in all cases the amount of claims for labor and material furnished to defendant should be deducted and retained by the company, and paid to the claimants, or held till súch dues were paid or otherwise settled.” Defendant sublet the work, and his contract with the subcontractor provided that he should have the same right to pay claims against the subcontractor which the railway company had reserved to itself. The subcontractor gave orders to plaintiffs for various sums to different parties, for supplies and labor, which they paid, and for the amount so paid they brought suit against defendant. Held, that the rule tnat toe party to be benefited by a contract not under seal may sue thereon, although the promise be not made to him, did not apply, and that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.</p>

<p>1. State Laws—United States Courts—Judicial Notice.</p> <p>The circuit courts of the United States take judicial notice of the laws of the several states.</p> <p>2. Contracts Valid Where Made, Valtd Everywhere—Exceptions.</p> <p>The general rule is that a contract valid by the law of the place where it is made is valid everywhere; but there are exceptions to this rule, and, among them, contracts against good morals, and that tend to promote vice and crime, and contracts against the settled public policy of the state, will not be enforced, although they may be valid by the law of the place where they are made.</p> <p>3. Lord's Lay Contracts—Valid in Tennessee, when.</p> <p>In Tennessee isolated private contracts made on the Lord’s day, outside of the ordinary calling of the parties to them, are valid.</p> <p>4. Samis—Arkansas Rule.</p> <p>Prima facie, contracts made in Arkansas on the Lord’s day are void; but contraéis made in that state, on that day, between parties who observe as a day of rest any other day of the week, agreeably to the faith- and practice of their church or society, are valid.</p> <p>5. Same—Common Law.</p> <p>At the common law, contracts made on the Lord’s day were as valid as those made on any other day.</p> <p>6. Public Policy—IIow Ascertained.</p> <p>The only authentic and admissible evidence of the public policy of a slate, on any given subject, are its constitution, laws, and judicial decisions.</p> <p>7. Lord’s Lay Acts--Police Regulations.</p> <p>The Lord’s day acts are not religious regulations ; they are a legitimate exorcise of the police power, and are themselves police regulations.</p> <p>8. Lord’s Lay Contracts—Upon What Grounds Void.</p> <p>Contracts made on the Lord’s day'are not void on religious or moral grounds, but upon the familiar and established doctrine that when a statute inflicts a penalty for doing an act,—no matter what that act may be,—a court of justice will not enforce a contract made in violation of such statute, and in the making of which the parties to it incurred the prescribed penalty. A penalty implies a prohibition of the thing itself, on the doing of which the penalty is to accrue.</p> <p>9. Same—When 'Enforced.</p> <p>When, by the laws of a state, a largo class of its citizens may lawfully labor and make contracts on the Lord’s day, it is not, in a legal sense, against the public policy of such state, nor shocking to the moral sense of its people, for its courts to enforce a contract made on that day in another state, and valid by the law of that state.</p> <p>10. Same—Valid Where Made, Enforced Everywhere.</p> <p>A contract made on the Lord’s day, and valid by the law of the state where made, will be enforced by the courts of another state, by the laws of which such contract would be void.</p>

<p>Motions for New Trials.</p>

<p>Patent—Hyatt's Patent Ceúuüloid Piano Keys.</p> <p>It is an infringement of the first claim o£ the Hyatt patent. (No. 210,780) if a substantial portion ot tlie upper surface of the key-board of a piano or organ is covered with a single sheet of celluloid, but it it is not an infringement to cover single keys with separate strips of celluloid.</p>

In Equity. Hearing on bill, answer, and proofs. Bill to restrain an alleged infringement of claims Nos. 2, 3, 5, and 6, of patent (No. 64,404) issued May 7,1867, to Edward Bostock, and claim No. 1 of patent (No. 80,269) issued July 28, 1868, to said Bostock for improvements in sewing-machine tuck-ereasers assigned by mesne assignments to Sarah L. Bostock.

<p>Injunction—Infringement—Litigated Patent.</p> <p>The United States cannot be heard to ask an injunction restraining the commencement or prosecution of suits for infringement of a patent, for the repeal of which they have begun an action.</p>

<p>1. Patents—Peters’ Carriage Dashes —Sheaths for Applying Mouldings.</p> <p>Patent No. 178,463, granted George M. Peters for improvements in sheaths or holders lor applying- mouldings to the tops of carriage dash-boards, held to be anticipated by a machine used for putting mouldings on combs by means of a sheath constructed and operated similarly. That the machino was comparatively small, and used only for applying mouldings to combs, is immaterial.</p> <p>2. Same—Infringement—Anticipation.</p> <p>That which would infringe, if later, anticipates, if earlier.</p>

<p>1. Patents fob Inventions—Interference Proceedings—Decision of Commissioner of Patents--How Reviewed--Rev. St. § 4915.</p> <p>From a decision oí the commissioner of patents upon an interference no appeal lies to the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the only romfcdv is by a bill in equity in the United States circuit court, under Rev. St. § 4915, to review the proceedings in the patent-office.</p> <p>2. Same—Costs.</p> <p>The last clause of section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, requiring the applicant to pay all the expenses of the proceeding, whether the final decision is in his favor or not, is limited to cases in which there is no opposing party other than the commissioner of patents, and whenever there are opposing parties, as in a contested case of interference, the ordinary rule should be followed, and costs be awarded to the party prevailing.</p> <p>3. Same—Butler Improved jVIii.k-Can—Antioipation—Shaw Can.</p> <p>The first claim of the patent applied for by Francis Gf. Butler, on November 20, 1878, for an improved milk-can, he,IS not anticipated by the original patent granted to Philander Shaw, on September 10, 1878, for an improvement in milk-cans, and that while Butler was not entitled to a patent on his third claim, he was entitled to a patent, for the invention specified in his first claim, and to the costs of this suit.</p>

<p>1. Patents—Sectional Honey-Frames.</p> <p>Patent'No. 243,674, granted to James Forn crook for an improvement in sectional lioney-frames, held .void for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. Same—Specific Mechanism.</p> <p>Whether such patent is for a honey section containing a combination of all the elements specified, so that each element has been made material, quaere; but held, that the patent is not merely for the blank adapted for the construction of the honey section by simply bending and uniting the ends, but also embraces the honey-frame, as thus formed and made out of such blank.</p>

<p>This is a proceeding in admiralty, by information filed by the district attorney against the defendants in personam, charging them, as owners and master of the steamer John Taylor, with the violation of the laws of the United States regulating steam-vessels. That law provides in substance, among other things, that all passenger steam-vessels navigating any waters of the United States, etc., engaging in excursions, shall obtain from the inspector a special permit in writing for the occasion, in which the number of passengers that may be carried, and the number and kind of life-preservers, shall be stated, etc. The statute further prescribes a penalty of $500 for the violation of said provision. Rev. St. §§ 4400, 4466, 4500.</p> <p>It is alleged in the libel that the said John Taylor was a boat propelled by steam, and that said steamer violated said provision, in the fact that she carried passengers largely in excess of the number allowed by her permit, and that she failed to carry the required number of boats and life-preservers. The defense set up is—First, that the boat, upon the excursion in question, carried citizens of the city of Burlington, Iowa, only, upon the Mississippi river from that city to another place in the state of Iowa, within the same county in which said city is situated, and that the transaction in question in nowise appertained to commerce with any other state than the state of Iowa, hut that it was a transaction connected solely and exclusively with the domestic intercourse of said state; second, that the boat was not a passenger steamer, but a steam ferry-boat, plying between said city of Burlington and the Illinois shore, and that as such she is excepted from the penalty prescribed by the statute.</p>

Hearing on Libel, Answer, and Proofs. Libel by the master and owners of the schooner William L. White against the steam-ship Algiers, for a collision, in which the steamship sank and destroyed the schooner and her cargo. The Providence Washington Insurance Company intervened for their interest, as insurers of the schooner’s cargo. The collision occurred shortly before 1 a. at. on November 19, 1882, about 25 miles south-eastwardly from the capes of the Delaware.

Appeal by tüe Mary L. Cushing from the Decree of the District Court awarding salvage exclusively to the tug Storm King.

<p>1. Demurrage—Charter-Party—Master—Consignee—Cargo—Place of Discharge.</p> <p>When a charter-party specifies that the cargo shall be discharged at the same place as the other cargo, such discharging to commence immediately after arrival of the ship, in order to recover 'demurrage from the consignee, the master must show that lie provided a suitable place for discharging- the goods, or liis inability to do so, or else some circumstance relieving him of his duty to provide such suitable place.</p> <p>2. Same—What is a “Suitable Plyce.”</p> <p>A suitable place for discharging- iron rails is not a place at which the customs officers will not weigh such article, and is not a place whore the owners of the wharf will not permit iron rails to bo landed.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. ,</p>

Action on Promissory Note. Motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. This was an action having a statutory and common-law count on a note in the following terms: $1,040. Savannah, Ga., April 20,1881. “ On or before the seventeenth day of October next we agree to pay J. S. "Wood & Bro., or order, for advances, one thousand and forty dollars, and eight per cent, interest from maturity.

<p>Action against Receivers.</p> <p>When based upon consent to sue, on petition to equity court, can only be entertained by that court.</p>

<p>Equity Jurisdiction—Adequate Remedy at Law —Rey. St. § 723—Payment oe Coupons on Municipal Bonds—Mandamus.</p> <p>Wliero a writ of mandamus wi 11 lie to compel a city treasurer to pay coupons duo on bonds of the city out of tlio fund provided by statute, or to compel the proper officers to set apart taxes collected as a sinking fund for the payment thereof, the bondholder lias an adequate remedy at law, and cannot proceed by bill in equity, not ancillary to any ponding proceeding at law, to enjoin the application oi the funds to other purposes.</p>

<p>1. Equity—Pleading—Multifariousnmss—Action by Receiver of National Bank.</p> <p>Where a bill, brought by the receiver of a national hank against all of the directors holding office during the existence of the bank, the legal representatives of deceased directors, and the cashiers of the bank, joins claims for losses suffered by the bank by reason of the directors’ negligence and inattention, and claims for losses suffered by the stockholders by reason of having been induced to subscribe for new shares by misrepresentations of the directors, it is multifarious.</p> <p>2. Same—Oebtatnty—Demurrer.</p> <p>Where such a bill does not state the dates of the losses sustained by the corporation, nor the dates of the acts or omissions contributing to those losses, with sufficient certainty to inform each of the defendants with which and how many of the losses it is sought to charge him, it is demurrable.</p>

<p>In Equity. On motions to dissolve injunctions.</p>

In Equity. This cause first came before the court on demurrer to the bill. For a-full statement of the case, and for the opinion of the court overrulling.the demurrer, see 15 Fed. Rep. 6. Upon final hearing before Mr. Justice Miller and District Judge Caldwell the bill was dismissed in conformity with the opinion of the former. 18 Fed. Rep. 344.

