Volume 60 — United States Reports

Held: that if a judgment be correctly given under a law which is repealed pending-the appeal, this court is. bound to reverse it.” The Supreme Court of the United States have acted on this principle in cases of much more difficulty than that now before the court.

<p>Where-there appears to be an omission in the record of an important paper, which may be necessary for a correct decision of the case of the defendant in error, who has no counsel in court, the court will, of its own motion, order the case ■ to be continued and a certiorari to be issued to bring up the missing paper.</p>

This was a motion for a mandamus to bé directed to the judges of the Supreme Court of the Territory, of Minnesota, commanding them to vacate and set aside an order of the eourt, passed at January term,-1856, whereby the said Secombe was removed from his office as an attorney and counsellor of that, court. The subject was brought before this court by the following petition and documents m support of it: To the Hon. the -Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States:.

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Held: that a person furnishing necessary repairs and supplies in a foreign port, to a vessel sailing under a contract of this kind, has not a remedy against the owner, and also a lien on, the vessel for such provisions and supplies^ as well as for repairs *39 to the vessel — although they are both furnished at the request of a master who is without funds, and has no other means of obtaining them — then this class of eases…

<p>Where' a flat-boat, -which, was fastened to, the bank of the Mississippi river at night, was run down' and sunk by a steamer, the circumstances show that the steamer was in fault, and must be responsible for the loss.</p> <p>It was not necfSsary for the flat-boat,' in the position which it occupied, to sho-fr a light during-the night.</p> <p>When a boat or vessel of any kind is fastened for the night at a landing place- to. which other boats may have occasion to make a landing in the night, it is cer- - tainly prudent for her position to be designated by a-light, on her own account, as well as. that' the' vessel making a landing may have light to do so. But when a vessel is. tied to the hank of a river, not in a port or harbor, or at a place of landing, out of the line of customary navigation, there is no occasion for her to' show a light, nor has it ever been required that she should do so.</p>

<p>Where no - error appears upon the record in the proceedings of the Circuit Court, the case having been left to a jury, and no instructions asked from the court, • the judgment below must be affirmed.</p>

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana. The suit was commenced by Charles Judson, a citizen of Hew York, to recover from Lathrop the amount of a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in June, 1851, for $1,810, with interest from the 2d of May, 1845. The plaintiff attached to his'petition a copy of the record of the .judgment. The suit was commenced on 6th May, 1854.

<p>■ In the present case, 'where a bill was filed to set aside titles for frauds alleged to . have been committed in 1767, the bill does not make out a sufficient case; and the evidence does not even sustain the facts alleged. And the disability to sue, arising from coverture, is not satisfactorily proved. • *</p> <p>In case of alleged fraud, it is true that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. But then the bill must be specific in. stating the facts and circumstances which constitute the fraud; and in the present case, this is not done.</p> <p>Where property was sold under an administrator’s sale, the presumption is in favor of its correctness; and after a long.possession under .it, the burden of proof is upon the party who impeaches the sale.</p>

. This- was an appeal from the District Court- of the United States for the northern district of Alabama. It was a bill filed by Betts against Lewis and wife, under1 the same circumstances which gave rise to the case, of Lewi». v. Darling, reported in 16 Howard, 1. It will be seen by at reference to that case, page 6, that Burr H. Betts was one off' the legatees in the will of Samuel Betts. It is not material in the present report to state the nature of the case.

United States v. Le Baron, 60 U.S. 73 (1856), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the court held that an officer of the United States is appointed to his office when his commission is signed and seal by the President. The failure of the officeholder to receive such commission does not invalidate the appointment.

This ease was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit'Court of the .United States fqr the district of Missouri. It was an action of ejectment .brought by Sandford, a citizen of Rew York, to recover tbe following-described premises, viz: . A certain tract of land, containing 750 arpens, more or less, wbicb was claimed by one Antoine Lamarehe, as derived to him from the Government of Spain, was surveyed for said Lamarehe by John Harvey, a deputy, surveyor under the.

■This Whs an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United-States for the-district of California,; .

This was an .appeal from the District Court of the United States fot the northern district of California. ■ The case presented a general demurrer to the following libel for information:1 Ik- the- District Court of the United States, for the Northern District of . California. In Admiralty; To the Non: Ogden Hof man, Jr.,.

This case’ came up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for. the northern district of Yew York. It was a suit brought by McCormick against Seymour and Morgan, for. a violation of his patent right for reaping, machines,1 which suit was previously before this court, and is reported in-16 Howard, 480'. It will be seen by reference to that case that McCormick obtained three patents, viz: in 1884, .1845, and 1847.

