Volume 45 — United States Reports

This case was brought up, by writ óf error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the. District of Mississippi. A judgment was obtained in that, court, at May tern', 1839, by the. defendants in error agáinst Ephraim Gwinn and Jemes Ballance, for the sum of $ 2,679*88, with interest at the rate of eight per cent., from the 27th of May, 1839, until paid, and costs.

This was a writ of error to the District Court of the United Státes for the Northern District of Mississippi, to bring up for review certain instructions delivered to the jury in an action of trover, brought, by the. defendant in error against the plaintiff in error, and in which the plaintiff below obtained the verdict. The case was this.

This case was brought up by writ of error to the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama. It was an action of assumpsit on a promissory note made by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The commissioners under the act of the 3d of March, 1837, amendatory of the act entitled “ An Act for laying off the Towns of Fort Madison,” &c., approved July 2d, 1836, confirmed unto Alexander Levi and John Thompson, as tenants in common, the right of purchase, by preemption, of lot No. 68, in the town of Dubuque, being of the first class, containing seventeen one hundredths of an acre.

<p>MoReyin the hands of a purser, although it may be due to seamen, is not liable to an attachment by the creditors.ofthose seamen..</p> <p>A purser cannot be distinguished from any other disbursing agent of the government ; and the rule is general, that, so long' as money remains in the hands of a disbursing officer, it is as. much the money of the United States as if it had not been drawn from the. treasury. .</p> <p>- A decision of a state court, sanctioning such an attachment, may be revised by this Oburt under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act. '</p>

This case whs brought up from the. Supreme Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the C orrection of Errors of the S tatic of New York, by a writ of efror issued under the ?6th. section of ;the Judiciary Act. . The facts were these. The. relator, Frederick F; Bapkus, previous -tojthe.20th .day of July, 1840, had obtained' á júdgment.in the Supreme.Cpiirt of . the11 State of New York against Lyman A..

Held: as well by the profession as the community generally, as comprehending that class of deeds. It is equally certain, that ever since the establishment of a separate registry for the city of Detroit, mortgages, and other deeds affecting real estate in the city, have'uniformly been recorded in that registry.

This case was brought up by writ of error to the Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals for the State of Tennessee, under the„25th section of the Judiciary Act. The case was this.

Held: under this act, that the lien of tire judgment, or rather the judgment itself, cannot be' enforced after the death of the ancestor, until the personal estate is proceeded against and the plea of fully administered found in favor of the personal representative. Boyd v. Armstrong’s Heirs, 1 Yerger, 40 ; Gilmer v. Tisdale, 1 Yerger, 285; Peck v. Wheaton, M. & Yerger’s Rep. 353.

Held: that by the regulations the plaintiff in error was. not entitled to a commission on disbursements, but the' per diem was in ful? of all extra compensation. That as to a charge for disbursements of contingencies of fortifications, he was at liberty to show it by evidence.

This case was brought up,-by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The facts in the case bringing it within the principles of the case of Price ». Sessions, decided at the last term of this court, Mr. Crittenden, on behalf of the defendant in error, submitted it without argument.

<p>In an action of ejectment, where two of the plaintiff’s lessors were married women, and the demise was laid in the declaration to have been on the 1st of January, 1815, it was necessary to establish to the satisfaction of the jury, that the marriage took place before that day, inasmuch as their husbands were stated to have joined in the demise.</p> <p>Two depositions, taken in 1818, were given in evidence, one of which stated the death of the father of the women to have taken place “ upwards of twenty yean ago,” and the other “ about twenty-eight years ago.” Both of the depositions, when enumerating the children of the deceased, mentioned the fact of the marriage, without saymg when such marriage took place.</p> <p>In giving its instructions to the jury, the court remarked that “ the depositions should be favorably construed.” After retiring, the jury returned into court and inquired what was meant by the instruction that the “ depositions should be favorably construed,” when the court informed them, that “ where a suit was brought by A. and B. as man and yvife, and a witness proved them man and wife shortly after the suit was brought, without proving the time at which they were intermarried, it might well be inferred that they were man and wife when the suit was instituted; and if there was an ambiguity in the deposition of William Rawle (the witness), it was in the power of the jury to find that the two femes covert had intermarried before the 1st of January, 1815.”</p> <p>The jury were further told, that “ the depositions had been referred to the court, on a motion, on the part of the defendant, for a nonsuit, for want of proof of heirship and intermarriage of the daughters of Reynolds, at the date of the demise, 1 January, 1815; qpd that it seemed to the court that William Rawle (the witness) .referred to the persons who were the heirs of Reynolds at the time of his death, and not at the time the deposition was taken, and refused the non-suit; but the jury were not bound by the construction given by the court, and could give thé deposition any construction they saw proper.”</p> <p>No exception having been taken to the opinion of the court overruling the motion for a nonsuit, the question whether, as matter of law, there was any evidence to be submitted to the jury, going to establish the intermarriage at or before the time of the demise laid in the declaration, was not before this court.</p> <p>And in the submission to the jury óf the question of fact, whether or not the evi- . dence proved the marriage before that time, there was no interference with the</p> <p>Íirovince of the jury, or violation of any rule of law, the question having been eft open for their finding.'</p> <p>There was, therefore, no error in the proceedings of the court below. '</p>

