Volume 242 — United States Reports

Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co. v. Ward, 242 U.S. 1 (1916), was a civil lawsuit that came before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1916. It involved the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company, a shipping company operating in the Hawaiian Islands. The Supreme Court declined to review a judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Cross v. United States, 242 U.S. 4 (1916), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding remuneration for clerks of the court for the copying and docketing of naturalization claims.

The case is stated in the opinion. I. The provision in the contract to control assignments of moneys due was valid. Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, and many other cases were cited to the general proposition that parties to contracts may prohibit assignment. The .prohibition may extend to the assignment of moneys due under the contract.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in the circumstances stated in the opinion, to have amounted at most to the conferring of a mere revocable license. *16 The general principle reiterated that what seems on its face a mere license by a municipality may not be converted into a contract by resort to general implications.

The case is stated in the opinion. The effect of the construction placed upon the Colorado irrigation acts by the court below was to take the plaintiff’s property without due process and deprive him of the equal protection of the laws. Plaintiff had a right to take water from a tributary of the South Platte River in Water District No. 23. By the constitution.and laws of Colorado such a right is recognized as a right of real property.

Held: that such a suspension — the legal equivalent of an absolute and permanent refusal to impose any sentence under the statute — was beyond the power of the court.

<p>Ordinances of a city which subject the business of private detectives and detective agencies to police supervision, and provide that' no person shall engage in such business without first obtaining recommendation by the Board of Police Commissioners, taking the oath prescribed for city detectives and giving a bond in the sum of $1,000 to secure proper conduct, do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>A contention to the contrary is not, however, frivolous.</p> <p>A State, under her police power, may supervise and regulate the police business within her limits and all that pertains to it, and this as regards the citizens of other States as well as her own.</p> <p>Even though the ordinances were construed by local officials, m other cases, as excluding nonresidents from the detective business in Georgia, one who made no application to comply with them and thus failed to obtain a constrúction of them in his own case, is not entitled to raise in this court the question whether they discriminate against him as a citizen of another State. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183.</p>

Held: that the evidence concerning the fitness and efficiency of the automatic couplers in question, and concerning the special condition which existed, as a result of the train’s being on a curve when the couplers failed and the áccident occurred, did not preclude a reasonable inference that the Safety Appliance Act was not complied with.

Held: under these circumstances, as more fully developed in the opinion: (1) That for all practical purposes the effect of the arrangement was to make the two appellant railroad companies the joint owners of the terminal.

United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), was a landmark Supreme Court decision applying the common law concept of res judicata (literally: the thing is decided) to criminal law cases.

Held: That the tabulated statement, and oral testimony comparing it mathematically with figures stated in the findings, were competent evidence, tending to overcome the prima facie force of the Commission’s orders.

Held: That it was reasonable to assume that the exemption was extended subject to the right of alteration and repeal. New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104 , distinguished. (2) That, in view of this and the apparent absence of any promise made or burden assumed in reliance bn the exemption, this court was not prepared to hold that the state court, erred in holding the exemption a revocable privilege.

Held: are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising-in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they -have appellate jurisdiction in other cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise a like jurisdiction. from courts of bankruptcy not within any organized circuit of the United States and from the supreme court of the District of Columbia. . . . “Section 25.

Held: That, subject to the limitations of the Federal Constitution, the existence and status of the consolidated corporation in Alabama were dependent on the Alabama laws.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP PENNSYLVANIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR to the district court oe the united states FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS. •</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that tender of the stock actually received, being all the subscribers could do toward restoring the original position, was an adequate preliminary to an action at law against the respondent to recover the amounts paid on their subscriptions. Heckscher v. Edenborn, 203 N. Y. 210 , approved.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p>

<p>Partners are individually responsible for torts committed by their firm while acting within the general scope of its business, whether they personally participate therein or not.</p> <p>One who, being entrusted with the possession of corporate stocks as security for an indebtedness, deliberately sells them and appropriates the proceeds, in excess of the debt secured, without the knowledge or consent of their owner, is guilty of a “willful and malicious” injury to property within the meaning of § 17, clause 2, of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by the Act of February 5, 1903, 32-Stat. 798, and, consequently, his liability is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy.</p>

<p>A stipulation in a “uniform live stock contract” signed and accepted by both shipper and carrier to govern an interstate shipment, and declaring in effect that the carrier shall not be liable for loss or dam-' age unless' a claim therefor be made in writing; verified by affidavit, and delivered to a designated agent of the carrier at his office, in a place named, within five days of the removal of the stock from the cars, is on its face unobjectionable and, in the absence of any proof of circumstances tending to render it invalid or excuse a failure to comply with it, will be enforced.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that, whether the certification was sufficient or not, it was error to affirm the judgment and thus foreclose the defendant from protecting • itself by introducing other evidence on a new trial. The case is stated in.the opinion. .■ Mr. Albert S. Marley, with whom Mr. John S. Motley and Mt. Robert J. Cary were on the brief, for plaintiff In error.

Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the local law banning the sale of products without sufficient butter-fat content as "ice cream" was constitutional.

The case is stated in the opinion. The- history of the legislation, with § 37 of the statute, providing for thei disposition of the moneys received, proves that the Legislature intended to impose the fees for revenue purposes. The record shows affirmatively that in a very short périod the income was vastly in excess of the cost of registration and inspection. This was pure profit.

<p>In the absence of clear and palpable error,,this court will not disturb the concurrent findings of state trial and appellate courts upon the mere sufficiency of the evidence concerning negligence and assumption of risk in a case under the Employers’ Liability Act.</p> <p>Certain requests for instructions are here held rightly refused because of deficiencies in recitals of facts.</p>

Held: that, whether the court was right or wrong in upholding the cancellation proceeding as applied to the contract, there-was no denial of due process of law, since' due process was afforded in the suit to quiet title itself. Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U. S. 112 , distinguished.

Held: there, is no provision for notice to them. They are not bound by the order entered; at least in the absence of such participation. And if the rates made by tariffs filed under the authority granted seem to them unreasonable, or unjustly discriminatory, §§ 13' and 15 afford ample remedy.

This is a civil proceeding brought by the United States in the United States District Court for the District of' North Dakota, to recover $500 from the Northern Pacific Railway Company for the claimed failure to file, for five successive days, with the Interstate Commerce Commission, a report of violations of the Hours of Service Act, as required by an order of the Commission issued June 28, 1911.

<p>The jurisdiction of this court being here challenged; and it appearing that the facts presented are identical with those on which depends a suit over boundary, brought by the State of Arkansas against the State of Tennessee (defendant in error herein) while this case was pending in the courts of the latter State; that a decision of this case upon the merits will be equivalent to a decision of the boundary controversy and that an affirmance of the judgment will dispose of the avails of nearly or quite all the lands involved in that case and . this; Ordered, that this case be restored to the docket and be assigned for hearing immediately after the boundary case; and that upon a stipulation of the facts of that case by the parties thereto, both cases will be taken on briefs if all parties consent, or advanced for early argument if they prefer.</p>

<p>In a criminal case tried in a District Court of a Territory and coming here by way of the Supreme Court of the State into which the Territory was afterwards converted, defenses based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments (in part not raised until the case reached the latter court) are within this court’s jurisdiction to consider.</p> <p>Quaere, Whether under the Constitution a defense of former jeopardy is waived if not made before the prosecution has introduced its evidence in chief?</p> <p>Defendant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to an indictment for murder; on a day subsequent, without withdrawing the plea, he demurred to the indictment as not charging an offense. The demurrer being overruled, both sides being ready for trial, a jury was duly impanelled and sworn and the witnesses for both sides called and sworn, but on motion of the prosecuting officer the court dismissed the jury and directed that the defendant be arraigned anew. This was done forthwith, the accused pleaded not guilty again, and both sides being ready, the same jury was sworn once more and the trial proceeded to a conviction.</p> <p>Held. (1) Not double jeopardy.</p> <p>(2) Due process and the right to á jury, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments respectively, did not require that a new jury be impanelled after the second arraignment and plea.</p> <p>(3) Under the circumstances, dismissing the jury to allow of the second arraignment and plea, whether a necessary formality or not, was clearly permissible.</p>

Held: insufficient to remove the menace *203 of future injury arising from the facts that defendant retained the junior patent under which the alleged infringements were practiced and justified, did not disclaim intention to proceed under it, denied infringement, put in issue plaintiff’s patent and title, and shortly before this bill was filed brought an action for damages based on the published notice of infringement,…

Held: that neither by the Act of 1887 nor the amendatory Act of 1906 did Congress intend that the enforcement of such duty might be compelled by orders of' the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Held: Upon consideration of the village and township grants and the law under which they were made (Act of 1867, §§ 13, 14 and 20), that the right to charge fare as therein permitted, upon the lines covered by those grants, was a valid right of contract whose obligation could not constitutionally be impaired by subsequent state legislation.

