Volume 220 — United States Reports

Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (1911), is a unanimous ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the state of West Virginia was bound by its constitution to pay one-third of the outstanding debt of the commonwealth of Virginia as of January 1, 1861. In its ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the geographic narrowness of the port and road improvements made by Virginia (most of which occurred outside West Virginia's current borders) were incurred by the people of the entire state and did not discharge West Virginia's duty to pay. The Court also held that Virginia's attempts to discharge its debts while its negotiations with West Virginia continued did not absolve West Virginia of its duty to pay.

<p>In determining whether an office is one continuously operated, a trifling interruption will not be considered; and quaere, whether a railway station shut for two periods of three hours each day and open the rest of the time is not a station continuously operated night and day within the meaning of §§ 2 and 3 of the act of March 4, 1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415.</p> <p>Under §§ 2 and 3 of the act of March 4,1907, c. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415, a telegraph operator employed for six hours and then, after an interval, for three hours, is not employed for a longer period than nine consecutive hours.</p> <p>The presence of a provision in one part of a statute and its absence in another is an argument against reading it as implied where omitted; and so held that the word “ consecutive ” is not to be implied in connection with limiting the number of hours during the twenty-four that telegraph operators can be employed under the act of March 4, 1907.</p> <p>177 Fed. Rep. 114, affirmed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO AND APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of certain provisions of the pure food act of June 30, 1906, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED. STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>By a bill in equity exhibited in the Circuit Court the appellant, as owner and holder of capital stock and bonds of the Natural Carbonic Gas Company, sought a decree enjoining that company from obeying, and the other defendants from enforcing, a statute of the State of New York, approved May 20, 1908, entitled “An act for the protection of the natural mineral springs of the State and to prevent waste and impairment of its natural mineral waters,” and containing, among others, this provision: “Pumping, or otherwise drawing by artificial appliance, from any well made by boring or drilling into the rock, that class of mineral waters holding in solution natural mineral salts and an excess of carbonic acid gas, .or pumping, or by any artificial contrivance whatsoever in any manner producing an unnatural flow of carbonic acid gas issuing from or contained in any well made by boring or drilling into the rock, for the purpose of extracting, collecting, compressing, liquefying or vending such gas as a commodity otherwise than in connection with the mineral water and the other mineral ingredients with which it was associated, is hereby declared to be unlawful.” Laws 1908, vol. 2, 1221, ch. 429.</p> <p>In addition to what properly may be passed without special mention the bill alleges that the gas company owns twenty-one acres of land in Saratoga Springs, New York, which contain mineral waters of the class specified in the statute; that these waters are percolating waters, not naturally flowing to or upon the surface, and can be reached and lifted to the surface only by means of pumps or other artificial appliances; that the gas company is engaged in collecting natural carbonic acid gas from these waters and in compressing and selling the, gas as a separate commodity; that this business has come to be both large and lucrative, and as a necessary incident to its successful prosecution the gas company has sunk upon its land wells of great depth, made by boring or drilling into the underlying rock, and has fitted these wells with tubing, seals and pumps, whereby it lifts the waters and the gas contained therein to the surface; that these pumps do not exercise any force of compulsion upon waters in or under adjoining lands, but lift to the surface only such waters as flow by reason of the laws of nature into the wells; that when the waters are lifted to the surface the excess of carbonic acid gas therein naturally escapes and is caught and compressed preparatory to its sale, none thereof being wasted and no process being employed to increase the natural separation of the excess of gas from the waters; and that many other land owners in Saratoga Springs have like wells which are operated in a like way with a like purpose.</p> <p>It also is alleged that the gas company bottles and sells for drinking purposes and for use by invalids and others all of the mineral waters pumped from its wells “for which there is any market or demand,” but there is no allegation of the extent of this market or demand, and it was conceded in argument that a large proportion of the waters pumped from the company’s wells is not used, but is suffered to run to waste.</p> <p>In terms the bill predicates the right to the relief sought upon the claim that the state statute deprives the appellant and others of property without due process of law and denies to them the equal protection -of the laws, and therefore is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>In the Circuit Court the defendants other than the gas company demurred to the bill, the demurrers were sustained (170 Fed. Rep. 1023), and a decree dismissing the bill was entered, whereupon this appeal was prayed and allowed.</p>

