Volume 54 — United States Reports

<p>Where a grant of land, in Iiouisiána, was made by the Spanish governor, in Febrn ary 1799, 'but no possession was ever taken by the grantee, during the existence of the Spanish government, or since' the cession to the United States; and no proof of the existence of the grant until 1835, when the grantee sold his interest to a third person; the presumption Arising from this neglect is,' that the grant, if made, had been abandoned. ’</p> <p>The regulations of Gayoso, who made the grant,.were, that the settlér should forfeit the land, if .he failed to establish himself upon it within one year; and put under labor ten arpents in every hundred within three years.</p>

Held: in a previous case of this plaintiff and the United States, that the neglect-to take possession, and the absence of any claim under the grant, and- of any evidence even of the existence "of the grant itself, for so long a period of time, afford such a violent presumption of abandonment of the claim, that unless explained to the satisfaction of the court, it is impossible, consistent with any sound principles of law…

This was a land case arising under the acts of 1824 and 1844, and came up by appeal from the. District Court of the United States for Louisiana. The parties were the same as in the two preceding cases. Joseph Hughes filed his petition on the 16th June, 1846, claiming 3200 arpents of land, as having been granted by the governor of Louisiana, Gayoso, on the 26th April, 1798, to André Martin. He alleges that said Martin took immediate possession, and held it till his death.

These four cases were land cases, arising under the acts of 1824 and 1844, and were appeals from the District Court of the United States, for Louisiana. " They were cases of French grants made after the treaty of Fontainbleau by which Louisiana was ceded to Spain.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Virginia. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court so far as they bear, upon the question of jurisdiction; and it is unnecessary to state the other facts.

These cases were brought up from the Supreme Court of Alabama, by a writ of error issued under the 25 th section of the Judiciary Act. . The facts and pleadings are stated in the opinion of the court. contended that the transactions as described by the pleas, fell within the prohibitory clause of the Constitution' of the United States, “ that no State shall issue a bill of credit,” and cited 4 Peters, 410 ; 11 Peters, 313; 7 Alab. Rep. 18.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit. Court of the United States for the District of Illinois. It was an ejectment brought by Forsyth, Dumain, and Bovis, to recover two lots of ground, viz.,. Nos. 47 and 65, in che town of Peoria. .The bills of exceptions extended over thirty-sevenpageá of the printed record, and included deeds and depositions and proceedings under a tax sale, &c. See. It is, therefore, impossible to insert them.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Alabama'by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The plaintiff in error brought an ejectment in- the Circuit Court of Mobile county, under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court. The judgment of that court was against them, and they then appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama,, where the judgment was affirmed. They then brought the case up to this court.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Illinois. McCormick was the inventor of McCormick’s patent Virginia Reaper,” and being desirous of manufacturing, the same for -sale in the States of Illinois and ■'Wisconsin, entered into partnership with Gray. The'articles were very specific, but too. long to be inserted here.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United. States for the Northern District of Florida. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court. after giving a' history of the cause and the laws, proceeded.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Hill was a citizen of South- Carolina, and sold two slaves to Barrow, a citizen' of Louisiana. Barrow gave his note for $2,000, dated 12th of February, 1848, payable twelve months after date. When due, it was protested. Hill then filed his petition in the Circuit Court of the United States.

Held: so that the purchaser , has never been able to obtain posséssion or enjoy the benefit of his purchase. If this allegation is true, Bradford hád a complete defence at law in the action upon his bonds, for' such an adversary holding places him in precisely the same predicament as if he had gone into possession under his purchase and then been.ousted by a paramount title.

This case was brought up from the Court'of Appeals of the State of Virginia, b.y a writ of error, issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court. 1. That, under'the act passed the 25th of February, 1834, incorporating the stockholders of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad Company, Sess.

This was an' appeal from the. District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Alabama. It was a bill filed by the appellants, as creditors, to set aside-1 a deed of settlement made by George Goffe upon' his wife and daughters, under circumstances which are détailed in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States,' for the District of Ohio. It was a.n action of trespass on the case brought by the owners of the steamboat Major Barbour, (the defendants in error,) against the owners of the Paul Jones, another steamboat, for injuries resulting from a collision between the boats.

This case was brought up, by a writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Mitchell was an officer of the army, and was sued in an action of trespass by Harmony for seizing his property in the Mexican State of Chihuahua. By an act passed on the 3d March, 1845, (5 Stat. at Large, 750) Congress allowed a drawback on foreign merchandise exported in the original packages to Chihuahua and Santa Fé, in Mexico.

Before this case was readied upon tbe docket, a motion was made to dismiss it upon the ground that the appellee had not been served with a citation, and also upon' another ground,, wffich is stated in the following opinion of tie court as pronounced by Mr. Justice McLean.

Held: therefore, void under the second section of the bankrupt act. Point 1st. The second section of the Bankrupt act does not embrace in its terms, or by necessary implication, powers of attorney to bond fide creditors to confess judgment.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the Northern’ District of Mississippi. ‘ The question was one of pleading and arose in this way: At June term, 1840, of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi, Aaron Ross, a citizen of Pennsylvania, recovered a judgment against George.Wight-man and Smith Hogan, for $3,177¡05, with interest from the 11th day of December, 1839.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

This .case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. .