<p>1. Payment—Promise to Pay in Money or Equivalent—Time oe Payment-Election.</p> <p>Where a promise is in tlio alternative, to pay in money or in some other medium of payment, the promisor has an election either to pay in money or the equivalent, and after the day of payment, has elapsed without payment, the right of election on the part of the promisor is gone, and the promisee is entitled to payment in money.</p> <p>2. Same—Railroad Bonds — Payment oe Interest in Money or Scrip—Action to Recover Interest.</p> <p>By the terms of bonds issued in 1875, by the Texas & Pacific Railroad Company, the company acknowledged itself to be indebted to the holder in the sum named therein, which it promised to pay to--■, or assigns, at the office of the company in New York, on the first day of January, 1915, wilh’interest thereon at 7 per cent, per annum, payable annually on the first day of July oí each year, as provided in the mortgage on the lands of the company, and upon the net income derived from operating its road east of Fort Worth, by which payment was secured. The bonds further provided that in case such net earnings should not, in any one year, be sufficient to enable the company to pay 7 per cent, interest on the outstanding bonds, then scrip might, at the option of the company, be issued for the interest, such scrip to be received at par and interest, the same as money, in payment for any of the company’s lauds, at the ordinary schedule price, or it might be converted into capital stock of the company when presented in amounts of $100 or its multiple. The mortgage was silent as to payment of interest or principal, except that it authorized tlio trustees to sell the lands if default was made in the principal sum at maturity of the bonds, and apply the proceeds to satisfy tlie amount due. Held, that the mortgage did not qualify or control the absolute promise in the bonds to pay interest in money or in scrip ; that the bondholders were entitled to paymeut of interest in money, if earned, or, if it was not earned, to the scrip, on the day at which, by the terms of the bonds, the company was to pay tlio interest; or exercise its alternative; and that after that day had elapsed, without an election by tlie company, they were entitled to be paid in money, and could maintain au action to recover the same, although no presentment of the bonds or demand of payment had been made.</p>

<p> Habeas Corpus. </p>

Habeas Corpus. In this case the petitioner, a Chinaman, had, by the judgment of the court in a proceeding of habeas corpus, been remanded, to the custody from which ho was taken. The marshal thereupon made return that the ship from on board which he was taken had sailed, and that it was therefore impossible to execute the order of the court.

<p>1. Constitutional Law — Discrimination — Effect of Unconstitutional Amendment to Valid Act.</p> <p>The validity of a constitutional act is not affected by an amendment which is unconstitutional, because it discriminates between citizens of different slates, and which does not in terms repeal the original act. The amendment is void, and does not by implication repeal the original act.</p> <p>2. Same—Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>An offender, convicted under the original act, will not be discharged on writ of habeas corpus.</p> <p>3. Same—Construction.</p> <p>Doubts are to be solved in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments.</p>

<p>1. Bankruptcy—Discharge —Gaming—Rbv. St. § 5110.</p> <p>The discharge of a bankrupt is not a matter of right, but of favor, and the law may prescribe the terms on which he may be released from the payment of his debts; and every person who subjects his property to the hazard of loss at the gaming table, and loses'what in fact belongs to his creditors, is not within the class entitled to the benefit of the statute.</p> <p>2. Same—Loss by Gaming—Winnings—Evidence.</p> <p>The law does not charge the court with the duty of ascertaining whether or not the bankrupt’s lopes by gaming exceeded his winnings, and if it is shown by the evidence that he actually lost money by gaming the court must refuse him a discharge.</p>

<p>Patents for Invention --Hums dm Ho. 10,087—Sir add- IT older for Lamp—Infringement of Combination—Use of Part Only—Intention of Infringer.</p> <p>lleissuod patent Ho. 10,087, granted April II, J882, to Bennett B. Schneider, as assignee of Carl Votti, the original inventor of an “ improvement in shade-holders for lamps,” in winch the shade-holder becomes the base of the chimney, and the shade its top, retaining all their own functions in the lamp, and dispensing with a separate chimney, is a valid patent, and is infringed by the manufacture and sale of the shade-holder without the other part of the invention, in combination witli winch it is useful, with intent that it shall lie used by tlie purchaser in combination with a chimney to perform the function for which it was invented.</p>

<p>1. Patent—Topham’s Patent for “ Improvements in Spittoons.”'</p> <p>The invention claimed by Topham in bis second claim, of reissued letters patent (No. 5,514) is void for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. Same—Void Expanded Claim—Effect as to Other Claims.</p> <p>Although a reissue may be void as to new or expanded claims, it may still be held good for claims that are not expanded, or which do not show a different ’ invention from the original patent.</p>

<p>Patent—Bottoms of Cuspidors—Dismissal of Bill.</p> <p>Law announced in decision in case of Havemeyer v. Randall, ante, 404, applied to tilia case.</p>

<p>1. Patent Law—Judgment in Trial of Same Issues before Another Court.</p> <p>In hearing a case formerly tried before another court, no new question being suggested or newly-discovered evidence adduced, the judgment of the former court should be assumed to have been correct.</p> <p>2. Same—Patent Whip-Holders—Invalid Claim—Costs—Rev. St. $ 4922.</p> <p>The invalidity of a new claim in a reissue does not render a patent void or impair the validity of the first claim, and suits may be maintained on the parts which the patentee is entitled to hold, although if such suits are commenced before a disclaimer is entered no costs can be recovered.</p>

<p>7. Salvage—Public Policy.</p> <p>Salvage exceeds a fair remuneration for work and labor, the excess being intended, upon principles of sound public policy, not only as a reward to the particular salvor, but also as an inducement to others to render like services.</p> <p>2. Same—Want op Skill or Energy on Part of Salvor.</p> <p>But salvage may be reduced by want of skill or energy displayed by the salvors, or even forfeited by their misconduct or gross negligence. ______</p> <p>3. Same—Stranded Vessel.</p> <p>Where salvors, having the management of the business, fail to get a stranded vessel afloat at the first high water at which she might have been floated, had they employed the proper means, they must bo considered as having failed in point of skill and energy, and must suffer the just and legal consequences of such failure, notwithstanding they may have saved the vessel and cargo.</p> <p>4. Same—Mistake or Accident.</p> <p>Where, by mistake or accident, salvors, in attempting to haul off a stranded vessel, misplace a beaoh-a.nohor and thereby unnecessarily prolong the work, they will not be entitled to a compensation much, if any, in excess of their actual expenses.</p>

<p>Personal Jnjur-s—Presumption of Negligence.</p> <p>Wliere a stevedore, engaged in his usual occupation, falls through an ordinary coal-bunker hateli that is used for stowing cargo, the presumption is of his negligence rather than that of the officers of the vessel.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. Libel in rem.</p>

<p>Salvage—Pilots Acting as Salvors.</p> <p>The service rendered by pilots must, he beyond their ordinary duties as pilots to entitle them to salvage; but where there is unusual and extraordinary risk incurred in rendering service to a vessel in distress, although it bo but a pilot, age service, courts oí admiralty may give an additional compensation to encourage meritorious action in such cases.</p>

<p>1. Seaman’s Wages.</p> <p>Where suit has been commenced by a seaman for wages in a state court against the owner, but it has been dismissed before hearing, an admiralty court may entertain jurisdiction upon the same subject-matter.</p> <p>2. Same—Court may Decree Wages, when.</p> <p>A court of admiralty may decree seaman’s wages, although earned on a steamer of less than five tons, engaged in carrying freight and passengers upon navigable waters.</p>

<p>Personal Injuries—Fellow-Servants—Master and Servant—Common Undertaking.</p> <p>Tie libelant was one of several men procured by a stevedore to shift coal in a vessel, all of whom were paid for by the ship, by the day, and he was injured, without his own fault, by a board which fell through the hatch inconsequence of the winchman’s starting up the steam-winch without notice to his fellow-workman, whose business it was to tend the ropes at the platform. The winch-man was furnished by the ship and not by the stevedore, and was a competent person. Held, that all were in the common service of the ship, and were co-laborers in the same undertaking, and that the ship, therefore, was not liable for the injury, no breach of any duty owed by the ship or her officers being shown. Held, also, that it was immaterial that the winchman was paid by the month directly by the ship, and Die other men by the day, through the stevedoi",; the former being under the direction of the men at the platform when to start or stop, and all being under the common supervision of the stevedore, or his foreman, and employed in a common undertaking.</p>

<p>Maritime Lush—Supplies—Ship’s Agents—Secret Agreement with Stevedore.</p> <p>A supply of rope necessary for uso in unloading a sliip, furnished to the ship by request of the ship's agents, binds the shij to pay for it. The ship’s agents have presumptive authority to procure it on account of the ship. A secret agreement with a stevedore that he shall provide and pay for all such rope does not prevent a lien therefor in favor of one who furnishes such rope to the; ship on her account, at the request of the ship’s agents, when he has no knowledge or notice of such an agreement.</p>

<p>1. Contract—Actions in Contract and Tort—Joinder op Causes.</p> <p>Under the Code of North Carolina causes of action in tort and contract maybe joined in the same case, provided they arise out of transactions connected with the same subject-matter, and affecting the same parties.</p> <p>2. Same—Deceit in Business Transactions.</p> <p>Dccit in business transactions consists in'fraudulent representations or contrivances by which one man deceives another who has a right to rely upon representations, and has no means of detecting the fraud.</p> <p>3. Same—Sale op Goods—Fraudulent Rbihuískntations as Basis por Suit at Law.</p> <p>Fraudulent representations in the sale of goods will not of themselves constitute deceit, which will be tlie subject of a suit for damages. Mere “ dealing talk,” unless accompanied with some artifice to deceive the purchaser, or throw him off Ms guard, or some concealment of intrinsic- defects not easily detected by ordinary care and diligence, does not entitle one to an action.</p> <p>4. Same—Neglect oe Purchaser to Inspect Goods.</p> <p>A party cannot bo relieved by law, who, having every opportunity allowed him to inspect goods for himself, neglects to do so, but takes the goods at the estimate put on thorn by the seller.</p> <p>5. Same—Sale by Sample—Implied Warranty.</p> <p>To constitute a sale by sample with warranty implied, it must appear that the parties contracted solely with reference to the sample, and mutually understood that they were so dealing with the quality of the bulk.</p> <p>6. Same—Implied Warranty Generally.</p> <p>It is generally understood that in the sale or exchange of goods a warranty as to quality is not implied in law. The law presumes that a party who distrusts lus own judgment and shrewdness will protect himself by requiring an express warranty.</p> <p>7. Same—“Sound Order” in Contract por Sale op Tobacco.</p> <p>The words “ sound order,” as applied in a contract relating to tobacco to be delivered to a manufacturer, means such order as would, with ordinary care, insure the sound condition of the tobacco at the time of its arrival at the place where it is to bo manufactured, and for a reasonable time thereafter, until it could be used in the course of manufacture.</p> <p>.8. Same—One Party cannot Rescind. Contract in Part.</p> <p>A party entering into a contract for the purchase of goods to be sent in two consignments, cannot accept, pay for, and use the the first consignment, and refuse the second, and rescind the contract, without the consent of the seller.</p> <p>9. Same—Written Contract Presumed to Embrace Previous Oral One.</p> <p>It is a rule of law that all previous stipulations between parties to a transaction are presumed to be embraced in a subsequent, written contract about the same subject-matter.</p> <p>10. Same—Right op Action not Waived by Acceptance op Goods.</p> <p>A party who accepts and uses a commodity, notwithstanding the fact of its being other than it was represented to be, does not thereby waive his right of action, but is entitled to recover for the breach of warranty the difference between the values of the goods in their damageu and undamaged condition.</p>

