Volume 65 — United States Reports

Held: to extend over “inland navigation.” 1 Curtis’s Juris.-Courts U. S., 34, 48. De Loviot v. Boit,'2 Gallison, 398,436, 468, and authorities cited. This may especially be said, under the recent decisions, that admiralty jurisdiction does not include matters relating to transactions talcing place within the limits of a single State. . Allen v. Newbury, 21 How., 244 . Maguire v. Card, 21 How., 248 . *33 3.

Held: that there was no escape on the , ground that the water floating the commerce was not' salt or brackish.

A motion was made in. behalf of the State of Kentucky, by the direction and in the name of thi Governor of the State, for a rule on the Governor of Ohio to show cause why a mandamus should’ not be issued by this court, commanding him to cause Willis Lago, a fugitive from justice, to be delivered up, to be removed to the State of Kentucky, having jurisdie tion of the crime with which he is charged.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southeru district of New York. It was a case of collision in the East river, at the southern extremity of New York, between the ship Wisconsin, propelled by the steam-tug Hector, on the one hand, and the Republic on the other.

This was an appeal from the District Court of the tJnited' States for the northern district of California.- The case is stated in the opinion of thé couri. The arguments consisted of comments upon the evidence in the case, which would not be interesting to the profession generally.

<p>This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California.</p> <p>The claim was based upon Sutter’s general title, which has been explained in some' of the preceding volumes of these Reports.</p> <p>It appears to have been confirmed by the court below before they knew the decision of this court with regard to Sutter’s general title.</p>

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. The dispute arose under the two acts of -Congress passed in ■ T820 aiid 1823, confirming the claims of settlers in the village of Peoria,, which are particularly, mentioned in the opinion of the court, and. which were also examined in a case reported in 19 Howard, 334.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the western district of Texas. Angelina R. Eberly, and the minor, Peyton Lytle, brought ■an action of trespass to try title to-a tract of land situated in Falls county, in the State of Texas. The suit was brought against a number of persons, who adopted different modes of' defence. Moore and Raybon pleaded the general issue ana-* certain pleas of adverse possession in bar.

This was an appeal 'from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio. It was a hill filed on the equity side of the court by Creighton, a citizen of Iowa, against Fitch, a citizen of Ohio, under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court. The Circuit Court decreed against Fitch, who brought up this appeal.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of New York. The principal question related to'the construction of Page’s patent for improvements in the construction of a portable circular saw-mill, the circumstances of which are stated- in the opinion of the court.

This ease was brought up by writ of error from the Court of Sessions for the city and county of San Eraneisco, in the State of California. ■ It was a constitutional question entirely, and is stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. Blair placed his opposition to the law upon two grounds, viz: 1st, that it imposed a tax upon commerce; 2d, that it amounted to a tax upon exports.

' This casé was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit ■ Court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois: The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the residence and possession of land for seven years by a tenant inures to the benefit of the landlord, so as to secure for him the protection of the act; and that this protection is not confined- to the; particular close- upon which the claiman. resides, but also extends to the entire parcel of laud of-which1 the legal possession has been maintained as a consequence of. his actual possession and residence.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the'United States for the northern district of Illinois. It was a sequel to the case of Ballanee v. Forsyth, reported in 13 Howard, 18.' After the mandate went down from this court, Ballanee filed a bill on the equity side of the court; setting forth the same titles that were involved in the suit at law, and praying relief upon certain special grounds, which it is not necessary to enumerate.

This was a branch of the three preceding cases, coming np from the same court. . moved to ■ dismiss the writ for the following reasons, viz: That it is manifest by the record filed iu this court in. tlie . said cause that the said writ of error was issued on the 15th day of July, 1859. That the clerk’s return thereto was filed with the clerk of this court on. the 3d day of October, 1859.

