Volume 30 — United States Reports

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case. The Cherokee Nation asked the Court to stop Georgia from enforcing state laws that took away their rights within the Cherokee territory. However, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the cases's merits, stating that it lacked the original jurisdiction, or authority, to decide in a matter between a U.S. state and the Cherokee Nation. Chief Justice John Marshall explained that the Cherokee Nation was not a "foreign nation" but a "domestic dependent nation", comparing their relationship with the United States to that of a "ward to its guardian".

Held: that so much of this evidence as went to prove the death of Mr. Madison, was admissible on the trial, and ought not to have been excluded by the court. 1 A patent was issued by the governor of Kentucky, for a tract of land containing 1850 acres, by survey, &c., describing the boundaries; the patent described the exterior lines of the whole tract, after which the following words were used, “ including within the said…

On the 2d of April 1825, the plaintiffs commenced an action of ejectment against the defendants, asserting a title and right of entry in and to 1850 acres of land, patented to their ancestor, James Madison, by the commonwealth of Kentucky. The grant was dated August 8th, 1798 ; and was in consideration of sundry land-office treasury-warrants, issued by the state of Virginia, and a survey bearing date 26th December 1796, founded on an entry made prior to the 1st of June 1792.

Held: that the true construction of the power is, that it vests a several as well as a joint authoiity in the attorneys; they are appointed “ the attorney or attorneysand if the intention had been to *86 give a joint authority only, the words “attorney” and “or” would have been wholly useless.

Held: that the sheriff was not responsible for levying the attachment for the debt so satisfied, or for refusing to redeliver the property attached.

Held: that this agreement fell within the scope of the general authority of the attorney, and was binding on the plaintiffs in the suit.

United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831), was an early United States Supreme Court case held on appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, which recognized that the U.S. Government has a right to enter into a contract without relying on any specific legal mandate for authorization. The case involved Commodore Thomas Tingey who, with others, had acted as surety for a bond executed on 1 May 1812 by Lewis Deblois, a naval purser.

<p>Withdrawal of demurrer, after affirmance.</p> <p>The court will not, on the motion of the plaintiff in error, instruct the circuit court to permit him to withdraw his demurrer, after an affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court; although this might have been done, had the judgment been reversed.</p>

The lessee of James Greenleaf instituted an action of ^ , ejectment, in the circuit court for the county of Washington, for the recovery of lot No. 16, in square No. 75, in the city of Washington, which suit was afterwards removed to the county of Alexandria, and was there tried in the circuit court.

In the circuit court, the defendants in error, the plaintiffs below, instituted an action of covenant on a charter-party, '‘dated July 15th, 1820, at Bath, Maine, by which they, the plaintiffs, let and hired to the [*142 defendant, the brig James Monroe, to proceed from Bath to Havana, thence to Mobile and elsewhere, as Simonton should direct, the dangers of the seas excepted, for the term of twelve months from the 7th of July.

This was an action of trespass, instituted in the circuit court, to try titles, according to the forms prescribed by the local law of South Carolina ; by which this action is substituted for an ejectment.

Held: that their principal having omitted to designate the fund out of which the payments were made, they could not do so.

*The appellant, William Hunter, was the assignee of Archibald Crary and Frederick Crary, under the insolvent law of Rhode Island ; the Crarys obtained the benefit of that law, in June 1809 ; William Hunter was duly appointed one of their assignees, and was the sole surviving assignee. One Jacob Smith had, as surety in a custom-house bond, been compelled to pay to the United States, for the Crarys, about $2125 ; this payment was made in May 1808.

Hoffman moved the court for a writ of mandamus,%o be directed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York, in the second circuit, commanding that court to review its settlement of certain bills of exceptions, which were tendered on the part of the defendants, on the trials of those cases in the circuit court, and to correct, settle and allow, and insert in the said bills, the charges to the jury in each case, or the substance thereof; and…

Held: that the sum due under the deed of trust ’ to Patton, should be charged on the funds arising from the sale of the real estate; and that having omitted to retain from the proceeds of the personal estate, the sum due to him by Page, Patton could not afterwards charge the same against the legal assets, being the fund produced by the personal estate.