Held: following its previous decision in Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 175 Indiana, 630, 638, that the Railroad Commission itself, by virtue of the act, had power to grant relief through a rehearing, and that without first resorting to that method of prpcedure plaintiff in error was not entitled to have the *261 order set aside by the courts.

Minerals Separation v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916), is a United States Supreme Court case on the patent protection of froth flotation.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OE THE STATE OE NEW YORK.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the judge is the essential-party respondent and the request must therefore be denied. No return having been made by the respondent on the return day, the time for his return is, under the circumstances, extended. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr, Harry W. Standidge on behalf of -the moving parties. Memorandum opinion by Me. Chief Justice White, by direction of the court.

Held: that this was a method of compensating that officer and to encourage the actual enforcement of the law against its violators and not intended to'require him to become a party litigant; In the second case a statute was considered that required telegrams to be transmitted with impartiality and in the order of time in which they were received, and without discrimination as to rates.

<p>Under §§ 8, 9- and 16 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, all damages properly attributable to the exaction of excessive rates by carriers in interstate commerce may be awarded in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission; .and, when damages because of such rates have been so awarded, and satisfied, further damages resulting from the same cause may not be recovered through independent proceedings in court.</p>

Held: that the plaintiff was not employed in interstate commerce when injured, and the case, therefore, was not within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 128 Minnesota, 119, reversed. The cAse is-stated in the opinion. Mr. Blewett .Lee, with whom Mr. W. S. Horton was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr.' Samuel A. Anderson.for defendant in .error, submitted. Mr. Justice Holmes- delivered the

Held: where a rest of more than the minimum period required by the latter act had intervened between the violation and the injury. The case is stated in the opinion.

Held: that the administrative question, so determined, could- not be revived by the carrier to oust the jurisdiction of the court.

<p>That a case may be within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (c. 149, 35 Stab 65), it is essential that the person injured be employed at the'time of injury in some task of interstate commerce; mere expectation of such employment is not enough. So held where the employee, subject to be employed in either interstate or intrastate commerce as directed by a superior, was injured while in quest of orders, and, but for the injury, would have received orders requiring him immediately to make up an interstate train.</p> <p>In cases brought here under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the rule obtains that, in the absence of manifest error,- this court will not disturb concurrent findings of state trial and appellate courts that the evidence of employment in interstate commerce was, insufficient to go to the jury.</p>

Held: That whether or not the shares were “interest bearing securities,”, the transfer'was not void. (2) Title being in the' trustees, the estate was not liable for the assessment, and consequently defendant could not be held as a distributee under the Wisconsin statute.

These were suits for injunctions compelling the defendants to accept intoxicating liquors for shipment into West Virginia. The appeals were taken from decrees of the District Court dismissing the bills. The facts are stated in the opinion.

<p>An order of a state commission fixing a rate for transportation in purely intrastate commerce will not be disturbed upon the grounds that it produces discrimination against interstate commerce, interferes with administrative provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, and intrudes up op the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, where the relations of the rate fixed to interstate commerce have not been determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission and are not established by the evidence, and where the certainty that it will operate to the injury of those engaged in such commerce is not made to appear.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.,</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS POR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: not a case within the Federal Employers’ Liability Act. 131 Minnesota, 181; id. 496, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Frederick M. Miner, with whom Mr. William H. Bremner was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Humphrey Barton, with whom Mr. John H. Kay was on the briefs, for defendant in error.

<p>ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: free from misconstruction or misapplication of law. The provisions of §§ 17 and 18 of the Act of June 28, 1898, supra, inhibiting enclosures and holdings of lands in excess of allottable quantities, were left in force as to the Choctaws and Chickasaws by the agreement in the 29th section which became effective through tribal-ratification op August 24, 1898.

<p>The provision in § 9 of Article I of the Constitution guaranteeing the privilege of habeas corpus is not a limitation upon state action.</p> <p>A decision of a state Supreme Gourt, involving only the construction of the state constitution and statutes respecting the jurisdiction of state courts, can raise no question under the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.</p> <p>To invoke the full faith and credit clause and the act of Congress passed to carry it into effect, Article IV, § 1; Rev. Stats., § 905, on behalf of a judgment of one State in a court of another, it is necessary by allegation or proof, or in some other recognized mode, to bring to . the attention of that court the law or usage which defines the effect of the judgment in the State of its rendition.</p> <p>Assignments of error contrary to' the foregoing- propositions are frivolous.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: a substantial distinction, satisfying the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 182 Indiana, 178, affirmed. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John B. Peterson and Mr. J. A. Gavit, with whom Mr. Addison C. Harris and Mr. Robert J. Cary were on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error.