<p>Motion for Injunction.</p>

<p>1. Sat/vors, who are, and Compensation of.</p> <p>A person rendering aid to a ship in distress is a salvor, whether he is a mere volunteer or acts upon the request oí the owner or agent of the ship; and unless there is an express contract to the contrary, or such a one must necessarily be implied from the circumstances oí the case, the law implies that the service is to be compensated l'or on the usual condition of the ultimate safety of the property.</p> <p>.2.. Same—Amount of Compensation,</p> <p>A salvor in pursuance of a request is entitled to compensation according to tlie circumstances of the case, although he is unsuccessful, if the property is not lost or is otherwise saved; but a mere volunteer is not entitled to compensation unless he succeeds, and the fact that his reward depends on this contingency may enhance the amount of it; but even when a salvor acts in pursuance of a request, and it is manifest that the property in peril must be wholly saved or lost, his compensation also depends upon the contingency of success, and should he enhanced accordingly.</p> <p>3. Same—Reward.</p> <p>In awarding compensation for a salvage service the courts do not stop at mere payment for the work and labor performed, but go further, and give the salvor an appropriate reward in the interest of commerce and navigation.</p> <p>4. Same—Elements of Compensation for Salvage.</p> <p>The elements that enter into the estimate in fixing the compensation for a salvage service are: (1) The value of the property saved and of that employed in saving it; (2) the degree of peril from which the saved property is delivered ; (3) the risk to which the property and person of the salvor is exposed; (4) the severity and duration of his labor; (5) the promptness with which he interposed his services; and (6) the skill, courage, and judgment involved in them.</p> <p>5. Same—Payment for Service, when not a Bar to Suit for Salvage.</p> <p>A payment received by a salvor as for work and labor and use of material, upou the reasonable understanding on his part that the other and principal salvors would settle and receive payment on the same basis without a suit for salvage, is no bar to such salvor intervening for his interest in a suit subsequently brought by such other salvors for salvage, and receiving his due share of the award therefor, less the payment theretofore made.</p>

<p>1. Pilots—Duty of—Unknown Obstructions—East River—Costs.</p> <p>A pilot is not an insurer. He is only chargeable for negligence when he fails in due knowledge, care, or skill, or to avoid all obstructions which were known or ought to have been known to him.</p> <p>2. Same—Injury to Tow—Costs.</p> <p>The schooner J. B. O., drawing ¥1% feet of water, while in tow of the tug J. A. G-., ran upon the edge of an obstruction in the East river, 400 to 500 feet easterly from the .Nineteenth-street buoy, (Nes Rock,) near mid-channel. Shortly before the trial, the existence of a pinnacle rock 4 jmrds square on the upper surface, and 12^ feet below low-water mark, was for the first time discovered and located in the precise region where the schooner struck. Held, that the schooner had struck upon the edge of the newly-discovered rock, previous ignorance of which was not a fault, and that the pilot having pursued the customary course, the tug was not liable for the damage: but, as the facts seemed to warrant the suit, the libel vías dismissed without costs.</p>

<p>Collision—Tug and Tow—Steamer Unincumbered Bound to JCeep Out of-the Way.</p> <p>A steamer having easy and perfect command of her own movements is bound to keep out of the way of a cumbersome tow going slowly with the tide, where there is nothing in the way to prevent the steamer’s doing sb. The steamer M., coming up the bay, sighted a tug with a heavy tow on a hawser, going down, being altogether 800 feet long, and some two miles distant. She was at first-to the westward of the tow, but worked across to the eastward, and Anally came in collision with the end of the port side of the tow. On contradict ory evidence as to the place of collision, and whether the steamer was in motion or not, held, that the steamer had abundant room to avoid the tow on either sido; and that whether she had stopped her engines or not, during a debate as to whether she should go to lied Hook or Brooklyn, she was equally at fault in not keeping out of the way of the tow.</p>

<p>1. Maritime Liens—Wages—Traveling Expenses—Stevedore’s Services and Ship’s Necessaries—Order oe Priority.</p> <p>Seamen having shipped at Japan upon a Dutch vessel for a voyage to New York and back, and the voyage being broken up by a sale of the vessel in New York, held, that the liens of the master and seamen were regulated by the Code of the Netherlands, and that they were entitled, under the fifth rank of privilege, to priority out of the proceeds of the ship for the payment of their wages and “double advance” over liens for supplies and stevedore’s services furnished in New York, which come under the sixth rank as ship’s necessaries. Traveling expenses were disallowed under the proofs.</p> <p>2. Same—Dutch Code—Ship and Freight Distinguished.</p> <p>The freight being also attached, and no express order of privilege on freight being established by the Dutch Code, held, under the equities of this case, that the freight should be shared pro rata by the ship-chandler and stevedore, and by the master and seamen for the residue of their claims not paid from the proceeds of the ship.</p>

<p>Jurisdiction of Circuit Court—Transfer of Interest Pending Hearing— Oitizensu i p—Supplemental Bii.u.</p> <p>(J., a, citizen oí Wisconsin, brought a suit in the circuit court of the United States for the western district of Wisconsin agai nst S., a citizen of Minnesota, and W., a citizen of Ohio, to set aside a tax deed upon his land, situated in Wisconsin, as a cloud on Ms title, and, after the case was ready for trial and set down for hearing, transferred his entire interest in the land to C.,a citizen of Minnesota. Held that, although 0. could not originally have brought the suit, the jurisdiction ol the court, having once attached, was not divested by the transfer in such a manner that the assignee could not, by a supplemental bill, or an original bill in the nature of a supplemental bill, filed in the circuit court, continue the jurisdiction of the court, and retain and preserve the benefit of the former proceedings in the suit of (i. against the sume defendants.</p>

<p>1. Taxation—National Banks—Kentucky.</p> <p>The city of Covington, Kentucky, assessed a tax for municipal purposes upon the surplus fund and undivided profits, the real estate and improvement used as a banking-house, real estate bought at judicial sales for the purpose of recovering an indebtedness to the bank, and the office furniture of the national 'banks, complainants herein. The statutes of Kentucky impose an annual tax of 50 cents on each share of stock, equal to S100, in any national bank within the state. A similar tax is imposed upon state banks and corporations of loan and discount. Other corporations are assessed upon their corporate property, hut stockholders are exempt ed from listing for taxat ion shares in such corporations. Held that, in tho light of the decisions of the court of appeals construing-these statutes, the corporate property of banks organized under the laws of Kentucky is not taxable beyond the tax of 50 cents per share of $100, and that the same rule applies to the taxation of national banks; and therefore that the furniture aud real estate of complainants are exempted from such municipal taxation.</p> <p>2. Samb—Surplus Fund and Undivided Promts.</p> <p>When a state law taxes shares of national bank stock, it taxes the same interest of the stockholder that he would transfer on a sale of his certificate; and therefore the tax of 50 cents a share imposed by the statutes of Kentucky, as above, is a tax on the whole interest of the stockholder represented by his slock, including his interest as such in tho surplus and undivided profits, as well as the authorized capital and assets of the bank.</p> <p>3. Same—Furniture and Keal Estate.</p> <p>The furniture of national banks is exempt from state taxation, because congress has not permitted ít, ; while the real estate of such banks may be subjected to a state tax, because congress does permit it,</p> <p>4. Same—IluegaTí Taxes—Injunction.</p> <p>There is no doubt of tho jurisdiction and remedy by injunction in the United States courts to prevent the collection of illegal taxes upon national banks. Pelton v. Nat. Bank, 101 U. S. 143; Cummings v. Nat. Bank, Id. 153.</p>

<p>Adverse Possession—Receipt of Receiver of Land-Office — Written In-’ STRUMENT—CONVEYANCE—WISCONSIN REV. St. 1878, § 4211.</p> <p>The receipt issued by the receiver of the land-office upon payment of the purchase price of,land to the government, containing a description of the land, constitutes such a conveyance of the premises as section 4211 of the Wisconsin Revised Statutes of 1878 contemplates as a proper foundation for a 10-years’ adverse possession.</p>

<p>1. Tariff Laws—Regulations of Customs Offices.</p> <p>Tbe secretary of the treasury, with a view to facilitate the work of collectors .of the port, may not make such regulations as would seem to negative existing laws.</p> <p>2. Same—Importation of Mineral Waters—Proof Required as to Their Nature.</p> <p>Under the laws, the importation of natural mineral waters is permitted free of duty. Under these circumstances, an importer is not restricted to a certificate of the owner of the spring in showing the character of the waters imported.</p>

<p>1. Municipal Corporations—Or&anization or Town or Ashland—Wis. Rev. St. 1858.</p> <p>The organization of the town of Ashland, in Ashland county, Wisconsin, was valid and legal,-although the orders of the county board in setting apart certain territory, and designating the boundaries thereof, to form said town, were not in the exact language of the statute. Wis. Rev. St. 1858, c. 13, 28, 30.</p> <p>2. Same—Collateral Attack—Action to Set Aside Tax Deed.</p> <p>Where the original orders organizing a, town are invalid, after the lapse of a period of more than 10 years, the validity of such organization and its authority to .levy taxes cannot be questioned collaterally in a proceeding by the alleged owner of town lots to remove a cloud on Ms title caused by a tax deed issued to a purchaser at a tax sale for taxes levied by such town.</p>

<p>1. Reissue No. 4,364—“Schillinger" Patent—Concrete Pavements—Validity—Infringement.</p> <p>Reissued letters patent No. 4,364, granted John J. Schillinger, May 2,1871, for improvement in concrete pavements, held valid and infringed.</p> <p>2. Same—“Schillinger’s” Construction—“Mueller and Dietrich’s” Construction.</p> <p>Schillinger’s invention, consisting of a concrete pavement laid in sections, with tar paper or its equivalent between the several divisions, permitting the separate removal of each block, and allowing the blocks to be severally and independently affected by varying states of the weather or changes in the temperature, and thus preventing the irregular cracking of the pavement and the cracking of the blocks, the openings resulting from shrinkage coming along the line of the joints or divisions, held infringed by the defendant’s construction, in which the cement is laid in a solid mass, and, while in plastic state, its surface is marked off by a fish-line or trowel into blocks, the incision or marking being but a short distance into the body of the cement, and no material being interposed between the several blocks.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Irwin Kerosene Hand Lantern—Novel Principle.</p> <p>An important and novel principle of the kerosene hand lantern made under reissued letters patent to John ¿1. Irwin, No. 8,598, (original patent No. 89,-770,) was the supply of external air to the flame by means of deflectors, which compelled the introduction into the supply tubes, in an irreversible current of air which, but for such deflectors, would blow over and exhaust the tubes.</p> <p>2. Same—Infringement.</p> <p>Patent No. 89,770 and reissue No. 8,598 construed, and held to describe and claim a structure having conduits which supplied heated air when the lantern was at rest and external air wliea it was exposed to the wind, and which could also have the assistance, if any there might be, of heated air in introducing a flow of fresh air through the tubes. The defendant’s lantern, which is an external air-feeder only, is therefore not an infringement of reissue 8,598.</p> <p>í¡. Same—Patents No. 104,318 and No. 151,703.</p> <p>Held, that defendant’s lantern infringes the first claim of No. 104,318, and the second claim of No. 151,703, both patents to John H. Irwin.</p>