<p>Revocation of letters testamentary. — Plea puis darrevn continuance. Effect of plea in bar. — Disability of plaintiff.</p> <p>L., as executor to W., instituted an action of assumpsit, on the 8th of April 1826 ; the declaration stated L. to be executor of W., and claimed as executor, for money paid by him as such; the defendant pleaded non assumpsit, and a yerdiet and judgment were given for the plamtiif ; after the institution of the suit, and before the trial, the letters testamentary of L. were revoked by the orphans’ court of the county of Alexandria, he having, after being req dred, failed to give bond, with counter-security, as directed by the court.</p> <p>The powers of the orphans’ court of Alexandria are made, by act of congress, identical with the powers of an orphans’ court, under the laws of Maryland ; it is a court of limited jurisdiction, and is authorized to revoke letters testamentary in two cases — a failure to return an inventory, or to account. The proceedings against L. were not founded upon either of these omissions ; the appropriate remedy, on the failure of the executor to give counter-security, is to take the estate out of his hands, and to place it in the hands of his sureties.</p> <p>The issue tried by the jury was on the plea of non assumpsit; as the plaintiff was incontestably executor, when the suit was brought, and when issue was joined, and could then rightfully maintain the action, and the revocation of the letters testamentary was not brought before the court by a plea, since the last continuance, as it might have been; the defendant must be considered as waiving this defence, and resting his cause on the general issue.</p> <p>A plea since the last continuance waives the issue previously joined, and puts the case on that plea.1</p> <p>It is not doubted, that the revocation might have been pleaded; and it ought to have been pleaded, in order to bring the fact judicially to the view of the circuit court; it ought to appear upon the record, that judgment was given against the plaintiff, in the circuit court, because ho was no longer executor of W., not because the defendant was not indebted to the estate of W., and had not made the assumpsit mentioned in the declaration.</p> <p>The rule is general, that a plea in bar admits the ability of the plaintiff to sue; and if the parties go to trial on that issue, the presumption is reasonable, that this admission continues.</p> <p>When a suit is brought by an administrator, during the minority of the executor, his powers as administrator are determined, when the executor has attained his full age; and the fact that he has not attained his full age, must be averred in the declaration; but if this averment be omitted, and the defendant pleads in bar, he admits the ability of the plaintiff to sue, and the judgment is not void.</p> <p>A distinction seems to be taken between an action brought by a person who has no right to sue, and an action brought by a person capable of suing at the time, but who becomes incapable, while it is depending; in the first case, the plaintiff may be nonsuited at the trial; in the last, the disability must be pleaded.</p> <p>*2261 ru'e is’ ^at w^en matter of defence has arisen, after the commencement of a suit, it J cannot be pleaded in bar of the action, generally; but must, when it has arisen before plea or continuance, be pleaded as to othe further maintenance of the suit, and when it has arisen after issue joined, puis darrein continuance.</p> <p>It may safely be affirmed, that a fact which destroys the action, if it cannot be pleaded in bar, cannot be given in evidence on a plea in bar, to which it has no relation. If any matter of defence has arisen, after an issue in fact, it may be pleaded by the defendant; as, that the plaintiff has given him a release; or, in an action by an administrator, that the plaintiff’s letters of administration have been revoked.</p>

This was an action of ejectment, brought to May term 1820, of the circuit court of the United States for the . district of Georgia, to recover a tract of land, containing *7300 acres, J lying in that part of the county of Gwinnett, which was formerly a portion of Franklin county.

The action of ejectment was commenced in the circuit court of Union county, on the 20th of May 1822. At September term 1822, William Cockerell, the defendant, appeared, and at his instance, as well as of the plaintiff, an order of survey was passed, requiring the surveyor to lay off the land in controversy, as either party should require.

Held: that the corporation of Washington were not liable for the payment of half of the prize drawn by ticket No. 5591, to the owner of the half ticket.

Held: to exelude his co-tenant, would impute a fraud to him. Fraud is no exception to the operation of the statute of limitations, after it has once been discovered by the person against whom it is to act; but the hostile purpose under the fraud must be known, before the statute can begin to apply.

In the circuit court for the county of Alexandria, the appellant, William Robinson, filed a bill for the specific execution of a contract entered into between him and James Leander Catheart, on the 10th of September 1822. The bill was filed in March 1829, and an injunction issued as prayed.

