Volume 235 — United States Reports

IN EQUITY. The facts, which involve the location of a part of the boundary line between the State of North Carolina and the State of Tennessee, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which are the same as those involved in Lane v. Watts, 234 U. S. 525, are stated in the opinion. The decision leaves open the question of the status of the conflicting Mexican grants — San Jose, Tumacacori, and Calabazas — and yet affirms a decree which enjoins the appellants from further action in respect to the Ohm homestead entry and other entries which are within the boundaries of these Mexican grants.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute of Florida taxing sleeping. car companies, are stated in the opinion. The tax is not a capitation tax or a license tax provided for by § 5 of art. 9 of the Florida constitution. ' The tax is not an ad valorem tax based upon a “just valuation of all property” and provided for by “a uniform and equal rate of taxation” throughout the State.

ERROR TÓ THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. . The facts, which involve the construction of § 6 of the White Slave Act of June.25,1910, are stated in the opinion. ' The review here is limited to the precise question decided below. The statement provided by the statute is due from any “keeper,” though not concerned in importation. The court, below disregarded the literal reading of § 6 of the White Slave Act.

<p>The court having instructed the jury that if the shipment of liquor within the State was to complete an interstate shipment the local prohibition statute did not apply, the contention that § 4180, Snyder’s Compiled Laws of Oklahoma,, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, held too frivolous to support the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment of the state court on writ of error.</p> <p>The record in this case not justifying the assumption that the conclusion of guilt could only have been reached by disregarding proof, . this court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of the state court on writ of error on that ground; it is frivolous.</p>

DeJonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., 235 U.S. 33 (1914), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held every instance of a copyrighted work must observe copyright notice formalities for the work to maintain copyright, even if the work appears multiple times on the same sheet of paper. Every copy of a copyrighted painting must bear the notice for the painting to maintain copyright.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 9 of the Land Grant Act of July 28, 1866, and the provisions therein contained for grants of lands in Indian Territory on the extinguishment of the Indian title, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the application and construction of Acts of Congress imposing and affecting restrictions on alienation of lands allotted under the Choctaw and Chickasaw agreement ratified July 1, 1902, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, to review a judgment of the state court confirming a street widening assessment, are stated in the opinion. • Special assessments are local matters. Spencer v. Merchant, 125 TJ. S. 345; Cooley, Taxation, 3d ed., p. 68. This court does not interfere- with revenue laws of the State. French v. Barber Asphalt Co., 181 TJ. S. 324; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210, 217; Williams v. Albany, 122 TJ.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, to review the judgment of a state court, are stated in the opinion. No Federal question is presented by the assignment of errors, nor was any Federal question specifically set up in the Supreme Court of Ohio. No change in decision has in fact taken place.

The facts stated in the certificate may be summarized as follows: On March 14, 1913, one Albert Freeman with two other individuals, was convicted in the District Court, Southern District of New York, on five indictments for violation of the statutes relating to the use of the mails, and for a conspiracy.

Held: and the imposition of a restraint upon his liberty of disposition is a necessary and legitimate means of protecting his property.

The facts, which involve the extent of the power of this court on appeal from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and also the validity of a judgment of that court holding that a transfer of property was a conditional sale that had become absolute and was not a mortgage, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the use of the name Waterman in connection with the manufacture and sale of fountain pens, are stated in the opinion. The burden of proof is upon the defendant company to prove the affirmative defense set up by the answer, namely, that the defendant, Modern Pen Company, is selling pens made by a partnership rightfully doing business under the name “A. A. Waterman & Co.” and rightly making and marking the same with the firm name.

Held: within the meaning of § 237, Judicial Code, to claim such a ■ right and immunity under such statute, as to confer jurisdiction upon this court to review an adverse final judgment of the highest state court in such suit. Nutt v. Knut, 200 U. S. 12 , 19)Ill. Central R. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514 , 525; Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Jackman, 204 U. S. 522 , 532; Straus v. Am.

Held: in the case of Dallinger v. Richardson, 176 Massachusetts, 77, supra, that Richardson was not a resident of Massachusetts. In the course of the opinion in that case, the court points out that, for the purpose of the tax question, the matter of residence was not foreclosed by the adjudication of the Probate Court, whether in accordance with the truth or not.