Held: that an action on the case by the purchaser, for a false and fraudulent representation, was not maintainable without showing that such representation was false to the knowledge of the seller, or that he acted fraudulently or against good faith in making it,) we need not stop to inquire. See also Atwood v. Small, 6 Clark & Finnelly, 233, 338, 447; Early v. Garret, 9 Barn. & Cress. 928.

This.case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland.

<p>'The, act of June 17, 1844, (5 Stat. at Large, 676,) reviving the act of 1844, gives jurisdiction to the District Courts in cases only where the title set up to'lands, under grants from former governments, is equitable and inchoate, and where there is nq grant purporting to convey a legal title.</p> <p>Grants from the British government, as well as those of France and Spain, are equally within this restriction.</p>

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio. On the 8th of February, 1840, the Mississippi Union Bank issued the following certificate : Mississippi Union'Bank, Jackson, Miss. Feb. 8th, 1840.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Alabama, The only question was one of evidence, which is fully explained in the opinion of the court.

<p>Where a person desired to purchase land from a party who was ignorant that he had any title to it, or where the land was situated; and the purchaser made ftaridulent representations as to the quantity and quality of the land, and also, as to a lien which he professed to have for taxes which he had paid; and finally bought the land for a grossly inadequate price, the' sale will be set aside.</p>

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio, by a writ of error, issued under the 25,th section of the Judiciary Act.

This Was an appeal from, the District Court of the United States for the State of Arkansas. Glenn and Thruston, the appellants, filed a, petition in the District Court of Arkansas, "on the 24th of January, 1846, in virtue of the act of 1824, as revived by the act of 1844, claiming confirmation of a concession of a large tract of country which liesN partly in Arkansas and partly in Missouri, consisting-of nearly half a million of acres of land and known as the Clamorgan grant.

Held: and until the conditions were entirely fulfilled. In this instance the time was restricted to one year, for making the improvements required by the regulations, and three years were allowed for making an establishment on the premises.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia. It was argued at December term, 1849, and is reported in 9 How. 196.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern' District of New York. The plaintiffs in error, W. W. De Forest & Co. sued the collector to recover back money paid under protest, for duties on importations into New York, in the years 1847 and 1848, from Buenos Ayres,. invoiced as sheepskins, having the wool on them.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. ' The libel was filed by the appellants, in the District Court, where they obtained a decree on the 1st May, 1848, for $18,500 and costs. Ah appeal was taken to the Circuit Court.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi. It was an ejectment, brought' in the court below by Miller, against the Taylors, who were the purchasers of the property in question at a sheriff’s sale. The controversy was respecting the validity of the sale, the circumstances attending which are' detailed in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. It was a suit brought in the Circuit Court, by Thomas Tremr lett, a merchant of Boston, against Adams, the collector of the port of New Bedford, for return of duties.

prefixed to this statement. ■ There were six exceptions to the admissibility of evidence taken during the progress of the trial in the Circuit Court. The plaintiff below then offered eleven prayers to the court, and the defendant, thirteen.

<p>In equity; where a creditor agrees to receive specific articles in satisfaction of a debt, . even although it be a debt upon bond, secured by mortgage, he will be held to the performance of his agreement.</p> <p>But, in order to bring a case within this principle, there must be,—</p> <p>1. An agreement not inequitable in its terms and effect.</p> <p>2. A valuable consideration for such agreement.</p> <p>3. A readiness to perform, and the absence of laches, on the part of the debtor. Where the agreement to receive payment in goods was'made by a person who acted</p> <p>under a power of attorney from the creditor, authorizing him to trade, sell, and dispose of notes, bills, bonds, or mortgages, and, under this power, a partial payment was received in goods, which was afterwards recognized as a payment by the creditor, the power was sufficient to authorize an agreement to receive the remaining amount, also in goods, at any time when called for within twelve months, especially - as the bond had yet four years to run.</p> <p>This agreement was not inequitable; there was a valuable consideration for it; and the debtor was always ready to, comply with it, on his part.</p> <p>The creditor cannot now.allege fraud in his debtor. It is not charged in the bill; •and, although he may not have known of the agreement when the Dill was framed, "yet, when the answer came in, he might have -amended his bill, and Charged fraud.</p>