This, was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, sitting in admiralty. It was a case of collision under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court.

This ■ was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana, sitting as a court of equity. ■ , ' The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: the purchaser took in trust for the beneficiary. Har'rison, administrator, et :al., v. Mock et al., 10 Ala. R., 185. If an agent discovers.^ defect in the title to the land of his principal, he cannot misuse it to acquire a title to- it himself.

Held: that under the contract, the settlement was conclusive, unless impeached by the bill. ' This was an' appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States. for the western district of Pennsylvania, sitting as á court pf equity. . It was a' bill filed hy Eachtrieb, under the circumstances mentioned in the

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri. Boyle, who was. a citizen of Kentucky, brought an action of ejectment against Meegan, to recover a lot within the present limits of the city of St. Louis, in Missouri, which was partied-. larly described m the declaration. There was no dispute about location, and both parties claimed under the title of Francis Moreau.

This was an' appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York, sitting in, admiralty.' " It was a libel filed by the owners of the ship Richmond and cargo, under circumstances which are particularly stated in . the opinion of the court'. The District Court dismissed the libel, thereby affirming the sales.

Held: that “if he was a competent master; if an .emergency actually existed, calling for a decision whether to make a jettison of a part of the cargo; if ho appears to have arrived at his decision, with due deliberation, by a fair exercise of his skill and discretion, with no unreasonable' timidity, and . with an honest intent to do his duty,, the jettison is lawful.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. moved to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the record was not filed in time.

