Volume 56 — United States Reports

This was an appeal from the District. Court of the IJnited States for the I i astern District of Louisiana, under the Acts of 1824 and 1844 so often referred to in cases previously reported. The facts of (he case are recited in the opinion of the Court.

<p>A claimant of a share of the grants spoken of in the preceding ease, having failed to produce evidence of the right of his grantor to convey to him, cannot have a decree in his favor.</p> <p>A person cannot intervene here who’ was no party to the suit in the District Court. And even if the practice of this court sanctioned such intervention, there is nothing to show his right to do so in this case.</p>

<p>This was an appeal from the District Coürt of the United States, for the Eastern District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The history of the claim is fully set forth in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The case is fully'stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>A grant of land in Louisiana by the French authorities in 1764, is void. The province was ceded to Spain in 1762. (See 10th Howard, 610.)</p> <p>In 1793, certain legal proceedings were had before Baron de Carondelet in his judicial capacity, wherein the property now claimed is described as part of the estate of the grantor of the present claimant. But this did not amount to-a- confirmation of the title in his political character; and if it did, the title would be a perfect one, and beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, under the bets of 1824 and 1844.</p>

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of North Carolina, sitting as a court of equity. The bill was filed by Elizabeth E. Potter, during her lifetime, to which her executors afterwards became parties. The opinion, of the court contains an explanation of the case as it is set forth in the bill, and it is not necessary to repeat it.

O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853), also known as The Telegraph Patent Case, is an 1854 decision of the United States Supreme Court that has been highly influential in the development of the law of patent-eligibility in regard to claimed inventions in the field of computer-software related art. It holds, essentially, that an abstract idea, apart from its implementation, is not patent-eligible.

<p>This cause came up from the Circuit. Court of- the United States for the District of Ohio, upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof.</p> <p>An action was brought by Smith, as the assignee of Morse and Vail, against Ely, O’Reilly, and others, for an infringement of Morse’s patent rights to the telegraph, which are particularly set forth in the report of the preceding case.</p> <p>The first count of the declaration was upon the patent of 1840, surrendered and reissued in 1846.</p> <p>The second count was upon the patent for improvements in transmitting and recording intelligence, by the use of the motive power of electricity. Both of these patents were surrendered, and reissued in 1848.</p> <p>The defendants filed eighteen pleas. On the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 10th, the plaintiff took issue. He demurred to the remaining pleas, and upon some of these demurrers the court were divided.</p> <p>All that need to be stated in explanation of the case, will be to state the difference of opinion, and refer to the pleas.</p> <p>And afterwards, to wit, on the twenty-third day of October, being in the year and at the time of said court last mentioned, “ this cause came on to be heard at the present term upon the demurrers filed by the plaintiff to the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth special pleas of the defendants. And thereupon, the arguments of counsel being heard, and due deliberation being had, the opinion of the judges of said court were divided as to the following questions, to wit:</p> <p>I. Upon the demurrer to the sixth and seventh pleas, respectively, whether the said letters-patent to the said Morse are void, for the reason that the same do not on their face respectively express that they are to run for fourteen years from the date of the patent issued to said Morse in the kingdom of France.</p> <p>II. Whether, upon the demurrer to the eighth, ninth, and eighteenth pleas, said letters-patent to said Morse assume, as to the matter alleged in said eighteenth plea, to patent a principle, or a thing which is not an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter; and if so, whether, and to what extent, said letters-patent, or any part thereof, are void in consequence thereof; and also whether said pleas are bad, respectively, for the reason that they assume to answer certain material and -substantial parts of the plaintiff’s claim, without averring that there are no other material and substantial parts embraced in his claim, which can be distinguished from the other parts averred to be so claimed without right, and on which he would be entitled to recover.</p> <p>III. Whether, upon the demurrers to the fourteenth and fifteenth pleas, said patent, issued April 11th, 1846, and reissued June 13,1848, is void; and if so, to what extent; for the reason that it embraces as a material and substantial part thereof, a material and substantial part of a former patent issued to said Morse.</p> <p>IV. Whether, upon the demurrers to the eighth, ninth, fourteenth, and fifteenth pleas, said letters-patent issued to said Morse are void, for the reason, as averred in said pleas, that he was not the original and first inventor of the several matters in said pleas respectively set forth; but the same had been, prior to said invention by said Morse, known and used in a' foreign country.</p> <p>The substance of these pleas was as follows:</p> <p>6th. This plea alleges, that on the 18th of August, 1838, Morse took out a patent in France for the same invention patented to him in his letters of June 20,1840; but that the latter were made to run fourteen years from date, instead of fourteen years from the date of the French letters.</p> <p>7th. This plea states the same as the sixth, and that Morse’s French patent was issued more than six months next before he filed his specification and drawings, annexed to the letters-pateht of June 20, 1840. ■</p> <p>Upon the demurrers to these two pleas the court were divided, as mentioned in the first question of division.</p> <p>8th. This plea sets out with the patents of 1840, as reissued, and then alleges that “ the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, however developed, for marking, or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,” is a substantial and material part of the thing patented; and it states that Morse was not the original and- first inventor or discoverer of the thing patented, but that the • same was known before to one Dr. Steinheil, of Munich, and used on a line from Munich to Bogenhausen.</p> <p>The principles claimed and patented in the letters of 1840, referred to in the 8th and 9th pleas, are as follows, to wit:</p> <p>What I specially claim as my invention and improvément is, making use of the motive power of magnetism, when developed by'the action of such current or currents substantially as set forth in the foregoing description of the first principal part of my invention, as means of operating, or giving motion to, machinery which may be used to ■ imprint signals upon paper, or other suitable materials, or to produce sounds in any desired manner for the purpose of telegraphic communication of any distances.” ;</p> <p>Eighth. “ I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts- of machinery, described in the foregoing specification and claims, the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, however developed, for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances — being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.”</p> <p>9th. In this plea the defendants allege that the mode and process of propelling and connecting currents of electricity, or galvanism, through two or more metallic conductors, is a substantial and material part of the thing patented in the letters of 1840; and they aver that Morse was not the original and first inventor or discoverer thereof, but the same was known to one Edward Davy, in England.”</p> <p>18th. In this plea the defendants allege that “ the use of motive power of the electro-galvanic current, however developed, for marking and printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any distances,” is a substantial and material part of the thing patented, and is distinctly claimed by the patentee in the specification ; and he avers that the thing, so patented and claimed, is not any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any improvement on them.</p> <p>The demurrers to these three pleas raise the questions secondly certified to this court.</p> <p>14th. In this plea the defendant sets out the patent of 1846, as reissued to, and states that “ the combination of a pen-lever, pen-point or points, and roller,” mentioned in the patent, is a substantial and material part of the thing patented; and they aver that it was before known, and formed a part of an electromagnetic telegraph for which Morse had taken out letters-patent in 1840.</p> <p>15th. In this plea the defendants allege that, “ the mode of combining two or more circuits of electricity or galvanism, mentioned and described in the specification annexed to the said letters-patent as an improvement, is á substantial and material part of the thing patentedand they aver that in electromagnetic telegraphs, before known, modes of combining, on the same principle described in the specification, two or more circuits of electricity or galvanism, existed, and formed a part thereof, to wit, in one patented to Morse, June 20, 1840; to Edward Davy, of London, July 4,1838, by the Queen of Great Britain. This plea also states that Morse, in patent of 1846, does not specify and point out the improvement in the said mode of combining two or more circuits made by him, so as to distinguish the same from the said me des before known and patented by him and by Davy.</p> <p>The third question certified to this court is raised by demurrers to these two pleas.</p> <p>The fourth question is raised by demurrers to pleas 8, 9,14, 15, above set forth.</p>