<p>This case, was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p> <p>It was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit brought by Day, a citizen of New York, against the defendants in error, citizens of Massachusetts, for pulling down, a mill-dam within the town of Great Barrington, in the county of Berkshire, Massachusetts!</p> <p>The defendants put in a plea of; not guilty, and also a special plea of justification, viz.:</p> <p>And the defendants, further say, that at the time when the said trespasses are alleged to have been committed, and for a long time previously thereto, and prior to, ánd at the time of the erection of the said plaintiff’s said dam, certain mills and a certain mill-dam, the property of, and in the use and possession of the Berkshire Woollen Company, (a .corporation duly established by the laws of the State of Massachusetts,) had been and were then lawfully erected and maintained, by, upon, and across said stream on which plaintiff’s dam was built; that while said mills and dam were thus erected and maintained, and used by said corporation, the plaintiff' unlawfully caused to be erected in said stream, and below said dam, and at the time of said alleged trespass, unlawfully caused to be maintained therein the said dam in his declaration mentioned, in such manner as to injure the said mills and dam of the said corporation; that the defendants, by direction of said Berkshire Woollen Company, and as their agents and servants, did enter upon the said plaintiff’’s close, and did break down an.d demolish said plaintiff’s dam, in the manner least injurious to said dam; that they broke down and demolished no more of said dam than was necessary to remove or relieve the injury to said company’s mills and dam caused by the maintenance of said plaintiff’s said dam as aforesaid, and that said defendants did not break and enter the plaintiff’s close, any further or otherwise, nor thereupon use more force or violence, than were reasonably necessary to relieve the injury aforesaid.</p> <p>The plaintiff joined issue upon the plea of not guilty, and replied to the special plea as follows:</p> <p>And as to the said plea of the said defendants by them first above pleaded, the said plaintiff says, that he ought not to be barred from having and maintaining his aforesaid action thereof against them; because he says, that although true it is that at the said time when, &e., the said Berkshire Woollen Company were then the owners and possessed of the said mills and dam in the said plea, mentioned, and although true it is that the said mills and dam were upon and across the same strearil on which the said plaintiff’s dam then was, and although true it was that the said defendants committed the said trespasses by command of the said corporation, for replication nevertheless in this behalf, the said plaintiff says, that the said defendants of their own wrong and without the residue of the cause iii their said plea alleged, broke and entered the close of the said plaintiff, and tore down and destroyed the said dam, and committed the said trespasses in the introductory part of the said plea mentioned, in manner and form as the said plaintiff hath above complained, and this he prays may be inquired of by the. country1. Wherefore he prays judgment and for his costs.</p> <p>By B. ft. Curtis, Esq., Ms Attorney.</p> <p>And the defendants do the like.</p> <p>By William Whiting, Esq., their Attorney.</p> <p>Upon the trial, the jury came into court once for instructions, and afterwards returned three times with verdicts.</p> <p>The final verdict was as follows-:</p> <p>In the above-entitled cause the jury find that the reduction of the said dam of the said plaintiff, to the extent of three inches for its entire length, was justified; but that the further reduction was not justifiéd; and so the jury find that the said defendants, of their own wrong, and without the residue of the cause by the said defendants in their said first plea alleged, committed the trespasses in the said plea mentioned, in manner and form as the said plaintiff hath, in his said declaration, complained; and thereof assess damages in the sum of two hundred dollars.</p> <p>Robert Orr, Foreman.</p> <p>Whereupon the court entered up judgment for two hundred dollars damages, without costs. The reason why the judgment wa.s entered “ without costs ” may be seen by a reference to a book recently published by Stephen D. Law, Esq., p. 256. The book is upon the jurisdiction and practice of the United States Courts.</p> <p>The bill of exceptions contains the proceedings of the court with respect'to these several verdicts,-and was as follows :</p> <p> Bill of Exceptions. </p> <p>This is an action of trespass for breaking and entering the plaintiff’s close and tearing down his mill-dam. The.defendants justified under an .alleged right to enter, &c., because the dam was a nuisance to mills above, on the same stream, belonging to the Berkshire Woollen Company, whose servants thé defendants were, and that, by command of the said company, the defendants entered and took down so mucli and no more of the said-dam as was necessary to relieve the mills above.</p> <p>At the trial the defendants claimed the right to begin and offer their evidence first, and open and close the argumentT The plaintiff claimed the same right. The presiding judge ruled in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff’s counsel excepted to the ruling. The presiding judge instructed the jury in his first summing up, that the defendants had a right by law to' enter the plaintiff’s close, and to take down so much of the plaintiff's dam as waá necessary to relieve the mills above from all practical injury occasioned by that dám; but that 'f the defendants had taken, down more of the dam than was necessary for that end, or if none was necessary to be taken down for that end, the jury must find for the plaintiff.</p> <p>That if the jury should find for the plaintiff on the last ground, viz. that the plaintiff’s dam caused no injury to the mills above, the plaintiff was entitled to «a complete indemnity, and the jury would allow in damages the cost of restoring so much of the dam as was taken down,, and -compensation for necessary delay of plaintiff’s mill; and they might also allow such sum for the expenses of prosecuting the action, over and above the taxable costs, as they should find the plaintiff had necessarily incurred for counsel-fees and the pay of engineers in making surveys, &c. But if, the jury should find for the plaintiff on the first ground, viz. in that the defendants had taken down more of the dam than was necessary to relieve the mills above, unless such excess was wanton and malicious, then the jury would allow in damages the cost of replacing such excess, and compensation for any delay or damage occasioned by . such excess, but not any thing for counsel-fees or extra compensation to engineers.</p> <p>The plaintiff’s counsel requested the court to instruct the jury that they might allow counsel-fees, &c. if there was any excess in taking down more of the dam than was justifiable, and gave as a reason that the defendants thereby became trespassers ab initio. The presiding judge instructed the jury as above set forth on this point.</p> <p>After being charged by the presiding judge, the jury retired, and subsequently came into court for instructions, preferring a' written request, as follows :</p> <p>U. S. O. C. Jury Room, Dec. 8,1849.</p> <p>To his Honor Judge Sprague :</p> <p>. If the jury find that the plaintiff’s dam was too high and ought to be reduced, but not to the extent of the- reduction by the defendants, can the jury find a verdict to that effect for the plaintiff according to law? if so, can they find damages for the excess of such reduction ? R. Orr, Foreman.