The facts, which involve the distribution of a fund between Cherokee Indians pursuant to decrees of this court and of the Court of Claims, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Although generally slow to overrule decisions of courts other than .those of the -United States on questions of local practice, this court will do so where, as in this case, the court below yields a considerar tion of the merits to form and takes too strict a view of its own powers.</p> <p>When an appeal is taken in open court, all parties are present in fact or in law.and have notice; formalities arc >t needed to indicate that it is taken against all parties.</p> <p>The requirement of a bond in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia does not go to the essence.of the appeal, and the form should' be objected to within twenty days; and where the appeal was taken in open court, objections to the form of bond cannot be taken on a motion to dismiss the appeal filed six months after the appeal was taken based on defects in the appeal.</p> <p>Although too late for an appeal to be dismissed on account of the form of bond, if the proper parties are before the court, leave can be given to file an additional bond if desired.</p> <p>31 App. D. C. 92, reversed.</p>

“The act to prevent cruelty to animals while in transit,” approved June 29, 1906 (c. 3594, 34 Stat. 607), provides: “Sec. 1.

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911), was a United States Supreme Court case in which a taxpayer challenged the validity of a federal income tax on corporations. The privilege of incorporation is a state function, and the challengers argued that only the states should tax corporations.

<p>APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the Corporation Tax Law, are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES POR THE DISTRICT OP MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the Corporation Tax Law, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: etc. The statute also makes provision for the forfeiture of liquors and other personal property employed in unlawfully trafficking in liquórs. *199 The State of Oklahoma, through its governor, is here complaining that “The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and Ralph E. Campbell, the District Judge of said district, sitting as judge of said Circuit Court, have in direct violation…

<p>Writs of prohibition refused on authority of Ex parte-Oklahoma, ante, p. 191.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>The value of the matter in dispute in this court is the test of jurisdiction. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165.</p> <p>Where the only question is the amount of indebtedness, which the security was sold to satisfy, that is the measure of the amount in controversy, and the counterclaim for return of the property sold cannot be added to the amount of the debt to determine the amount in controversy and give this court jurisdiction. Harten v. Loffler, 212 U. S. 397, distinguished.</p> <p>The mere fact that suits are tried together for convenience does not amount to a consolidation, and where the understanding of the trial judge was that there was no consolidation this court will not unite the actions so that the aggregate amount will give jurisdiction.</p> <p>A judgment of the intermediate appellate court reversing and remanding with instructions to enter judgment for plaintiff in accordance with its decision without fixing a definite amount is not such a final judgment as will give jurisdiction to this court.</p>

<p>Where the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico has general jurisdiction under the act of March 2, 1901, c. 812, § 3, 31 Stat. 953, its power to award relief because of the situation of the property involved against non-resident defendants not found within the District depends on'§ 8 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 472; and the right of absent parties defendants not actually personally notified to have the suit reopened and to make defense depends on the proviso to that section.</p> <p>Where a defendant has not been actually personally notified as provided in § 8 of the act of 1875, but publication has been resorted to, he has a right to appear and make defense within a year, independently of whether he has had knowledge or notice of the pendency of the action by any methods other than those specified in the statute; and the court has no power to impose terms except as to costs.</p> <p>The District Court of the United States for Porto Rico having permitted certain defendants not personally notified to come in and defend to do so but only on condition of showing they had not received the published notice, had no knowledge of the pendency of the suit and had no meritorious defense to the bill, the order is reversed, as the defendants have the right to have the case reopened without terms other than payment of costs.</p>