Held: to require one of the companies interested to perform such work at its own expense. Chicago &c. Railroad Company v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57 , 76. The broad authority to require any railroad company to make such improvement, in the interest of public safety, is conferred by the legislature upon the city.

Held: arrested or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or return of any person to a condition of peonage, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” The facts to be gathered from the indictments and pleas, upon'which the court below decided the cases and determined that no offense was charged against the statutes of the United States as above set forth,…

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, and also the constitutionality under the impairment of obligation provision of the Federal Constitution of an ordinance of the City of New Orleans relating to the construction and operation of a belt railroad within the city, are stated in the opinion.

<p>If it sufficiently appears that plaintiff in error raised the question of constitutionality of later legislation repealing that on which its contract rested, as impairing the obligation of that contract, and that the state court gave effect to the repealing legislation, the case is properly here under § 237, Judicial Code.</p> <p>Under such conditions, it is the duty of this court to determine for itself whether a contract existed and whether its obligation has been impaired.</p> <p>A street franchise which becomes operative upon the grant of the consent of the city is a property right. The grant is not a nude pact, but rests upon an obligation, expressly or impliedly assumed, to carry on the undertaking to which the grant relates. Such grants are made and received with the understanding that the recipient is protected by a contractual right from the moment the grant is accepted and during the course of performance as contemplated; as well as after that performance.</p> <p>Grants of franchises are subject to the tacit condition that they may be lost by non-user or mis-use'r. The condition thus implied is a condition subsequent.</p> <p>A franchise is given in order that it may be exercised for the public good, and failure to exercise as contemplated is ground’ for revocation and withdrawal.</p> <p>An indefeasible interest only becomes vested under a franchise which has not only been duly granted, but has also been exercised in conformity with the grant.</p> <p>Whether the authorities shall proceed in case of forfeiture of franchise for non-user or mis-user by quo warranto or, as in- this case, by ordinance of repeal, the propriety of which can be adjudicated in a subsequent legal proceeding, is entirely a matter of state law..</p> <p>In this case, held that as the right to use the streets was to be used within a reasonable time or lost, and as it never had been used, an ordinance of the City of New York of May 11, 1906, revoking the right of the plaintiff in error to lay wires in, and otherwise to use, the ■ streets of New York under a permission granted in 1878 did not contravene the impairment of obligation clause of the Federal Constitution.</p>