</p> <p>Thereupon' the presiding judge gave anew the instructions aboye set forth, except that he instructed them not to allow anything for counsel-fees, &c. if they should find that the reduction of the dam to any extent was justifiable. The jury again retired, and subsequently returned into court with, a written paper, in the words following:</p> <p>U. S. C. p. Jury Room, Dec. 8,1849.</p> <p>In the case of H. H. Day against Woodworth et al. the jury find that the reduction of the plaintiff’s dam -to the extent of three inches for its entire length justifiable. The jury further find that the defendants pay to the plaintiff the sum of one thousand dollars in full for such excess of reduction and delay.</p> <p>Robert Orr, Foreman.</p> <p>The plaintiff asked to have a verdict presented to the foreman for his signature, following the words of the issue. The presiding judge stated- that he was not prepared to say to the jury that that would be the same in substance as their finding; and ruled that the verdict, to be presented to the foreman for his signature, should also set forth that part of the finding that the plaintiff’s dam was lawfully reduced to the extent of three inches throughout its entire length. There was ho evidence that the defendants had reduced the plaintiff’s dam through its entire length, but it appeared that the plaintiff’s dam was one hundred and twelve feet long, and that the part cut down by the defendants was the most westerly' part, about fifty-four feet in length, and that this fifty-four feet was cut down about inches, and that this would have the effect of reducing the obstruction presented by. the dam more than three inches for its entire length.</p> <p>. To the above rulings of the presiding judge the plaintiff excepted.</p> <p>In this stage of the proceedings, the defendants’ counsel desired of the presiding judge to inquire of the jury whether something for counsel-fees was not included in the sum of one thousand dollars mentioned in said finding of the jury.</p> <p>The presiding judge being of opinion that there was noevidence which would warrant the jury in finding damages to the amount of one thousand dollars for the said excess of reducing the dam, without expressing this opinion, made -the inquiry requested, to which the foreman answered, that they did not allow any thing for counsel-fees, but only for the excess and delay, as appeared by the written verdict. The defendants’ counsel then urged that the written verdict said that the sum of one thousand dollars Was to be in full, and requested the presiding judge to ask the jury if they did not allow that - sum in the expectation that the plaintiff was to recover no more. The foreman of the jury responded in substance as before but one of his fellow’s said he understood the plaintiff was to recover no more, and that each party was to pay his own costs, and that he had agreed to the verdict on that understanding. This understanding was denied by another of the jury, and the presiding judge then said that it must be the verdict of each,juror, and that this was not the verdict of the one who said he had agreed to it on the misunderstanding, and therefore the presiding judge proceeded to sum up anew on the subject of damages, referring to the evidence, and giving to the jury substantially the instructions, in point of law, before given, and adding that* if the plaintiff should recover $1,000 damages, he would,-as the prevailing party, by law recover his taxable costs; and having so done, directed the jury again to retire; to this proceeding the plaintiff’s counsel excepted. Subsequently, the jury again returned into court, and brought in a second verdict, in writing, in the words following;</p> <p>U. S. C. C. Jwy Room, Boston, Dec. 8,1849.</p> <p>In the case of Horaca H. Day v. Woodworth et al. the jury find that the reduction of the plaintiff’s dam to the effect of three inches for its entire length was justifiable.</p> <p>The jury further find, that the defendants pay to the plaintiff the sum of two hundred dollars for such excess of reduction and delay. Robert Orr, Foreman.</p> <p>This verdict was put in the form in which it appears on the record, but before it was'signed the plaintiff’s counsel suggested to the presiding judge, that, as the jury had been instructed that in one event the plaintiff would recover costs, some of the jury might have agreed to this verdict with that understanding, and requested that this inquiry might be made of the jury; thereupon the presiding judge inquired of the jury whether, in rendering this verdict, they had any reference to costs, and the foreman of the jury, having replied that they had not, was about to sign the verdict, when one of .his fellows objected, and stated that he had agreed to tae verdict in the belief that, as prevailing party, the plaintiff could recover his costs; thereupon the presiding judge charged the jury a third time on the subject of damages, referring to the evidence, and repeating in substance the instructions in point of law before given; and further instructed them that the plaintiff, recovering only two hundred dollars, would not recover costs, and that it would be a violation of their oaths to have any regard to the costs, it being their duty to find the actual damage proved, and no more, and. directed them again to retire; which having done, they brought in the verdict which appears of record. To all these proceedings the plaintiff excepted, and prayed that his exceptions might be allowed, and that this bill’ of exceptions might be signed and sealed by his honor the judge; all of which being found ‘true, the same is accordingly signed and sealed.</p> <p>Peleg Sprague, [seal.] Judge of the U. S. Mass. District.</p> <p>First. The affirmative was with the plaintiff, and he had the right to introduce evidence first, and the right to open and close the argument. Burrill’s Practice, 233.</p> <p>Where the general issue is pleaded, the plaintiff has always the right to begin. Carter v. Jones, 6 Carr. & Payne, 64; Col-ton v. James, 1 Moo. & Mai. 273, 275, and 505; Cooperu. Wakley, 3 Carr. & Payne, 474 and note; Fish v. Travers, 3 Carr. & Payne, 578; Price v. Seaward, 1 Carr.' & Marsh. 23; Booth v. Millns, 15 Mees. & Weis. 669 ; Cripps v. Well's, 1 Carr. & M. 489; Mercer v. Whall, 5 Adol. & EL (n. s.) 447; Harrison v. Gould, 8 Carr. & P. 580 ; Ayer v. Austin, 6 Pick. 225; Brooks ??. Barrett, 7 Pick. 94; Ware v. Ware, .8 Maine, 42; Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Maine, 100,102; Sawyer v. Hopkins, 22 Maine, 268; Robinson v. Hitchcock, 8 Met. 64; 'SuIIivant ■??. Reardon, 5 Pike, 140; Lexington Ins. Co. ??. Paver, 16 Ohio, 324.</p> <p>Second. The judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury, that if the defendants cut down the plaintiff’s'dam more than was necessary to relieve the mills above, that they were not authorized to .allow any thing in addition to cover counsel-fees. or extra compensation paid by him to engineers. -</p> <p>Third. The judge erred in charging the jury that it would be a violation of their oaths to have any regard to whether their verdict would carry costs or not.</p> <p>Fourth. This being an action of tort tÜe plaintiff was. not limited to the actual damages proved; but the jury white authorized to give him such' as the circumstances of the case might inda-, cate as proper; Allen ??. Blunt, 2 Woodb.. &'Min. 121; Jennings ??. Maddox, 8 B. Mon. 109; Whipple v. The Cumberland Man, Co., 2 Story, 661; Washburn v. Gould,. 3 Story, 136; Whit-more v. Cutter 1 Gall. 478; 1 Bald.328; The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 379; Staats ■??. Ex. of Teneyck, 3 Caines, R. Ill; Kingsbury ??.■ Smith, 13 N. H. R. 122; 4 Johns. 1; Street v. Patrick, 12 Maine, 9; Beal v. . Thompson, 3 B. & P,. 407; Pitkin v. Leavitt, 13 ■Verm. R. 379; Earle v. Sawyer, 4. Mass. T, 12; Boston Man. Co.! v. Fiske, 2 Mason, 1-19,120; Sedgwick on,Damages; Curtis on Patents, &e.</p>