Held: and taken to be conclusive evidence of the protest of such note, bill, or other writing offthe day it purports to have been made ; and the notary shall not be required to go beyond the limits of the county of his residence to give evidence of the facts. The foregoing provision declares the force and; effect of the instrument. *130 And then, the statute prescribes its form.

Held: that in an action of assumpsit and not guilty pleaded, and issue,-the judgment may be entered, for it is only mispleading, and the real merits may as well be tried on that issue as on any other. 4 JBac. Abr. 84. The omission to join in issue to some of the .replications is healed after verdict. 3 Harris & Johns. 109. Departure is cured by verdict. Connect. Rep. 252.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for West Pennsylvania. There was no bill of exceptions signed by die judge, and the record presented the following appearance. Among the rolls, records, and judicial proceedings of the Circuit Court of the United States, in and for the Western District of Pennsylvania, in the Third Circuit, may be found the following wotds and figures, to wit: — Copy of Docket Entries.

Held: that the title to the land he claimed was invalid, because he produced no other evidence of claim than the receipt of the receiver above set forth, dated 8th March, 1836 ; that the act of June 15, 1832, limited his right to purchase to three years ; and not having filed his notice of claim, and paid his money, until the 8th of March, 1836, he came too late, and for this reason, also, the petition must be dismissed.

This case was brought up by appeal from the Circuit Court of thé United States for the District of Rhode Island, sitting as a court of equity. The bill was filed by Carpenter against the insurance company, and referred to an action at law, which he brought against said company, in 1839, and which was brought, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is reported in 16 Peter 495.

Held: that an equitable title could not be set up either to sustain or to defeat an action of ejectment. 3 How. S. C. R. 760. Hence, had the bond been acknowledged by these married women, and otherwise valid, it was properly rejected by the lower court. 59 2.

Held: at an early day, in this court, that one good count was sufficient to uphold a general verdict and judgment upon all the counts, though some of them might be bad, the information being regarded in the nature of a criminal proceeding. (Locke v. The United States, 7 Cranch, 339 ; 1 Johns. R. 320 ; Doug. 730 ; 8 Bac.