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution of a statute of South Dakota regarding the right of foreign corporations to sue in the courts of the State and prescribing conditions to be performed in regard thereto, are stated in the opinion. The statute is constitutional though it may affect interstate commerce.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction of the Creek Indian allotment statutes and the effect of the provisions regarding restrictions on alienation of allotments and their applicability to allotments made to deceased members of the tribe, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of acts of Congress regarding railroad rights-of way and the right of entrymen within the reclamation projects to deed rights of way for. railroads, are stated in the opinion. The authority to convey a right of way for railroad purposes expressly given to homestead settlers by § 2288, Rev. Stat., is not impaired by the provisions of the Reclamation Act.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of courts on habeas corpus proceedings and to what extent the court will pass upon questions of jurisdiction and the merits of the case before the trial, are stated in the opinion. The petitioner- was not a wilfully recalcitrant witness.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 and the construction of the Cattle Quarantine Act of 1905 and its application to receivers of common carriers under the Amendment of 1913, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.</p> <p>Salen was indicted, for making false statements in the sworn declaration required of Consignees by the Tariff Act of 1909. August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 93. The first five counts charged that in entering laces in February, 1910, and January and February, 1913, he had falsely sworn that the-Consular invoices attached were the only invoices covering the shipments, when he well knew that there were others in existence. The court overruled the demurrer to these counts and they are not involved in this case.</p> <p>The sixth count related to a Declaration made by Salen • on March 17, 1913, in making an entry of foreign laces covered by Consular Invoice No. 7893. Salen was therein charged with having fraudulently, concealed from the Collector the existence of certain material facts and thereby had falsified the' required statement in the sworn . declaration "that nothing has been on my part, nor to my knowledge on the part of any other, person, concealed or suppressed, whereby the United States may be defrauded of any part of the duty lawfully due on the said goods.” This count sets out at great length and in narrative form certain, evidentiary facts which may be thus summarized:</p> <p>Salen was the New York agent and primary consignee .of Goetz, a French exporter, who, for eight years, had been shipping laces to Salen for sale and delivery to Robinson, the purchaser and ultimate consignee.</p> <p>When the last consignment arrived in New York, Salen presented the declaration to the Collector, attaching thereto, as required by law, the bill of lading; a list or entry account of the goods; and the consular invoice No. 7893. He paid the duty assessed on the basis of the foreign values as given in the invoice, and thereupon removed the goods and delivered them to Robinson the purchaser. This count of the indictment further charged that Salen knew that the foreign values had been falsely and fraudulently stated in the previous invoices; that such foreign values named in those invoices was uniformly greatly below the prices at which the laces were sold in the United States; that in making the Declaration as to the shipment represented by Consular Invoice No. 7893, Salen concealed the fact that it was one of the series of shipments in which Goetz and Robinson had fraudulently' concealed the great and uniform discrepancy between the foreign values named in the invoices and the prices at which the lace was sold in the United States.</p> <p>It was charged that this concealment- was the suppression of a fact by which the United States may have been defrauded of its lawful duty, for if Salen had communicated the facts the Collector would have called for a reappraisement of the laces and their undervaluation would have been disclosed.</p> <p>The defendant demurred on the ground that there was no positive averment that the goods were undervalued but only an argumentative statement of facts the existence of which did not raise the legal conclusion that there was any undervaluation and that the count failed to charge facts sufficient to constitute an offense under sub-section 6 of § 28 of the act of August 5, 1909, e. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 95, or any other statute of the United States. The demurrer was sustained on the ground that the facts stated did not constitute, an offense under the statute, and the case was then brought here by the Government under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat., 1246.</p> <p>The case is properly before this court under the Criminal Appeals Act.</p> <p>The penalties imposed by customs law are intended for the prevention of fraud, the protection of the revenue, and the protection of honest importers. The act should be so construed as to give effect to this intention in general and to the evident intent of Congress in particular to require of the importer, by means of the provisions of sub-section 5, the observance of the highest degree of good faith toward the Government.</p> <p>The words “nothing has been concealed or suppressed,” as used in sub-section 5, do not mean nothing has been concealed or suppressed in. the entry and invoice. The history of: the statute shows that Congress had intended to make the scope of the declaration a wide one, and to impose an obligation not to suppress or conceal anything (whether in the entry and invoice or not), which migh* tend to defraud the United States of duties.</p> <p>One knowing certain facts which would have influenced any ordinary reasonable man acting as collector, in investigating or ordering an investigation or appraisement or reappraisement of values, and concealing such knowledge on his part, certainly conceals “something” and swears falsely when he makes oath that “nothing has been concealed or suppressed by him.”</p> <p>The importer's duty of disclosure to the Government is an obligation ubérrimos fidei as broad as that imposed upon the insured in marine insurance.</p> <p>Whether a knowledge of prior fraudulent shipments constitutes a suppression of “nothing” may hé tested by considering whether the party could have been examined under oath regarding such knowledge, on a summons under sub-section 15 of the act which gives the appraiser and collector a power to examine “touching any matter or thing which they may deem material.”</p> <p>It may also be tested by considering whether evidence that such party knew of prior frauds in undervaluation would be admissible if he should be indicted for perjury in swearing to the present .declaration that the invoice produced by him exhibits the actual market value, etc.</p> <p>It is not necessary to allege in the indictment or to prove that the United States was actually defrauded of duties. It is only necessary .to allege facts calculated .to deprive, or of a character which might deprive, the United States of such duties.</p> <p>Proof of an intent to defraud is-not required by subsections 5 and 6 to be alleged or proved. All that is necessary is (a) a false statement, (b) knowingly made — i. e., made with knowledge of its falsity.</p> <p>The statement in the declaration was “material thereto,” i. e., material to the declaration.</p> <p>In support of these contentions see Bollinger’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 560, 564; Cliquot’s Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 145; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet. 507, 516; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 IT. S. 485, 509; Taylor v. United States-, 3 How. .197, 207 y United States v. Biggs, 211 U. S. 507, 518; United States v. Birdsall, 233 IT. S. 223; United States v. Bitty* 208 IT. S. 393; United States v. Campbell, 10 Fed. Rep. 816; United States v. Cargo of Sugar, 3 Sawyer, 50, 51; United States v. Carter, 231 IT. S. 492; United States v. Doherty, 27 Fed. Rep. 730, 733-735; United States v. Corbett, 215 IT. S. 233,. 