Held: that a carrier could not properly look beyond goods tendered to it for transportation “to the ownership of the shipment,” as the basis for determining the application of its established rates, because doing so would be a violation of the second section of the act to regulate commerce; (6) that the fact that the carriers in Official Classification territory had voluntarily established both liberal carload rates and…

<p>The rule that the allowance of amendments to pleadings is discretionary with the trial court and not to be reviewed on appeal except in case of gross abuse does not apply where such discretion is controlled by this court and the refusal to allow an amendment defeats the evident purpose of this court in remanding the case.</p> <p>Where the refusal of the Circuit Court to allow an amendment is in conflict with the opinion and mandate of this court there is an abuse of discretion which tins court can and will correct on appeal, even if such abuse be the result of misconception of the opinion and of the scope of the mandate.</p> <p>While the decision of this court in this and other commodities clause cases, 213 U. S. 366, expressly held that under the commodities clause stock ownership by a railroad company in a bona fide corporation, irrespective of the extent of such ownership, does not preclude the railroad company from transporting the commodities manufactured, produced or owned by such corporation, it is still open to the Government to question the right of the railroad company to transport commodities of a corporation in which the company owns stock and uses its power as a stockholder to obliterate all distinctions between the two corporations; and an amendment to the original bill in one of the commodities cases alleging such facts as show the absolute control by. the defendant railroad company, through stock ownership, over the corporation whose commodities are being transported, is germane to the original bill and should have. been allowed by the trial court.</p> <p>By the operation and effect of the commodities clause a duty has been cast upon an interstate carrier not to abuse its power as a stockholder of a corporation whose commodities it transports in interstate commerce by so commingling the affairs of that corporation with' its own as to cause the two corporations to become one and inseparable.</p>

<p>APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

BILL IN EQUITY. The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States conferring original jurisdiction on this court in controversies, in which a State is a party, are stated in the opinion.

BILL IN EQUITY. The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States conferring original jurisdiction on this court in controversies in which a State is a party, are stated in the opinion.

Held: and determined by the supreme or other final appellate court of such State as the successor of said Territorial supreme court and appellate court, subject to the same right to review upon appeal or error to the Supreme Court of. the United States now allowed from the supreme or appellate courts of a State under existing laws.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.</p> <p>The facts' are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE SUPREME COURT OP THE TERRITORY OP NEW MEXICO. ■</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Hills & Co. v. Hoover, 220 U.S. 329 (1911), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held the owner of a copyright is restricted to a single action against another to find, seize, and seek penalties for allegedly infringing copies of a work.

Held: “A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. The test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense.

The facts, which involve the liability of the present city of Manila in the Philippine Islands for claims against the city of Manila as it existed prior to the cession under the treaty of 1898, are stated in the opinion.'

The facts, which involve the constitutionality, under the commerce clause, of a statute of Virginia requiring prompt transmission of messages by telegraph companies, are stated in the opinion.

Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., (220 U.S. 373) (1911), was a United States Supreme Court case on anti-trust grounds that ruled that resale price maintenance, a form of vertical restraint, is illegal per se. The Dr. Miles Medical Co. (Dr. Miles), now Miles Laboratories, was founded in 1884. In an era when most products were snake oil, Dr. Miles invented a patent medicine that had an actually useful, if somewhat toxic, active ingredient: bromides. John D. Park & Sons Co. (Park & Sons) was a discount drug reseller that sought to profit off the advertising of Dr. Miles' remedies while selling Dr. Miles products at rock bottom prices. While lower prices drove sales for Park & Sons, it cut into the profits of Dr. Miles. To fix this, Dr.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and the right of a defendant to remove a case thereto from the state court on the ground of separable controversy, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of certain letters patent for improvement in rubber tires, are stated in the opinion.