<p>This case was brought' up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island.</p> <p>' It was ah action for the continuance of an alleged nuisance .from 13th-September,-185U, to 15th April, 1852. It will hereafter appear why the first of these dates was named.</p> <p>The. nuisance charged is described in two preceding cases, viz: City of Boston v. Leeraw, 17 How., 426, and Richardson v. City of Boston, .19 How., 263. ’Without noticing at present 'the first-named case, it may be proper to give the history of the present one.</p> <p>The action was brought by Richardson in the Circuit Court; of Massachusetts to October term, 1850. ...</p> <p>1851,March. General issue pleaded, and special plea; plaintiff demurs to special .plea.</p> <p>1851, April. Plaintiff’has leave to amend his declaration by adding two counts. .*</p> <p>1851, May. A statement of facts submitted.</p> <p>• 1851, October. Agreement of counsel that the case should be carried to.the Supreme Court.</p> <p>1852, May. Plaintiff'has leave to amend declaration.</p> <p>• 1852, October. Boston files petition to remove the ease, because Mr. Justice Curtis had been counsel, and Judge Sprague was interested; removed to Rhode Island.</p> <p>1853, June.' Argued before Judge Pitman on the agreed statement of facts; verdict guilty; damages and costs, $2,026.87 up to 13th September, 1850; judgment on sixth' count; motion for new trial; pending which, the case of Le-craw v. City of Boston was decided by this court, as reported in 17 How.; case continued by agreement.</p> <p>1855, June. New trial granted; plaintiff amends writ and declaration by adding a count, which is the subject of comment by this court in the present opinion ; verdict not guilty; plaintiff,sues out writ of error, and brings the case up to this court to December term, 1855.</p> <p>1856, December term of this court. Case tried, and reported in 19 How., 263; judgment reversed. - .</p> <p>1857, November term of Circuit .Court.' Mandate from this court presented;' new trial ordered.</p> <p>1858, June term. Plaintiff amends writ and declaration by striking out the words constituting the ad damnum in ’ said writ, as the same now stands, and-inserting in lieu thereof the words following, viz: “ten thousand dollars.”</p> <p>By S. BARTLETT, his Attorney.'</p> <p>And now, by agreement of parties, and with the leave of the court here, plaintiff amends the several counts of his declaration by striking therefrom such parts thereof as claim damages for the injury to the ends of his wharves by material deposition near the same, by means of the structure complained of.</p> <p>The case then went on to trial before Mr. Justice Clifford and J udge Pitman. Under tbe instructions which were given by the court, the jury found a verdict for the defendant, and the plaintiff again brought the case up to this court by a writ of error. •</p> <p>The bill of exception was very long, and included the record of the former case, together with a vast quantity of other matter. The instruction of the court,. admitting this record in evidence, was as follows:</p> <p>“That the record of the former verdict and judgment is admissible in evidence; but inasmuch as it appears that the verdict was found by the jury under an erroneous instruction given by the court, the judgment is entitled to very little weight upon the question of the right to recover in this case, and none whatever upon the question whether the supposed way or dock before described was duly laid out and established by the town of Boston, or the authorities'thereof, pursuantto law, either as a public highway, town way, or public way, for the access of boats and vessels to high water, or the egress' therefrom to the sea, as is alleged in the seventh count of the plaintiff’s declaration.”</p> <p> By his Honor Judge Pitman. </p> <p>The record above referred to was in a ease decided by me upon an agreed statement of facts, which was excluded in this case. It was therein admitted by the defendant that the place between the said wharves was “ an ancient public dock or highway.” This fact, and the case having been submitted to Judge Sprague, and decided by him in favor of the plaintiff before the case was sent to the -Rhode Island, district, I was disposed, to decide the same way, unless I saw it was manifestly erroneous. It was to be determined under the law of Massachusetts, with which I believed he was much better acquainted, than myself: I did not, therefore, so critically examine the documents in the case, and their legal effect, as I have since done. Since the decision of .the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Lecraw v. City of Boston, I have considered the opinion erroneous which I then delivered, and the judgment as entitled to no weight for that reason as évidence to a jury, and therefore I excluded the judgment from the consideration of the jury in' the former trial. I am now of the opinion that it is entitled to no weight, though it be admissible.</p> <p>I did not decide that the supposed way was laid out as a way for boats and véssels by the town of Boston or its authorities. I instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to . recover upon the sixth count of his declaration, the one on which he rested his case,-and they found a verdict accordingly.</p> <p>JOHN PITMAN,</p> <p> District Judge JJ. S., JR. Island District. </p> <p>September 16, 1858.</p> <p>The arguments of the counsel upon the construction of the previous decisions of this court and upon the admissibility of the indictments, (a question reserved in' the course of the trial,) and also upon the powers and acts of the town council as far back as 1685, are considered to be so local in their application as to justify the reporter in omitting them.</p>

This case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the western district of Texas. All the facts in the case, and also the proceedings of the court below, are set forth in the opinion of this court.

