Volume 343 — United States Reports

Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the convictions of five attorneys for contempt of court.

Held: “It is clear, that when the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction. And it is equally clear, that where a jurisdiction, conferred by statute, is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is, so far, a repeal of the statute conferring the jurisdiction. “It is quite possible that this effect of the act of 1866 was not. contemplated by Congress.

Held: as a matter of law, that the payment should have been deducted and entered judgment for petitioner. 84 F. Supp. 537 . The Court of Appeals reversed. 188 F. 2d 964 . Because of the important statutory issue involved and petitioner's claim that this case is distinguishable from Cobb v. Commissioner, 173 F. 2d 711 , we granted certiorari. 342 U. S. 810 .

from pages 181-182 intentionally omitted] Messrs. John D. Gray, A. L. Wirin, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioner. Mr. Adolph Alexander, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent. Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 Petitioner has been convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. He asks this Court to reverse his conviction as wanting in that due process of law guaranteed against state encroachment by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952), is a major decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. It was a case on state political parties' requiring of presidential electors to pledge to vote for the party's nominees before being certified as electors. It ruled that it is constitutional for states to allow parties to require such a pledge of their candidates for elector, and that it was not a breach of otherwise qualified candidates' rights to be denied this position if they refused the pledge. However, the violation of any pledge a faithless elector made was not at issue. It officially defined state electors as representatives of their respective states, not the federal government.

Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), was a case that came before the United States Supreme Court in 1952. It upheld an Illinois law making it illegal to publish or exhibit any writing or picture portraying the "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or religion". It is most known for giving a legal basis to some degree that forms of hate speech that may be deemed to breach US libel law are not protected by the First Amendment.

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), was a release time case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a school district allowing students to leave a public school for part of the day to receive off-site religious instruction did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

from pages 326-327 intentionally omitted] Mr. Stanley M. Silverberg, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Mr. Nicholas Jaurequy, Portland, Or., for appellees.

from pages 341-342 intentionally omitted] Mr. Joseph S. Robinson, New York City, for petitioner. Mr. Robert W. Ginnane, Washington, D.C., for respondent. Mr.

from pages 373-374 intentionally omitted] Frederick Bernays Wiener, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Daniel W. Knowlton, Washington, D.C., for appellees, United States and Interstate Commerce Commission. Douglas F. Smith, Chicago, Ill., for appellees, railroad defendants. Lee J. Quasey, Chicago, Ill., for appellees, National Live Stock Producers Assn. and others. Nuel D. Belnap, Chicago, Ill., for appellees, Chicago Live Stock Exchange and others.

from pages 414-415 intentionally omitted] [415] Mr. Wilkie Bushby, New York City, for Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. et al. Mr. William J. Grove, Harrisburg, Pa., for Pennsylvania Public Utility… Held: that the States were 'unable to agree' within the meaning of § 20 of Part I of the Act. II. 8 It is contended that some of Penn Water's sales at wholesale were not 'in interstate commerce' and therefore were not subject to federal regulation under Part II.

Held: no arguments were heard, and no discussion was had on this aspect of the pending bill. * * * For the same reason, namely, that we have had no hearings on the matter, we are not seeking to legislate affirmatively as to certain claims and denials of a right of election of remedies under existing laws, which claims and denials have not yet been adjudicated by the Supreme Court, although various other Federal courts…

Besser Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1951), is a 1951 patent–antitrust decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court upheld a ruling that the dominant U.S. manufacturer of concrete block–making machines violated the antitrust laws when it acquired its two principal competitors (attaining a 65% market share), bought important patents, made bad–faith threats of patent infringement suits, and entered into patent licensing agreements in which the parties were given veto powers over any prospective additional licensees.

Public Utility Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), is a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the playing of radio programs on street cars and busses of a transit system regulated by the government as a public utility did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

from pages 470-471 intentionally omitted] Mr. James Cassedy, Washington, D.C., for Federal Trade commission.

Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), also referred to as the Miracle Decision, was a landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court that largely marked the decline of motion picture censorship in the United States. It determined that provisions of the New York Education Law that had allowed a censor to forbid the commercial showing of a motion picture film that the censor deemed "sacrilegious" were a "restraint on freedom of speech" and thereby a violation of the First Amendment. In recognizing that film was an artistic medium entitled to protection under the First Amendment, the Court overturned its previous decision in Mutual Film Corporation v.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), also commonly referred to as the Steel Seizure Case or the Youngstown Steel case, was a landmark United States Supreme Court decision that limited the power of the president of the United States to seize private property. The case served as a check on the most far-reaching claims of executive power at the time and signaled the Court's increased willingness to intervene in political questions.

Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that cash contest prizes are taxable, and attributable to the most-recent thirty-six months ending with the close of the year in which it was received.

Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that a dual U.S./Japanese citizen could be convicted of treason against the United States for acts performed in Japan during World War II. Tomoya Kawakita, born in California to Japanese parents, was in Japan when the war broke out and stayed in Japan until the war was over. After returning to the United States, he was arrested and charged with treason for having abused American prisoners of war. Kawakita claimed he could not be found guilty of treason since he had lost his U.S. citizenship while in Japan, but this argument was rejected by the courts (including the Supreme Court), which ruled that he had in fact retained his U.S. citizenship during the war.

Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant when they argue an insanity defense in a criminal trial. This differed from previous federal common law established in Davis v. United States, in which the court held that if the defense raised an insanity defense, the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but Davis was not a United States constitutional ruling, so only limited federal cases, but not state cases. Oregon had a very high burden on defense, that insanity be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. At that time, twenty other states also placed the burden of persuasion on the defense for an insanity defense.