This was an appeal.-from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Daniel T. Walden, as indorser of two notes of William Christy, was indebted to Fowler, the complainant, and suit was brought by him upon these two notes, and judgment recovered, as above stated.

These two cases were argued and decided together. The suits related to the same tract of land and the rights of the same parties, although they came iip from . different' States. The first, which-is referred to in the opinion of the court as No. 121, was an action on the case brought by Ingersoll in the Circuit Court of Alabama (State court) to. recover damages for the wrongful obstruction, by Howard, of the.

Held: “ The latter act seems to have been a repeal of ,the former: it was made to supply the deficiencies of the former.” The language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Nichols qui tarn v. Squire, 5 Pick. 168 , is very clear: !t We think the statute of 1785, c. ,24, upon which the qui tarn action is founded, is repealed, if not by Stat. 1800, c. 57, (which seems to have had a different object in view,) yet…

This was an. appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama.

<p>This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Mississippi.</p> <p>It was an. action of trespass brought by Crofford, who described himself as a citizen of Tennessee, but who • had a plantation in Arkansas. The suit was broúght against the McAfees and Alford, for acts which are described by the testimony stated in the first exception.. In the course of the trial there was but one bill of exceptions taken, which included the whole case. It will be better understood by dividing the rulings of the .court below, which is rendered necessary by the great 'length of the exception.</p> <p>There were three exceptions to the admission of evidence, and one to the charge of the court to the jury. The declaration contained four counts to the following effect:</p> <p>1st. For entering upon the defendant’s plantation, in the State of Arkansas, and forcibly carrying off and converting to the use of plaintiffs in error, a number of slaves of the value of $15,000.</p> <p>2d. For entering, and by threats and violence, chasing and frightening away from said plantation, other slaves of the value of $40,000, whereby said slaves were greatly damaged and lessened in value.</p> <p>3d. For the injury done to the defendant’s business of planting, and cutting ánd selling cord-wood,'by thus forcibly carrying off some of the slaves and frightening aw£y others.</p> <p>4th, For the value of the services of the slaves during the time they were gone from the defendant’s plantation, and wood-yard.</p> <p>•The plea was the general issue with an agreement, entered of record, that any matter constituting'a good plea in bar might be given in evidence upon'reasonable notice.</p> <p>First Exception. Upon the trial, Crofford, the plaintiff,’-offered to read the depositions of three of his neighbors, Parker, Driver, and Kafkemeyer, who testified in substance to the -following facts: —• About the last of October, of 1st of November, 184$, the McAfees and Alford, assisted by several other persons, all armed, crossed the Mississippi River in skids, and forcibly carried off twenty-one slaves from Crofford’s plantation. Crofford was absent. His overseer remonstrated, but the assailants replied that they intended to take all the negroes, and would kill any one who interfered. There were forty-two negroes, men, women, and children, on the plantation; but, as the assailants were engaged for several days in catching and transporting them to the opposite bank of the river, four, women and seventeen men were so frightened that they ran off into the swamps, and remained out five or six weeks. Crofford had some 1,800 or 2,000 cords of wood cut at' the time of these occurrences, which, on account of, the absence of the slaves, was either floated off or greatly injured by a subsequent rise in the river. In addition to this, the neighbor’s hogs, cattle, horses, and mules broke into the plantation, and" nearly destroyed 120 acres of growing corn; all, of which was the consequence of the absence of the hands.</p> <p>These witnesses testify, that the slaves carried over the riverf being twenty-one-in number, were worth $12,580; wood worth $2.50 per cord, and corn 50 cents per bushel.</p> <p>To all this testimony the plaintiffs in error objected, but the court overruled the objection, and the depositions were read.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendants below excepted.</p> <p>Crofford then proved that his plantation was in Crittenden county, Arkansas, and then closed his case.</p> <p>Second Exception. The defendants below, on their part, offered in evidence the record of a judgment, rendered in one of the courts of Mississippi, in favor of the Commercial Bank of Manchester against James T. Crofford and Morgan McAfee, for the sum of $4,143.93, together with divers writs of fi. fa. issued thereon, levied upon' Crofford’s property, delivery-bond given and forfeited, and fieri facias issued upon this. By virtue of this last fi. fa. the slaves forcibly carried away from the plantation, in Arkansas, were levied upon and most of them sold, producing the sum of $6,132, which fully satisfied the said execution.</p> <p>The McAfees also provedithat Morgan McAfee was only security for Crofford in the aforesaid judgment, and that at the time of executing the. delivery-bond mentioned .above, Crofford promised not to remove his negroes from Tallahatchie county, until said debts should be paid.</p> <p>The Me Afees then introduced a witness whose evidence, drawn out upon cross-examination, constituted the subject of this exception. The witness was introduced to prove various admissions made by Crofford in reference to the amount of his com crop and his cord-wood; which witness, upon cross-examination, stated, that in the same conversations Crofford said that Morgan McAfee had agreed with him to obtain from the said Bank of Manchestér an extension of one, two, and three years, in which to pay the said debt, and also to credit thereon a judgment of Crofford against Morgan McAfee, in the.United States District Court at Pontotoc, for about $l,500"or .