. This was an appeal from the Circuit. Court.of the-UnRa States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, sitting in admiralty. The arguments of the counsel were directed to the merits, of the case, which it is not necessary to state under thetview taken of it by the.court.

Held: that “as to the second exception, the record was not between the same parties. The rule is, that verdicts are evidence between parties and privies. The court does not .feel inclined to enlarge the exceptions to this general rule, and -therefore the judgment of the court below isaffirmed.” . This is the judgment with which we have to deal.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the western district of Texas. ( The principal question in the case was the construction of the statute of limitations passed -by the State of Texas, which is discussed in thé opinion of the court, and need not be stated in this place. A cursory view only of the arguments can be given.

<p>It is the duty of the court to determine the competency of evidence and to decide all legal questions that arise in the progress of a trial; and consequently, when assuming that all the testimony adduced hy the one or the other party is true, it does or does not support his issue, its duty is to declare this clearly and directly. Whether there be any evidence, is a question for the judge $ whether there be sufficient evidence, is for the jury.</p> <p>Therefore, where, in a land souit in Texas, the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations, and the documentary evidence showed that neither the plea of five years’ possession nor three years’ possession (see preceding case in this volume) ' could be sustained, it -was errronéous for the judge to leave that question to - the jury. •</p> <p>It was also error in the judge to exclude testimony to show that the deed was fraudulent under which the defendant claimfed." The Supreme Court of Texas . have decided that conveyances .made with an intent to defraud creditors are void. .</p> <p>The decision of the court upon another point having been favorable to the plaintiff, he has- no cause of complaint against the ruling of the court.</p>

<p>Ill-a collision which took place.in the Ohio river between a steamboat ascending and a flat-boat descending, ,the steamboat was in fault.</p> <p>When a floating boat follows the course of the current, the steamer must judge of its course, so as to avoid it. This may be done by a proper exercise of skill, which the steamer is bound to use.</p> <p>Any attempt to give a direction to the floating mass on the river would be likely to embarrass the steamer, and subject it to greater hazards. A few strokes' of an engine will be sufficient to avoid any float upon the river which is moved only by the current, and this is the- established rule of navigation.</p>

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. • In consequence of some negotiations relative to coal lands, and their eventual purchase by Picked and Thompson, they executed to Mr. Smith the following notes: Promissory Note No. 1. Baltimore, June 2, 1853. On the 31st of December, 1856, we promise to pay' "William H. Smith, or order, two thousand dollars, with interest from July 20, 1853.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States 'for the eastern district of Tennessee. The principal'question' in the case was, whether'the possession of the defendants below was upon the tract of land claimed by the plaintiffs, so as to constitute á bar to the action through thé statute of limitations. Maps were produced in court, but so many tracts of land were laid down upon them, that it was difficult to decide the point.

. This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for-the eastern district of Virginia. The nature, of the case and rulings of the court below are fully explained in the opinion of the court.

<p>A corporate franchise to take tolls on a canal cannot be seized and sold under a fieri jadas, unless authorized by a statute 6f the State which granted the act of incorporation.</p> <p>Neither can the lands or works essential to the enjoyment of the franchise be separated from it and sold under nfi.ja., so as to destroy or impair the value of the franchise.</p>

Held: that the grant here in question, under which the defendant claims, could not be distinguished from those which had been passed upon in former cases; and upon the authority of those, cases, it was decided, that the grant wanting such consent wiy3 void. That question, therefore, cannot be considered as now an open one.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas. It was similar to the. preceding case with respect to the principal question involved, and was argued by the same counsel.

Held: in the case of Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet., 450 ,. that Congress had the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of a patent issuing from the United States; that a patent carries the fee, and is the best title known to a court of law.

Held: the said Mechack Frost, Isaiah Frost, Thomas J. McKaig, and William W. McKaig, shall have full power and authority to exercise all the corporate powers of the said company, fc. .