<p>This case came up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts.</p> <p>■ The facts in the case and state of the pleadings in the Circuit Court are set forth so particularly, in the opinion of the court, that they need not .be repeated.</p> <p>As the points -raised in the case are entirely new, i it is thought expedient to present them to the reader as they were brought before the court by the respective counsel.</p> <p>Mr. Dana, for the plaintiff in error, after stating the circumstances of the case, said that, the question for the court to decide was:</p> <p>Whether, under these circumstances, there is an exemption from the operation of our patent laws, by reason of the nationality of the yessel. •</p> <p>Since this cause was argued in the Circuit Court, my attention has been called to the case of Caldwell v. Yan Vlissengen, 9 Hare, 415, (9 Eug. L. and Eq. Rep., p. 51.)</p> <p>In that case, the machine patented was a screw propeller. This was a substantial part of the'Vessel, and almost necessary tq her use. The yessel was-built and solely owned in Holland, where the invention was in free and common use. The affidavits set forth facts sufficient to establish an exemption, if national character can' give one. The court fully considers the question,- and decides against the exemption. (On pp. 58, 59, the court puts the right to an injunction upon the ground that actions at law are. maintainable in these cases.) The court considers that the question of the exemption of foreign vessels, either entirely, or in cases of reciprocity, is one of national policy, and to be dealt with by-the Legislature, rather than by the courts.</p> <p>After reading, this decision, I wrote to Sir "William Page Wood, the counsel for the respondents, then. Solicitor General, tod now Vice Chancellor, and received from him the following reply: - '</p> <p>81 Gueat George St., Westminster, November 6, 1855.</p> <p>' My Dear Sir: Ypur letter reached me yesterday. The cáse you refer me (Caldwell v. Yan Vlissengen) was not appealed. I thought the decision was right, though it was against me. At the same time,' I saw that there were inconveniences in the application of the law; and in the session of 1852, when a bill was passing through the House of Commohs, with reference to. the amendment of the Patent Laws, I proposed the insertion of the following clause. . [Here follows section 26, of the act of 15 and 16 Victoria, ch. 83.]</p> <p>■ The opinion of Sir William Page Wood is entitled-to great weight before every judicial tribunal, • as is well known - to your honors!</p> <p>After this1 decision, the' act 15 and 16 Victoria, eh. 88, was passed; section 26 of which is as follows: (4 Chitty’s Statutes, 217.) . “Ho letters patent for any invention (granted after the passing of-this act) shall-extend to prevent the use of such invention in any foreign ship or vessel, or for the navigation of any foreign ship, or vessel, which may be in any port of her Majesty’s dominions, or in any of the waters within the jurisdiction- of any df her Majesty’s courts, where such invention is not used for the manufacture of any goods or commodities to be vended within or exported from her Majesty’s dominions. Provided, always, that this enactment shall not extend to the - ships or vessels of any foreign State, of which the laws authorize subjects of such foreign State, having patents or like privileges for the exclusive use .or exercise of inventions within its territories, to prevent or interfere with/the use of such inventions in British ships or vessels, while in the,ports of such foreign.State, or.'in the waters within the jurisdiction of its courts, where such inventions are not so used for the manufacture of goods or commodities, to he vended within or exported from the territories of such foreign State.”</p> <p>- Such is the state of the law in Great Britain, the greatest commercial nation bf Europe. There is no reason to believe that the law of any other nation of Europe varies from that of England. Indeed, it is probable that other nations will do. likewise, and keep in their own hands the power of granting or withholding such an exemption, on considerations of policy, , by legislation or treaty. ,</p> <p>f It is therefore respectfully suggested that the court should leaVe this question to the law-making and treaty-making departments of our Government, in the mean time placing the law in this country upon the same basis upon which it rests in England;</p> <p>. Is there any'controlling reason why the court should not do this? ’</p> <p>It is conceded that the statute-, in' its terms, suggests no exemption. No interpretation of the statute would suggest an exemption. If one is.established, it must be by some imposed construction, paramount over the plain language of the acts. This is found solely in- certain supposed principles of international law. No decision in point; in this country, has been eitedj and'the English eases referred to are inapplicable, as shown in Caldwell v.- Yan Vlissengen, cited.</p> <p>The defendant’s vessel, b.eing private property, and here voluntarily, for purposes of trade, has no' exemption from general national- jurisdiction. (Phillimore’s Int. Law, 367, 373; The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 144; Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 383.) / 4 .</p> <p>; International law respects absolute rights, the violation of ' Which is cause of war, and comity, or rights of 'imperfect obli'gation, the contravention of which is not presumed, but which each nation is competent to contravene if it -chooses. . (This distinction is' well stated in Mr. "Webster’s /letter to- Lord Ashburton, in the appendix to Wheaton’s Law of Nations.).</p> <p>It will not be claimed that the prohibition of the usb of such an article as this, in a private vessel, under these circumstances, is a violation of any absolute right secured by the law of nations. The Government has the right to prohibit commerce altogether, or with particular nations, as by embargo or non-intercourse laws. (1 Kent’s Com., sec. 33 n; Vattel, Book 2, Ch. 7, sec. 94; Ch. 8, sec.' 100; Ch. 2, secs. 25, 33' — Book 1, Ch. 8, sec. 90.)</p> <p>As a nation may prohibit trade, so it may lay conditions and restrictions. Authorities' cited supra. (Vattel, Book 2, Ch. 8, sec. 100.)