Volume 476 — United States Reports

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the rule from Lockett v. Ohio (1978) dictated that mitigating evidence not be subject to limitations based on relevance.

McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that an unloaded handgun is a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of federal bank robbery laws. Justice John Paul Stevens' brief four-paragraph opinion in McLaughlin has been described by some analysts as "the shortest opinion by the Court in decades."

Petitioner, a black man, was indicted in Virginia on charges of capital murder for fatally shooting the white proprietor of a jewelry store in the course of a robbery. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 753 F.2d 342, reversed and remanded.

Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined that citizens do not have Article III standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute in federal court unless they possess a "direct stake" in the outcome.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge in a criminal case—the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so—may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race. The Court ruled that this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case gave rise to the term Batson challenge, an objection to a peremptory challenge based on the standard established by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. Subsequent jurisprudence has resulted in the extension of Batson to civil cases (Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company) and cases where jurors are excluded on the basis of sex (J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.).

Petitioners, husband and wife, who owned a building housing a restaurant and apartments, were charged with various crimes in connection with a fire in the building that resulted in the killing of two… Held: The trial judge's granting of petitioners' demurrer was an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the Commonwealth's appeal was barred because reversal would have led to further trial proceedings.

Petitioners robbed a bank van of $281,000 in cash and killed the guards by dumping them into a lake in sacks weighted with rocks. Held: Reimposing the death penalty on petitioners did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Pp. 152-157. (a) When a conviction is reversed on appeal, it is nullified and " 'the slate wiped clean,' " so that if the defendant is convicted again, he may constitutionally be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful.

At respondent's Arkansas state-court trial for capital felony murder, the judge at voir dire removed for cause, over respondent's objections, those prospective… Held: The Constitution does not prohibit the removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial.

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that aerial observation of a person's backyard by police, even if done without a search warrant, does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case decided in 1986 dealing with the right to privacy and advanced technology of aerial surveillance.

During the time pertinent to this case, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) (later repealed) required that qualified entities (such as respondent county), receiving federal… Held: The Secretary does not lose the power to recover misused CETA funds after expiration of the 120-day period specified in § 106(b). Pp. 258-266. (a) The mere use of the word "shall" in § 106(b), standing alone, is not enough to remove the Secretary's power to act after 120 days.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), was a case before the United States Supreme Court. It is the seminal case for the "strong-basis-in-evidence standard" for affirmative action programs.

The Speedy Trial Act (Act) commands that a defendant be tried within 70 days of the latest of either the filing of an indictment or… Held: Congress intended subsection (F) to exclude from the Act's 70-day limitation all time between the filing of a pretrial motion and the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, whether or not a delay in holding that hearing is "reasonably necessary." The plain terms of the statute exclude all time between the filing of and the hearing…

Certain provisions of the Social Security Act in effect between 1979 and 1983 authorized payment of survivor's benefits to a wage earner's widowed spouse who remarried after age 60 but not to a… Held: The provisions in question did not violate the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 345-350.

Held: among other things, that the Interstate Commerce Commission had the power to order an increase in specific intrastate railroad rates charged to customers in order to avoid discrimination against interstate commerce. “In other words, Section 2(b)(1) was from the outset concerned with protection against federal preemption of the states’ setting of individual customer charges for specific intrastate services.” Joint…

Appellee was formerly employed as a ship superintendent for a stevedoring company. Held: The Alabama Supreme Court's holding that appellant had waived its pre-emption claim by noncompliance with state procedural rules governing affirmative defenses did not present an independent and adequate state ground supporting the court's judgment, and the court erred in declining to address that claim on the merits. Pp. 387-393. 2.

Petitioner shippers brought class actions in Federal District Court against respondent motor carriers and respondent ratemaking bureau, alleging that during the years 1966 through 1981 respondents… Held: Petitioners are not entitled to bring a treble-damages antitrust action. Keogh, supra. Pp. 415-423. (a) Nothing in the Reed-Bulwinkle Act or in its legislative history indicates that Congress intended to change or supplant the Keogh rule.

On the application of a customer of respondent, a bank issued a standby letter of credit for respondent's benefit in the amount of $145,200. Held: A standby letter of credit backed by a contingent promissory note does not give rise to an insured deposit.

Respondent organization of dentists in Indiana promulgated a policy requiring its members to withhold x rays from dental insurers in connection with evaluating patients' claims for benefits. Held: The FTC's factual findings regarding respondent's x-ray policy are supported by substantial evidence.

The Social Security Act provides benefits to disabled persons under two programs administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA): the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (SSD)… Held: The District Court properly included in the class claimants who had received a final decision from the Secretary but did not seek judicial review within the statutory 60-day period. The 60-day requirement is not jurisdictional but rather constitutes a statute of limitations.

City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the extent of discretion given to cable franchises to challenge restrictions on First Amendment grounds. The Court affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, holding that: ...where the city has made factual assertions to justify restrictions on cable television franchising and these assertions are disputed by respondent, there must be a fuller development of the disputed factual issues before this Court will decide the legal issues.

South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498 (1986), is an important U.S. Supreme Court precedent for aboriginal title in the United States decided in the wake of County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State (Oneida II) (1985). Distinguishing Oneida II, the Court held that federal policy did not preclude the application of a state statute of limitations to the land claim of a tribe that had been terminated, such as the Catawba tribe.