$2,000. -To this evidence, elicited on cross-examination, the McAfees excepted.</p> <p>Third Exception. - The McAfees then proved that before the trespass complained of, Morgan McAfee' had paid the debt to the Bank of Manchester, which had assigned the judgment to Madison McAfee.</p> <p>As rebutting' testimony, Crofford offered to introduce the record of a proceeding by quo warranto in one of the courts in Mississippi, by which it appeared that at the time of the sale of the negroes upon said execution, the’ said bank, its agents, and 'its assignées, were enjoined from collecting any of its demands, though the levy upon a part of the, negroes was made before the execution of the writ of injunction. Crofford also offered to introduce records showing that he had existing unsatisfied judgments to the amount of $2,847 against Morgan McAfee. The defendants below objected to the admission of this rebutting testimony, but the court overruled the objection and admitted it, whereupon the McAfees excepted.</p> <p>The charge of the court was as follows: The court instructed the jury that a trespass had been committed by the defendants, “if the jury believe from the testimony that the defendant had a judgment in Mississippi against the plaintiff, the defendant would not be authorized to collect- said judgment by forcibly removing the property-of the plaintiff from the State of Arkansas to the State'of Mississippi.”</p> <p>• “ That in assessing damages the jury had a right to take into consideration all the circumstances to which said first charge the counsel for the defendants at the time excepted, before the. jury returned from the. bar of the court; and to which several matters and things the said defendants, by their said counsel, excepted, and tendered their said bill of exceptions as herein-before stated, and before the jury retired from the court, and prayed that the same might be signed and sealed by the court and made part of the record herein ; all which is done accordingly.” S. J. Gholson. [seal.]</p> <p>The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and assessed the damages at. $10,613.72.</p> <p>The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contended, that the Nerdict is .manifestly against, the testimony. The principle upon which damages are given in an action of trespass is to indemnify the plaintiff for what he has actually suffered, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the case. Bateman u. Goodwyn, 12. Conn. 575. In this case Crofford in reality sustained no damage, as the property taken was disposed of in discharge- of his own debt. “ In an action of trover, when the property converted has been sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the plaintiff’s debt; or otherwise to his use, it-goes in mitigation of damages.” Pierce n, Benjamin, 14 Pick. 356; Prescott v. Wright, 6 Mass. 20; Caldwell v. Eaton, 5. Mass. 399; 14 Shep. 126.</p> <p>Whatever damages Crofford sustained, if any, were the consequences of his own wrong in removing this property beyond the limits of the State of Mississippi, in violation of his agreement with his surety, McAfee. If this verdict is permitted, to stand, Crofford will be suffered to take advantage of his own wrong in having his debt paid, amounting, at that time, to over six thousand dollars, and in addition receive, as a bounty for his dishonesty, the large amount assessed by the jury.</p> <p>The estimate put upon the negroes by the witness, Parker, is proven to be’ too great by the result of the sale, they only bringing, at said sale, about half of said estimate. There is no proof,, or pretence that the sale was not fair. It was made by the sheriff, and is to be presumed to have been made' in a legal manner, after due notice given.</p> <p>'The evidence as to the consequential damages to the corn and wood is too loose and indefinite to have received the consideration of the jury. It should have been ruled out by1 the court.</p> <p>“ Consequential damages are not recoverable in an action of trespass vi et a-rmis, for taking away goods.” , Alston v. Huggins, 2 Const. Rep. 688.</p> <p>“ Opinions of witnesses as to the amount of loss inadmissible.” 28 Wend, 425.</p> <p>McAfee may not have acted strictly within legal bounds in going to Arkansas, and taking the negroes by force; but when it-is reeolleetéd that he was Crofford’s surety, that Crofford had deceived and defrauded him by taking the negroes out of the ' State, thus leaving his surety to suffer, and this, too, in violation of an express agreement, surely Croffprd, the original wrongdoer, whose criminal acts superinduced the necessity of McAfee’s proceedings, cannot be heard to complain.</p> <p>... Crofford recognized the payment and satisfaction of the bank judgment by endeavoring to take advantage of. it in defence to a .suit brought against him in equity, wherein the lien of this judgment was complained of. The deposition of J. J. Hughes, the cashier of the bank, proves the suretyship of McAfee.</p> <p>The record of the proceedings against the bank is wholly irrelevant, and the court erred in admitting it. At the time of the transfer of the judgment to Madison McAfee, the proceeding had not been commenced. No judgment of forfeiture was ever rendered. The other judgments introduced are also irrelevant, and have no bearing whatever on the case. At most they offset one another, and, as far as they are concerned, show but little indebtedness either way.</p> <p>In cases of this sort, appealing to principles of natural justice, more than to strict rules of law, it is conceived that the equity maxim, that the complaining party should come into court with clean hands, applies here as well as in a court of chancery.</p> <p>It may be said that the bank judgment was satisfied. by the payment by McAfee, and that the transfer to his brother was thereupon inoperative. Be this as it may, the moral obligation on Crofford remained the same. The attempt to evade the pay-m.ent of a just debt, and suffer the burden of it to fall on his surety, is the wrong complained of on our part — the wrong that gave occasion to the trespass and its consequences.