<p>1. Patents eor Inventions—Construction oe Patent.</p> <p>Letters patent No. 50,617, granted October 24, 1865, to Alfred Nobel, do not cover a cajisuie or percussion cap as a means of exploding nitro-glycerine.</p> <p>2. Same—Reissue.</p> <p>After a reissue of said patenl, which in terms embraced a capsule or percussion cap as a means of exploding nitro-glycerine, a disclaimer of so much of the specification as described that method was filed. Held that, although the reissue, after being thus amended, might still bear an interpretation which would include the use of a capsule or percussion cap, yet such construction ought not to prevail in the face of the express disclaimer.</p> <p>3. Same—Disclaimer.</p> <p>A construction of a patent amended by a disclaimer which would render the disclaimer altogether nugatory, must be essentially wrong, and cannot ho accepted.</p>

<p>Patents—Eso- Beatebs.</p> <p>Patent No. 254,540, granted to Charles Deis l'or an improved egg and sugar beater, consisting of a box or i'eceptaele containing a revolving shaft, on which “ are set a number of projecting whips or beaters of wire, either in bunches or singly, and in rows or alternately,” held that, in view of the state of the art at the time the patent was granted, it must be limited to the combination described, embracing 'the particular form of beater shown in the specifications and drawings; and that it is not infringed by a beater in all respects like Deis’, except that, instead of wire whips, it has, on the revolving shaft, rigid cast-iron projections arranged in four or more parallel rows, these radial arms being so arranged in each row as to he intermediate with those of the other, and the arms on each row connected at their outer ends by longitudinal stiffening rods; said beater being manufactured by defendant under patent No. 266,679, granted to him.</p>

<p>1. Seamen’s Wages—Stipulations—Bisoiiahge.</p> <p>Where seamen were employed on a steam-boat to make the run from Philadelphia to Port of Spain for a stipulated sum, and to have their passage paid on their return to the port of departure, and the vessel, after having'gone a short distance to sea, was compelled to put back, and some of them were discharged by the captain because he had no further use for them, held, that they were entitled to lie paid the full sum agreed upon for their wages.</p> <p>2, Same—Leaving Vessel—Seawobthiness.</p> <p>Two of the libelants having; left the vessel on the ground that she was not seaworthy, held, that unseaworíhiness justillos a crew in leaving a vessel, and entitles them to the payment oí their wages for the month or voyage; and that the discharge of seamen and nnseaworthiness may be proved in the same manner as other facts are proved before a court or jury.</p> <p>3. Same—Statutory Provisions.</p> <p>Statutory provisions relating to the discharge of seamen, and the holding of surveys on vessels alleged to be unseaworthy, are not exclusive of other remedies than those therein contained.</p>

Plea to the Jurisdiction. This is an action for an injury alleged to have been received in Kansas through the negligence of defendant, a Kansas corporation. The defendant’s road does not extend into Missouri, but it has an office in both Kansas City and St. Louis. The service in this case was upon the officer in charge of the company’s office at the latter place.

<p>Prtnoifat, and Agent—Interest on Money Retained by Agent — Rate of Interest—Law of Peace.</p> <p>Money, voluntarily left by a principal in tlie hands of an agent, lies without interest until some request for it or occurrence changes the character of the detention; hut when the detention is against right, interest, from the time when the money should have been paid to the principal, at the rate fixed by the law of the place where it is detained, is chargeable to the agent.</p>

<p>1. Bail-road Company—Contract Ultra Vires—Rescission—Part Performance.</p> <p>A court of equity, upon a bill filed by a corporation, will rescind a contract still executory into which it has entered, where the same is ultra vires and against public policy, although all the stockholders may have either expressly assented thereto or acquiesced for a season therein, and in its partial execution by the other party.</p> <p>2. Same—Constitution of Pennsylvania—-Contract to Construct Railroad.</p> <p>The constitution of the state of Pennsylvania provides that “no corporation shall issue stocks or bonds except for money, labor done, or money or property actually received; and all fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness shall be void.”' An incorporated railroad company of that state entered into a construction contract whereby tile contractor agreed to furnish all the materials and do all the work necessary to construct the company’s road, at an expenditure, however, not exceeding §200,OIK); and in consideration thereof the company agreed 1o issue to the contractor .«300,000 of its capital stock as fully paid up, and §300,000 oí its first mortgage bonds. The materials could be furnished and the road built for §180,000 cash. Held, that the contract contravened the constitutional provision, and was ultra vires and void.</p> <p>3. Same—Pennsylvania Statutes of April 4, 1868, and April 18, 1874.</p> <p>The act of assembly of April 4, 1868, limits the amount of a railroad company’s construction mortgage bonds to the amount, of the capital stock subscribed, and authorizes the issue of such bonds in amounts not exceeding double the amount actually paid up of the capital slock subscribed; and the act of April 18, 1874, forbids any corporation to increase the amount of its indebtedness bej-ond the amount of its eapii al stock subscribed, until the amount of its capital stock subscribed shall bo fully paid in. Held, that the performance by the railroad company of its said contract involved a violation of these statutory provisions, it appearing that no part of its subscribed capital stock, which was §250,000, had boon paid in.</p> <p>4. Same—Part Performance by Contractor—Compensation.</p> <p>Before the bill was filed the contractor had entered upon the work of construction, and he has expended upwards of §40,000. Held that, while the contract must be rescinded as one which the corporation had no lawful power to make or perform, yet the rescission should be upon terms securing to the contractor just compensation, his conduct being' free from actual bad faith</p>

<p>Trade-Mark—Validity oe Mark ,n Doubt—Preliminary Injunction.</p> <p>Wliere it is very doubtful whether the name claimed as a trade-mark does not describe the articles themsel ces, and the kind of them, and indicate that they are made according to the patent known by the name claimed, rather than that the patentee made them, a preliminary injunction should not be granted.</p>

<p>Action under California statute of April 23, 1880, to recover taxes for 1880-81, with penalties and interest.</p>

<p>1. Covenant—Implied Contract—Condition Precedent—Damages—Pleading. »</p> <p>By articles of agreement under seal, dated May 8th, executed by II. and a railroad company, II. agreed to furnish labor and materials for laying ties and rails on the third division of the company’s road, from their depot grounds at Or. to the shore of the Delaware bay, near L., and on the projecting wharf or pier to be constructed in connection therewith,—about 17 miles in all; and the said third division, was to be ballasted and finished by the first of August next, if the rails and ties could be had by that time. H. was also to build and construct the wharf in conformity with the specifications set out in the agreement.. The work, was to be begun within 30 days after signing the articles; all the piles of the wharf to bo driven by the last day of July; and the said wharf and the whole of the said division were to be finished and completed by the tliirty-iirst. of October ensuing. It, was further agreed that immediately upon signing- the said articles the plaintiff should subscribe for $150,000 of the capital siook of the company, certificates for which wore to be issued to him in part compensation for Ins services, etc. On the twentieth of August, while II. was engaged in the performance of his contract, and was ready, willing, and able 1o carry on, prosecute, and finish the same in manner and form, etc., ho was prevented by the company from so doing, and was wholly discharged; and thereupon he brought his action for a breach of the covenant. The declaration contains seven counts, to five of which the defendant demurred, alleging that the covenants declared on were not the covenants of the defendant, but were repugnant to the express covenants in the articles of agreement; also, that the plaintiff, having neglect ed or failed to subscribe for the stock, begin the work, or finish the third division at the times agreed on, could not maintain this action. Held, that the agreement on the part of the plaintiff to do the work, and on the part of the defendant to pay for it, raised an implied covenant on the part of the latter to permit the plaintiff to do the work; that the time stipulations were not conditions precedent, not being- made so in terms, nor can they be implied, being only agreements of the plaintiff, for the breach of which lie might tie liable to damages, if the defendant could show any damages resulting therefrom. If plaintiff’s delini ¡neney in these particulars evinced an intention on Ins part to abandon the contract, and not perform it at all, it would be evidence on that issue;' and abandonment would have authorized the defendant to consider the contract at an end, and to stop the plaintiff from further ititerni'-dd ling with the road and pier. The defendant could have pleaded justification of the prevention, and discharge of the plaintiff, and put in evidence his failure on the time stipulations, his want of reasonable diligence, etc., in support of such a plea.</p> <p>2. Same—Damages.</p> <p>Where one party agrees to perform a service or work which necessarily requires time and progress in 1 lie performance, and is to receive a compensation from the other party therefor, if the party for whom the service or work is to be done puts an end to the performance, either before its commencement or during its progress, the other party, though able and willing to proceed, cannot recover compensation ior work' not done, but can only recover damages for the breach of the contract; and those'damages will consist of his outlay already incurred, and of the profits which he would have realized had he been permitted to complete the work; or in place of outlay, when the compensation for the service is divisible, he may recover compensation for the service already performed, and damages for being prevented from completing his contract.</p> <p>3. Pleading—Issues Raised by Plea.</p> <p>Pleas which attempt to raise cn immaterial issue, or take issue upon a matter of law, held bad ou demurrer.</p>

<p>Motion for New Trial.</p>

<p>Demurrer to Complaint.</p>

<p>On Demurrer to Complaint.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Novelty—Patent No. 170,852.</p> <p>The first and fifth claims of patent No. 170,852, granted December 7, 1875, to George Hayes, for an improvement in ventilating louvers, held void for want of novelty.</p>

<p>1. Patents Tfoit Inventions — Reissues 8,674, 8,675 — Sky-Lights and Ventilators.</p> <p>The eighth claim of reissued patent No. 8,674, and the first, second, and seventh claims of reissued patent No. 8,07.6, for improvements on sky-lights and ventilators, are not to he found in the original patent, and are void.</p> <p>2. Same—Reissue 8,689—Validity—Infringement.</p> <p>The second and third claims of reissued patent No. 8,689, for sky-lights and ventilators, are not anticipated by any prior patents or structures, are valid, and are infringed by defendant.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions — Reissue No. 9,743—Electrical Apparatus for Lighting Street Lamps.</p> <p>Claims 2 and 5 of reissued patent No. 9,743, granted to Jacob P. Tirrell, assignqr, and dated June 7, 1881, for electrical apparatus for lighting street lamps, held invalid. '</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Assignment—Rejection of Application—Amendment by Solicitor—Issue of Amended Patent—Validity—Recovery of Agreed Price.</p> <p>M. made an improvement in metal vessels for culinary purposes, consisting of a shoulder around the inside of the upper edge to support the lid, and assigned it to L. to procure a patent; and the application, being rejected for want of novelty, was amended by the solicitor to include an inclosed wire at the extreme edge, and a palent having such a shoulder strengthened at the edge by the wire was issued to L., who made and sold at a profitvessels having the shoulder without the wire and vessels having both the shoulder and wire, and marked and claimed them all as patented. M. claimed a royalty on all the vessels sold under his contract with L. Held, that if the shoulder without the wire liad been new, so that the patent would have covered that as a part of the patented invention, U. could lawfully control the monopoly of the shoulder only; hut that when the claim for that alone was rejected, and such rejection acquiesced in, it could not bo claimed that the patent covered that alone; that while as to the public tlio patent would be Void because M. did not invent the wire, and the act of the solicitor in inserting it was unauthorized, the relations of M. and L. were governed by their contract, and that At. was entitled to recover as claimed.</p> <p>2. Same—Vkrdict—Evidence.</p> <p>Upon examination of the evidence the verdict in favor of plainlill is sustained.</p>

In Equity. Exceptions to parts of answer. This is a suit for the infringement of a patent on an improvement on railroad-track drills, invented by the complainant. The bill alleges, in substance, that the patent claimed to have been infringed was issued to the complainant, and Andrew Warren and Perrin Gr.