<p>This case was brought up, by writ of error, from-the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of •Pennsylvania.</p> <p>On the 16th of August,' 1839, Patrick Brady, a resident of the city of Philadelphia, presented -to the custom-house in that city an entry' of certain goods which had arrived from Liverpool, in the ship Franklin. Accompanying the entry was the oath of James Buckley, the present claimant, taken at Liverpool, on the. 8th of - . June, 1839. It was what is called the manufacturer’s oath, as contra-distinguished from the purchasér’s oath, and stated the value, the. purchaser’s oath stating the actual cost, of the goods. The bill of lading was for three bales, marked P. B., 810, 811, 812, and eight cases, marked P. B., 813 to 820, which were consigned.to the saitL Patrick Brady.</p> <p>These goods were ordered to be. appraised by the two regularly appointed appraisers for the port of Philadelphia, namely, Thomas Stewart and Henry Simpson. The examination was not finished until the 25th of September, 1839 ; the result of which was an appraisement of d6.1,9I7j the invoice being £ 1,647.</p> <p>On the. 15th of February, 1840, the claimant,.being then in England, made out a copy of the invoice of the goods in question, to which he annexed a purchaser’s oath, staling the goods to have been purchased, oh the 28th of May, 1839, from William Buckley and Company.</p> <p>On the 25th of May,. 1840, the claimant appealed from the decision of the official ¿ppráisers,'in the manner pointed out in the. act of Congress providing for an appeal, when Samuel .Ross., and A. J. Lewis wére appointed to make an appraisement Oh the 22d of June, 1840, they took the oath required by law, and proceeded to make the valuation.</p> <p>Abopt this time, but the record does not state exactly when, the agent of the claimant filed in the custom-house at Philadelnhia the purchaser’s oath just spoken of.</p> <p>On the 22d of June, .1840, the appraisers, Ross and Lewis, who had been appointed under the appeal to appraise the goods, took the necessary oaths and proceeded to execute the duty. The result was, that their appraisement was seventeen per cent, higher than the value as stated in the invoice.</p> <p>On the 28th of September, 1840, an informátion was filed against the goods in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. . It consisted of four counts.</p> <p>The first was founded on the sixty-sixth section of the act of 1799.</p> <p>. The second, upon the fourth section of the act of 1830, and charged that the invoice was made up with intent, by a false valuation, to evade and defraud the revenue of the United States.</p> <p>The third, upon the same section of the same ¿ct, charging that each of the several packages was made up with intent, &c.</p> <p>The fourth, upon the fourteenth section of the act of 1832., charging that the goods were composed wholly, or in part, of wool or cotton, and that all and each of .the several packages in the invoice were made up with intent, &c.</p> <p>As these counts are the subject-matter of a part.of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is proper to insert them in extenso.</p> <p>In the District Court of the United States of America, in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Eastern District of Pennstevania, ss.:</p> <p>Be it remembered, that, on this twenty-eighth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and forty,- into the District Court of the United States of America, in and for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, comes .John M. .Read, attorney of the said United States of America, and prosecuting in their name and on their behalf, and gives the said court here to understand and be informed, that, on the twenty-fourth day of June, in the year aforesaid, at the city of Philadelphia, in the, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the following goods, wares, and merchandise, to wit: —-</p> <p>Three bales of cloths, marked P. B., 810, 811, 812, and eight cases of cloth, marked P; B., 813, 814, 815, 816,817, 818,819, 820, were seized on land by Calvin Blythe, Esq., collector of the custom's of the port and district of Philadelphia, in the said Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and are now in his custody, as being forfeited, for the causes hereinafter mentioned, to wit:—</p> <p>1. That the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise are of the growth, produce, and manufacture of some foreign place or country, to the said attorney unknown ; and were heretofore, to wit, on the sixteenth day of August, in the year of pur Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-nine, brought or imported in a ship or vessel, being á ship called the Franklin, from a foreign port or place, to wit, the port of Liverpool, to the port of Philadelphia, in the collection district of Philadelphia, in the Eastern District of Penn-' sylvania, which said goods, wares, and merchandise are subject to the payment of duties to the United States, on being brought and imported as aforesaid.</p> <p>That an entry of the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise, duly signed, was, at the time of said importation thereof, made at the office of the collector of the customs of the said port and district of Philadelphia ; and that, on such entry being made as aforesaid, an invoice of the goods, wares, and merchandise included in such entry was produced, and left with the said collector of the customs of the port and district of Philadelphia.</p> <p>And the said attorney further avers, that the aforesaid goods, wares, and mérchandise, which were so entered as aforesaid, and of which an ^invoice was so produced and left as aforesaid, were not invoiced according to the actual cost thereof at the place of ex.portation, .hut, op the contrary, were in fact invoiced at less sums than the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation, with design to evade the duties thereupon, or some part thereof, against the form of the act of Congress in such case made and provided.