</p> <p>The question is really-under the condtas gentium. Between countries trading freely, is there a presumption from the law., of comity that no nation will prohibit or restrict the use *of áuch an invention, under such circumstances, so well settled as to authorize a court to establish the exception against the language of the statute ? '</p> <p>This can hardly be contended, since the'pase of Caldwell v. Van Vlissengen, and the act 15 and 16 Victoria.</p> <p>This is not a question, of property, or of the domicil or situs of property. The defendant may have his vessel full of these articles, if hé chooses. We admit the property in the article to be in him', and that it is part of the national wealth of France, and has its situs in France, for purposes of .taxation, and for all national purposes. (Hays v. Pacific Co.,' 17. How., 596.) J The question is upon a restriction,of its use within our dominions.</p> <p>As the use. of the machine is not alleged to be necessary, and the presence of the vessel here is voluntary, if the comity of nations does not allow the prohibition in this case, it would forbid it in all cases of patents; and vessels nominally owned in the British Provinces, and in the West India Islands, may use all. our nautical patents.</p> <p>To what burdens is the foreigner and his personal property subject? ,</p> <p>Hot to taxes for the support of the 'Government. (In re Bruce, 2 Cr. and J., 437; Vattel, Book 2, Ch. 8, sec. Í06.)'</p> <p>Nor to duties that relate to the quality of a citizén, as militia- or jury duties. But they are subject to all burdens, taxes, and duties, relating to the police and economical regulations of a State. ■ (Vattel, B. 2, Ch. 8, sec. 106.)</p> <p>' They are subject to imposts and duties levied for the purpose of encouraging the manufactures or other industry of a •country, and are liable to prohibitions and restrictions made for the same purpose. Such are most navigation laws, and a large part of the-revenue laws of a country. (Vattel, B. 2, Ch. 8, sec. 106; 1 Kent’s Com., 35.)</p> <p>Their exemption seems to be based upon the principle that they shall not he required to do, anything inconsistent with their home allegiance, or anything which supposes an allegi-, anee or fealty to the State in whim they merely sojourn..</p> <p>The patent and copyright laws of a country stand upon the same ground with navigation laws," and laws prohibiting alto- . gether or restricting certain kinds of trade, for economical purposes, or to add to the military resources apd strength, or to increase the- effective power and industry of a country, or to develop its genius. As to these, each nation is the proper judge of its own policy. (Vattel, B. 2, Ch. 2, secs. 25, 33.)</p> <p>Indeed, Vattel (B. 1, Ch. 20, sec. 255) seems to define the police regulations of a country so as to include patent laws.</p> <p>The object of the patent laws is to develop the genius and industry of the country, as well for war as for peace. And. whether the law in this case be looked upon as a prohibition of the use, or as a duty, burden, or tax, on the use, it is equally within the recognised jurisdiction of the sovereign, under the comity of nations. '</p> <p>Under the British copyright laws, a foreigner cannot introduce into England, even for his private use, a book printed in his own country, if it is subject to copyright in England; and the introduction entails a forfeiture, instead of a tax to.be paid to the author, (Act 5 and 6 Victoria, Ch. 45.)</p> <p>In this state of the international law, in the absence Of all direct decisions in support of the defendant’s position, and since the passage of 15 and 16 Victoria, and the decision in Caldwell v. Van Vlissengen, it is respectfully suggested that thé question of exemption of foreigners (in cases not of necessity or charity) should be treated as a political rather than a legal question, and the British precedent be followed by the court, until Congress or the treaty-making power phall act upon it.</p> <p>Mr. Austin, for' defendant in error, made the following points: - '</p> <p>.1. Foreign vessels entering a port of the United States, by the express or implied permission of the Government, do so under an implied immunity and. reservation of the right belonging to them by 'the laws of the country to which they belong, with an implied understanding that the persons on'board shall .not violate the peace or domestic laws of the country. (Vattel’s Law of Nations, B. 2, Ch. 8, sec. 101.)</p> <p>The Alcyon, coming from the island of Miquelon, may be deemed, to have entered a port of the United States by express permission. (5 United States Statutes at Large, 748, Ch. 66, which specially mentions this island.)</p> <p>The plaintiff says that the terms of the patent law are broad enough to render the úse of the aforesaid contrivance or gaff-saddle on hoard of the Alcyon, while in. the harhor of Boston, a violation of his right.</p> <p>The question is, whether the patent law can be properly so construed as to include a use of said gaff-saddle, notwithstanding the circumstances under which the said gaff-saddle was incorporated into the structure of the Alcyon, and notwithstanding the express or implied permission of the United States, by force of which she entered a port of the United States.</p> <p>II. What shall or does constitute a vessel must be determined exclusively by the law of the country, to which the vessel belongs, i. p':, by the law of the owner’s domicil.</p> <p>This follows necessarily from general maxims of international jurisprudence. (Story on Con. of Laws, secs. 18, 20.)</p> <p>In order to ascertain what is or is not real property, we .must resort to the lex loci rei, (Id., sec. 882, 447;) so as to what is or what is not a corporation. (Bann of Augustas. Earle, 18 Pet,, 519.)</p> <p>The Alcyon, although, in a port of the United States, was still within the jurisdiction of Prance.</p> <p>Children born on boardVff her while in Boston1 harbor would have béen Prench subjects. (Yattel L. of if., B. 1, Oh. 19, sec.-216.)</p> <p>The extent to which this principle is applied is shown in the case of In re Brucé, (2 Cr. and J., 437,) and Thompson v. The Advocate General, (12 Clark and P., 1.) See also United States v. Wiltbérger, (5 Wh., 76.)