Volume 41 — United States Reports

Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was a case brought in diversity in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York on a bill of exchange accepted in New York in which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that United States federal courts that heard cases brought under their diversity jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789 must apply statutory state laws when the state legislatures in question had spoken on the issue, but did not have to apply the state's common law if the state legislatures had not spoken on the issue. The ruling meant that the federal courts that decided matters not specifically addressed by the state legislature had the authority to develop a federal general common law. In 1938, this decision was overruled by Erie Railroad Co. v.

Held: and now hold the property. 4. All the land up to the time of the possession and improvements of Holman was open, and used as a public landing, as a “ quai.” 5. The proceedings in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,' and the act of the legislature of Alabama, and the conveyances under the same to the plaintiffs in error. First.. As to the title set up by the defendants in error, who were plaintiffs below.

An action of debt was instituted by the defendants in error against Benjamin Long, then' sheriff in Madison county, in the state of Mississippi, for the recpvery' of six thousand two hundred and seventy-seven dollars and costs, the same being the amount of a judgment obtained by Palmer, Smith, and Company against Thomas S. Scott, at the January term, 1833, of the District Court of the United States, for the district of Mississippi, with interest, &c. The plaintiffs in the…

Held: that the clerk pro tempore was authorized to record the deed of trust, under the constitution and law of Mississippi; In' every instance in'which a tribunal has decided upon a matter within its regular jurisdiction, its decision must be presumed proper, and is binding until reversed by a-superior tribunal; and cannot be affected, nor the rights of persons dependent upon it be impaired, by any collateral proceeding.

In the District Court for the southern district of Mississippi, an action was instituted by the President, Directors, and Company of the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Memphis, citizens of Tennessee, against the plaintiffs in error,. Hugh M. Keary, Patrick ' F. Keary, and Charles A. Lacoste, citizens of the state of Mississippi, on a promissory note drawn by Hugh M. Keary, and Patrick F. Keary, ih favour of, and endorsed to the bank by Charles A. Lacoste.

Held: That the decision of the Court of Appeals was erroneous; and- the judgment of that ’ Court was reversed. It has often been decided that the sum in controversy iff a suit, is the damages claimed in the declaration.

Held: that, leaving'the property in the hands of the assignor under these circumstances, did not affect the assignment; or give a ri'ght to a creditor not preferred by it, to set it aside. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district .of Kentucky.

Held: . that the instructions of the Circuit Court were correct. When a factor makes advances, or incurs liability on a consignment of goods, if there be r.o special agreement, he may sell the property in the exercise of a sound discretion, according to general usage, and reimburse himself out of the proceeds of the Sale, and the consignor has no right to interfere.

<p>ON appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District qf Columbia, for- the county of Washington.</p>

Held: that there was no error in the Circuit Court in giving leave to amend. The power of the Circuit Court to authorize amendments, when there is anj thing in the record to amend by, is undoubted. In this case the defendant admitted by, hi? plea that he was the person liable to the suit of the plaintiff; but averred that he was executor and not administrator.

<p>Florida land claim. Breward petitioned the Governor of East Florida, intending to establish a saw-mill to saw lumber on St. John’s river, for a grant of five miles square of land, or its equivalent; ten thousand acres to be in the neighbourhood of' the place designated, and the remaining six thousand acres in Cedar Swamp, on the west side of St. John’s river, and in Cabbage Hammock, on the east-side of the river. The governor granted the land asked for, on the condition that the mill should be built; and the condition was complied with. On the 27th of May, 1817, the surveyor-general surveyed seven thousand acres under the grant, including Little Cedar Creek, and bounded on three sides by Big Cedar Creek, including the mill. This grant and survey were confirmed.</p> <p>Three thousand acres were laid off on the northern part of the river St. John’s, and east of the Royal Road, leading from the river to St. Mary’s, four or five miles from the first survey. This survey having been made at a place not within the grant, was void; but the Court held that grantee is to.be allowed to survey under the grant three thousand acres adjoining the survey of seven thousand acres, if so much vacant land can be found; and patents for the same shall issue for the land, if laid out in conformity with the decree of the Court in this case.</p> <p>In 1819, two thousand acres were surveyed in Cedar Swamp, west of the river St. John’s, at a place known by the name of Sugar Town. This survey was confirmed.</p> <p>Four thousand acres, by survey, dated April, 1819, in Cabbage Hammock; were laid out by the surveyor-general.- This survey was confirmed.</p> <p>By the eighth article of the Florida Treaty, all grants of lands made before the 24th of January, 1824, by his Catholic Majesty, were confirmed; but all grants made since the time, when the first proposal by his majesty for the cession of the country was made, are declared and agreed by the treaty to be void. The survey of five thousand acres having been made at a different place from the land granted, would, if confirmed, be a new appropriation of so much land, and void, if it had been ordered by the Governor of Florida; and of course it is void, having nothing to uphold it but the act of the surveyor-general. Cited, 10 Peters, 309.</p> <p>In the Superior Court of East Florida, the counsel for the claimant offered to introduce testimony in regard to the survey of three thousand acres; and the counsel of the United States withdrew his objections to the testimony. The admission of the evidence did not prove the survey to have been made. Proof of the signature of the surveyor-general to the return of survey, made the survey prim-1 facie evidence. Cited, Mrs. Wiggins’s Case, 14 Peters, 346.</p> <p>The proof of the signature of Aguilar to the certificate of a copy of the grant by the Governor of East Florida, authorizes its admission in evidence; but this does not establish the validity of the concession. To test the validity of the survey, it was necessary to give it in evidence; but the survey did not give a good title to the land.</p> <p>The United States have a right to disprove a survey made by the surveyor-general, if the survey on the ground does not correspond to the land granted.</p>