Held: besides, that as diverse citizenship existed the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and in answer to the contention that as jurisdiction depended entirely on diversity of citizenship the decree of . the Circuit Court of Appeals was final, this was said: “We think, however, that as infringement of a trade-mark registered under the act was charged, the averments of the bill, though quite defective, were sufficient to…

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Whether a municipality may list and tax its own property is a matter of state practice and, except as it may affect a right previously acquired and protected by the Federal Constitution, presents no Federal question.</p> <p>This court .in order to determine whether a contract has been impaired within the meaning of the Federal Constitution has power to decide for itself what the true construction of the contract is.</p> <p>A contract of exemption may be impaired by wrongful construction as well as by an unconstitutional statute attempting a direct repeal.</p> <p>A lease of property belonging to a municipality in which the lessees have expressly agreed to pay taxes due the state or Federal Government is not impaired by an assessment made by the municipality under power to tax acquired subsequent to the making of the lease.</p> <p>Parties to a lease by a municipality not then possessing taxing powers are chargeable with notice that the power to tax may be subsequently conferred, and the conferring of such power does not impair the contract in the lease if there is no exemption expressly contained therein.</p> <p>Doubts and ambiguities as to exemptions from taxation are resolved in favor of the public. St. Louis v. United Railways, 210 U. S. 273.</p> <p>108 Virginia, 28, affirmed.</p>

<p>The provision in the act of August 30, 1852, c. 103, § 3, 10 Stat. 41, 56, • forbidding payment of Indian annuities to any attorney or agent and requiring the same to be paid, to the Indians or to the tribe did not give any vested rights to the Indians but was a direction to agents of the United States.</p> <p>In the Indian treaties under consideration in this case the Government dealt with the tribes and not with-individuals, and the treaties gave rights only to the tribes and not to the members.</p> <p>Under the act of Mar. 1, 1907, c. 2290, 34 Stat. 1055, authorizing this suit, the action is analogous to one at law to recover money paid under mistake of law or fact, rather than one in equity, and this court follows the rule not to go behind the findings of the Court of Claims. United, States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427, distinguished.</p> <p>45 Ct. Cl. 287, affirmed.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for püblic work with the United States and the validity of claims made by the contractor thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

<p>In an action of ejectment in New Mexico, the trial court was of opin- . ' ion that the boundaries under which plaintiff claimed did not include the land in dispute, and the Supreme Court of the Territory affirmed on the ground of defect in plaintiff’s grant and that the evidence as to possession was too vague to raise a presumption in place of proof; and this court affirms the judgment.</p> <p>Where both parties move for a ruling, and there is no question of fact sufficient to prevent a ruling being made, the motions together amount to a request that the court find any facts necessary to make the ruling; and, if the court directs a verdict, both parties are concluded as to the facts found, and unless the ruling is wrong as matter of law the judgment must stand. Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. The case tested the constitutionality of the Forest Reserve Act of 1891, which delegated the power to make rules and regulations regarding the use of federal Forest Service lands and to punish violations of these rules as a criminal offense to the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (a part of the Federal Executive Branch). The Court ruled, after a re-argument, that such a delegation of rulemaking power was permissible because it was separate from true legislative power (which is only vested in Congress as the legislative branch).