237; United States v. De Rivera, 73'Fed. Rep. 679; United States v. Fawcett, 86 Fed. Rep. 900; United States v. Heinze, 218 U. S. 532, 540; United States v. Heinze, No. 2, 218 IT. S. 547; United States v. Keitel, 211 IT. S. 37Ó, 385; United States v. Kissel, 218 IT. S. 601, 606; United States v. Leng, 18 Fed. Rep. 15; United States v. Mason, 213 IT. S. 115, 122;' United States v. Mescall, 215 IT. S. 26, 31; United States v. Miller, 223 IT. S. 579, 602; United States v. 19 Bales of Tobacco, 112 Fed. Rep. 779; United. States v. 99 Diamonds, 139 Fed. Rep. 961; United States v. One Bag of Wheat, 166 Fed. Rep. 562; United States v. Pullen, 226 U. S. 525, 535; United States v. 66 Cases of Cheese, 163 Fed. Rep. 367; United States v. Stevenson, 215 IT. S. 190, 195; United States v. 20 Boxes of Cheese, 163 Fed. Rep. 369; United States v. 26 Bales of Boots, 3 Ware, 205, 2Í0; United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430; and see also 1 Stat. 627, 657; 3 Stat. 729, 730; 12 Stat. 737; 18 Stat. 190; 22 Stat. 488; 26 Stat. 407; 34 Stat. 1246; 36 Stat. 11, 92; Rev. Stat., §§ 2841, 2864.</p> <p>. Sub-section 6 is either a perjury' statute, or, at least,' one in the nature of a perjury statute. It is highly penal. See act of March 1, 1823, § 4;, Rev. Stat., § 2841; United States v. Auffmordt, 122 U. S. 197, 204; Customs’ Administration Acts of June 10, 1890, 26 Stat. 132; August 5, 1900, 36 Stat. 94.</p> <p>The suppression referred to relatés wholly to things concealed o!r suppressed in the written entry and invoice. It obviously means things relating to the character, quantity,' quality or cost of the goods, or other facts concealed or suppressed which should have been fairly stated in. the invoice or written entry constituting the representation, and by the acceptance of which the collector might be deceived, and thus the United States might be defrauded. United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430.</p> <p>. Rev, Stat., § 2839, was repealed by the Customs Administrative! Act of June 10,1890. In its place was substituted sub-section 6 which prescribed punishifient or forfeiture for malting “any”’ false statement in the declaration material thereto.</p> <p>The indictment in the case at . bar does not charge that the goods entered were manufacturer’s goods. But if it did, there was no; requirement that the selling price in this country should be disclosed. Notwithstanding these changes in the statute,' the Auffmordt decision is as pertinent now as it was then on the point, that® disclosure of things relating to values at other times and places not ■provided to be disclosed by the forms prescribed — such as . the value or selling price in this country — are not within the purview of the statute, and hence cannot be made the ’ .basis of forfeiture much less of criminal prosecution for ’suppression. They are not “material” to the declaration. United States v.. Cargo of Sugar, 3 Sawyer, 46.</p> <p>The things alleged to have been suppressed were not material to the declaration within the meaning of the statute; nor is there any averment that defendant had been called upon under sub-sections 15 or 11 to make, disclosures of the facts charged to have been suppressed. United States v. Doherty, 27 Fed. Rep. 731; United States v. Calhoun, 184 Fed. Rep. 499, 504; Gulbenkian v. United States, 153 Fed. Rep. 858.</p> <p>The importer is not guilty of a criminal offense under sub-section 9 even though the entry is based upon invoices in which the consignor has falsely and fraudulently misstated the cost or values, unless the importer knows or believes that they are so false and fraudulent, and even though the use of such false entry and invoice should result in depriving the United States of a portion of its duties. United States v. 1150112 Pounds of Celluloid, .82 Fed. Rep. 627, 633; 581 Diamonds v. United States, 119 Fed. Rep. 556, 560; United States v. Bishop, 125 Fed. Rep. 181; United States■ v. 99 Diamonds, 139 Fed. Rep. 961; United States v. 75 Bales Tobacco, 147 Fed. Rep. 127; United States v. One Silk Rug, 158 Fed. Rep. 974; United States v. 9 Bales Tobacco, 112 Fed. Rep. 779;:Markham v. United States, 160 Ü. S.' 325.</p> <p>Suppression by which the United States may be defrauded is limited to things within the scope of the disclosures required to be made in the stereotyped form of declaration and papers attached, constituting the representation.</p> <p>There can be no fraud without a representation, express or implied, where there is a duty or obligation imposed upon the party to speak. For definition of “fraud” see Black’s Law Diet.; 20 Cyc. 10; 19 Cyc. 403.</p> <p>This court will not give the statute a construction which would place declarants in such an unfair situation, and make, the statutory forais prescribed a snare to entrap those who rely upon their sufficiency. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 214.</p> <p>Words used in a statute by which they are not defined are given the same meaning as at common law. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446, 451; Keck v. United States, 172 U. S. 434, 446. And see Mutual'Life Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U. S. 485, distinguished; 3 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance, 2011; Mercantile Ins. .Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall. 237,253.</p> <p>. The omission, in the suppression clauses in forms (1) .and (2) of sub-section 5, of the words “in the said entry or invoice,” was not intended to enlarge the scope of those clauses beyond the meaning of the suppression clause of forms (3) and (4). Lawrence v. Allen¡ 7 How. 793; Brown v. Duchesne-, 19 How. 183; Atkins v. Fiber Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272; Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520; Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U. S. 644; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287, 293; Smith v. The People, 47 N. Y. 330. See also Endlich- on Interpretation, § 378, p. 528; Morris v. Mellin, 6 B. & C. 446; Bennett v. Daniel, 10 B. & C. 500; Bryan v. Child, 1 L. M. P. 429; Myser v. Veitch, L. R. 4 Q. B. 649; R. v. Tone, 1 B. & Ad. 561.</p> <p>Charges of suppression of a belief in the happening of a future event are argumentative, uncertain, hypothetical and duplicitous and surplusage. United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611; 19 Cyc., p. 394; United States v. Keitel, 211 U. S. 370, 397; United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 606.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court on appeals from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico and thé right to sue Porto Rico, and the construction and application of the- statute of limitations of Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment based on substituted service, and the validity under the Fourteenth Amendment of the practice of the Kentucky courts in regard to special appearances and also questions arising under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constituion, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which' involve the validity and construction of an act of the territorial legislature of Alaska amending § 43 of Title II of the Alaska Code of Civil Procedure so as to permit one indictment for several offenses of the same class,, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of certain provisions of the Federal Meat Inspection Law, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the principles controlling the granting of bills of review in cases affecting title to land, and their application to property the title to which is claimed under grants of different States, the boundary between which has long been in dispute, are stated in the opinion.