</p> <p>The charge of. the court is manifestly incorrect. It assumes the fact that a trespass had been committed, and leaves nothing for the jury to determine in this, particular. .The remainder of the charge, — that “if the .jury believe, from the testimony, that the defendant had a judgment in Mississippi against the plaintiff, the defendant would not be authorized to collect said judgnfent by forcibly removing the property of'the plaintiff from the State of Arkansas to the State of Mississippi,” may be, and doubtless is, a correct proposition of law; but it does not necessarily follow that the existence of the judgment might not have been properly adduced to show that no actual damage had accrued. The manner in which the charge was given was well calculated to impress the jury with the idea that, although they “ had a right to take into consideration all the circumstances,” yet that the judgment was no circumstance at all worthy of their consideration.</p> <p>The counsel for the defendant in error contendéd that the only questions arising upon this record are: first, upon the charge to the jury; and, second,' as to the several items of proof maue by the defendant in error, and excepted to by the 'plaintiffs.</p> <p>As to the first, of these questions, no authorities can be necessary. There is obviously no erro,r in the instructions of the qourt to the jury. No bad faith on the part of Crofford, nor any breach of contract, could have justified the plaintiffs in error in going with an armed band into the State of Arkansas, and taking property by force, in order to subject it to an execution in Mississippi. This was a trespass, and if the .judge said so to the jury, he was fully sustained by the proof. p But this court has said, “ it will not examine the charge of the inferior court to the jury upon mere matters of fact and its'commentaries upon the weight of evidence. • Observations of that nature are understood to be addressed to the jury merely for their consideration as the ultimate judges of the matters of fact.” Carver, v. Jackson ex dern. Astor et al., 4 Peters, 80, 81;, Evans v. Eaton, 7 Wheaton, 426;. Garrard v. Lessee of Reynolds et-al., 4 How. 123; Games et al. v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322; Hyde & Gleis.es v. Boraem & Co. 16 Pet.. 169.</p> <p>The exceptions to the testimony of the witnesses who proved the trespass, and the damages resulting to the crops and cord-wood, were evidently not well taken. All thfe direct and necessary consequences of á tfespass may be given in evidence, to enable the jury to estimate the full amount of damages incurred. Dickinson v. Boyle,T7 Pick. 78. In this case the court say:' “ Where the act complained of is admitted to have been doné with force, and to constitute a proper ground for an action of trespass vi et armis, all the damage to the plaintiff, of which such injurious act was the efficient cause, and for. which the plaintiff’ is entitled to recover in any form, may be recovered*', in such action, although in point of time such damage did hot occur till some time after the act done.” Johnson v. Courts, Harris & McH. 510; Ogden v.- Gibbons, 2 South. 536; Duncan v. Stalcup, 1 Dev. & Bat. 440; Hardin et' al. v, Kennedy, 2 McCord, 277; Damron v. Koache, 4 Humph. 134; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. .172, 182; Barnum v. Vandusen, 16 Conn. R. 200: All the circumstances of aggravation may be proved without minute averment. Warfield v. Walter, 11 G. & J. 80; Hammatt v. Russ, 4 Shepl. 171; Carrington v. Taylor, 11 East, 571; Keeble v. Hickeringill, Id. 574,m.; Id. 11 Mod. 74, 130; Id. 3 Salk. 9; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 268, a,' 254, 270, 272, 635, a. See note, 2 Greenl. § 243,' and the authorities there quoted.</p> <p>The exception to the statements of Crofford, drawn out upon cross-examination, is equally untenable. ‘They were parts of the same conversations which the witness detailed in his examination in chief. But the testimony was not material in any point of view, and could not have influenced the verdict of the jury. 1 Greenl. Ev., § 201, and the authorities quoted in the note thereto: ■</p> <p>As to latitude of cross-examination, see 1 Greenl. 449, 450, and notes.</p> <p>As to immateriality of testimony, Turner v. Fendall, 1 Cranch, 131.</p> <p>Erroneous instructions, if immaterial, not cause of reversal. United States v. Wright, 1 M’Lean, C. C. R. 509;. Forsyth v. Baxter, 2 Scam: 9.</p> <p>Exceptions taken to the records introduced as rebutting testimony— the proceeding by quo warranto, and the-judgments in favor of Crofford v. McAfee. As to the first of these, it is certain the Bank of Manchester, at the time of the execution sale of Crofford’s negroes, was enjoined by a competent tribunal from making that sale. It was competent to show this fact, riot to invalidate the sale, but to show the reckless disposition of the parties, and their contempt of lawful authority. It does not appear what effect this testimony had upon the case, or what instructions the judge gave in regard to it. The jury seem to have deducted the debt of $6,000, which was paid by the sale of the slaves, from the whole amount of damages, and given. their verdict for the balance.. This appears from the fact that the amount of the verdict is not equal to the value of the slaves actually taken away and sold, as that value was proved by three imcontradicted witnesses, besides the damage to the crop, the wood, and the slaves'who took refuge in the swamps.- The proof of the injunction could not have operated to prevént this mode of adjustment by the jury; it was admissible evidence only to show the animus of the plaintiffs in error; their disregard of the laws of their-own State as well as those of Arkansas, throughout the whole of these violent proceedings.</p> <p>. The judgments of Crofford v. Morgan McAfee were wholly .immaterial to the case, except po far as they tended to pslliate the bad faith of Crofford in leaving his security to pay. his debt. In' this point of view they were, admissible as rebutting testimony ; feeble and unimportant it may be, but still admissible. Havis v. Taylor, 13 Ala. 324; Gilpins v. Consequa, Pet. C. C. P. 85; Pettibone u. Deringer, 4 Wash. C. C. ft. 215. Even if th? admission of this testimony was erroneous, the court will not reverse, when it is plainly immaterial and inoperative in the case. .Zacharie & wife v, Franklin, 12 Pet. 151.</p>