This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for -the district of Wisconsin. The bill and answers opened a wide field of discussion relating to events which had transpired many years before, and the arguments could not be made intelligible without a minute statement of thoáe events. But as the opinion of the court does not require that this should be done, the reporter omits a particular narrative of these circumstances.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district oflndiapa. The foots of the case are fully stated in the opinion - of the courtJ The reporter despairs of, giving &n account of these arguments within a reasonable space, and therefore omits. them. altogether.

This case was brought’up from the Supreme Couvt of the. State of Pennsylvania by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. ■ The facts of. the case are stated in the opinion of the court, and also the decision of-the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, .which was alleged to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States.

This case came up or a certificate of a division of opinión between- the judges of the Circuit Court of Che United States for the northern district of California. The question certified is stated in the opinion of the court. The question being merely one of practice, which is authoritatively settled by the judgment of this court, it is not thought necessary to give the authorities referred to.

This was an appeal from tbe' Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe eastern district of Virginia, sitting in admiralty. It was a case of collision which occurred between tbe steamship Jamestown and the steamship Pennsylvania, the libel being filed by the owners of the former. The collision took place some few miles below the port of Norfolk, in Virginia, under circumstances which are freely stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up by writ of error'from the District Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the administrator was entitled to the fund as assets of the estate. The reasons for this decree will be found in the report of the case referred to.

This was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Territory of Kansas. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

These two cases were brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. They related to the same subject-matter, and were argued together. The first case was an action brought by Sickles and Cook for their share of the earnings of the steam-packet company by the use of their cut-off from March 13,1846, to October 19, 1846; the second for the same earnings from October 13, 1846, up to December 26, 1855.

This .was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California. The title of Castro is. set forth in the opinion of the court.

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the. district of Indiana, sitting in equity.- Washburn made an assignment of his property to Keith, for the benefit of his- creditors. Day and Matlock, and Frothingham and Warner, citizens of Ohio and New York, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of'the United States to set' asirle this de.ed as fraudulent.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana holding sessions for the eastern district of Louisiana, being issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary act. The head note has given an outline of the case so that the reader can understand it; and the opinion of thé court contains a full statement. Tate was sued in the court below, and disclaimed title otherwise than as one of the heirs of Nancy Tate, whose other heirs then intervened.

This case was brought up from the Supreme Court of Missouri by a writ of error issued under the 25th section, of the Judiciary act. . The record was very voluminous, as it traced the title to land for a number of years. It is not necessary to follow this. Mackay was the holder of ¿ grant of land from Spain for 30,000 arpents, prior to 1819.

This case came up on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania. The nature of the case is explained in the head note of this report, and fully set forth in the opinion, of the court. Mr. Knox divided Ms argument into the following heads: 1. .The words' of the acts. , 2. The purpose of the acts. •3.