<p>In Equity. Demurrer to bill for infringement of a patent.</p>

<p>On Bill, Answer, and Proofs. Final hearing.</p>

<p>Patents iron Inventions—Time-Lock—Infringement.</p> <p>Infringement of patent No. 262,091, granted to Henry P. Newbury, August 1, 1882, for an improvement in time-locks, held not shown, and preliminary injunction refused.</p>

In Equity. This was a bill in equity for an infringement of letters patent No. 215,679, issued May 20, ’1879, to George Bartholomae as assignee of Leonard Meller, of Ludwigshafen on the Bliine, and Edmund Hoffman, of Mannheim, Germany, for an “improvement in processes for making beer.” This improvement was first patented in France, to Leo Meller & Co., November 30, 1876, and on February 28, 1877, a Belgian patent was issued to the same parties.

<p>1. Wharves and Slips—Obstructions—Sunken Pile—Damage to Vessel.</p> <p>A coal merchant having by arrangement with a'railroad company, the owner, obtained the exclusive use of a wharf and of the slip adjoining, for the purpose of receiving coal upon cars of the company, and of thence selling and shipping the coal on board vessels that he procures to come to the wharf to receive it, paying the company a fixed sum, as wharfage, for all coal thus sold and shipped, is liable for the damages to such vessels occasioned by a sunken pile near the wharf, after notice of the existence of the obstruction and of its dangerous character, the vessel having been directed to move over the dangerous spot by his general superintendent.</p> <p>2. Same—Liability of Owner and Occupant.</p> <p>The liability of the company, as owner, for the same damage, if proved, would he no defense to the several liability of the occupant of the wharf.</p>

<p>1. Carrier or Goods—Bill or Lading— Quantity or Goods Shipped.</p> <p>A bill of lading is not conclusive upon a carrier of goods as to the quantity received for carriage, but, like other receipts, may be explained.</p> <p>• 2. Same—Evidence or Loss or Goods—Action to Recover Freight—Orrset.</p> <p>Upon examination of the evidence in this case, held, that it does not show conclusively that the alleged loss of a portion of the cargo occurred while the same was on the schooner, and that damages for such loss could not, in the absence of proof that the carrier was at fault, be allowed as an offset in an action to recover the freight.</p>

<p>Appeal from Taxation of Marshal’s Costs.</p>

<p>Motion to Remand.</p>

<p>Will—Precatory Trust.</p> <p>C., by will, left all of Ms property to Ms wife, with-full power of disposition, adding these words: “ I recomme ad to her the care and protection of my mother and sister, and request her to make such gift and provision for them as, in her judgment, will be best. 1 also request my dear wife to make such provision for my daughters, H. and C., as she may, in her love for them, choose to exercise.” Held, that no precatory trust was created by the use of the words of recommendation and request.</p>

<p>Will—Precatory Trust.</p> <p>Colton v. Colton, ante, 594, followed, demurrer sustained, and bill dismissed.</p>

<p>Equitable Jurisdiction and Relief—Insolvent Partnership—Receiver.</p> <p>A» insolvent firm offers by circular letter to its creditors to pay 50 per cent, of their debts, and agrees in the same circular to make no preferences. Many creditors accept the offer. It subsequently continues business at large expense, postpones the execution of this compromise for. an indefinite period until all the creditors accept, and pays many of the debts in full, thereby making preferences. Held, equity has jurisdiction on bill filed to appoint a receiver and také possession of the firm assets and administer them for the benefit of the creditors; and this can be done in Virginia by a creditors’ bill, without previously obtaining judgments at law.</p>

Action to Itocover Ileal Property. Motion for judgment on tlie pleadings. This action is brought by the plaintiff, a citizen of New York, to recover the possession of the undivided jj- of the E. ¿ of the donation of Danford Balch, the same being claim 58, and parts of sections 28, 29, 32, and 33, in township 1N., of range 1 E. of the Wallamet meridian, and situate in the county of Multnomah and state of Oregon.

<p>Indian Lands—Negotiating Lease of, not an Offense—Rev. St. 5 2116.</p> <p>It is not an offense, witliin the meaning of section 2116 of the Revised Statutes, to negotiate, without authority from tho United States government, a lease of lands for grazing- jiurposus, from an Indian tribe to a corporation.</p>

<p>1. Courts-Martial—Their Powers as Compared with Those of Civil Courts.</p> <p>Courts-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts of the United Stales, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law military, as the latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an exercise of their powers.</p> <p>2. Same—Amenability of Soldiers, and Sailors to Their Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Every one connected with the military or naval service of the United States' is amenable to tlie jurisdiction which congress has created for their government, and while thus serving surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts.</p> <p>3. Same—Within the Scope of Thhir Jurisdiction not Reviewable by Civil Courts.</p> <p>Provided a court-martial has jurisdiction to hear and determine and to render the particular judgment or sentence imposed, however erroneous the proceedings may be, they cannot be reviewed collaterally upon habeas corpus.</p> <p>4. Same—Prisoner Properly before Them has not Benefit of Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>A party legally in' custody, awaiting trial by court-martial, (and he is legally in custody if the offense is one oí which that tribunal has jurisdiction,) cannot avail himself of a CJuited States civil court in a habeas corpus proceeding.</p> <p>5. Same—Statutory Limitation.</p> <p>It is for the court-martial, and not for a civil court of tlie United States, to decide whether the statutory limitation contained in the 103d article of war can lie invoked by a party accused of desertion to protect him from punishment.</p> <p>6. Same—Party Improperly Enlisted—Power op Sircar Courts.</p> <p>If aa alleged deserter was not ever duly enlisted in tho United States service, he is not amenable to tho jurisdiction of a court-martial. ■ .</p> <p>1. Minority op Soldier—Ekeect op Rev. St.</p> <p>The oilecfc of sections 1116, 1117, and 1118 of the Revised Statutes is that the contract of enlistment of a minor under 16 years of ago is void; but that over that age it is valid, in tho absence of fraud or duress as to him; but during his minority it is invalid at the election ol his parents or guardians.</p>

Indictment against a postai clerk for stealing letters from a postal car. The defendant was found guilty -in the district court of stealing a number of letters from a postal car as charged, part of which contained and are stated in the indictment to have contained two one-dollar United States treasury notes each. The indictment gives the names of the parties to whom the letters were addressed, but does not allege the ownership either of the letters.or their contents.

<p>Perjury—Timber Culture Act—Oath—Who can Administer.</p> <p>To make a party liable to prosecution for perjury in a United States court, it does not matter that the oath taken by him when endeavoring to benefit by the “timber culture act” was taken before an officer authorized by a state, rather than one authorized by the United States to administer oaths.</p>

<p>1. Patents nor Inventions—Anticipation—Application of Old Machine— Similar Subject.</p> <p>The application of an old process or machine to a similar or analogous subject, with no change in the manner of application, and no result substantially distinct in nature, will not sustain a patent, even if the new form has not been before contemplated.</p> <p>2. Same—Patent No. 23,957—Spriku Lathe—Murdock Lathe.</p> <p>Patent No. 23,957, granted to Charles and Andrew Spring, May 10; 1859, for an improvement in lathes for turning irregular forms, held anticipated by the Murdock lathe, and invalid.</p>

<p>1. Patent Law—Manufacture of Xyloidine.</p> <p>Patents JSTos. 97,454 and 101,175, for certain improvements in the art of dissolving' and manufacturing xyloidine, held invalid by the court.</p> <p>2. Same—Patentability—Requirements of Constitution and Statutes.</p> <p>Under the constitution a patent can be granted only for an invention, and under the statute the thing !or which a patent may be granted must be not only new and useful, but must amount to an invention or discovery.</p> <p>8. Same—Solvents of Pyroxyline—Modification of Well-Known Solvents.</p> <p>Before the invention by Spill (1869) the world was informed that dehydrated or strong alcohol combined with camphor was a solvent of pyroxyline. This being the case, the use of alcohol of loss strength, and yet of sufficient strength for the purpose, was no invention. Smith v. Nichols, 21 Wall. 112-119.</p> <p>4. Same—Bleaching Xyloidine—Adaptation of Familiar Process.</p> <p>In the operation of bleaching xyloidine the employment of ordinary bleaching materials (although heretofore not contemplated as adapted for the purpose in connection with this substance) is not patentable. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Locomotive Engine Safety Truck Co. 110 U. S. 140; S. C. 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 220.</p>

<p>Patent Law—Improvement in Soda-Water Fountains.</p> <p>Alleged infringement of patent for tin-lined steel soda fountains. After investigation of the inventions of plaintiffs and defendant, and a comparison of their several parts each with each, no infringement found.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions—Soldering Process—Novelty.</p> <p>Patent 191,405, granted to George M. Clark and Arthur Harris, May 19,1877, for an “ improvement in soldering process,” held void for want of novelty.</p> <p>2. Same—Infringement—Soldering Tool.</p> <p>Patent No. 194,519, granted <,o Clark and Harris, as assignee of Arthur Harris, August 27, 1877, for an “improvement in soldering tools,” held infringed by soldering tool used by defendant.</p>

In Admiralty. The libel in this case was filed by the owners of the Dutch steamship Edam, against the British steam-ship Lepanto, in rem, and against her master, in personam, to recover $450,000, the alleged value of the Edam and her cargo, which were sunk by a collision with the Lepanto during a dense ,fog off George’s bank, at about 10 p. m. on the night of September 21, 1882.

<p>In Admiralty. On appeal from district court.</p>

<p>Demurrage—Lien— Biux, of Lading.</p> <p>A ship-owner has a lien upon tho cargo for demurrage, enforceable in the admiralty, although the bill of lading contains no demurrage clause.</p>

<p>Motion to Confirm Report of Commissioner in Favor of Libelant.</p>

<p>Chancery. On plea and demurrer to bill.</p>

<p>In Equity. Petition for rehearing.</p>

This is an action of ejectment, and, a jury being waived, is tried by the court. The facts are briefly these: John Leavey, owner of the land in controversy, mortgaged the same to A. A. McLeod, June 14, 1877, to-secure the payment of $400, duo June 14,1882. The mortgagee assigned the mortgage to the plaintiff, which was recorded January 26, 1878.