Wirt, for the complainant, stated, that the subpoena had been regularly served, upwards of two months, and there was no appearance on the part of the state of New York. The 17th section of the judiciary act of 1789, authorizes the court to make and establish all necessary rules for the conducting the business of the courts of the United States ; this court has such a power, without the aid of that provision of the law.

In that court, the United States instituted a suit against the plaintiff in error, John Smith, T., who, with Wilson P. Hunt, were, by a bond executed on the 7th of February 1810, in the sum of $10,000, the sureties of Alpha Kingsley, appointed a district paymaster in the army of the United States, under the act of congress passed the 16th of March 1802. Alpha Kingsley was dismissed from the service of the United States, in 1815. The action was commenced in December 1824.

This case came before the court, from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, upon certain questions certified from that 'court, upon which the judges of the circuit court were divided, which, with the facts, are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the appellee had no standing in a court of law. Now he is to be driven from a court of equity, and hung up like Mahomet’s coffin ; and is-to be suspended between the two courts and denied an entry to either. The bill and proceedings show a long account between the parties, intricate, and involving many questions which can best be determined by a court of chancery.

Held: that a deed purporting to be made by an attorney, in his own name, was void upon its face. Cited also White vs. Cuyler, 6 Durn. East, 176. 2 Stark. Ev. 477. Elwell vs. Shaw, 16 Mass. Rep. 42. 1 Greenleaf, 339, S. C. is a case analogous to the present.

Held: possessed and enjoyed the same. 4 'That no evidence is offered by plaintiff, that at the time of the said bargain, sale and conveyance, and of the payment of the said purchase money to Glover, Tayloe had any actual notice of the said original judgments, or either of them; that is, no other than the constructive notice arising from the records of said judgments.

<p>Official bonds. — Action on bond. — Responsibilities of sureties.</p> <p>F. and B. were sureties in a bond for $30,000, given to the United States, as sureties for one Rector, described in the bond as “ surveyor of the public lands in the states of Illinois and Missouri, and the territory of Arkansasupon looking into all the laws on this subject, it can hardly be doubted, that this officer was intended to be included in the provisions of the act of congress of May 3d, 1822, requiring security of the surveyor-general; literally, there was, at that time, provision made under the laws for only one surveyor-general; but it is abundantly evident, that the officer who gave this bond was intended to be included in the provisions of that act, under the description of a surveyor-general; the indiscriminate use of this appellation in the previous and subsequent legislation of congress on this subject, will lead to this conclusion.</p> <p>The surveyors of public lands are disbursing officers, under the provisions of the act of congress.</p> <p>The defendants in the court below pleaded performance, and the plaintiffs alleged, as the breach that at the time of execution of the bond, there were in the hands of Rector, as surveyor, to be applied and disbursed by him, in the discharge of the duties of his office^ for the use and benefit of the United States, divers sums of money, amounting, &e., and that the said Rector had not applied or disbursed the same, or any part thereof, for the use and benefit of the United States, as in the execution of the duties of his office he ought to have done; the jury found for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages for the breach of the condition at $40,000, and the judgment was entered “ quod recuperet,” the damages, not the debt: This judgment is clearly erroneous.</p> <p>It would seem, that in adopting this form of rendering the judgment, the court below has been misled by the application of the 2fith section of the act of 1789 to this subject; that section, if it sanctions such a judgment at all, is expressly confined to three cases : default, confession or demurrer.</p> <p>The plaintiffs in error are sureties in an official bond; and if it is perfectly clear, as to them, a judgment cannot be rendered beyond the penalty, to be discharged on payment of. what is due, which, of course, can only be, where it is less than the penalty; the statute expressly requires, that the surveyors of the public lands shall give bond for the faithful disbursement of public money, and in this bond, the words which relate to disbursement are omitted, and the only words inserted are “ that he shall faithfully disoharge the duties of his office.” The court feel no difficulty in maintaining, that where the conditions are cumulative, the omission of one condition cannot invalidate the bond, so far as the other operates to bind the party.</p> <p>Rector was commissioned surveyor of the public lands, on the 13th of June 1828, and the bond bears date the 17th August 1828; between the 3d of March and the 4th of June, in the same year, there had been paid to Rector, from the treasury, the sum of money found by the jury, and thus it was paid to him, before the date of liis commission, and before the date of the bond. For any sum paid to Rector, prior to the execution of the bond, *there is but one ground on which the sureties could be held answerable to the United States, and that is, *• on the assumption that he still held the money in bank or otherwise; if still in his hands, he was, up to that time, bailee to the government; but upon the contrary hypothesis, he had become a debtor or defaulter to the government, and his offence was already consummated. If intended to cover past dereliction, the bond should have been made retrospective in its language; the sureties have not undertaken against his past misconduct; they ought, therefore, to have been let in to proof of the actual state of facts so vitally important to their defence; and whether paid away in violation of the trust reposed in him ; if paid away, he no longer stood in the relation of bailee.1</p> <p>Such a case was not one to which the act applies which requires the submission of accounts to the treasury, before discounts can be given in evidence; since this defence goes not to discharge a liability incurred, but to negative its ever existing.</p>