Held: that after the government *147 adopted the act of the collection from Willis, and charged it to Crane, that it was, of course, conclusive upon Crane. What we object to is, the application of this principle, and the subsequent reasoning as to the sureties. The government may, by an artificial and artistical way, make out the accounts between these parties, so as to obscure the true issue, but that cannot preclude us.

Mr, Justice Curtis did not sit in this cause, having been of counsel for the patentee. This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana. It is not necessary to state either the facts or arguments of the case, inasmuch as it went off upon a point of practice. ■

<p>This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting as a court of equity.</p> <p>The facts in the case are very fully stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: and, going back to the declaration, declared it bad; and secondly, overruled the demurrer to the defendant’s fourth plea.

This case was brought up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana, upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof. The facts in the case are succinctly stated in the opinion of the court, and also the questions certified.

Held: in substance and effect, that a cause was not actually removed into the United States Circuit Court, until certified copies of the papers in the State court, and of an order for their transmission, were sent to, and entered in the United States court. This decision, if' correct, sets the question of the actual jurisdiction of this case, pending the application for its removal, at rest.

Held: that the action of the commissioner, in accepting a surrender of a patent and issuing a new one, concluded the parties, unless fraud be shown. And in Stimpson v. West Chester Railroad, 4 Howard, 380 , this court say, “ In whatever manner the mistake or inadvertence may have occurred is immaterial.

Held: That the State could not object, as she stood on the foot of every other individual stockholder and need not be sued; and, - 2. That fugitive stockholders, who were changing every day, and quite too numerous to be included in a suit, need .not be made parties of record.

Held: that although the mechanical construction and action of the defendants’ machine might be different from that of the plain *259 tiff’s, it was still an infringement if it reduced the balls to blooms by continuous pressure and rotation. This was an erroneous position. For one thing was certain. We had the right to reduce puddlers’ balls to blooms by any machine having a different action from that of the plaintiff.