</p> <p>The gaff-saddle was as much an integral part of the Alcyon as her rudder, or her keel, or her gaff. Whether a more or less necessary part, does not' alter the fact that it was rightfully a part of the vessel by Prench law. Therefore, if the United States patent law operated topreyentthe defendant from using the gaff-saddle while in the harbor of Boston, notwithstanding it was a part of his vessel, without plaintiff’s permission, it operated just sq far to impose a restriction on the implied permission accorded by the United States to all Prench vessels to enter the ports of the'United States, and upon the express permission accorded to all Prench. vessels from Miquelon.</p> <p>The statutes of the United States relating to patents were sot intended to .affect, and do hot affect, foreign vessels coming intQ.the ports of the United States-. •</p> <p>1st. The statutes of a country relating to patenté are hot such laws as a'foreigner, visiting this country temporarily, and not to become a resident, is bouhd to obey, so far as those laws relate merely to the use of articles purchased abroad, and brought into the country solely for the personal use of the Íarty in possession while a. transient visiter. (Vattel L. of U., I. 2, Oh. 8, secs.. 101, 106, 109; Boullenois Traite des Statuts, pp. 2, 3, 4; Universities of Oxford and Cambridge v. Richardson, 6 Vesey, Jr., 689, which entirely supports this position.)</p> <p>2d. The United States, in granting letters patent, or any other exclusive privilege to a citizen, necessarily always reserve by implication their, own rights of sovereignty, which are not to, be affected by any individual or private privilege.</p> <p>Examples of the application of this principle are as follows:</p> <p>1. In regard to the right of eminent domain.</p> <p>This exists inherently in every Government. (Yattel’s L. of. 351., B. 1, Ch. 20, sec. 244; Bonaparte v. The Camden and Am-boy Railroad, 1 Bald., 220.)</p> <p>It is recognised in the -Constitution of the United States. (Arndt. V.)</p> <p>Therefore, if the Government by a land patent convey today a portion of its public lands to an individual, it could tomorrow, by virtue of the implied reservation of its right of eminent domain, resume the land from its own grantee, and against his consent, by paying to him an indemnity.</p> <p>Independently of the, principle that the right of eminent domain, being an attribute of sovereignty, could not be conveyed away, the conclusion above stated follows from the rule that in., public grants nothing passes by implication.. (United ■ States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 738; Jackson' v. Lamphire, 3 Pet., 289.)</p> <p>2. The constitutional power of Congress over commerce.</p> <p>This power extends to navigation, (2 Story’s Com. oh Con., sec. 1,060,) and to every species of commercial intercourse. .(Id., 1,061.)</p> <p>• ' In ‘the exercise of this power, Congress in 1845, after the date of the plaintiff’s patent, passed the law relating to French-vessels coming from Miquelon, (ubi supra,) which law makes no exception as to the kind of vessel, or the mode of its rig, or the peculiarities of its structure.</p> <p>Either, therefore, the power of Congress to pass an act thus broad in its' terms was limited by the grant to the plaintiff of an exclusive right to usé the contrivance in question, qr the exclusive right was limited in its extent by the implied reservation of power to pass such an act. As the grant to the plaintiff,-'and the act of 1845, are in direct opposition, the grant must be construed against grantee. (Mills, v. St. Clair County, 8 How., 569.)-</p> <p>The defendant does not contend that he would have a right tojaring into, a port of the United States a cargo or any number of these contrivances for sale; nor even that he had a right to. detach and sell that, on board of the Alcyon. In this argument the gaff-saddle is deemed a part of the schooner, in the saíne way as fixtures are parts of the reality.</p> <p>3. The power of Congress to alienate a portion of its territory.'</p> <p>This power exists iu every Government, (Vattel’s L. of ÍT., B.I., Ch. 2}, sec. 263.')' It was exercised in the'Treaty of "Washington-, 1842, (8' U. S.- Stat. at Large, 572.)</p> <p>Every patent right then existing extended over the whole country as then bounded. The alienation of a . portion of the territory diminished the value, by diminishing the extent of every existing patent right; but they were all granted, subject to the implied reservation of power on the part of .the Government thus to diminish their value.</p> <p>The right, therefore, 'of the plaintiff, to an exclusive use of his patented contrivance within the jurisdiction of the United States, was limited by the paramount right bf the sovereignty of the United States to admit all vessels into the ports of the United States, which right they have exercised in regard to Erench vessels, .by implication, by treaty, and by statute. The same-reasoning which would separate the gaff-saddle from, the schooner might be allowed to separate her into as many parts - as there should, happen to be articles on board of her incorporated into her Structure, the like of which were patented in' this country. .</p> <p>3. Th$ private right of every patentee is subjéct to the public right of the Government, to admit into the ports of the United States any foreign vessfel, free from any private of public charges) tolls, or burdens, other than those imposed .by treaty' or by the laws of nations. (The Attorney General v. Burridge, 10 ¡Price,'350; Same'-». Barmeter, Id., 378; .The same v. The Attorney General, Id., 412.)</p> <p>The cases cited are exactly analogous in principle to the case at bar. '</p> <p>In the citations, the jus privatum was a grant by Charles I Of his property in land between high and low water mark; and the jus publicum with which it interfered was the right of the public freely to pass and .repass upon .the salt water, between high and-low water mark.</p> <p>In thé'present case, the jus. privatum' is the exclusive right Sranted to' the plaintiff to use within the1 jurisdiction of the iiited States'a certain machine, and the jus publimm with which it interferes is the ^ight -the public has to the free admission into the ports of the United States of all foreign vessels, being such according to the law of the country where they belong. . 