Shankland v. Washington, 30 U.S. 390 (1831), is a United States Supreme Court case on lotteries and contractual relations, which held that when individuals purchase a share of someone else's contractual right to a future payout, they do not enter into a contractual relationship with the original seller.

The case was submitted to the court by Doddridge, on the following case. “ This is an ejectment originally brought in the common pleas of Hamilton county, in the state of Ohio, and afterwards removed to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Ohio, for a part of lot No. 86, in the city of Cincinnati, in the county of Hamilton, in said state, by the defendant against the plaintiffs in error.

Held: to exclude his co-tenant, would impute a fraud to him. Fraud is no exception to the operation of the statute of limitations, after it has once been discovered by the person against whom it is to act; but the hostile purpose under the fraud must be known before the statute can begin to apply.

Held: that in appeals from the circuit courts in chancery cases, the parol testimony which is heard at the trial in the circuit court, ought to appear in the record.

<p> Executions for fines in Washington city. </p> <p>The “ act concerning the district of Columbia,” passed 3d of March 1801, does not require the marshal to apply to the district-attorney for executions, in all cases of fines levied by the circuit court, and make him liable for neglecting to do so, if no execution issued.</p> <p>The levy court of Washington county are not entitled to one-half of all the fines, penalties and forfeitures imposed by the circuit court in cases of common law, and under the acts of congress, as well as the acts of assembly of Maryland, adopted by congress as the law of the district of Columbia.</p> <p>The district-attorney is specially charged with the prosecution of all delinquents for crimes and offences; and these duties do not end with the judgment or order of the court; he is bound to provide the marshal with all necessary process to carry into execution the judgment of the court; this falls within his general superintending authority over the prosecution.</p> <p>Interest is not chargeable on'money collected by the marshal of the district of Columbia, for fines due to the levy court, the money having been actually expended by the marshal in repairs and improvements on the jail, under the opinions of the comptroller and auditor of the treasury department, that these expenditures were properly chargeable upon this fund; although that opinion may not be well founded.</p> <p>Levy Court v. Ringgold, 2 Or. C. C. 659, affirmed.</p>

In the circuit court, the lessee of Joshua Barney brought an ejectment for 50,000 acres of land, in the state of Kentucky, which he claimed under a patent from the commonwealth of Virginia to Philip Barbour, dated the 27th December 1785, and a deed from Barbour to him, dated the 7th of August 1786.

Held: that this was a misapplication of so much of the fund ; and decreed that Potter should pay the same amount to the creditors of Peleg Gardner, if it could *463 not be recovered from Ezekiel; and also, the balance that remained due of the two-thirds of the purchase-money.