</p> <p>2. That the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise, being subject to thé payment of ad valorem duties to the United States, an entry thereof, duly signed, was, at the, time of the importation thereof, made at the office of the collector of the customs of the said port and .district of Philadelphia, and that, on such entry being made as aforesaid, an invoice of the goods, wares, and merchandise included in Such entry was produced and left with- the said collector of the customs of the said port and district of Philadelphia.</p> <p>And the said attorney further avers, that the said invoice, sb produced and left as aforesaid, was made up with intent, by a false valuation, to evade and defraud the revenue of the United States, against the form of the act of Congress in such case made and provided.</p> <p>3. That the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise, being subject to the payment of ad valorem duties to the United States, an entry thereof, duly signed, was, at the time of the importation thereof, made at the office of the collector of the customs of the said port and district of Philadelphia and that, on such entry being made as aforesaid, an invoice of the goods, wares, and merchandise included in the -said, entry was produced and left with the said collector of the customs. of the said port and district of Philadelphia'.</p> <p>And the said attorney further avers, that all and each of the said several packages contained in the said entry so made, and in the invoice so prodüced and left as aforesaid, in which die aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise were so imported and entered as aforesaid, was made, up with intent, by a false valuation, to evade and defraud the revenue of the United States, against the form of the act of Congress in such case made and. provided.</p> <p>4. That the aforesaid goods, wares, and merchandise, being composed wholly or in part of wool or cotton, an entry thereof, duly signed, was, at the time of the importation thereof, made at ■ the office of the collector of the customs for the port and district of Philadelphia ; and that, ón the said entry being, made as áforesaid, an invoice of the said goods, so as aforesaid composed wholly or in part [of] wool, or cotton, included in such entry, was produced and left with the . said collector of the customs of the said port and district of Philadelphia.</p> <p>And the said attorney further avers, that all and each of the several packages-in the said invoice so produced and left as aforesaid, and in the said entry so much as aforesaid, in which the aforesaid goods were so imported as aforesaid, were made up with intent to evade and defraud the revenue of the United States, against the form of the act of Congress in such case made and provided.</p> <p>By reason of all which the premises and the acts of Congress in this behalf made and provided, the said goods, wares, and merchandise have become and are forfeited.</p> <p>Wherefore, the said attorney- prays the aid and the advice of the said court here in the premises, and due process of law. for the condemnation thereof.</p> <p>JOHN M. READ,</p> <p> United States-Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. </p> <p>The acts of Congress upon which, these counts are founded are as follows : —</p> <p>The sixty-sixth section of the act of 1799, chapter 22, providedj —</p> <p>“ That if any goods, wares, or merchandise, of which entry shall hare been made in the- office <?f a collector, shall not be invoiced according to the actual cost thereof at the place of exportation, with design to evade the duties thereupon, or any part thereof, all such goods, wares, and merchandise, or the value thereof, to be recovered of the person making the entry, shall be forfeited.”</p> <p>The fourth section of the act of 1830, chapter 147 (4 Lit..& Brown’s ed. 410), provided,—</p> <p>“ That the collectors of the customs shall cause at least one package out of every invoice, and one package at least out of every twenty packages of each invoice, and a greater number should he deem it necessary, of goods-imported into the respective districts, which package or packages he shall have first designated, on the invoice, to be opened and examined, and if the same be found not to correspond with the invoice, or to be falsely charged in such invoice, the collector shall order, forthwith, all the goods contained in the same entry to be inspected ; and if such goods be subject to ad valorem duty, the same shall be appraised, and if any package shall be found to contain any article not described in the invoice, or if such package or invoice be made up with intent, by a falsé valuation or extension, or otherwise, to evade or defraud the revenue, the same shall be forfeited ; ”, (then follows a repeal of the fifteenth, section of the act of 1823, and of any act which imposes an additional duty or penalty of fifty per cent, upon goods appraised above their invoice price ;) “ and no goods liable to be inspected or appraised as aforesaid shall be delivered from the custody of the officers of the customs, until the same shall have been inspected or appraised, or until the' packages sent to be inspected or appraised shall be found correctly and fairly invoiced and put up, and so reported to the collector ; provided,” &c., &c., &c.</p> <p>The fourteenth section of the act of 1832, chapter 224 (4 Lit. & Brown’s ed. 593), provided, —</p> <p>“ That whenever, upon the opening and examination of any package or packages of imported goods, composed wholly or in part of wool or cotton, in the manner provided by the fourth section of the act for the more effectual collection of the impost duties, approved on [thej 2Sth day of May, 1830, the said goods shall be found not to correspond with the entry thereof at the customrhouse ; and if any package shall be found to contain any article not entered, such article shall be forfeited ; or if the package be made up with intent to evade or defraud the revenue, the package shall be forfeited ; and so much of the said section as prescribes a forfeiture of goods found not to correspond with the invoice théreof be, and the same is, hereby repealed.”