<p>The High Court of Errors and Appeals of the state of Mississippi, on a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi, confirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court, by which a title to land set up on an act of Congress of the United States, was held valid; thus construing the act of Congress in favour of the party claiming a right to the land, under the act. The party against whom the decision of the Court of Appeals was given, prosecuted a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. The writ of error was dismissed, the Court having no jurisdiction.</p> <p>In order to give the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction in such cases, it is not sufficient that the construction of the act of Congress on the validity of the act on which the claim was founded, was drawn in question. It niust appear, also, that the decision Was against the right claimed. The.nower of the Supreme Court is carefully defined and restricted by the judiciary act of 1789; and it is the duty of this Court not to transcend the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon it.</p>

Held: that trie-grant was void; no land having been severed from the public domain previous to the 24th January, 1818, and because the calls of thergrant aro too indefinite for locality to be given to them.

The heirs of John Low claimed sixteen thousand acres of land in. East Florida, under a grant by'Governor. Coppinger, founded •on a petition alleged to have been presented by- their ancestor, dated 20th March, 1816, and a decree of.

Held: that the decree was erroneous : and the Court reversed the same," and ordered the case to be reirianded, and the petition to be dismissed with costs, by the Circuit Court of Louisiana. The Supreme Court has no authority, as an appellant Court, upon a writ of error, to revise the evidence in the Court below, in order to ascertain whether the judge rightly interpreted .the evidence, or drew right conclusions from it.

In the Circuit-Court of Ohio, a bill was, filed by Duncan M‘Arthur, asking for a specific performance of a contract,, dated the 10th of November, 1810.

Held: that the authorities of Spain were authorized to grant the public domain, in accordance with,their own ideas of the merits and considerations presented by the grantee: *199 and that our powers extended only to the inquiry, whether in fact the grant' had been made; and its legal effect when made, in cases where the law by implication introduced a condition, or it was peculiar in its'provisions.

Held: that the owner of goods stolen, was a comper tent witness for all the matters in issue, upon an indictment for the theft; although the statute declaredihat the thief, upon being convicted, should forfeit and pay treble the value of. the property stolen to the owner thereof.

Held: that there was error in this order of the Court. By the act of Congress, relating to the enrolment of ships and vessels, it is not required to make a bill of sale of a vessel valid,-that it shall be enrolled in the custom-house. The enrolment seems not to be necessary by the law to make the title valid, but to entitle the vessel to the character and privileges of a« American vessel.

Held: ■ that the assignee, under the insolvent laws, was entitled to receive from the Treasury of the United States, the amount so allowed. Cited, Comyges v. Vasse, 1 Peters, 196; The United States v. M'Daniel, 7 Peters, 1; The United States v. Pillebrown, 7 Peters, 50; Emerson v. Hall, 13 Peters, 409. ON appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the county of Washington in the district of Columbia.

Held: that these surveys were valid, notwithstanding that they were made, at different places. APPEAL from the Superior Court of East Florida. This was an appeal from the decree of the Superior Court of East Florida, confirming, the claims of the heirs oí Clarke and Atkinson, to fifteen thousand acres of land, under the acts for the adjustment of land-claims in Florida.

Held: that'under the provisions of the second "section of the' act, the .defendant in error cláiming.under the purchase made under the act of 1818, ahd under the .act of 1824, was entitled to the lot.

Held: that this lot was within the exceptions’ ofithe act of 1824; and no right to the same was vested in the city of Mobile by the act. IN error to the Supreme Court of the state of Alabama. The ease was argued by Mr. Test, for the - plaintiffs in error; and by Mr. Key and Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant in error. Mr. Justice M'Lean delivered the

Held: that there could be no objection taken to the introduction of the release in this form, under the circumstances of the case. The release having been admitted without exception, no objection could afterwards be made to the manner in which it was introduced. It had the same effect that it would have had upon á cross-bill, or supplemental answer; and the complainant had the same opportunity of impeaching it.

Held: that tiro lands having been purchased under the act of'1826, and riot being held under the act of 1804, were subject to taxation.. Ah the purchasers held under the'act of 1826, and cannot' go behind it f and their laiids are subject like other persons’ to be taxed by the state.