<p>Action on Policy of Insurance,</p>

<p>Mandamus. Demurrer to return.</p> <p>This is a proceeding by mandamus against the judges of the county court of St. Charles county, in the state of Missouri, and the treasurer of said county, to enforce the satisfaction of a judgment rendered in this court upon certain bonds and coupons issued by St. Charles county, under the act of March 14, 1870, for the improvement of certain swamp lands. The relator alleges that said treasurer has $1,687.50 in his hands, which should be applied towards the payment of said judgment, and that the payment of said sum upon the bonds merged in said judgment has been demanded and refused. In answer to an alternative writ of mandamus, directed to him and said judges, said treasurer has made a return in which he substantially admits ■ the possession of $1,687.50 as proceeds of a tax levied to pay the bonds in judgment merged; but, in denial of relator’s rights to a peremptory writ, said treasurer sets up that the taxes levied in pursuance of the act of 1870, for the payment of bonds and coupons issued thereunder, became in great part delinquent for the years 1873 to 1877, inclusive; that from sales made under execution issued on judgments rendered upon suits brought by the collector to recover the same, certain moneys were collected, out of which the attorneys for the collector, as well as the collector himself, retained as fees certain sums in excess of the legal allowance, which sums so illegally retained were refunded on suit brought by the county court, and paid into said treasurer’s hands, and constitute the fund now in his possession; that the suits instituted for the recovery of said taxes and illegal allowances were promoted by one Theodore McDearmon, an attorney who represented two parties, who together owned $5,500 of bonds issued under said act, and which matured before those merged in the relator’s judgment; that payment of said fund upon the bonds merged in the relator’s judgment had been refused, when demanded, because of the aforesaid facts, and because said McDearmon had previously, and before said fund came into said treasurer’s hands, demanded payment of the bonds owned by his clients, and the demand, though refused, had been duly noted as required by law. In conclusion the respondent states that he is ready and willing to pay over said sum to the proper party, but does not know whether it should be paid to the relator or McDearmon’s clients. To this return the relator demurs.</p>

<p>1. Chinese Immigration—■Custom-House Tag—Certificate — Acts of 1882 and 1884.</p> <p>A Chinese laborer, in September, 1883, went back to China, after obtaining from the custom-house officer a “tag ” entitling him to the certificate required by the act of 1882, but without procuring the certificate itself, and in August, 1884, returned to the United States and sought to land by virtue of his “ tag.” Held, thatthe act of 1884, which declares that the certificate issued to the laborer should be the only evidence permissible to establish his right to re-enter the United States, was as applicable to the certificate issued under the act of 1882, as to a certificate issued under the act of 1884, and that he was not entitled to re-enter.</p> <p>2. Same — Removal of Chinaman Unlawfully Returned — Duty of SteamShip Company.</p> <p>The acts of congress, both original and amendatory, contemplate that parties unlawfully bringing here Chinese laborers prohibited from landing shall take them back to the country from which they are brought, or, at least, beyond the jurisdiction of the United States; and” a steam-ship company cannot escape from this duty by the departure of the vessel on which they are brought, or any change in its officers or management.,</p> <p>Per Field, Justice.</p> <p>3. Same — Habeas Corpus — Release of Chinaman on Bail — Departure of</p> <p>Vessel—Remanding to Master on Return of Vessel—Refusal of Master to Receive Him—Penalties.</p> <p>When,, on. proceedings by habeas corpus to tost the right of a Chinese laborer to re-enter the United States, his body is produced in court, the court may order that lie continue in the custody of the party detaining him, or commit him to the custody of the marshal, or release him on hail to await a decision of the question, and when he ha* been released on hail he is still deemed in the custody of the law, and as never having been landed; and if, before final decision, the vessel on which he was brought departs on its regular trip, when she returns he may be remanded to the master, whether he is the one who produced him or another, and a refusal to receive him when so remanded would constitute an aiding and abetting or permitting tile landing of a person unlawfully, within the provisions of sections X and 2 of the restriction act, and both the master and the ship under his command would incur the penalties pronounced by sections 10, 11, and 12 of the act.</p> <p>Per Sawyer, J.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Composition tor A.rtifictat> Ivory—Novelty.</p> <p>Patent No. 89,531, granted ¿April 27, 1869, to William M. Welling, for an improved composition for artificial ivory, is void for want of novelty, and because it does not disclose an advance in tlve art.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Couplings for Cultivators—Claim 1 of Patent No. 190,816—Patentability—Anticipation—Infringement.</p> <p>The first, claim oí letters patent No. 190,816, granted to William P. Brown, May 15, 1877, for an improvement in coupling's for cultivators, construed, and held, that Brown’s device was a patentable invention, not anticipated by Coon-rod’s pa lent of 1867, Stover’s patent of 1870, or Jlaslup’s patent of 1872, and was infringed by the device of defendant.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Patent Ho. 190,816—Claims 1 and 2—Infringe-ment.</p> <p>The defendant’s cultivator compared with, patent Ho. 190,816, sustained in Brown Manuf’g Co. v. Deere, ante, 709, and held, that the first and second claims thereof are infringed by defendant.</p>

In Admiralty. Libel to recover an unpaid balance of $322.56, for coal supplied by the libelants at Washington to the steamer Francis; this part of the bill being furnished from July 15 to July 18, 1879. The Providence & Stonington Steam-boat Company, a Rhode Island corporation, were the general owners of the steamer, and appeared and defended as claimants. On June 30, 1879, the Francis was chartered to “Thomas Collier, of Brooklyn, N. Y., and Jos.

<p>1. Collision—Tug ayo Tow—Obscuration ok Lights.</p> <p>A tug is bound to keep her colored lights in such a position that her low will not obscure them, as respects vessels at a distance requiring tho notice which the colored lights arc designed to afford.</p> <p>2. Same—Lookout—Mutual Fault.</p> <p>Where the tug T. had on her starboard side the barge M. in tow, loaded with railroad cars, partly sheltered by a narrow fore and aft roof called an umbrella, which was of such height as to obscure the lug’s green light as she was going- up the North river, and the steamer II., crossing the river to tho northward and seeing no colored light, supposed the T. was going down river instead of up river, and ported so as to go astern of the T., as she supposed, but too late discovered the error and came in collision, held, that the collision was caused in part by the obscuration of the green light, for which the T. was responsible. lldd, that the 11. was also in fault for want of any proper lookout, when going- at the rate of 13 miles in crossing the river, as such a lookout might liave discovered that the T. was going up river in time for the 1L to avoid her.</p> <p>3. Same—Limitation ok Liability.</p> <p>A libel to limit liability is not defeated by a recovery by a claimant of less than the stipulated value of tho vessel, whore his origina J claim was greater than its value.</p> <p>4. Same—Personal Injury—Damages —Contribution—Abmikalty Rule 59,</p> <p>A deck hand on tho H. having been injured by the collision without his own fault, held, that he had a several claim for his whole damages against the T.; and the T. being responsible, and having a right to indemnity from the II. foe one-half what the T. must pay by reason of tho common fault of both vessels, held, that, the usual decree might go against both, without considering the question whether tho deck hand, as a fellow laborer, could have maintained a separate suit against tho IL or her owners alone.</p>

<p>Maritime Debts—First Attachment Dives no Preference.</p> <p>By tlie maritime law the creditor first filing a libel and arresting the vessel does not thereby acquire the right to have his debt paid in full to the exclusion of other creditors whose debts are of the same rank and equal merit, and who intervene and prove their debts before or at the time a final decree in the suit first brought is rendered.</p>

<p>Towage—Passage through Draw in Bridge—Nmgijgknos: of Draw-Tkndbr • —Negijghnob of Tug—Stranding of Vesskli-—Division of Damages.</p> <p>The schooner O., while being towed by the steam-tug JT., was passing with a ilood-tido from east to west, and with the wind blowing hard from the north, through a draw in a railway bridge, and the draw not being wide enough for both to pass at once, the tug fell behind. The draw-tender, acting in accordance with the custom of himself and his predecessors for many years, assisted in making fast the lines, and in casting them oil', so as to speed the passage of the schooner, and his negligence in casting off one of such lines put the schooner adrift, so as to be impelled by the wind and tide towards the southern shore. After she had drifted once or twice her length, the tug, following her as quickly as possible, overtook her, and made fast to her port side, prevented her from grounding on the southern shore, swung her head around into the channel, which was quite broad, and pushed her against the wind across the channel towards the northern shore, but, by negligence and mismanagement, pushed her too far in that direction, so that she stranded on that shore, at a distance of at least 800 feet from the place where she was east adrift, or from the'píase where the tug was made fast to her again. Held, that the whole damage caused by such stranding must he borne by the tug.</p>

In Equity. Motion to set aside order overruling demurrer to bill. For a statement of facts, and the opinion upon the demurrer, see 21 Fed. Rep. 15.