</p> <p>On the 7th of October, 1840, Buckley filed his claim, and on the 13th of December, 1842, the cause cfime on for trial. In the course of it, the counsel for the claimant took nine exceptions to the admissibility of certain evidence offered in support of the prosecution, which may be stated as. follows-</p> <p>1. The first exception was to the admissibility of Thomas Stewart to prove an appraisement of the'goods made by him as one of the official appraisers of the port; to which testimony the counsel for the claimant objected, that the. appraisement was not made in presence of the court and jury.</p> <p>2; Was to the admissibility of the appraisement.</p> <p>3. Was to.the admissibility of the testimony of Felix A. Huntingdon, an importer and experienced judge of goods, to prove what was the value, in his belief, of the goods in the British market at the date bf.thé invoice upon which they were entered ; the ground of the objection being, that the appraisement was not made in the presence of the jury.</p> <p>4jj Was to the admissibility of the affidavits, of Samuel Ross and A. J. Lewis, who had appraised the goods under an appeal, taken by them before -entering on the performance of their duty as appraisers under the appeal.</p> <p>5. Thereupon the coursel of the United States gave in evidence their appraisement; and to this the claimant excepted, that the appraisement had ijiot been made in presence of the jury.</p> <p>6. The counsel for the United States having produced the invoices of two importations — one into Philadelphia, , and the other into New York —of goods exported from, England by the claimant, whose affidavit was in each case annexed, dated 23d May, 1839, and 12th June, 1839, the counsel for the claimant- excepted to the reading of these two affidavits.</p> <p>7. Several other invoices, affidavits, and entries were offered on the part of the United States, after being verified in the same- manner as .those mentioned in the last exception ; and to their admission in evidence the counsel for the claimant excepted.</p> <p>8. The counsel of the claimant also excepted to any evidence being given of certain importations made by the claimant into New York, per Republic and United States, in which cases the value of the .goods were appraised at a higher value than the invoices.,-</p> <p>9. The counsel for the United States proved that the claimant’s factors in Philadelphia had received goods from him to be sold for his account, and had sold the same at prices more, by one hundred and twenty percent., than the prices entered upon the invoices upon which they had been entered ; a.-id to the admissibility'of this testimony the counsel for the claimant excepted.</p> <p>The evidence being closed on both sides, the counsel for the United States prayed certain instructions, and the court proceeded to charge the jury. The two following appear to be the passages to which the counsel for the claimant excepted.</p> <p>The United States allege that the appraisements and thé affidavits, and the fact of Mr. Bubkley’s acquaintance with the different forms of oaths., show his fraudulent.'intent in this importation; —- other invoices of the claimant are also given in evidence to show the same fraudulent design. Fraud is to be judged of by varipus circumstances. If this were the only case, the presumption might be that there was a mistake ; but the United States have presented these various invoices to show that there was no mistake. They have further shown the appraisements and the sales of these other importations by James Buckley at an advance from one hundred and fourteen to one hundred and forty per cent, in the invoice. Whereas eighty-five per cent, advance is a fair profit according to the testimony. These circumstances go to show intention; • because, though the goods may be under invoiced, yet, unless fraud was intended, the under valuation will not work a forfeiture. The United States are only bound in the first instance to prove to the court probable cause.. I have no difficulty in saying that the United States have abundantly shown probable 'cause ; the burden of proof is hence thrown upon the claimant.</p> <p>It is said, that, although some of the goods were undervalued, some were not so, and should not be condemned. The law is this; if in any particular package the prices of some of them are undervaluedfand some of them, are fairj if thé whole package has been made up by a false valuation with, intent to defraud the revenue, the whole is forfeited. The same is the case with an invoice. Although it may be composed of some packages fairly made up, yet, if the whole invoice has been made up with intent to defraud, the whole invoice will be forfeited. If the cost of the whole invoice offered for entry is made up with intent to defraud, the whole of the goods contained in it are. forfeited</p> <p>Thé first question for your decision then, is, whether the goods were put in the invoice under their cost or.value ; if so, whether such undervaluation was with a view to defraud ; if this were so, then as to those goods there can be no difficulty; whether the other goods in the invoice are to be forfeited must depend on the intent of the party in making up the invoice. .</p> <p>1st. And thereupon, the counsel for the claimant did except to so much qf the said charge as decided upon the question of probable cause as a question of law, taking it entirely from the jury.</p> <p>2d-. And to so much of the said charge as decided that, under the present information, thér jury should not be restricted in their condemnation to any restricted goods which they found undervalued j but find, first, either the whole, package, or second, the invoice in which they were imported, forfeited,- though containing other goods Correctly valued ; if they should find that such package or invoice had been made up with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States. ,</p> <p>And forasmuch as the exceptions aforesaid do not appear of record, the said defendant prayed that the court will sigh and seal this his bill of exceptions, which is done accordingly.</p> <p>ARCHIBALD RANDALL.</p>