<p>This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>The principal point in controversy was the pow^r of the Circuit Court, under the 14th section of the Judiciary 'act, to issue a writ of mandamus in this ease. Upon this subject, a portion of the arguments of the counsel can be given.</p> <p>Mr. Porter said:</p> <p>If the Circuit Court of the United States has power to issue a writ of mandamus to enforce the payment of a judgment at • law, it derives that power from the provisions of the 14th see- ' tion of the Judiciary act of 1789. ■</p> <p>It is not pretended that there is any other foundation for it.</p> <p>The words of the section are: “ That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable^ to the principles and usages of law.”</p> <p>I maintain that the “exercise of jurisdiction,” in any sense in which the writ of mandamus could be called in aid of it, was completé in this case upon the rendition- of final judgment; that to enforce the payment of that judgment by means of this extraordinary writ would not be “ agreeable to the principles and usages of law.” Passing over the fact which appears in the. record, that an execution was issued, and a levy actually made, which the party voluntarily abandoned to resort to his writ of mandamus; and conceding, for the sake of the argument, what the opposing counsel assumes in his brief, that “no execution can be levied on the general property and effects of the county,” I affirm that this state-of facts simply presents the ordinary case of a party holding a; debt of record which cannot be realized by process of execu- ■ tion. And I deny that it follows that a writ of mandamus in such a case is, in any just sense, “necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction,” or “agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”</p> <p>The writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy to enforce the performance of some duty enjoined by law, where there is no. other adequate .remedy.</p> <p>The duty imposed by law on the board of commissioners of the county of Knox, now sought to -be enforced, was a duty to. - levy a tax for the payment of interest coupons, not judgments of'ia court of law.</p> <p>The holders of those coupons had a right to go into the s State courts,-and enforce the levying of the tax for their payment, by mandamus; but they elected a different remedy.</p> <p>They chose to sue in the ordinary form, in the Circuit Court, merged their coupons in a judgment at law, and must rely for the collection of that judgment on the ordinary and usual writs in use for that purpose.</p> <p>If, upon the failure of these, they may resort to the writ of mandamus to compel the payment of their judgment, on the ground that such a writ is necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction, why may it not be used in every case; to compel the payment of judgments which cannot be collected in the usual -way? The words of the statute, then, instead of being understood as words restraining the power to issue the writ in aid and furtherance of ordinary remedies only, will become a grant “to. the Circuit Courts of the power to employ a new and formidable process in all eases where the common writs of execution fail.</p> <p>• The defendants in error rely on the case of Wayman v. Southard to show that the words “ necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction ” apply to proceedings after judgment, as well as before.</p> <p>The question decided in that ease will appear from the’ certificate at the close of the opinion, which is as follows:</p> <p>“ Certificate. — This cause came on to be heard on the questions certified from the United States court for the seventh circuit and district of Kentucky, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, this court is of opinion that the statutes of Kentucky in relation to executions, which are referred to in the questions certified to this court, on a division of opinion of the said judges of the said Circuit Court, are not. applicable to executions which issue on judgments reudered by the courts of the United States; which is directed to be certified to the said Circuit Court.”</p> <p>10 Wheaton, 50.</p> <p>' That part of the opinion of the court which relates to the question now under consideration isjis follows:</p> <p>“The Words of the 14th section are understood by.the court to comprehend executions. An execution^ a writ which is certainly ‘agreeable to the principles and usages of law.’</p> <p>“ There is no reason for supposing that the general • term ‘writs’ is restrained, by the words ‘which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,’ to original process, or to process anterior to judgments. The jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied. . Many questions .arise on the process subsequent to-the-judgment, in which jurisdiction is tobe exercised. It is, therefore, no unreasonable extension of the words of the act to. suppose an execution necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction. Were it even true that jurisdiction could technically be said to terminate with the judgment, an execution would be a-writ necessary for the perfection of that which was-previously done, and would consequently be necessary to the beneficial exercise of' jurisdiction. If any doubt could exist on this subject, the 18th section, which treats of the authority of the court over its executions as actually existing, certainly implies that the power to issue them had been granted' in the 14th section. The same implication is afforded' by the 24th and 25th Sections, both of which proceed on the idea that the power to issue writs of execution was in possession of the courts. .So, too, the process act, which was depending at the same time with the Judiciary act, prescribes the forms of executions, but does not give a power to issue them. On the-clearest principles of just construction, then, the 14th section of the Judiciary act must be understood as giving to the courts of the iTnion, respectively, a power to issue executions on their judgments.”</p> <p>10 Wheaton, 23, 24:</p> <p>Now, I submit that all this is inapplicable to the case at bar. The learned counsel for the defendants says, in his brief, after quoting from the opinion of the court .in Wayman v. Southard, “all that is said above about writs of execution must be equally applicable to writs of 'mandamus, when they are necessary to carry a judgment into effect.”