<p>1. Equity Practice—Corporation's—Ninety-Fourth Equity Rule—Tennessee Code, 1492-1497.</p> <p>Where a Tennessee corporation has been dissolved by a foreclosure sale of its franchises, but its existence is continued by statutory provision for a term, of five years, during which suit may be brought in its name to wind up its affairs, a bill by stockholders is well filed under the ninety-fourth equity rule, if it appear that the suit is not a collusive one, and that the plaintiffs have applied to such of the late directors as thej'- can reach to bring the suit, and they have refused.</p> <p>2. Same Subject—Statutory Receiver under Tennessee Act, 1852, e. 151— Tennessee Code, § 1101.</p> <p>But where the corporation was a railroad company, indebted to the state for aid under the internal improvement acts of 1852, and was, at the time of the dissolution, in the hands of a receiver appointed by the governor, the receiver was, under those acts, by operation of law, the manager of the company, and the proper person to bring suits in the name of the dissolved corporation, as required by the Tennessee Code; and if the suit be against the receiver himself to call Kim to account, the ninety-fourth equity rule would not apply, as it would be unreasonable to ask him to sue himself. The stockholders, therefore, may- proceed in tlieir individual right without compliance with the ninety-fourth rule in that respect.</p> <p>3. Equity—Trusts—Right of Beneficiary to an Account—Accounting with Executive Department.</p> <p>It is quite a matter of course that a trustee shall, in a court of equity, pass his accounts whenever demanded by the beneficiary; and he cannot escape an account by showing that the judgment creditors of the beneficiary will absorb the fund, or that he is a statutory receiver, authorized to report to the governor of the state, to whom he has made a satisfactory report. An act of the legislature conferring exclusive power over such account on the executive department would probably be unconstitutional.</p> <p>4. Same Subject—Unsatisfactory Account.</p> <p>But where it appears that the beneficiary has not been injured by the too general statement of the account, and a failure to file vouchers in the executive department, and there is no showing' of false or fraudulent conduct, a court of equity will not, for the mere satisfaction of the plaintiff, require the receiver to account more in detail, and file his vouchers, when the plaintiffs have been foreclosed of their interest in the fund by a mortgage sale.</p> <p>5. Equity Pleadings—General Accusation of Fraud.</p> <p>Merc epithetic accusations of fraud will not suffice in equity pleading, but the facts must be staled which show the conduct complained of to ho fraudulent.</p> <p>6. Mortgagor and Mortgagee — Account for Rents and Profits — Eore- ’ closure Bale—Right of Purchaser—Senior and Junior Mortgages.</p> <p>Where a prior mortgagee is in possession, and pending liis possession there is a foreclosure sale under a subsequent mortgage, a person buying the property subject to the prior lien, in the absence of any agreement or other circumstance fixing the amount of the incumbrance, is entitled to an account with the senior mortgagor to ascertain the amount due to him at the time of the sale from the mortgagee, and his bid, presumably, included only the amount found due on that accounting.</p> <p>7. Same Subject—Credits Allowed—Permanent Improvements.</p> <p>On such accounting the senior mortgagee will he allowed credits for all permanent improvements and necessary expenditures during his possession, and all incumbrances paid before the sale.</p> <p>8. Same Subject — Railroads — Tennessee Internal Improvement Acts of 1852—Tennessee Code, § 1101—State Receiver.</p> <p>This principle applies to a receiver in possession of a railroad under the Tennessee internal improvement acts of 1852, (Code, § 1101,) during whose possession the road is sold at the suit of its own mortgage bondholders, and the equity of the purchasers to the accumulated earnings in his hands is paramount to that of the stockholders and creditors, and the bill of the latter for an account will be dismissed.</p> <p>9. Same Subject—Tennessee Haiuhoad Liquidation Act op 1869, e. 38.</p> <p>This principle of the general law of the relation of the parties is strengthened by the liquidation act of 1869, e. 38, under which the purchasers, by consent of plaintiffs, liquidated the company’s debt to the state on the express condition that the purchasers should be substituted to the lien of the state upon the earnings in the receiver’s hands. The plaintiffs cannot now repudiate that agreement by diverting the fund to the payment of other debts, or by distribution of it among the stockholders.</p>

<p>I’RATTDULTiN'r CONVEYANCE — MORTGAGE — COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS — ABSCONDING Debtor—Porüglosiji.'e op Mortgage.</p> <p>II., being hopelessly insolvent, applied to V., one of his creditors, for a loan of 8i5,000, to compromise his debts by payment of 25 cents on the dollar. V. loaned him the money with- full knowledge of tho facts of tho case, and took a mortgage, executed by II. and wife, on his homestead farm (which was all of his projierty within reach of his creditors) in Vermont, duly recorded it, and thereafter advanced tho money, faking no precautions to procure its payment to the creditors. The deed of composition provided that II. might sell or dispose of his property within a certain lime in furtherance of a settlement with his creditors. V. and some other creditors signed this deed. II. failed to pay the money as agreed, and fled with it to Ganada. V. subsequently tiled a bill to foreclose the mortgage, making attaching creditors defendants with H. Held, that as to all the property, except the homestead interest in the land, the mortgage was void as to the creditors; that V. was entitled to foreclose as to the homestead interest only on payment to the attaching creditors who were parties to the deed of composition the 25 cent s on the dollar, as agreed, with interest; and that as to the residue oí tho estate the bill should be dismissed.</p>

<p>1. Indian Treaty—Chickasaw Treaty on July 1, 1834—Treaty on Pontotoc op March 1, 1833—Effect on State Laws— Constitutional Law.</p> <p>Under the Chickasaw Indian treaty of July 1, 1834, as interpreted by the previous treaty of Pontotoc of March 1, 1833, to which it, was a supplement, state legislation that interferes with the national rights of the Chickasaw Indians, while in possession of lands under the tribal organizations, is extraterritorial, and, so far as conflicting with rights secured by the treaty, unconstitutional ; and rights once vested under the treaty are beyond the power of state legislation, even after the removal of tho Indians.</p> <p>2. Same—Beal Estate—Conveyance of Indian Bbservations</p> <p>It was competent for the United States by treaty, notwithstanding any state law, to proscribe the conditions to the conveyance of Indian lands which should he the law of tho title. But on the extinguishment of the original Indian title, and the removal of the Indians from the state, the laws of the state would come into operation, except so far as modified by the existing treaties and laws of the United States.</p> <p>3. Same—Yondntary and Involuntary Conveyances.</p> <p>The restrictive clauses of the foregoing treaties upon the alienation of Indian lands provided that the reservations to individuals should not bo “ sold, leased, or disposed of” except in tho particular manner pointed out by the treaty, but the terms of the treaty apply only to voluntary conveyance by the Indians, such as were effected by the personal will of the possessor, and not to transmissions of title by operation of law, except where provision is especially made for a peculiar descent on the death of the possessor.</p> <p>4. Same—Attachment Sale of Indian Land^.</p> <p>Where, therefore, the possessor of an Indian reservation of individual lands left his land and rejoined his tribe in the Indian nation, in consequence of which absence from the state the land was attached at the suit of his creditor and sold by the sheriff', tho purchaser at the sale took a good title, which must prevail over the claim of title by his heirs at law, under the tribal laws of descent or the ordinary laws of the state.</p>

In an equity cause pending in this court, in which a large amount of written testimony in the form of depositions was to bo taken in shorthand, a decree and order was made appointing the regular examiner of the court to take the proof of witnesses residing here, and many depositions had been taken by him; and others were being taken, when, on May 2, 1884, the examiner made a report to the court of certain alleged misconduct on the part of respondent, who was attending the…

This is a suit for the proceeds of a promissory note deposited by the plaintiff, indorsed in blank, with the Indianapolis Banking Company at Indianapolis for collection, and transmitted by that company to the defendant at St. Louis, where it was payable, with the direction to “collect and credit” it to the Indianapolis Banking Company.

At Law. This is a suit upon a contract between plaintiffs and the defendant, whereby the former agreed to convey to the latter their interest in certain lands, situated in Missouri, in consideration of the sum of §5,250; §250 cash, balance to be paid upon delivery of a deed. The tender of a deed is alleged, and judgment for the unpaid balance of the purchase money asked.

Suit upon a policy of insurance upon a steam-boat owned, as alleged, by the 0. Y. Kountz Transportation Company. The insured vessel, while making the trip specified in the policy, accidentally struck the river bank, in attempting to make a landing, and was so injured that she sank and became a total loss. The other material facts and the points made in the defense sufficiently appear from the charge.

<p>1. Chínese Immigration—Right op Wipe op Chinese Laborer to Enter.</p> <p>The wile of a Chinese laborer is not entitled to enter the United States on. her husband’s certificate since the passage of the act oí 1884, but must furnish the certificate required by section (i of the act. Per Pieud, J.</p> <p>2. Same—Status op Wipe—Right to Enter United States.</p> <p>Upon the marriage of a Chinese woman, who was not before a laborer, to a Chinese laborer, she takes upon herself the status of the husband as one of the class who are not now permitted to ente the United States, without reference to her former status. Per Sawyer, J.,</p>

<p>Chinese Immigeation—Custom-House “ Tag ” —Oimitiihcatb — Chinese Labohek.</p> <p>Tbe only evidence of tbe riglit of a Chinese laborer who left the United States a fter the passage of the act of J 882 to re-enter this country is the certificate provided in the act; and the fact that he had a “ tag ” entitling him to such a certificate, but that the collector took up such “tag” and failed to give him a certificate therefor, will not entitle him to re-enter.</p>

<p>Chinese Immigration—Acts of 1882 and 1884—Chinese Laborers—Certificate—Former Residence in United States.</p> <p>A Chinese laborer resided in the United States from November 17, 1880, until June, 1881, when he departed for Honolulu, in the Hawaiian kingdom, where he remained until September, 1884, when be sought to re-enter the United States. Held, 1hat the acts of 1882 and .1.884 did not except him from the necessity of presenting the certificate required by those acts, and that without, it he could not be allowed to re-enter.</p> <p>Sawyer, Sabin, and Hoffman, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p>Chinese Immigration—Bailing Kemanded Prisoner.</p> <p>When a Chinese person, after final hearing on habeas corpus, has been remanded to the marshal to be deported from the United States upon the vessel by which she was brought to this country, and such vessel has departed, she cannot be admitted to bail upon a recognizance that she will appear when a vessel is ready to depart. Per Field, Justice; Sawyer, Hoeeman, and Sabin, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p>.Patents fob Inventions—Lawther Process for Treating Oleaginous Seeds.</p> <p>Patent. No. 1158,164, granted to Alfred 13. Lawtlier, September 28, 1875, lor an improvement in processes of treatment of oleaginous seeds, compared with other methods in use previous to the granting of such patent, and held, that the Lawther patent cannot be sustained as a patent fora process.</p>

<p>Colmsion—Fault.</p> <p>Where a collision is brought about by a lack of walchfulness and care on the part of those on board a steam-vessel colliding with a schooner nearly at rest, although a whistle from a tug having the schooner in tow might have called their attention to their duty, the steam-vessel is, nevertheless, liable.</p>

<p>1. Removal op Cause—Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company—Sp. Laws IIinn. 1881, Oh. 219.</p> <p>Chapter 219, Sp. Laws Miun. 1881, entitled “An act to authorize the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Company to acquire, construct, maintain, and operate railroads in the state of Minnesota,” not purporting to create a new corporation, but declaring that for certain purposes the foreign shall be deemed to bo a domestic corporation, must be regarded as simply an enabling act, and the railway company, which was a Wisconsin corporation, is still one, and as such has the right to remove a case for trial from the state court to the federal court.</p> <p>2. Same—Proviso Preventing Removal Void.</p> <p>As the only scope and effect of the provision in the act, that the railway company shall be deemed to be a domestic corporation “ in all suits and proceedings upon causes of action arising in this state in which it shall be a party,” is to deter it from the right to submit certain controversies to the judgment of the federal court, this' proviso must be held void ; following Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, and distinguishing Stout v. Railroad Co. 8 Fed. Rep. 794.</p>

A suit is brought by the executors and trustees of Harwood W. Banner, deceased, aliens, and citizens of England, to set aside and cancel a certificate issued by the sheriff of Martin county, Minnesota, to the defendants, on a sale of real estate under a judgment obtained by them against H. F. Shearman. Shearman is the common source of title, and the land in controversy is situated about 13 or 14 miles from the town of Fairmont, where the defendants reside.