Held: in the case of Warren v. Briscoe, 12 Louisiana Rep. 472, the protest must show that the bill itself was presented, &c. This case, it is true, has in effect been overruled by the case of Nott’s Executor v. Beard, 16 Louisiana R. 308, although the court endeavoured to reconcile the two cases. The last case, it is submitted, is irreconcilable with the principle and the adjudicated cases hereinbefore cited.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the.United States for the District of Middle Tennessee, sitting as a court of equity. It is unnecessary to recite all the circumstances which led to the filing of. the bill in eq’iity, as it was dismissed for the want of jurisdiction in the Circule Court. The facts in the case are summarily stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: and upon the subordinate c laracter of the possession as the legal result of those relations.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West Tennessee, sitting as a court of equity. The appellants had filed a bill against the defendants, which bill was-dismissed by the Circuit Court. The facts in the case were these.

Held: that “when a note is made payable or negotiable at a bank, whose invariable usage it is to demand payment and give notice on the fourth day of grace, the parties 'are bound, by that usage, whether they have a personal knowledge of it or not.” In the Bank of Washington ®.

This case came up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. It was an action brought by the plaintiffs in error, transacting business as copartners, in the city of New York, under the name of Smith, Thurger, & Co., for the return of duties which they alleged to have- been illegally exacted, upon several importations of wool, by Hoyt, the collector of New York.

Held: that the holder was not bound or- presumed to know where the indorser lived. But. it was enough if the agent of the indorsee or holder made due inquiry, and directed the. notices to the places -indicated by the iriformation, though wrong. It was the best that could be done under the circumstances. Nichol v. Bate, 7 Yerger, 307 ; Dunlap v. Thompson .et al., 5 Yerger, 67.

Held: Samuel Fessenden, the agent of Williams College, resided in Portland, the place of said meeting, but was not present at said meeting. “ Upon this evidence, the honorable justice who presided at said trial ruled that the mortgage deed offered Jn evidence by the defendant, given to the said trustees of Williams College, dated the fifth day of June, 1827, ¡marked 5, does not comprehend and cover the two lots, 11th in…

Held: that after a patent was surrendered, the inverition would be open to public use *390 without hazard, so far as depends on such patent. 1 Paine, 355 .

Held: that though it was an old debt, yet. the assignee, having received them in payment, held them for value. The same doctrine is held in Swift v. Tyson, which was an undisputed case of absolute payment of -an old debt. All that is decided by those two cases is, that it is immaterial whether the note is given at the inception of a transaction, or subsequently, if it is given in *410 absolute payment.

Held: the first day of every year, in the government-chamber, and in the presence of Monsieur the Lieutenant-Governor, a meeting of all the inhabitants of this post, wherein, by ar plurality of voices, there shall be named two Syndics, who shall together (£ unanimously ’) superintend the maintenance of the streetsy bridges, and' canals of the village, and who shall be obliged to cause to be observed and fulfilled strictly…

This case was brought up, by writ -of error, fróm the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Missouri. It was exactly the same, in most of its points, with the case ,of Mackay and others v. Dillon, reported in a preceding part of tjiis volume. Reference will be made to that case in all the pomts which are similar. !

This case was brought up, by- writ pf error, from the Court of Appeals for the Territory of .Florida. A motion was made by Mr. L. «#. Thompson to dismiss it, upon two grounds : -— 1. Because there was no service of the citation upon the defendant in error. 2. Because the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Florida, remanding the cause for a new trial below, was not a final judgment.

of feat case reads thus : — ££ A plea of a former suit and decree . signed and enrolled in fee Court of Chancery, in respect' to the same matters, allowed, though the bill in that court was dismissed, not on the merits, but for want of evidence.” The same principle was recognized in Pickett v. Loggon, 14 Vesey, 232, 233.

~ This-case- was brought up from the Ninth Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana,, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act. ' . . moved to dismiss the writ for the following reasons.

Held: that the prescription of a promissory note, under the Spanish law, was thirty years. It is a mistake that Claude Girod says in his will that he leaves no debts but to the amount of ‡ 30,000. He says, I am indebted to divers persons by obligations, and little by accounts, in a sum of about $ 30,000. He may have meant to persons other than his brothers;;— to persons out of his fámily.