</p> <p>Granting this, it must appear that in the case at bar a writ of mandamus was necessary to carry the judgment into effect</p> <p>That is the touchstone proposed by the counsel for the defendants; and tried by that very test, the case is, in my opinion, against them.</p> <p>. A case might be imagined, doubtless, where a writ of mandamus would be necessary to the “beneficial exercise of jurisdiction,” and to carry the judgment into effect. Suppose, for instance, that an execution were.lodged in the hands of the sheriff, and that he were to neglect or refuse to serve it,. In such a case a mandamus might properly be invoked in aid of the jurisdiction,- though more summary proceedings would probably be preferred. Rut in this-case no obstruction is put in the way of the ordinary writs, which, “agreeably to the principles and usages of law,” may issue upon judgments at law. All the remedies which any such judgment ordinarily supplies. are open to the parties in this case. Rut they are said to be inadequate; yet it does not appear that ample property could not be found whereon to levy. The parties then propose to seek another remedy, not a means of carrying into effect the judgment already obtained, but a separate and independent proceeding, in which they must begin de novo, and conduct a new suit through the several stages of pleadings, hearing, and final judgment. The judgment already obtained is not the basis of this new proceeding. The claim on «which that judgment was obtained is, it is a proceeding for enforcing the claim by a separate and independent action, not for enforcing the judgment. The object of the proceeding is, to créatela fund out of which the claim may be paid. Is there any writ or proceeding in the same case by which a fund may be created for the payment of a judgment at law, “agreeably to the principles and usages of law? ”</p> <p>The proceedings in mandamus constitute a separate suit ir general. So say the authorities. 6th Rae. Ab., 458.</p> <p>Mr. Vinton said:</p> <p>The Judiciary act of 1789, after having conferred on tfie several courts of the United States their respective, jurisdictions over the matters subjected- to their cognizance, and upon-which they may pronounce judgments, proceeds iii the 14th section to provide for ^the ex'ercise of those jurisdictions— that -is to say, for carrying them into execution, in the language-of the above-recited clause of the Constitution, and, as I have already said, into full and complete execution. -For that purpose it enacts “that all the before-mentioned courts of the • United States, (the Circuit Court being one of them,) shah have power to Issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs-not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”</p> <p>1 Statutes at Large, 81.</p> <p>Under this section, the power of'the Circuit Courts and of all other courts of the United States is limited to the issue of writs. for the sole purpose or object of exercising their jurisdictions; but for the accomplishment of that object and purpose, the power is given to issue “all writs,” whether of mandamus or any other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary, and are agreeable to the principles and usages of law. For the accomplishment of-that purpose no language could be more comprehensive.</p> <p>A construction was given to this 14th section in respect to ' the extent of the power conferred by it on the Circuit Courts to.issue writs in the above-mentioned case of dayman v. Southard, 6 Pet. Coud. Rep., 4.</p> <p>In that case, it was insisted by one of tlie parties, that the power conferred by that section was limited to process ante- . rior to the rendition of the judgment, and -that when judgment was rendered the jurisdiction of the court was exercised and exhausted; and that, consequently, the Circuit Courts could not, by virtue of that section, issue executions on their judgments.</p> <p>The court, after reciting the words of the’Mth section, answer this objection by saying, “the words of the fourteenth section are understood by .the court to comprehend executions. An execution is a writ which is certainly agreeable to the principles. and usages of law. There is no reason for supposing that the general term, ‘writs,’ is restrained, by the words ‘which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions,’ to original process, or to process anterior to judgments. The jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but continues until that judgment shall be satisfied. Many questions arise on the process subsequent to the judgment, in which jurisdiction is to be exercised. It is, therefore, no unreasonable extension of the words of the act to suppose an execution necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction.” 6 Pet. Cond. Rep., 4, 5.</p> <p>All that is said above about writs of execution must be ■ equally applicable to writs of mandamus, when they are necessary to carry a judgment into effect.</p> <p>This decision.establishes two propositions, which have an important bearing on the case now before the eourt.</p> <p>1st. That the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court over a case continues until .its judgment is satisfied.</p> <p>2d. That it has power to issue such writs, both before and after judgment, as. may be necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction, and are agreeable to the principles and usages of law.</p> <p>Erom these propositions, it would seem to follow, as a necessary corollary, that if in any case the writ of mandamus was necessary for the satisfaction of the judgment, and the case itself was one where, by the principles and usages of law, the writ would issue, then the 14th section confers on the court power to issue it for that special purpose.</p> <p>The question of the extent of power given to the Circuit-Courts by this 14th section, to issue writs of mandamus, first, came up for decision in this eourt, in the case of Mclntire v. Wood, 2 Pet. Cond; Rep., 588.</p> <p>Mr. Vinton then proceeded to comment on several subsequent decisions of this court.</p>