Petitioner and a codefendant, charged with committing a double murder, were tried jointly in an Illinois court in a bench trial at which neither defendant testified. Held: The trial court's reliance upon the codefendant's confession as substantive evidence against petitioner violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Pp. 539-547.

Prior to 1977, the Internal Revenue Code's gift tax permitted the taxpayer a lifetime exemption of $30,000 to be deducted from amounts… Held: There is no merit to appellees' argument, focused on the word "allowed" in § 2010(c), that Congress did not intend the transitional rule to be applied as the IRS applied it here, because when the 1976 gifts were required to be included in the estate as having been made in contemplation of death the $30,000 specific gift-tax exemption…

New York's Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABC Law) provides that a distiller, licensed to do business in the State, may not sell its products to… Held: inter alia, that the affirmation provision did not on its face directly regulate interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: 1. The affirmation provision of New York's ABC Law, on its face, violates the Commerce Clause. Pp. 578-585.

Respondent, in its gambling casino in Reno, Nev., operated a number of "progressive" slot machines. Held: Respondent was entitled to claim the deductions in question. Pp. 599-606. (a) The "all events" test prescribed by the Treasury Regulations requires that before an expense can be regarded as "incurred" for federal income tax purposes, a liability must be fixed and absolute. Pp. 600-601.

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be… Held: The judgment is affirmed. 794 F.2d 676, affirmed. Justice STEVENS, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice POWELL, concluded that the regulations in question are not authorized by § 504. Pp. 624-647.

Held: the resources of the Federal court system would be unduly taxed and little real value would be derived by the enrollees.

Held: there was no error in keeping that testimony from the jury. Because the reasoning of the Kentucky Supreme Court is directly at odds with language in several of this Court’s opinions, see, e. g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 485-486 (1972), and because it conflicts with the decisions of every other state court to have confronted the issue, see, e. g., Beaver v. State, 455 So. 2d 253, 256 (Ala. Crim.

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case which ruled that a government program requiring the use of a Social Security number did not violate the First Amendment.

United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which held that, pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, American Indians were prohibited from hunting eagles. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the unanimous opinion of the Court.

Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case involving a challenge to Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1982.

Respondent inherited interests in three Indian allotments, title to which was held in trust by the United States. Held: Respondent's suit is "a civil action . . . to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest," within the meaning of the Quiet Title Act, and therefore is barred by that Act's 12-year limitations period. Pp. 841-851. (a) The relief respondent seeks confirms this characterization of her suit.

Appellant's father died intestate at a time when § 42 of the Texas Probate Code prohibited an illegitimate child from inheriting from its father unless its… Held: The interest, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, in avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out of wedlock, requires that appellant's claim to a share in her father's estate be protected by the full applicability of Trimble. There is no justification for the State's rejection of the claim.

East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986), is a U.S. Supreme Court decision that clarified the scope of products liability under maritime law. The Court held that a manufacturer cannot be held liable in tort for purely economic losses resulting from a defective product that causes damage only to itself and not to persons or other property.

Petitioner Indian tribe brought suit against respondent corporation (hereafter respondent) in a North Dakota state court for negligence and… Held: Because the federal statute governing state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country, Pub.L. 280, was designed to extend the jurisdiction of the States over Indian country and to encourage state assumption of such jurisdiction, and because Congress specifically considered the issue of retrocession but did not provide for…

The New York Constitution and Civil Service Law grant a civil service employment preference, in the form of points added to examination… Held: The judgment is affirmed. 755 F.2d 266, affirmed. Justice BRENNAN, joined by Justice MARSHALL, Justice BLACKMUN, and Justice POWELL, concluded that the prior resident requirement of the New York civil service veterans' preference laws violates appellees' constitutionally protected right to travel and to equal protection of the law.

Under the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act, the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to make emergency loans to farmers who suffer economic losses as a result of a natural disaster. Held: The lower courts erred in holding that the Secretary's conduct violated the notice procedures relevant to the implementation of Pub.L. 93-237.

Appellants Nantahala Power & Light Co. and Tapoco, Inc., are wholly owned subsidiaries of appellant Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa). Held: NCUC's allocation of entitlement and purchase power is pre-empted by federal law. Pp. 962-972. (a) FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged Nantahala's interstate wholesale customers.

The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Act) provides in 21 U.S.C. § 346 that when the addition of any poisonous or deleterious substance to food is required in the production thereof or cannot be… Held: In light of § 346's inherent ambiguity, the FDA's interpretation of the provision is sufficiently rational to preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the FDA.

Held: as when we wish not to "tip our hand" in advance of an opinion's announcement. Second, when certiorari is granted, by definition the Court's resolution of the issues presented in that case might affect the judgment rendered below. That is not necessarily true of held cases. The judgment in a held case may rest on a number of grounds sufficient to sustain it.

Held: without qualification, that Wilson should be given retroactive effect. 777 F.2d 340 (CA6 1985). The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have reached similar results. Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (CA5 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 603 (1986); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (CA11 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 , 106 S.Ct. 893, 88 L.Ed.2d 926 (1986).

Held: it would have denied that claim as an abuse of the writ, because a competent lawyer would have been aware of the possibility of such a claim. 6 The Court of Appeals was mistaken in believing that its prior pronouncement that the jury's sense of responsibility was not diminished disposed of the Caldwell claim.