<p>A Federal instrumentality acting under Congressional authority cannot be subjected to an occupation or privilege tax by a State. Farmers’ Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516.</p> <p>Where the agreement between the Government and an Indian tribe imposés upon the Government a definite duty in regard to operation of coal mines, as is the case with the Choctaw and Chickasaw agreement of April 23, 1897; lessees of the mines are the instrumentalities through which the obligation of the United States is carried into effect, and they cannot be subjected to an occupation or privilege tax by the State in which the mines are located.</p> <p>Neither state courts nor legislatures, by giving a tax a particular name, can take from this court its duty to consider its real nature and effect. Galveston &c. By. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 227.</p> <p>Where the manifest purpose of a gross revenue tax equal to a specified percentage on gross receipts from production of a mine in addition to taxes levied and collected upon an ad valorem basis, is to reach all sales and secure such percentage, the tax is, in effect, a privilege or occupation tax; and so held a§ to such a tax imposed by Oklahoma on persons engaged in mining and producing coal.</p>

Held: under the circumstances of this case, to include levy. In the absence of directions not to levy it is the duty of the officers to obey the directions and commands of the writ. 201 Fed. Rep. 82 , affirmed.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, and the right of parents to recover for death of an adult son, are stated , in the opinion. The Employers’ Liability Act should be construed in the light of its own language, and the purpose of its enactment. Congress did not have in mind the changing, of any common-law principle as the survival of an action for personal injuries.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Commerce Court to review orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are stated in the opinion. The finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission that the reshipping privilege constituted an undue preference in favor of Nashville had substantial evidence to support it; is a finding of fact; and is not open to reexamination.