<p>Parlies. — Statute of limitations. — Evidence of death.</p> <p>Bv a statute of Kentucky, passed in 1796, several defendants, who claim separate tracts of land, from distinct sources of title, may be joined in the same suit.</p> <p>The statute of limitations of Kentucky, under which adverse possession of land may be set up, prescribes the limitation of twenty years within which suit must be brought; and provides, “ that if any person or persons entitled to such writ or writs, or title of entry, shall be, or were, under the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, or not within the commonwealth, at the time such right accrued or came to them, every such person, his or her heirs, shall and may, notwithstanding the said twenty years are or shall be expired, bring or maintain his action, or make his entry, within ten years next after such disabilities removed, or death of the person so disabled, and not afterwards.”</p> <p>The entries on the register of burials of Christ’s Church, St. Peter’s and St. James’s, in Philadelphia, and the entries of the death of the members of the family, in a family Bible, are evidence, in an action for the recovery of land in Kentucky, to prove the period of the decease of the person named therein.1</p> <p>The statute of limitations of Kentucky is a bar to the claims of an heir to a non-resident patentee, holding under a grant from the state of Kentucky, founded on warrants issued out of the land-office of Virginia, prior to the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, if possession has been taken in the lifetime of the patentee. Had the land descended to the heirs, before a cause of action existed, by an adverse possession, the statute could not operate against them, until they came within the state; if adverse possession commenced prior to the decease of the non-resident patentee, his heirs are limited to ten years from the time of the decease of their ancestor, for the assertion of their claim.</p> <p>That a statute of limitations may be set up in defence, in equity, as well as at law, is a principle well settled.2</p> <p>Statutes of limitations have been emphatically and justly denominated statutes of repose; the best interests of society require that causes pf action should not be deferred an unreasonable time. This remark is peculiarly applicable to land titles; nothing so much retards the growth and prosperity of a country as insecurity of titles to real estate ; labor is paralysed, when the enjoyment of its fruits is uncertain; and litigation without limit produces ruinous consequences to the individuals. The legislature of Kentucky have, therefore, wisely provided, that unless suits for the recovery of land shall be brought within a limited period, they shall be barred by an adverse possession.1</p> <p>Lewis v. Marshall, 1 McLean 16, reversed, in part.</p>

<p>Error to the District Court of Alabama.</p>

In the circuit court, the plaintiffs in error instituted an action of ejectment, for the recovery of a lot of ground in the district of Columbia.