United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States holding that a white man, adopted into an Indian tribe, does not become an Indian for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction.

The circumstances which led to the interlocutory opinion of the court in this case are sufficiently set forth in the memorial of Mr. Barry, and the opinion of the court.

Held: that, though no • action could be maintained by the payee, because he was both payee and one of the makers, yet the plaintiff, to whom it had been transferred by indorsement, might sue at law upon the note as indorsee, and recover. It was, say the court, like a note payable to the.maker’s own order, and by him indorsed and put intb circulation. See 5 Cowen’s Rep, 689.

This was a motion made to ormg up the- record in the above case, which had been decided by the Territorial Court of Appeals of Florida previously to the admission of Florida as a State.

Held: as to the government, “ that if the province of Maine lies more northerly than three English miles from the River Merrimack, ..the Massachusetts patent gave no right to govern there.” In 1684, the charter of Massachusetts was vacated on a scire facias, by the judgment of the King’s Bench, and a new charter was granted in 1691, including Maine and Plymouth, but the southern bbundary, as regards the present…

<p>After a case has been docketed and dismissed under the forty-third rule of court, and the plaintiff in error sues out another writ of error, this court will, when- the case appears to require it, order a supersedeas to stay all proceedings-pending the second-writ of error.</p> <p>The supersedeas is issued under the fourteenth section of the act of the 24th of September, 1783.</p>

<p>“ Clerk’s Office, Circuit Court, United States, 5th Circuit, and Eastern District of Louisiana.</p> <p>“Robert Holliday et al. v. Joseph N* Batson et al.</p> <p>[seal.]' DUNCAN N. HENNEN, Clerk.”</p> <p>Per Mr. Chief Justice TANEY.</p>

<p>The eighteenth section of the. patent act of 1836 authorized the extension of a patent, on the application of the executor or administrator of a deceased patentee.</p> <p>Such, an extension does not inure to the benefit of assignees under the original patent, but to the benefit of the administrator (when granted to an administrator), in-his capacity as such. But those assignees who were in the use of the patented machine at the time of the renewal have still a right to use it.</p> <p>The extension could be applied for and obtained by the administrator, although the original patentee had, m his lifetime, disposed of all his interest in the then existing patent Such sale'did not carry any thing beyond the term of the original patent.</p> <p>A covenant by the”patentee, made prior to the law authorizing extensions, that the covenantee should have the benefit of any improvement in the machinery, or alteration or renewal of the patent, did not include the extension by an administrator, under the act of 1836. It must be construed to include only renewals obtained upon the surrender of a patent on account of a defective specification. Parties to contracts look to established and general laws, and not to special acts of Congress.</p> <p>A plaintiff, therefore, who claims under an assignment from the administrator, can maintain a suit against a person who claims under the covenant</p> <p>An assignee of an exclusive right to’use two machines within a particular district can maintain an action for an infringement of the patent within that district, even against the patentee.</p> <p>In the case of Woodworth’s planing-maehine, the patent granted to the administrator was founded upon’ a sufficient specification and proper drawings, and is valid.</p> <p>The decision of the Board of Commissioners, to whom the question of renewal is referred, by the act of 1836, is not conclusive' upon the ■ question of their jurisdiction to act. in a given case.</p> <p>The Commissioner of Patents can lawfully receive a surrender of letters patent for a defective specification, and issue new letters patent upon an amended specification, after the expiration of the term for which the orig.nal patent was granted, and pending the existence of an extended term of seven years. Such surrender and renewal may be made at any time during such extended term.</p>

This case came up on a certificate of division in opinion between the Judges of the Circuit Court of the. United States for the District of Louisiana, sitting as a court of equity. Wilson was the complainant below, who filed a bill, and obtained an injunction against Simpson, Forsyth, and Mills. After sundry proceedings in the case, Forsyth put in a plea, and a rule was obtained, that- the plaintiff should show cause why the injunction should not be dissolved.

The bill was filed in this case, in the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, by the complainants, setting forth that William Woodworth was the inventer and patentee of a certain planing-machine, describing it; also, the extension of the said patent to W. W. Woodworthj as administrator, and that E. V. Bunn, one of the complainants, took an assignment from the said W. W. Woodworth for the., exclusive right- of making,'using, and vending machines for planing, &c., under…