<p>The decision of the Supreme Court of the Hawaiian Islands, made while the present Territory was an independent sovereignty, in a ease construing a will, that a devise of lands was in fee and not in trust, should ■ not be disturbed or pronounced void by the courts of- the Territory on grounds mainly of form and procedure.</p> <p>A duly filed written decision of the highest court of the former sovereignty must be regarded as an adjudication if at that time it was the recognized practice that the case, the submission and the written decision constituted the record.</p> <p>Where the constitution and statutes of the former sovereignty permitted the highest court to fill a vacancy by calling in a member of the bar, and it was the practice for years to fill more than one vacancy, the question of the validity of a judgment of that court should not be raised long after the change of sovereignty.</p> <p>Even if under the statutes of the Republic of Hawaii questions in equity could not be reserved, if the highest court did act on questions so reserved and entertained the cause, it had authority to decide and its judgment cannot be subsequently attacked in another court on that ground.</p> <p>Even if a case holding that a prior decision should not be disturbed did not again make the matter res judicata, the later case may be referred to as authority with regard to local procedure.</p>

The Attorney General of Arkansas, proceeding under Act No. 112, approved March 23, 1911, entitled “An Act for an annual franchise tax on corporations doing business in the State of Arkansas,” (Acts of Arkansas, 1911, p. 67), brought this suit in one of the courts of the State to recover a tax levied against the St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company by the state Tax Commission under the provisions of that act for the year 1911, amounting to the sum of $6,798.26, besides a…

Berwind-White Coal Mining Company v. Chicago and Erie Railroad Company, 235 U.S. 371 (1914), was a United States Supreme Court case involving a suit over demurrage of an Erie Railroad car used by Berwind-White Coal Mining Company to transport coal. The Court asserted that the filing of rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission complied with the notice requirements of the Act to Regulate Commerce and the point of reconsignment was clear under the company's usual practice for many years.

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment for damages obtained by the administratrix of an employé of a railroad company under the Employers’ Liability Act, are stated in the opinion. As this case involves no violation of any safety appliance act, the defense of assumption of risk is open as at common law. Seaboard Air Line v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492; Southern-Ry. v. Crockett, 234 U. S. 725.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of two statutes of Mississippi, one abolishing the defense of fellow servant in certain cases, and the other creating a presumption of negligence in certain cases, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the act of February 13, 1911, 36 Stat. 901, amending the fee bill and its application to interlocutory decrees, are stated in the opinion. The act of February 13, 1911, deals with a review by a Court of Appeals upon either "writ of error” or "appeal,” as the case may be of “ the.final judgment or decree.” The present controversy arises upon an appeal from an “interlocutory” decree, therefore the act does not here apply.

Held: that in view of the conflict of evidence as to the circumstances under which the intestate was killed, the question of assumption of risk was properly presented to the jury.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Michigan Railroad Commission Act and the effect of a decree of the Supreme Court of the State sustaining orders of the Commission, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the principles of law Upon which bills of review are granted and their application -to this case, are stated in the opinion. No appeal lies to this court from the decree dismissing the bill of review. A bill of review cannot be filed after the time to appeal has expired. At the time of filing the bill of review the time to appeal had long since expired. Thomas v. Harvey, 10 Wheat. 146. There is no error of law apparent upon the face of the record.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to directly review the judgment of the District Court in a case in which that court acted in accordance with the mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of statutes relating to Creek Indian allotments and the laws of descent applicable thereto, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the laws of deseent and distribution relating to Creek Indian allotments, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of a judgment against a railroad company for damages by fire caused by sparks from one of its locomotives, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve questions arising out of a demand made by the Governor of one State upon the Governor of another State for the rendition of a fugitive from justice who had been indicted by the demanding State for conspiracy to effect his own escape from the State Asylum to which he had been committed as a lunatic by order of the court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions in the Original and Supplemental Creek Agreements regarding the descent, and distribution of Creek Indian Allotments, are stated in the opinion.