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. It was argued in conjunction with the succeeding case of Goodall v. Tucker, but the facts being somewhat different, they are reported' separately.

This case, like the preceding one, of Hill v. Tucker, was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. They were argued together, and differed only in there being different plaintiffs. The cause of action in this case is stated in the opinion of the court; and the reader is referred to the report of the preceding case for the arguments of counsel.

Held: that an impression' made on. wafers or other adhesive substance-capable of receiving an impression, will come within'the definition of “ cera impressa.” If, then, wax be'construed to be merely a general term including within it any substance capable of receiving and retaining the impression of a seal, we' cannot perceive why paper, if it have that capacity, should riot as well be included in the category. ■ The…

<p>This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.</p> <p>It was the same case which was twice previously before the court, as reported in 3 How. 534, and 6 How. 279.</p> <p>The facts and points of law are set forth in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>The arguments of the counsel were so connected with an examination of, and reference to, the accounts, which were very voluminous, that it would be difficult to present an abstract of them.</p>

Held: that import's cover only what is brought within our limits and goes into the consumption of the country.

These were appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington. The facts, are fully stated in the opinion of the court. The arguments on both sides took a wide range, and it is impossible to insert the entire views of the case ,taken by the respective counsel. The following are given "as those bearing upon what appear to be the principal points.

Held: that the injury cannot be balanced against the benefits secured. And in the case of the King v. George Henry Ward, 4 Ad. & El. 384, it was held, where the jury found that an embankment complained of was a nuisance, but that the inconvenience was counterbalanced by the public benefit arising from the alteration it amounted to a verdict of guilty.