1</p> <p>The grant by Charles I of land between high and low water' mark was held void, so far as it prevented this free passage. By parity of reasoning, the letters patent of the plaintiff must he held void, or rather as never. having extended to foreign vessels visiting the ports of the United States, as the Alcyon visited Boston.</p> <p>The principle here contended for, as it applies to ports and harbors, is clearly stated by Lord Hale, in his treatise De Jure Maris, cap. 6, p. 35, and in the treatise De Portibus Maris, chapter on the jus publicum, pp. 84, 89: “When a port is fixed and settled,” “though the soil and franchise and dominion thereof prima facie be in the King, or by derivation from him in a subject, yet that jus privatum is clothed and superinduced with a jus publicum." So in the case at bar, the jus privatum of.the Patentee is subject to the Jits publicum by which foreign vessels,-owever constructed, may enter our ports. This Government, , never having undertaken to decide, nor ever having granted to an individual the right to decide for the Government, that certain vessels, or vessels constructed partly or wholly in a certain way, shall not enter our ports without paying a toll, or .charge, or duty, not imposed by treaty or special laws relating thereto. ' .</p> <p>4. The statutes relating to patents cannot properly be so construed as to include machines or contrivances forming a part ,of the original structure of foreign vessels entering the, ports of the United States, as the Alcyon entered Boston harbor.</p> <p>(1.) Because such construction, for the reasons above stated, would introduce public mischiefs and manifest incongruities. (Sawin v. Guild, 1 Gall., 485; Talbot v.- Seaman, 1 Or., 1; Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 2 Id., 64.)</p> <p>(2i) These statutes were passed alio intuitu. (See the reasoning of Judge Curtis, in the opinion delivered by. him in this case, printed from the original MS. in 4 Am. Law Register, 152. Also, Lessee of Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet., 178: “The laws will restrain the operation of a statute within narrower limits than its words import, if the literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the Legislature never designed to embrace in it” — 198.) It cannot be supposed that Congress intended the statutes on patents to confer a right on a patentee to interfere in any way with the exercise of a license conferred by Government on a foreign vessel. (Same doctrine in Mercer v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria, 1 Pet., 64.)</p> <p>IV. Letters patent of the United States confer upon the grantee the exclusive right to the subject-matter of the patent, to be exercised within their jurisdiction. A foreign ship coming within one of. the ports of the United States, with their express or implied permission, is without the jurisdiction within.which this exclusive right is to he exercised.</p> <p>1. Foreigners within the territorial jurisdiction of a country may. yet he within its municipal jurisdiction for no purpose whatever. Such is the status of public ministers — (Wheaton’s Elements of the L. of R., Part III, c. 1, s. 14; Id., Part II, c. 2, s. 9) — and of foreign sovereigns entering the territory of another — (id. id. id.) — and of foreign armies marching, &c., through the territory — (id. id. id.) — and of a foreign ship of war — (id. id. id.) — and Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cr.'135, 147.) . _ /</p> <p>_ 2. Foreigners within the territorial may he within the municipal jurisdiction of a country for all purposes. This is the status of foreigners who come into the country animo manendi, becoming inhabitants. (Vattel’s L. of R., B. I, c. 19, s. 213.)</p> <p>3. Foreigners within the territorial may he within the municipal jurisdiction for some purposes, and not for others. This is the case with transient persons (Vattel’s L. of R., B. II, c. 8, ss. 105-’6-’8-’9) and consuls; (Wheaton’s Elements; P. Ill, c. 1, s. 23.) The same principle applies to a part of the country in temporary possession of an enemy. (U. S. v. Hayward, 2 Hall./ 485.) To goods imported, and not entered, although Within the territorial jurisdiction of the State, they are not subject to its municipal jurisdiction. (Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet., 292.). _ '</p> <p>_ This principle applies, to a foreign commercial vessel visiting a port of the United States. ' It is within the jurisdiction of thfe United States, so far that persons on hoard are hound to do no act against the public peace, or contra bcmos mores, or against the revenue laws, &c., &c. But “for all the personal relations and responsibilities existing xin a ship at the time she entered a port, and established or permitted by the laws of her own country, her authorities are answerable only at home; and to interfere with them in discharge of the duties imposed upon them, or the exercise of the powers vested in them by those laws, on the ground of their being inconsistent with the municipal legislation of the country where the ship happens to be lying, is to assert for that legislation a superiority not acknowledged by the law, and inconsistent with the independence of nations:” (Mr. Legare’s Opinion, 4 Op. of Att.. 'Gen., 98, 102; Same, point, 6 Webster’s Works, 303.)</p> <p>V. The ease of Caldwell v. Van Vlissengen, (9 Hare, 415, reprinted in 9 Eng. Law and Equity R., 51,) will be cited by plaintiff in error, a3 deciding the point before the court. On this case, the defendants say:</p> <p>1. It will be regarded by tbis court only so far as the reasoning commends itself to the court as sound.</p> <p>2. The case was not placed .upon the grounds assumed in the c.ase at bar. Thp principles1 here contended .'for were neither considered nor even presented to the court.</p> <p>3. Statute 15 and 16 Victoria, c. 83, s. 26, passed July 1, 1852, provides that letters patént thereafter granted shall not ■prevent the use of inventions in foreign ships resorting td British ports when not used for the manufacture of goods'to be vended in or exported from England, excepting from the act, ships of foreign States in the ports ctf which British ships are prevented from using foreign inventions when not employed for the manufacture of goods to be vended in or .exported from such foreign States.</p> <p>This statute was passed in evident , recognition of the -existence and propriety of the.principles of international law contended for by the defendant in error.</p>