Held: that the order of the War Department of 14th March, 1835, took away all right-to the extra allowances claimed under the prior army regulations. In the district of Columbia, a writ of error lies to the decision of the Circuit Court, upon an agreed case. The same principle has been applied in cases brought before the Su. preme Court from other parts- of the United States.

In an action on a certificate of deposit, instituted on the 7th ofi November, 1839, by the defendant in error, Nathan Smith, in the District Court ofi the United States for the northern district of Mississippi, against the plaintiff in error, with- others, who were the surviving partners in the Real Estate Bank of Colunjbus, Mississippi ; the plaintiff obtained a judgment by default against all the defendants except Daniel W. Wright, who had .been sued with them as one of…

IÑ error' to the Circuit Court of the United States for Mississippi., An action was instituted in-the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Mississippi, by Beverly Chew, a.citizen of the state of Louisiana, against John A, Gibson and Kinchen A. Martin, citizens of the state of Louisiana. ' The action was-brought to recover the amount of a'promissory note drawn by John A. Gibson in favour óf, and endorsed by Kinchen A. Martin, for three thousand five hundred…

. IN error to' the Circuit Court' of the United States,- for the northern district of New York. The case had been tried' in the Circuit Court for the'northern district of New York, on a writ'of right, filed by the demandant', the plaintiff in error, for the recovery of-certain lands in-the county of Oneida, in thesta-te of New York. After various proceedings in the case, the Court gave judgment for the tenant, and this writ of error'was prosecuted by the demandant.

Court of the United States, for the bounty of Washington', in the district of Columbia. •The defendánt in error .instituted an action of covenant, in áhe Circuit Court of the’county. of Washington, against Philip Roach, upon certain articles of covenant. Before the -trial of the. cause, the defendant died, and his administrator became the defendant in the suit, a verdict apd jirdgment were rendered' for the plain tiff, and the defendant prosecuted this writ of error.

<p>IN- error tp the Cixeuit Court of the United States, for Washington co'unty, in the District of Columbia.</p>

Held: that the instructions of the Circuit Court were correct.

Held: first: That the instructions of the District Judge as to’the original seizure,-or the causes thereof,-were correct. ’ Jt is of no consequence, whatsoever, what were the original grounds of the seizure, whether founded or not; if. the goods were in point of law subject to forfeiture.

Held: not for revenue, but for colonization and settlement. After the grant, it was held by the proprietors as private property detached from government, and not as demesne lands of the government. This is conformable to usage. The proceeds of sáles of the territory went into the private purse of the proprietors, and was not applied, to the'fiscal purposes of the government.

Held: that he was not liable to be rated and assessed for his office under the United States, for county rates and levies. The question presented in the case before the Courts of Pennsylvania, was whether the office of captain of the revenue cutter, of the United States was liable to be assessed for taxes, under the laws of Pennsylvania..

The ease is fully stated in the opinion of the Court. The only question in the case on which the Court gave an opinion, was upon the right of the appellant to bring the case to this Court by appeal, instead of by writ of error. contended, that an appeal does not lie in this Court; this case could be brought here only by writ of error. It is not a case either of -equity, admiralty, or prize or no prize. From 1789 to 1803, all cases were brought here by writ of error.

Held: that this was proper. There was no piobable cause for retaining this part of the bill, to obtain an account from the respondents. Obviously, no claim exists that can be made available for the complainants, in regard to this portion of the property. ON appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

Held: that this instruction of the Circuit Court was correct. It never can be properly said that the stipulation in the policy is complied with, when there has been no such mention or endorsement as it positively requires; without which it declares, that the policy shall be void and of no effect. IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.

ON a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the district of Massachusetts. The plaintiff in error instituted a suit for the recovery of damages for the infringement of his patent for an improvement in the use of cotton gins. The Circuit Court, on the verdict of the jury, gave a judgment for the defendants. A bill of exceptions-having been tendered by the plaintiff to the charge of the Court, on the facts, in favour of the defendant, given by the Court.

Mr. Davies, for the appellée, moved to dismiss the appeal. He stated that the appeal had been actually entered in the Circuit Court, in the names of the appellants mentioned on the record; but that there were other defendants in the .Circuit Court, against whom the decree had been rendered^ who had not joined in the appeal, not having had any regular notice of such appeal. They were Hayes, Gouch, and Westcott.

The plaintiffs in error instituted a suit in the Circuit .Court of the state of Illinois, claiming, by a bill filed in that Court to hold under an act of the legislature of Illinois, an exclusive right to erect a ferry on the Mississippi river, from lapd owned by them, to the city of St. Louis, Missouri.

The case, as stated in the opinion of the Court, is as follows: “ The defendant in error and Joshua Mauran, Jr., of the city of New York, on thé 8th of September, 1S36, entered into articles of copartnership in the trade and business-, .of general shipping merchants, and of buying and selling merchandise on their own account, and also on commission for the account of others; which was to continue three years.

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 precluded a Pennsylvania personal liberty law that prohibited freedom seekers from being taken out of the state without due process. The Court overturned the conviction of slavecatcher Edward Prigg as a result.