Held: operative to pass an interest in the improvements on that parcel sufficient to give a preferential right to select it under § 11 of the Cherokee Agreement of 1902. Section 18 of the Cherokee Agreement of 1902 recognized in terms the right of a tribal member to hold possession by his agent as well as by himself of land not exceeding the allottable quantity.

Held: by some of the state courts, that a personal judgment effective within the territory of the State could be rendered against a non-resident defendant who did not appear and submit himself to the jurisdiction, provided notice of the suit had been served upon him in the State of his residence, or had been published in the State within which the court was situate, pursuant to the provisions of a local statute.

Held: that the effect of the ordinance upon the constitutional rights of the vendor-was immaterial to plaintiff’s case.- The contract expired before the evidence ,was closed.

Held: this is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 , 385; *425 Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 177 , 192; Hannibal Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194 , 205.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.</p> <p>The eases are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Petitions for writs of certiorari are at 'the risk of the parties making them/, and whenever in the progress of the cause facts develop which . if disclosed on the application would have induced a' refusal, the court may upon motion by a party or ex mero motu dismiss the writ.</p> <p>Such petitions should be ' carefully prepared, contain appropriate references to the record, and present with studied accuracy, brevity and clearness whatever is essential to ready and adequate understanding of points requiring the court’s attention.</p> <p>When the real situation is not set forth by the petition, a duty rests on opposing counsel to reveal it in their reply.</p>

<p>At the date of the Treaty of Greenville, August 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49, the right of the Pottawatomie Nation in lands on and near the shore of Lake Michigan now in Illinois was no more than a right of occupation.</p> <p>If the occupancy ever extended to lands formerly submerged in the lake such as are the subject of this litigation, the. court notices historically that it was long ago abandoned and that for more than half a century no pretense of such occupancy has been made by the tribe.</p> <p>The treaty did no more than'confirm the tribal right of occupancy, and when that was abandoned all interest of the tribe and its members .was terminated.</p>

Held: that these facts warranted the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals in. concluding that the insolvent intended to defraud his creditors within the meaning of § 67e and that the mortgagee was not a purchaser or lienor in good *439 faith (§§67e, 67d). Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U. S. 575 , 582; Coder v. Iris, 213 U. S. 223 , 244.

Held: that the maximum liability of the carrier for the loss of a part was not the total valuation so fixed, but the value, at the ratio of $100 per ton, of the part lost. 165 App. Div. 947 , reversed. The case is stated in the opinion. *449 Mr. Lester F. Gilbert for plaintiff in error. Mr. Daniel J. Kenefich and Mr. Charles B. Sears for defendant in error, submitted. Mr. Justice Brandéis delivered the

Held: not violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it appearing by the decisions of the highest court of the State that the requisite notice and opportunity are otherwise impliedly afforded under the state law. In proceedings under the New.

<p>Section 2 of the supplementary Safety Appliance Act of April 14, 1910, c. 160, 36 Stat. 298, requiring interstate railway carriers to equip their cars with secure running-boards, ladders, and hand-holds or grab-irons, became effective July 1, 1911.</p> <p>The purpose of § 3 of the act is to standardize the appliances required by § 2, and the purpose of the proviso in it is to confer, authority on the Interstate Commerce Commission to extend the time within which the carriers may conform to the established standards, but it does not authorize the Commission to change the date upon which § 2 became effective.</p>

<p>When injunctive relief against action by state officials granted in the court below becomes superfluous and the case moot because of subsequent state legislation passed while the case is here pending, this court will reverse and remand with directions tc dismiss the- bill without costs.</p>

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Farley Drew Caminetti and the Mann Act. The Court decided that the Mann Act applied not only to purposes of coercion and prostitution but also to noncommercial consensual sexual liaisons. Thus, consensual extramarital sex falls within the definition of "immoral sex."

Held: “organized for profit” within the meaning of the Corporation Tax Law of August 5, 1909. *504 The .decision whether a corporation is carrying on business within the ■ meaning of the Corporation Tax Law must depend in each instance upon the particular facts before the court; no particular amount of business is required.