Held: considering the circumstances, to be not a penalty but a provision for liquidated damages and that it was competent for the. par ties to the contract to provide the latter, and,'having so provided, recovery might be had “for the amount stated, as liquidated damages upon the violation of the contract and without proof of the damages actually sustained.” It will be observed, therefore, that a condition of recovery was…

Held: that the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund is a fund of the State, and that the- State had a first lien - on the failed bank’s assets to discharge whatever the State should advance for it. State v. Cockrell, 27 Oklahoma; 630; Lankford v. Oklahoma Engraving Co., 130 Pac. Rep. 278 . The object of the law is to' serve public not private rights.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

appeals prom the district court op the united states • POR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OP OKLAHOMA. The facts, which involve the claims of depositors in certain Oklahoma banks and the application of the Eleventh Amendment to suits in the Federal court to compel the members of the State Banking Board of Oklahoma to make payments from and distribute the Depositors’ Guaranty Fund, and also the question of whether the State consented to be sued, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 184 of the Penal Code of the United States, prohibiting, except under specified conditions, the carriage of letters and packets otherwise than in the mails, are stated in the opinion. Section 184 is a revenue statute and should be liberally construed. United States v. Bromley, 12 How. 88; Johnson v. Railway, 196 U. S. 17; United States v. 36 Bbls. Wine, 7 Blatch. 463; 4 Ops. A. G. 161.

Held: in view of the caution by the judge, not to have prejudiced the defendants. A verdict for damages resulting from an illegal combination in restraint of interstate trade under the Anti-trust Act of 1890, may include damages accruing after commencement of the suit but as the consequence o'f acts done before and constituting part of the cause of action declared on.

Held: in this case, to be impracticable and unreasonable and void.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 238, Judicial Code, and the construction of § 37, Judicial Code, and the jurisdiction and duty of the District Court thereunder, are stated in the opinion. Under the.pleadings as they stood the court was without power to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction due to lack of diversity of citizenship, and the order or judgment of dismissal whs a nullity.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of certain provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Ohio, are stated in the opinion.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the validity of a decree quieting title to property' in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 8 and 70 of the Bankruptcy Law of 1898 and §■ 4041 of the Georgia Code in regard to the allowance to be made for a year’s support of the widow and children of a bankrupt dying during administration of the estate, are stated in the opinion.

Conrad Braker, Jr., of New York, died testate July 21, 1890.

Held: that there was substantial evidence to support the order establishing rates and the Commission had jurisdiction under the McChord -Act to make the order reestablishing a former rate.

The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law of Maryland and their application to citizens of the District of Columbia, are stated in the opinion. . The act is an illegal attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Passing into or through States of the Union in automobiles is an act of interstate commerce.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, are stated in the opinion. Substantial pecuniary damage is presumed as a matter of law in favor of a. widow and children; the presumption is prima fade, of course, and it may be shown that the deceased husband and father was a burden, but in the absence of such rebutting evidence the presumption prevails.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certáin provisions of the ten-hour labor law of Mississippi and the right of a stockholder of a corporation to enjoin the corporation from complying with those provisions, are stated in the opinion. Chapter 157, Laws of Mississippi, 1912, unconstitutionally restrains the liberty of contract. Undue elevation of state police power at the expense of private constitutional right is a fundamental error.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of certain provisions of the patent laws of the United States in regard to liability for infringement, are stated in the opinion.

Adrian, Georgia, a station on the Wadíey Southern Railway, is 10 miles from Rockledge,. where the road connects with the Macon & Dublin R. R.,- and 27 miles from Wadley, where it connects with the Central of Georgia Railway. In consequence of this connection1 with both roads, goods could be shipped from Macon to Adrian, over either route.

Held: to amount to & waiver of the objection (based upon § 33 of the Arizona Enabling Act) that upon the commencement of statehood the action should have been transferred to the proper state court, subject to removal to the Federal court upon application made in 'due form for that purpose. Under Rev. Stat.

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Circuit Court of Ozaukee County, State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>