In that court, Joseph Stith, the appellee, filed a bill for an injunction, to stay perpetually proceed-by the appellants, on a judgment obtained by them, in an ejectment instituted by them, as the devisees of Francis Peyton, against Joseph Stith, the appellee. The relief sought by the complainant in the circuit court was founded on the allegation, that one.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. James Lawrason, the testator of the appellee, filed a bill in the circuit court of Alexandria, against the appellant, William Fowle, as surviving partner of Thomas Lawrason, who had died intestate, and who, with William Fowle, had carried on business under the firm of Lawrason & Fowle. After the decease of James Lawrason, the suit was prosecuted by his executor.</p> <p>The bill charged, that the complainant, James Lawrason, being seised of one moiety of a wharf and warehouse, in the town of Alexandria,.’ and liis son, Thomas Lawrason, of the other moiety ; the said Thom is being then a copartner of Fowle ; the complainant agreed to rent to the copartnership, his moiety of the same, and that, on or about the — day of-, they entered on the possession, and occupied them until the death of the said Thomas ; that the complainant understood and supposed, that he was to be paid for his moiety the annual rent of $1600 ; and that he expected to prove that the said Thomas frequently acknowledged that to be the annual rent. That the complainant’s interest in the property was worth that rent. That during the period the said *Lawrason & Fowle occupied p,. the premises, dealings and other matters of account took place *- between them and the complainant; which not having been settled during the life of Thomas Lawrason, it was agreed, after his death, that the accounts between the complainant and the firm should be settled by arbitration, and that arbitrators were accordingly appointed to make the settlement. That the arbitrators awarded the sum of $2000 in favor of the complainant, which award, with the accounts on which it was founded, were exhibited. That the defendant Fowle refused to submit to the award, alleging tha,t the arbitrators were under a misapprehension as to the complainant’s interest in the rent. That the complainant brought a suit at law on the award ; and the court decided, on the trial, that in consequence of some error in the submission, and in the form of the award, it could not be sustained. That the effect of this decision may be to open the accounts between the parties, and if so, they can nowhere be so correctly settled as in the court of chancery. That he considered himself, however, entitled to the benefit of the settlement made by the arbitrators ; and that, although a suit at law might not be sustained on the award, yet in equity it was valid and binding; that he claimed the benefit of it; but if this could not be obtained, he must submit to another settlement to be made by order of the court. The bill concluded with a prayer for the settlement of accounts, and for general relief.</p> <p>The complainant’s bill having been taken pro confesso as against the defendant Fowle, the court, at November term 1823, directed an account to be taken by the auditor between the complainant and the defendant Fowle, as surviving partner, &c., as well in relation to the rents claimed of the firm, as to all other matters of account between them ; and the auditor was authorized to take such legal testimony as should be offered by the parties, and to report, &c. At May term 1824, the complainant having died, Aaron R. Levering, his executor, was made complainant. At April term 1825, the auditor returned his report, accompanied by the depositions of Elisha and Romulus Riggs, for the complainant, and those of Thomas Irwin and Phineas Janney, for the defendant.</p> <p>From the report of the auditor, it appeared, that there existed *no difficulty in the settlement of the general account (exclusively of [*497 rent) between James Lawrason and the defendant Fowle, as surviving partner. The balance on this account in favor of Fowle, being admitted to be $11,769.30. That as to the rents, the only difference that existed between the parties, was, whether the amount which had been claimed by James Lawrason, and admitted by the auditor, was to be considered as the rent of the whole of the wharf and warehouse, as contended for by the defendant Fowle ; or was to be considered as the rent of the warehouse, and the cornplainant’s moiety of the wharf only, leaving Fowle still accountable to the representatives of Thomas Lawrason for the rent of his moiety of the wharf If the latter was correct, there was a balance of $2638.83, with interest from the 21st of August 1819, due the complainant from the defendant Fowle, as surviving partner. If the former, there was a balance due from the complainant to the defendant of $1295.93, with interest, &c.</p> <p>From the evidence laid before the auditor, he decided, and reported accordingly, “ that the amount of rents claimed by the complainant, ought to be considered, not as' his share or dividend, but as a reasonable rent for the whole of the wharf and warehouse; but as the defendant Fowle admitted that Thomas Lawrason had never made nor intimated an intention to make any charge against the company for rent, on account .of that half of the wharf which had been conveyed to him, this, taken into consideration with his declarations, as stated in the depositions of E. and R. Riggs, induced him (the auditor) to believe, that it was his (T. Lawrason’s) intention, that the whole rent of the property should go to his father (the plaintiff) during his life; he, therefore, reported the balance of $2638.83, to be due to the complainant from the defendant Fowle.”</p> <p>At November term 1825, Hugh Smith and Nehemiah Carson, administrators of Thomas Lawrason, were made defendants. At April term following, the complainant filed his amended bill against them, calling on them to answer to his original bill, as if they had been originally made parties to it; 1 *and praying that they might be bound by any decree the court J should make, in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if they had been parties originally. At April term 1827, the answers of the defendant Fowle and of the administrators of Thomas Lawrason were filed.</p> <p>The answer of Fowle admitted the copartnership, commencing in 1804, and terminating by the death of T. Lawrason, in 1819. That the wharf and warehouse were rented from the complainant, then the sole owner, in 1804, at $450 per annum, which rent was placed to the coihplainant’s credit, on the books of the firm, until the year 1808. That about that time, great improvements were made, and the property became more valuable ; but as no contract was made and no sum named by the complainant for the rent, after that time, no further credits were given him. That during the existence of the copartnership, the amount to be paid for the annual rent never was fixed. That after the death of his partner, he called on the plaintiff for his account. That the account was rendered, and admitted by the defendant Fowle, except as to the rate' of rent for one year only. That the account, on its face, purported to be for the rent of the whole of the wharf and warehouse, and was so understood by him, when he admitted it. That no claim for rent had ever been made by his deceased partner; and that he expected the complainant and the representatives of his deceased partner would settle between themselves the proportion the latter was to receive. That some difference having arisen between the complainant and him, relative to the account of the firm against the complainant, this, with the difference as to the amount of one year’s rent, was submitted to arbitration. That the arbitrators made an award, with which the defendant was perfectly satisfied, believing the credits allowed the complainant for rent were for the entire rent oi the premises, that they were so understood to be, by one of the two arbitrators. That on the award being returned, he communicated it to one of the administrators of his deceased partner, and requested him to call on the complainant, and adjust with him the proportion of rent to be allowed to the estate of his deceased partner, that he might charge it to the complainant, and credit the administrators of his partner with it; and then, for the first time, learned, that the '1:complainant claimed the whole amount of credits allowed ; not as the entire rent of the premises, nor under >- any contract or engagement with his son; but as his share of the rent, leaving the defendant Fowle, as surviving partner, still liable to the claims of the administrators of his deceased partner, for his share of the rent. That he endeavored to prevail on the complainant to open the award on this point, and to consent to a valuation or estimate of his share of the rent, but failed in his attempt. That the complainant sued on this award, and that judg ment was rendered in the defendant’s favor. This judgment ho pleaded, and relied on as a bar to all claims on the award. He professed to be still willing to make the complainant a fair allowance for his share or proportion of rent, which he averred would fall far below the sum he claimed. He charged, that in 1812 the complainant sold and conveyed one moiety of the wharf to his son, T. Lawrason.</p> <p>The answer of the administrators of Thomas Lawrason charged, that in 1812, the complainant sold and conveyed to him one moiety of the wharf ; they exhibited the deed of conveyance, made in consideration of the sum oí §6500 ; they denied the complainant’s right to the whole rent, and denied that their intestate ever relinquished his share to the complainant. They averred, that although he survived his son for many years, he never made any such pretension, and that he made none such in his bill. They required proof of the complainant’s right to the rent of his son’s share of the wharf if a decree was asked in his favor on that ground.</p> <p>The deposition of Elisha Riggs, returned by the auditor, stated a con versation between the witness and Thomas Lawrason, in 1817, in which the latter said, that the firm of Lawrason & Fowle were paying the complain ant $1600 a year for the rent of the wharf and warehouse. Romulus Riggs testified to the same conversation. Thomas Irwin and Phineas Janney testified on their examination before the auditor, that they were well acquainted with the premises, the rent of which formed the subject of controversy, and that they considered the sums which the complainant had charged, and which were allowed by the auditor, as a full rent for the whole of the wharf and warehouse.</p> <p>*The court, on hearing, decided, that the defendant Fowle, as sur- -.¡, viving partner, should pay to the complainant the sum of $2638.83, *- with interest from the 23d of August 1819, and costs. But without preju dice to any claims which the representatives of Thomas Lawrason, deceased, might make on the estate of the said James Lawrason, for any portion of the rents thereby decreed against the defendant Fowle. No disposition was made of the case as to the administrators of Thomas Lawrason. From this decree, Fowle, and the administrators of T. Lawrason, appealed to this court.</p>

