Volume 459 — United States Reports

Held: the Sixth Amendment forbids all efforts to elicit information from him in the absence of counsel, regardless of whether he is in custody, see United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 273-274, n. 11 (1980); Massiah v. United States, supra , and regardless of whether the technique used to extract information is in any way coercive, see McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U. S. 356 (1965).

Held: however, that such an application violates the Fifth Amendment. The court stated that § 522(f)(2) effects a "complete taking of the secured creditors' property interests," and is thus invalid under Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 *74 U. S. 555 (1935). The United States appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U. S. 1122 (1981).

Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Committee, 459 U.S. 87 (1982), was a United States Supreme Court case that dealt with political speech, and whether a state could require a minor political party to disclose its membership, expenditures, and contributors.

Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the enforcement of liquor laws by a non-government entity. Massachusetts had established a law that allowed any church or school located within 500 feet (150 m) of an establishment seeking a liquor license to object to that license. The Supreme Court, in an 8–1 decision, ruled that Massachusetts' law violated the Establishment Clause as it delegated powers normally reserved to the government to non-government entities and would allow decisions to be made along religious lines, effectively advancing religious purposes.

In 1974, San Antonio, Tex., negotiated with petitioner railroads to transport to San Antonio coal purchased under long-term contracts in… Held: The Court of Appeals should have deferred to the ICC on questions concerning the applicable rates. Pp. 138-144. (a) Under the Interstate Commerce Act, primary jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates lies with the ICC. Federal court authority to reject ICC rate orders extends to the orders alone and not to the rates.

Appellant, a New York corporation that manufactures and sells copying machines, shipped machine parts manufactured in this country to Mexico City, Mexico, for assembly by its affiliate there. Held: This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2).

Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a covered State or political subdivision, such as appellant city of Port Arthur, must obtain federal preclearance of a change in its… Held: The District Court did not exceed its authority in conditioning clearance of the electoral plan on the elimination of the majority-vote requirement. Pp. 165-168. (a) Section 5 does not forbid all expansion of municipal borders that dilute the voting power of particular groups in the community.

The Vermejo River—which originates in southern Colorado but is located primarily in New Mexico—is at present fully appropriated by users in New Mexico. Held: The flexible principle of equitable apportionment applies to a State's claim to divert water for future uses, and the criteria relied upon by the Special Master comport with this Court's prior cases. Pp. 183-188.

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) prohibits corporations and labor unions from making contributions or expenditures in connection with federal elections. Held: The persons solicited by NRWC were insufficiently attached to the corporation to qualify as members under § 441b(b)(4)(C) of the Act. Pp. 201-207. This interpretation of the Act does not raise constitutional difficulties.

Held: beginning with Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944), that "the exclusive agent's statutory authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca, 386 U. S., at 177 .

Title 18 U.S.C. § 6002 provides that "no testimony or other information compelled under the order [of a federal court] (or any information… Held: A deponent's civil deposition testimony, such as that in question in this case, repeating verbatim or closely tracking his prior immunized testimony, is not, without duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time, immunized testimony within the meaning of § 6002, and therefore may not be compelled over a valid assertion of his…

Before 1972, coverage under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA or Act) extended only to injuries sustained by workers on the actual "navigable waters of the United States… Held: Where Churchill is a party respondent under this Court's Rule 19.6 and has filed a brief arguing for his coverage under the Act, there is a justiciable controversy before the Court.

Respondent union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with respondent contractors associations and their members prohibiting dealings by the contractors with nonunion dump truck operators. Held: The Board acted within its authority in deciding that a reimbursement order would not effectuate the policies of the Act.

A Missouri statute provides that any person who commits any felony under the laws of the State through the use of a dangerous or deadly weapon is also guilty of the crime of armed criminal action… Held: Respondent's conviction and sentence for both armed criminal action and first-degree robbery in a single trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 365-369.

Alleging that they were defrauded by misrepresentations in a registration statement and prospectus for certain securities, purchasers of such securities… Held: The availability of an express remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act does not preclude defrauded purchasers of registered securities from maintaining an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Pp. 380-387. (a) The two provisions involve distinct causes of action and were intended to address different types of wrongdoing.

A Tennessee statute imposes a tax on the net earnings of banks doing business in the State, and defines net earnings to include interest received on obligations of the United States and its… Held: The Tennessee bank tax violates the immunity of obligations of the United States from state and local taxation. The tax cannot be characterized as nondiscriminatory under § 742.

Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court upheld the Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, finding that it did not unconstitutionally interfere with existing private contracts.

In an application in a federal court by a state prisoner for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) establishes a presumption of correctness for "a determination after a hearing on the merits… Held: The admission in the Ohio murder trial of respondent's Illinois conviction based upon a guilty plea did not deprive respondent of any federal right. Pp. 430-439.

Held: it does show that he had an opportunity to present a statement to the Committee. As noted previously, Helms acknowledged on the misconduct form that he "had the opportunity to have [his] version reported as part of the record"; we see no reason to question the accuracy of his statement.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded… Held: Section 504 does not require the FCC to review a public television station's license renewal application under a different standard than applies to a commercial licensee's renewal application. Pp. 508-512. (a) Congress did not intend the Rehabilitation Act to impose any special enforcement obligation on the FCC.

Petitioner multiemployer association and respondents (collectively the Union) are parties to collective-bargaining agreements governing the terms and conditions of employment in construction-related… Held: Based on the allegations of the complaint, the Union was not a person injured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. Pp. 526-546.

South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that prosecutors may use a suspect's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test as evidence of guilt and that the introduction of such evidence at trial does not violate the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination.

Held: such an interest is directly related to expression, at least where it is invoked against one who would use the flag to make a political statement. 418 U.S., at 413-414, and n. 8, 94 S.Ct., at 2732, and n. 8. There is nothing surprising about that conclusion; it follows from the nature of the alleged governmental interest at stake.

Held: "The intimidation and aggravated robbery charges 3 raise no double jeopardy issue.... (T)he aggravated robbery count implicates not a duplicate, but an allied offense.... 4 "The allied offense issue will arise only if the defendant is found guilty of aggravated robbery.

Held: is "merely a defense to state law claims;" a defense based on federal law cannot be a ground for removal. Id., at 578. The District Court's decision was reversed and remanded with instructions to remand the case to the state court.

Menora v. Illinois High School Association, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982), is a case heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit centered on two Jewish schools seeking to play in an interscholastic basketball tournament run by the Illinois High School Association (IHSA). The IHSA would not let the schools compete unless their students removed their religious head-coverings, called kippot (sg. kippah). The kippot violated a rule against players wearing headgear on the court, according to the IHSA, but the students refused to play without them. They, along with their parents and schools, sued the IHSA in 1981, arguing that their First Amendment right of freedom of religion had been violated.

Held: inter alia, that (1) a bargaining order to the employer was an appropriate remedy; (2) the bargaining order could be retroactively applied from the date the employer first denied recognition of the Union; and (3) because of the employer's actions during the strike, what began as an economic strike was converted into an unfair labor practices strike ab initio, justifying reinstatement of striking employees…