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United . States' for the district of South Carolina. . ‘ ,. It -was a libel filed on the 6th of April, 1854, in the District Court of South Carolina, by Mordecai & Co., against the schooner Mary Eddy, and all persons intervening.

. This' case was brought up, by writ!of error, from the Circuit , Court of the United States for the district of Rhode ■ Island. _ v It was an action brought by Day against Hartshorn and Hayward, for the violation of a patent for the preparation and application of India-rubber to cloths,' granted to E. M. Chaffee in 1836,. and. renewed for seven years in 1850. Day claimed under an assignment of this patent from Chaffee, oh the 1st of July, 1858.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

This was an : appeal from the. Circuit Court of. the United ■ States ..for the southern district of New York, sitting in admi- The facts are stated inrthe opinion of the court. „ The arguments of eounsel, with respect to the relative, rights i tof the claimants and libellants to the fund in'court, are omitted.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the District Court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama.' The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Phillips made the following points: The answer of garnishee is required by the statute to be under oath, and when not disproved, must be taken as true. (Code, sec. 2,540; Davis v. Knapp & Shew, 8 Mo., 657; Ker-gen v. Dawson, 1 Gilman, 89; Muson v. Campbel, 2 Pike, 511.) .

Held: if the King’s grant cannot take effect, according to his intent, it is void. 2 Williams Saunders’s Rep., p. 72 q, note 4 to Underhill V. Devereux, where a patent is granted to the prejudice of another’s fight, he may have a scire facias to repeal it at the King’s suit, and the Eng is of right to permit the person prejudiced to use his name.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court' of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, to which, it had been removed from the district of Massachusetts.

Held: that questions of jurisdiction, founded solely on the fact that there was an adequate remedy at law, must be presented by the pleadings. (Wiswall v.< Hall, 3 Paige, 313; Bank of Utica v. City of Utica, 4 lb., 399; 2 John. Oh. R., 339; 4 *276 Paige Cb. R., 77; 1 Baily Cb. R., 62, 1Í3; 1 S. and Marsb. . Cb.

This was an appeal- from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of Alabama, sitting in equity. The present appeal was from a collateral decree of the District Court, under the following circumstances: Lewis-had been for many years the attorney of Thomas A. Ronalds, the deceased testator of the present appellants.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Arkansas, sitting in chancery. The bill was filed by William Russell against Roswell Beebe, Mary W. W.'Ashley, Henry C. Ashley, William E. Ashley* George C. Watkins, and Mary A. Ereeman, praying that they might be ordered to convey to the complainant certain pieces of property, which, it was alleged, they fraudulently withheld from him, and account for the rents and profits.

This was an appeal from tlie Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas, sitting in chancery. The hill was filed by Woodfolk, a citizen of Tennessee, against the heirs and representatives of Frederic Eotribe and others, for the purpose of obtaining a title to certain lands. The court decreed that the defendants should procure the legal extinguishment of the lien and encumbrance which existed upon the lands, and convey them to the complainant.

Held: that the allegation being proved, a trust would be created as to the whole of the property in. favor of B.” (Podmore v. Gunning, 7 Simons, 644.) Parol proof is admissible to show fraud, and consequently a resulting trust, in a deed absolute on its face, notwithstanding any denial by the answer. (Lloyd v. Spillote, 2 Atk. Rep., 150; Ross v. Newall, 1 Wash.