Held: that the case was not within the provisions of the 25th section of the act of 1789. The provisions of the compact which relate to “ property,” and to “ rights,” are general; they refer to no specific property or class of rights; it is impossible, therefore, judicially, to limit their application.

This case came before the circuit court on the following case agreed : ; “ Samuel Robertson, a native of the state of Maryland, a purser in the 1 navy of the United States, and as such purser, for several years before his death, stationed and domiciled at Norfolk, in the state of Virginia, died, in the year 182-, at Bedford, in Pennsylvania, intestate, insolvent — whither he had gone on a visit, for the benefit of his health.

Held: that the representative of a deceased partner was liable in equity to a payee, who trusted his money on the faith of the joint credit: but expressed themselves with great doubt and caution as to the liability of the partners at law. 2 Gall. R. 30. 176 It seems to me that the circumstance which would excite a doubt in that case would remove it in this.

Held: that in order to constitute an appropriation of the money, or any portion of it in favour of the persons specified, some assent on the part of the bankers must be shown; and that the circumstances of the case did not establish it.

The defendants in error instituted an action against the Patapsco Insurance Company, in the circuit court of Maryland, on a policy of insurance on the schooner Frances, Seaward, master, from Curagoa or a port of departure in the West Indies, or on the main, to a port in the United States.

Held: that Edmondston was not liable for the same. 1 It would be an extraordinary departure from that exactness and precision which is an important principle in the law and usage of merchants, if a merchant should act on a letter of credit, such as that in this ease, and hold the writer responsible, without giving notice to him that he had acted on it. 2 . Error to the Circuit Court of South Carolina.

Held: not to empower them to mortgage their toll houses ; and they are not estopped by their deed from denying their power, 2 T„ R. 171..

Held: that they were entitled, towards the satisfaction of the same, to the sum awarded by the commissioners for the loss of the ship and her freight, with certain deductions for the expenses of prosecuting the claim before the commissioners ; with interest on the amount, from the period when a claim for the same from the assignees was made by a petition.

Held: that this was a misapplication of so much of the fund; and decreed that Potter should pay the same amount to the creditors of Peleg Gardner, if it could not be recovered from Ezekiel; and also, the balance that remained due of the two-thirds of the purchase money.