This to an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maine, sitting as a court of equity. The appellants were complainants below, whose bill was. dismissed under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the. court.

of Palethorpe v. Lesher, 2 Rawle, 272 : « Where a defendant in custody gives bond with surety to take the benefit of the insolvent laws and forfeits his bond, a second execution may be issued against him.” Section 1 of the United States insolvent law of the 6th of January, 1800, (2 Stat' at Large, 4, 5, 6,) shows that the debtor remains in custody until his right to discharge is finally decreed; and therefore that, had the defendant applied for the benefit of this act, he…

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Ar- , kansas, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act-

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louis- ■ i'ana. The facts in the case are set forth in the opinion of the court.

Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1854), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court established the doctrine of equivalents. It held that, even if the challenged device is not literally within the claims of the prior art's patent, the challenged device infringes if it arrives at the same result in the same way.

Held: absolved him from the obligation of performing any part of the contract, depended altogether upon its construction. The rights of the parties did not depend on the act of Congress making the cession, but upon the contract into which-they'had entered.

Held: that where the plaintiff avers in his declaration that he and'the defendant are citizens of different States, if the defendant means to deny the fact and the jurisdiction, he must plead it in abatement; and if he omits -to plead it in abatement, and pleads in bar to the action, he cannot avail himself of the' objection at the trial. Still less could he be permitted to do so upon a motion in arrest of judgment.

Held: as one of his father’s heirs, by a deed of partition. Both tracts front on lake St. Clair, aid were within the jurisdiction of the British posts.

Held: that it does not follow the construction of a State court on a will or deed, as it does on the construction of a statute. Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 464 , 476; Russell v. Southard, 12 Id. 139.

<p>Where a contract was made with an attorney for the prosecution of a claim against Mexico, for a stipulated proportion of the amount recovered, and services were rendered, the death of the owner of the claim did not dissolve the contract, but the compensation remained a lien upon the money -when recovered.</p> <p>A court of equity can exercise jurisdiction over the case if a more adequate remedy can be thus obtained than in a court of law.</p> <p>The want of jurisdiction should have been alleged in the court below, either by plea or answer, ¡if the defendant intended to avail himself of it. It is too late to urge it in an appellate court, unless it appears on the face of the proceedings.</p>

This case came up from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi, upon a certificate of division in opinion between the judges thereof. The case is fully stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey. The action of ejectment was brought to recover a tract of land at Paulus Hook, now Jersey City, on the Jersey shore, formerly under the tide waters of the Hudson river, and below low-water mark.- ’ The locus in qfio has been reclaimed from the Water by artificial means, and was in the possession of the Jersey Associates, and occupied by them as building lots.

<p>la 1841, Congress passed an act (5 Stat. at Large, 455) declaring that there shall be granted to each State, &c., (Louisiana being one,) five hundred thousand acres of land.</p> <p>This act did not convey the fee to any lands whatever; but left the land system of the United States in full operation as to regulation of titles, so as to prevent conflicting entries.</p> <p>Hence, where a plaintiff claimed under a patent from the State of Louisiana, and entries only in the United States office; and the defendant claimed under patents from thé United States, the title of the latter is the better in a petitory action.</p> <p>The defendant has also the superior equity; because his entries were prior'in time to those of the plaintiff, and the decision of a board, consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney-General, and the Commissioner of the Land Office, to whom the matter had been referred by an act of Congress, was in favor of the defendant.</p>

This was an appeal from the Ciieuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, sitting as a court of equity. It was a branch of the case of Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning et al. reported in 14 How. 193. The decree of the Circuit Court, now appealed from, is given at page 194. The bill was originally filed' by the Troy Iron and Nail Factory against Corning et al. and the Circuit Court dismissed the bill, but this court reversed that decree.

Held: succeeding to the business of the Circuit Court for the District of Arkansas, and the cases pending there when the act passed had been proceeded in as still in the same court.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of New Jersey, sitting as a court of equity. ■ The bill was filed by by Thomas and Horatio Kearney, and their sisters, Catherine, Anastasia, and Anne, who were the children of Edmund Kearney, deceased. The_ complainants were- citizens of several States, viz.: Thomas *and Catherine of Mississippi, Anne of Connecticut, Anastasia of Michigan, and Horatio of Ohio.

Held: that to bring a location within the saving of that section, it must have been feiade in conformity to law. So far from this location having been made in conformity to law, it was made in open and direct violation Of an express and positive law. The State selects Fremon’s lick by name. 3d. The court erred in refusing plaintiff’s third instruction.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit ' Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington; It was an action of assumpsit brought by Adams, the plaintiff in error, upon a promissory note drawn by Haw, Yellott & Company, in -favor of Philip Otterback, the defendant in error, and discounted by the Bank of' Washington. The proceeds of the discounted note were paid by the. bank upon the check of Otterback.

Held: that the result of the whole evidence did not authorize the conclusion that the respondents had not truly stated the actual cost, and, accordingly, he reported $1.50 as the cost per thousand, leaving an actual profit of 50 cents only.