This was an appeal from tbe Circuit Court of the United States for tbe eastern district of Arkansas, sitting in equity. It was a bill filed by Surget, a citizen of Mississippi, to set aside a sale made under the circumstances, which are fully stated in the. opinion of the court. Thé Circuit . Court decreed that the purchase of the lands by Byers was fraudulent and void, and ordered the sale to he set aside. Byers appealed to this court.

. This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri, sitting in' equity. ■ The bill was filed by the Memphis Insurance Company, a corporation created by the laws of Tennessee, and whose stockholders were citizens thereof, against the owners of the steamboat Convoy. In February, 1849, they received on board of their boat a large amount' of cotton, to he carried from Memphis to New Orleans.

. This was an appeal from tbe Circuit Court of the United States for tbe district of Massachusetts, sitting in equity. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>When, a grant or patent for land, or legislative confirmation of titles to land, has i heen given by the sovereignty or legislative authority only having the right to make it, without any provision having been made, in the patent or by the law, to inquire into ita fairness between the grantor and grantee, or between third parties and the grantee, a third party cannot raise, in ejectment, the question of fraud as between the grantor and grantee.</p> <p>A bill in equity lies to set aside letters patent obtained by fraud, but only between, the sovereignty making the grant and the grantee.</p> <p>Such a patent or grant cannot be collaterally avoided at law for fraud.</p> <p>The act of March 26, 1851, (California Laws, 764,) makes a grant of all lands of the kind within the limits mentioned in it which had been sold or granted by .any alcalde of the city of San Francisco, and confirmed by the ayuntamiento or town or city council thereof, and also registered or recorded in some book of record which was at the date of the act in the office or custody or control of the recorder of the county of San Francisco, on or before the third day of April, one thousand eight hundred and fifty.</p> <p>The registry of an alcalde grant, in the manner and within the time mentioned in the act, is essential to its confirmation under the act. In that particular, the grant under which the plaintiff in this suit claimed, is deficient. The defendants brought themselves by their documentary evidence within the confirming act of March 26, 1852.</p>

<p>The decision in the preceding case of Field v. Seabury, again affirmed.</p>

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the northern district of Illinois. The facts of the ease are stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up, by writ oi error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the southern district of California. The nature of the claim, and a list of the documents in support of it, are given in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe district of Maryland. Tbe nature of tbe case is fully explained in tbe opinion of tbe court.

This case was brought up, from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, by a writ of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act'. The history of the case is given in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York, sitting in admiralty. The case is explained in the opinion of the court.

<p>This case was similar to the preceding one of Pratt, &c., claimants, v. Reed, and was argued by the same counsel.</p>

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the southern district of California. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1857), is a United States Supreme Court decision involving Native American law. John Blacksmith, a Tonawanda Seneca, sued agents of the Ogden Land Company for common law claims of trespass, assault, and battery after he was forcibly evicted from his sawmill by the Company's agents. The Court affirmed a judgement in Blacksmith's favor, notwithstanding the fact that the Seneca had executed an Indian removal treaty and the Company held the exclusive right to purchase to the land by virtue of an interstate compact ratified by Congress.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Michigan. It will be seen, by .reference to 18 Howard, that this court, at the last term, in a case between these same parties, decided in favor of Cooper’s title to a tract of land in Michigan. In order to recover a part of the tract which was not included in the former suit, Cooper brought an ejectment against Roberts, and obtained a judgment against him.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Arkansas, sitting in equity. The hill was filed by the Branch Bank of Alabama, under the circumstances which are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>Where a case is brought up to this court by a writ of error issued to the Supreme Court of a State, under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, if it appears that the judgment of the State court only involved the construction of State statutes which both parties in the cause admitted to be valid, the writ of error will be dismissed on motion.</p>

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of tbe United States for the district of Maryland. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was "brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York.

This ease came up on a certificate of division in opinion .between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United;States for the southern district of Ohio. The case is stated in the opinion of the court;.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas, by a writ of error issued under tbe twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act.. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Taylor contended that, if the law of Louisiana governed, there was error, because— 1. The defect in the ship was an apparent defect, in the legal sense of the term, the existence of which imposed no responsibility on the vendor. 2.

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that held that the United States Constitution did not extend American citizenship to people of black African descent, and therefore they could not enjoy the rights and privileges the Constitution conferred upon American citizens. The decision is widely considered the worst in the Supreme Court's history and is broadly denounced for its overt racism, judicial activism, and poor legal reasoning. It de jure nationalized slavery, and thus played a crucial role in the events that led to the American Civil War four years later.