The Holy Cross Forest Reserve was established under the provisions of the act of March 3, 1891.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 17 of the Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 557, in regard to the practice to be pursued in courts of the United States in a case.whére an interlocutory injunction is applied for to restrain the enforcement, operation or execution of a state statute by restraining the action of any officer of the State, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court in regard to the scope of the grant of power under the Judiciary Act of 1891 to review judgments of the Circuit Courts of Appeal, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>On February 20, 1911, an inspector of customs, before a commissioner of a Circuit Court of the United States, charged Lawrence H. Mills, Charles G. Mourraille and Emil S. Duflot with conspiring to defraud the United States of a portion of the customs duties upon certain merchandise imported by said parties, who were engaged in business in the city of New York, under the firm name of Mills & Duflot. It was charged that the object of the conspiracy was to be accomplished by presenting to the Collector of the Port of New York false and fraudulent invoices, and the commission of a specific overt act was alleged. Upon this charge a warrant issued for the arrest of the accused. On the same day a deputy marshal with an agent of the Department of Justice proceeded to the place of business of the firm and executed the warrant by arresting the accused. At the time this was done the officers took possession of and carried away a large number of commercial books and papers which were found in the store or office of the accused: On the same day also the grand jury presented the accused for conspiracy to defraud the United States of its customs revenues and they were also arrested under a bench warrant issued upon this indictment, and were arraigned and admitted to bail.</p> <p>On February 23, 1911, Mills, Mourraille and Duflot in a petition filed in the Circuit Court recited the taking possession and carrying away by the officers of the books and papers as heretofore stated, and alleged that such books and papers “constituted substantially all the books and papers with which they are and have been for several years doing business.” It was averred upon information and belief that the books and papers in question had been turned over to. the United States District Attorney to be placed at the disposal of the grand jury. Averring that the seizure was unlawful and without warrant of authority, it waá prayed that the marshal and the district attorney be notified and after hearing they be commanded to return the books and papers. The district attorney quite elaborately answered the petition, admitting that the books and papers had been seized and carried away as alleged, traversing the averment that they were all the books, admitting that they were in his possession, that he had used and was intending to use them for the purpose of procuring indictments for violations of the customs laws and averring that reasonable access to the books and papers had been allowed the parties. The answer besides stated other matters which it was deemed sustained the seizure and the retention of the books and papers.</p> <p>After hearing, the court ordered the return of the books and papers. The reasons for this course were stated in an opinion which substantially, on a review of the decisions of this court, especially Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, and Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, held that the constitutional rights of the parties had been violated by the taking possession of the books and papers as alleged. 185 Fed. Rep. 318. Thereupon the district attorney, who is the plaintiff in error, refused to obey the order of the court and stated his reasons for the refusal in an elaborate paper filed in the Circuit Court and styled “Statement of grounds of United States attorney’s refusal to obey order.” In such paper, after referring to the taking possession of the books and papers and making certain statements concerning the same, it was declared: “As to the direction of this court to turn over the other books and papers now in his possession and taken into custody at the time of the arrest of the defendants, said United States attorney is unwilling and respectfully refuses to comply with said order, and the grounds of his refusal to obey the said order are as follows: . . This was followed by eleven paragraphs, in which were recited the charge against the accused, the taking possession of the books and papers, the return of some of them to the accused, the retention of the balance by the district attorney, their use before the grand jury and the intention to use them further. Certain papers were annexed as part of the statement.</p> <p>The district attorney persisting in his refusal, the court entered an order committing him for contempt. Thereupon this writ of error to the judgment of commitment for contempt was allowed by the circuit judge who ordered the commitment, and assignments of error were filed, concluding as follows: “Wherefore the said Henry A. Wise prays that the order and judgment of said Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, adjudging him to be in contempt, may be reversed and that the said court may be directed to enter an order and judgment vacating and setting at naught the said order upon which the commitment and complaint was made.”</p>

<p>Whore the court below had authority to make an order directing the performance of an act, irrespective of a constitutional question raised, the denial of a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of one committed for contempt for refusing to obey such order does not necessarily involve the construction or application of the Constitution and a direct appeal from the judgment denying the writ docs not lie to this court under § 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1891. .</p> <p>The writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the functions of a writ of error.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety-Appliance Acts, and the duties and liabilities of carriers to equip their cars with safety appliances, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety-Appliance Acts and the duties and rights of carriers and their employés thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety Appliance Acts and the duties and rights of carriers and of their employés thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi..</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. Argued March 7, 1911.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington.</p>

<p>Motion for leave to file petition submitted April 3, 1911.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of Wise County, State of Virginia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>Error to the Superior Court of the State of Pennsylvania.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California.</p>