Held: that the master not only had no general authority to sign the'bill of lading, and admit the goods on board when contrary to the fact, but that a third party taking the *393 bill was chargeable with notice of the limitation, and took it' subject to any infirmity in the contract growing out of it:" The first time 'the question • arose in England, and was determined, was in the case of Grant and others v. Norway and…

This was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the TJniteu States for the southern district of Illinois. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The points on behalf of the plaintiffs in error were the following. The counsel contended that the instruction given by the court below was erroneous, and cited these authorities % McMeehen v. Marman, 8 Q-. and J., 57, 73, 74, 75. Jackson v. Graham, 3 Gaines’s R., 188. Jackson v. Scott, 18 .Johnson’s R., 94.

Tais case was brought up by writ of error from the District' Court of the United States for the district of Wisconsin. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The points made by the .counsel on both sides were so connected with the special circumstances of the case, that the effort to explain them to the reader Would be fruitless without a long narrative.

This ease was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio by a writ.of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. The tacts or the case are stated m the opinion of the court, and also in 7 Ohio State Reports,, p. 528.

This case was brought up from the Court of Appeals for the State of Kentucky by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act. A motion was made by Mr. Mooar to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction, under the following circumstances : Porter and others, the plaintiffs in error, filed a.petition in the State court.to recover the title and possession of a lot of land in the town of Covington.

This case was brought up from the Court of Appeals, of Maryland by a writ of error issued, under the 26th section of the Judiciary act, The case is stated in the-opinion of the court, and is reported in 14th Máryland Reports, pages 470, 471.

This case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the western district of Texas. ' The bill of exceptions contained the evidence of the title of •Sheirburn, the plaintiff, when the defendants objected to the admissibility of said locations and entries because the same’ were vague, uncertain, and indefinite, and also because surveys thereon were not returned to the General Land Office; but the court overruled said objections, and the…

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota. - The record showed that a suit was brought by Tracy as surviving partner against Holcombe, and on. the 30th of December, 1857, the judgment of the court was entered that he should recover $2,340.71, with costs. .

This case was brought up writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the southern district of New York. The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court, and also in the report of the cases in 8 Howard. The points of law involved in the case are fully stated in the reports in 8 Howard, and it, is unnecessary to repeat them in the arguments of counsel now.

This case came up on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the western district of Pennsylvania. • In order to show the state of the case as it was presented to the Circuit Court the entire record will be inserted, which was as follows: Jacob E. Curtis, a citizen of the State of Virginia, v. the County of Butler, a corporation composed of citizens of Pennsylvania.

This case was brought'up from the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts within and for the county of Middlesex, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary act: The case is stated in the" opinion of the court.

Held: after a very-careful and extended examination by the court, through the Chief Justice, that the State law impaired the obligation of the mortgage contract, and was forbidden by the Constitution. This decision has since been repeatedly affirmed. 2 How., 612 ; 3 Ib., 716.

This was an appeal from tbe Circuit Court of the United • States, sitting in equity, for the southern district of Ohio.' The bill was filed by the appellants to set aside the devises arid bequest's in the will of Charles McMieken to the city of Cincinnati, in trust for the foundation and maintenance of two colleges. . The nature of the devise is stated summarily in the head note of this report, and more particularly in the opinion of the court.

Held: That in the absence of fraud, the decision of the appraisers as to the character of the article and the dutiable value of the importations was final and conclusive. 2.

This case came up on a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for the southern district of New York.' •The question was, whether barrels manufactured in the United States and exported empty to Cuba, and afterwards brought back to the United.'States filled'with molasses purchased in Cuba, were bi’ought back “in the same condition, as, when exported,” according to the .true intent and meaning of the acts' of Congress in that behalf.

• ' This case was brought up by writ of error from' the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri. It was a part of the. case between the same parties reported two cases back, and was argued by the same counsel who argued that case.

Held: Actual participation in the profits, as principals in general, creates a partnership as between the participant and third persons, whatever may have been the real relation of the former to the firm, but the rule has no application to a case of more service or special agency, where the employee has no power in the firm and no such interest in the profits as will enable him to go into a court of equity to enforce a…

This case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the middle district of Tennessee. In September, 1856, John J. Wheeler arrived at the small town of Charlotte, in Tennessee, about eight o’clock at night, in company with two Irishmen, the whole three being indifferently clad. Wheeler had four fine horses; each of the Irishmen was-riding one of the horses, with a sack and blanket to sit- upon instead of a saddle.

Held: and is hereby deemed and held, to have purchased the property in question, with full notice that the said sale at auction, under the pretended authority of the said Richard Relf and Beverly Chew, and'their.said act of sale to said Azelic Lavigne, were illegal, hull, and void, and in.fraud of the rights of the person or persons entitled to the succession of the said Daniel Clark.