<p>1. Sewer Assessments—According to Area.</p> <p>Assessments for sewer pm’poses, levied according to area and regardless of improvements, is a valid mode of assessment under the Colorado constitution.</p> <p>2. Same—Notice—When Assessment is Determined by a Mere Mathematical Computation Notice is Unnecessary—Dub Process of Law.</p> <p>Act of the legislature, Colorado, of February 19, 1879, amending the charter of the city of Denver, provides for the construction of sewers and the levy of assessments therefor according to area and regardless of improvements, on the petition of a majority of the property holders resident in any sewer district, or upon the recommendation of the board of health. The act also provides that, during the progress of the work, all persons interested shall have an opportunity to object to the materials used, the manner in which the work is done, or any supposed violation of the contract. Held, that the levy of the assessment being a mere mathematical computation, and as to ail prior proceedings full notice is provided for, it is unnecessary that the act should provide an opportunity forlot-owners to be heard on the assessments after they are levied, and that making such assessments a fixed charge against the lots, without notice or an opportunity to be heard, is not depriving the lot-owners of their property without “due process of law.”</p> <p>3. Same.—Equity will not Enjoin Collection of Tax on the Ground of Irregularity or Illegality.</p> <p>In an action brought to restrain sale of land to pay delinquent tax or assessment, equity will not grant an injunction, restraining collection of tax or assessment on the ground of irregularities in the levy or illegality of the tax or assessment.</p> <p>4. Jurisdiction of Federal Court—Due Process of Law.</p> <p>Jurisdiction of federal court, cannot be invoked on the ground that the act under which the proceedings are had violates tho constitution of the state, unless it also violates some provision of the federal constitution.</p>

<p>1. Vendor and Vendee—Inadequacy oe Consideration.</p> <p>Mere inadequacy of price is not sufficient to avoid the sale of real property; but- when such inadequacy is gross, and the vendor was needy and of weak mind, and acted upon the impression that he was indebted to the vendee, when he was not, equity will give relief by treating the vendee as the trustee of the property for the benefit of the vendor or his representatives. Four hundred dollars held to be a grossly inadequate price for property worth not less than §1,500.</p> <p>2. Insanity—Opinion of Non-I’roeebsionau Witness.</p> <p>Upon the trial of an issue involving the sanity of a person, the opinion of a non-professional witness, based upon his own observations, is competent evidence, and is entitled to weight according to the intelligence of the witness, his means of information, and the character of the derangement.</p> <p>S. Vendor and Vendee—Notice oe Prior Equity.</p> <p>A purchaser of real property for a valuable consideration is not affected by notice of a prior advei-se equity received from a".stranger or iicrson not interested in the property; no? will mere rumors or hearsay concerning such equity, and communicated by such person, be sufficient to put him on inquiry, and charge him with knowledge of the facts that he might have thereby learned.</p>

<p>1. Chattel Mortgage — Validity of, when Unrecorded, as against General Creditors of an Estate.</p> <p>A mortgage which is good against the deceased is aiso good against his administrator and the creditors. 'Hie rule as laid down in the case of Stewart v. Platt, 101 U. S. 731, governs.</p> <p>2. Same — Effect of Written Guaranty of One Mortgagee to Another.</p> <p>Where two mortgagees stand on equal footing, and are to be paid out of the same fund, the promise in writing of one mortgagee that he will see the other paid, postpones the mortgage of the former and. gives priority to the latter.</p> <p>3. Statute of Frauds — Consideration need not be Expressed—Forbearance a Consideration. .</p> <p>Under the statute of frauds, where a promise in writing is made to pay whatever one party owes another, it in binding, though no consideration be expressed. Forbearance to enforce a debt is sufficient consideration moving to such a promise.</p>

This suit was brought to recover of the defendant an indebtedness evidenced by 144 coupons of $35 each, cut from its certain 12 bonds,… Held: or by whom the returns thereof were made, nor is there anything to show that the required number of votes were polled in favor of said proposition, as required by law. “Complainants further charge that the order or ordinance of said board directing tlie issuance of said bonds was wholly without authority, illegal, and void: First,…

<p>In Bankruptcy.</p>

<p>1. Pensions—OnAuoisa Illeoal Fee—Indictment.</p> <p>An indictment for charging and collecting an illegal fee for obtaining a pension, need not state how the accused was instrumental, and what he did, in procuring the pension.</p> <p>2. Same—Maltce.</p> <p>It is also unnecessary for it to si ate that tho defendant “ willfully and wrongfully,” or “unlawfully,” did the act charged.</p> <p>3. Same—Admissibility of Evidence of a Sham Sale.</p> <p>Where the indictment charges the receipt of a sum in excess of what may be legitimately charged, evidence is admissible to prove that he sold the pensioner property for a sum largely in excess of its value, if supplemented by proof that tho sale was a mere trick to obtain an unlawful fee.</p> <p>4. Samis—Pbaotioe—Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>Where a bill of exceptions slates in such a case that a sale to the pensioner for a price largely in excess of the real value of the property sold was proved, and is silent as to whether or not the not essary supplemental evidence was introduced, it will be presumed that it was.</p>

<p>1. Patents for Inventions-—Damages for Infringement—Profits of Sales— Profits Derived from Use.</p> <p>When a patentee, in an action against an infringer who manufactured and sold for use bis invention, has had a decree for the profits of such sales, and such decree lias been satisfied, he cannot recover, in an action against the party to whom the patent was sold, the profits derived by him from the use thereof.</p> <p>2. Same—Bilk of Patented Article—Title of Vendee.</p> <p>The recovery of the profits of the sale of a patented article for use, in an action against the vendor, vests the title to the use in the purchaser of the article.</p> <p>3. Same—Practice—Interlocutory Decree—Pinal Decree.</p> <p>Although there has been an interlocutory decree for plaintiff, when it is shown, on the master’s report, that he is not entitled to recover, a final decree for defendants may be entered.</p>

<p>Patents for Inventions—Several Patents Applicable to Same Process—INFRINGEMENT—EXPIRATION OF ONE PATENT—MOTION TO DISMISS.</p> <p>Where a bill, in addition to the usual charges of infringement of three patents specified therein, states that “these several letters patent are applicable to the same process, and are so used by defendants,” and it appears that it may be impossible to award damages for infringement of two of the patents, without also taking into consideration the value of the other patent, a motion to dismiss the bill as to such patent, because it was so near its expiration that an injunction could not be granted under it, may be overruled. Betts v. Gallias, L. R. 10 Eq. 393, distinguished.</p>

In Admiralty. Sur rule to show cause why that portion of the respondent’s answer demanding a jury trial should not be stricken out, etc.

In Equity. This was a demurrer to a petition of defendant Canfield to set aside an execution and levy for a deficiency arising out of the sale of mortgaged premises upon foreclosure, to restrain the plaintiff and the marshal from further proceedings to sell the defendant’s lands; and also to open the final decree in the cause, and modify the same, so far as it decreed the payment of the mortgaged debt by the petitioner.

<p>1. Common Carrier—Delivery of Goods to Connecting Line—Liability of First Carrier.</p> <p>TV lien goods are to bo delivered by a railroad company to a second lino of conveyance for transportation further on, the common-law liability of common earners remains on the first earner until lie lias delivered the goods for transportation to the next ono Its obligation while the goods are in its depot does not become that of a warehouseman.</p> <p>X Same—Block in Freight —Damages Caused by Delay.</p> <p>Where, while goods received by the first carrier are in transit, the connecting line notifies it that it cannot receive the goods and transport them to their desiinalion because of a block in freight, this will not relieve the first carrier from liability for damages caused by the delay, whore it fails to notify the shipper and give him an opportunity to dispose of the property or take measures for its preservation.</p> <p>8. Hame—Measure of Damages.</p> <p>The measure of damages in such a case is the difference between the market value of the goods at- the place of destination when they ought to have been delivered and their market value when they were delivered.</p>

<p>Practice—Directing Verdict—Negligence.</p> <p>When, in an action for personal injuries caused by defendant’s negligence, upon the whole testimony the court would not feel justified in sustaining a verdict for the plaintiff, it should direct a verdict for the defendant; and that, although there may be some evidence which would raise a possibility or a suspicion that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.</p>

<p>1. Ejectment—Plaintiff’s Tenant in Possession—Assumed Agency.</p> <p>Where one standing in confidential relations to and assuming to act for the . plaintiff put another into possession of land as the plaintiff’s tenant, a defendent in ejectment, as against the plaintiff, cannot question the professed agent’s authority to create the tenancy.</p> <p>2. Same—Constructive Notice of Landlord’s Title.</p> <p>Actual, exclusive, and visible possession of land by a tenant is constructive notice of his landlord’s title equivalent to that afforded by the recording of a deed.-</p> <p>3. Same—Secret Attornment.</p> <p>It is not in the power of a tenant to destroy his landlord’s possession by a secret attornment to another, and as against the landlord such attornment is void and of no effect.</p> <p>4. Same—Quitclaim—Bona Pide Purchaser without Notice.</p> <p>A purchaser by deed of quitclaim simply is not to be regarded as a bona fide purchaser without notice.</p> <p>5. Same—Case Stated.</p> <p>H., who entered upon the plaintiff’s land as tenant, during his tenancy was induced secretly to attorn to and take a lease from S., who subsequently, with actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s title, obtained quitclaims for trifling-considerations from the widow and heirs of a deceased former owner who had conveyed, by an unrecorded deed, to a party under whom the plaintiff claims. S. then conveyed an undivided one-third of the land (H. being still in possession) to JEL Held, that inquiry of H. was incumbent upon ¡L., and that the latter was chargeable with constructive notice of the plaintiff’s title.</p>

On Demurrer. The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages to about 1,000 bales of cotton, alleged to have been caused by their negligence. Tlie third count of the declaration to which the demurrer—-quoted in the oninion of the court-—was taken is as follows: “Third,.

<p>Motion to Quash ca. sa.</p>

<p>On Habeas Corpus.</p>

In Equity. This was a bill to recover damages for an infringement of letters patent No. 86,152, dated January 26, 1869, to John T. Hancock, for an improvement in boiler injectors.

<p>1. Maritime Lien—Supplies— Foreign Port— Charterer.</p> <p>Where the charterer of the steamer .F. for ího “ centennial season,” not being master, applied in person to coal dealers in Philadelphia for coal, upon her first trip thither from Bridgeport, Connecticut, stating that he had a charter for the season, and directed the coal to be billed to him, and gave in payment his check on a Bridgeport bank, stating that it was not then good, but ho thought it would be when presented, and tio reference was made to the vessel as a source of credit, and there was no inquiry made of the master or dealing with him, or with any other officer or agent of the ship, and the charterer had, by the terms of the charter-party, agreed to pay for all such supplies, held, that the circumstances indicated to the libelants that the application for coal was upon tlie charterer’s credit only, and that, in furnishing the coal thereupon without any dissent or reference to the credit of the ship, or inquiry of the master, the libelants must bo held to have acquiesced in trusting to the charterer only, and that ilie ship was not bound.</p> <p>2. Same—Personal Credit.</p> <p>In dealing with a known charterer in a foreign port for mere ordinary supplies, tlie dealings are prima facie upon his personal credit only, tiemble, no sound legal or commercial reason exists why such dealings, not being a case of actual necessity or distress, should not he held subject to the precise limitations in the charter of which the material-man has, or is affected with, knowledge.</p>

In Admiralty. On exceptions to libel for breach of contract.

<p>In Admiralty. Sur motion to dismiss libel.</p>