<p>The Fifth Amendment relates to national action only. ,</p> <p>A city ordinance, which has been upheld by the highest court of the State as valid under the state legislation, is to be regarded by this court as a law of the State and is to be tested accordingly.</p> <p>Such an ordinance, when dealing with a subject within the police power, must be upheld unless shown to be clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory.</p> <p>A city, exercising the police power, may prohibit the erection of billboards in residence districts, in the interest of the safety, morality, health and decency of the community.</p> <p>Such á prohibition is not to be deemed unduly discriminatory because not including fences and other structures, found less likely to become a source of public injury.</p> <p>An ordinance prohibiting billboards is not invalidated- by a provision which removes the prohibition as to any billboard the erection of which is first consented to by the owners of a majority of the frontage on both sides of the street in the block in which it is to be erected. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, distinguished.</p> <p>He who is not injured by the operation of. a law or ordinance can not be said to be deprived by it of either constitutional right or of property.</p>

<p>This court is without jurisdiction to review a judgment of a state court under Rev. Stats., § 709, Jud. Code, § 237, upon the ground that a federal right was denied, when the claim of federal right relied on was refused consideration in that court because it was not asserted at a proper time or in a proper manner under the established state system of pleading and practice.</p> <p>The decision of the state court that a claim of federal right was not so presented is binding on this court when not rendered in a spirit of evasion for the purpose of defeating the federal right.</p> <p>In accordance with the foregoing principles, a party desiring to secure the benefits of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act in an action in a state court, must claim them in apt time and in an appropriate manner under the state rules of pleading and practice.</p>

Motions to reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss petitions-without prejudice. The case is stated in the opinion.

Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld individual states' power to regulate the offer, sale, and purchase of securities. Such regulatory laws are commonly known today as "blue-sky laws"; the phrase is often said to be based on this opinion, although speculative securities were described as "blue sky" in sources published prior to this opinion.

The case is stated in the opinion. The act denies to the appellees due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the South Dakota constitution, § 2, Article 6. A complete analysis of its provisions shows that this is not a law to prevent fraud in the sale of stocks and bonds. It is a law designed for the sole purpose of regulating the control of the sale of stocks and bonds to a point of absolute prohibition.

Held: not to render the act unduly discriminatory or involve unlawful delegation of power. The act complies with the requirement of the Michigan constitution that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. 228 Fed. Rep. 805 , reversed. The question in the case is the validity of the Blue Sky Law (using this designation for convenience) of the State of Michigan.

Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held hotels and restaurants that perform music must compensate composers, even if the venue is not separately charging patrons to hear the music. The decision legitimized ASCAP, a group founded to collect license fees from businesses that wanted to play performance recordings by its members. Because this case determined that playing music at the restaurants was an indirect way of profiting from the copyrighted music, it raised the question of what sort of indirect use would be too indirect to constitute infringement. Broadly speaking, this question was not anticipated by the Copyright Act and judges considered this a thorny problem.

Held: where both grants were complete and perfect before the Mexi- " can cession, and the grant confirmed by Congress was senior in time of grant. ■Such jurisdiction could not be conferred on the Court of Private Land Claims by consent of the owners of the grant confirmed by Congress. 20 N. Mex. 145, affirmed. *596 The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Neill B. Field for plaintiff in error.

Held: that the writ of error under § 237 should have been directed to the Court of Appeals and not to the Superior Court. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Landon L. Forchheimer, with whom Mr. Ferdinand Jelke, Jr., was on the brief, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Edward P. Moulinier for defendant in error. *601 Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice Day. This writ of error must be dismissed.

Held: that a lawof West Virginia, viz., Acts 1881, c. 17, §§ 69, 71; Code 1913, c. 54, §§2983, 2995, in declaring that “railroads” shall be public highways “free to-all persons for the- transportation of their persons and property,” embraces a branch line constructed and operated under it, and imposes on the carrier with respect to such line a continuing franchise obligation to *604 transport passengers as well as…

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United'States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Florida.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme. Court •of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>Board of Estimate and Apportionment of the City of New York et al. On application for a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York for the County of New York.</p>

<p>Appeal from and in error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of Lyon County, State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Special Sessions, First District, New York City, State of New York.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.</p>

<p>Appeals from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court qf tfié Utdted States for the District of Porto Rico.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>