Volume 70 — United States Reports

Lovejoy brought suit in one of the courts of Iowa against O. H. Pratt, and the sheriff attached certain personal property, which was assumed to be the properly of Pratt. A certain Murray, however, claimed it as his.

Held: that the act was, in contemplation of law, done on board the foreign schooner where the shot took effect; and that jurisdiction of it belonged to the foreign government, and not to the courts of the United States, under the Crimes Act of 1790.” A similar case is that of United States v. McGill. † The facts were, that the prisoner, the mate on the brig Rover, in the harbor of Cape Francois, gave the deceased a mortal…

The owner of the Kimball chartered her, in July, 1856, to a Boston firm, for a round voyage from New York to Melbourne, Calcutta, and Boston. The charter-party, in most of its provisions, was in the usual form.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 allows examination, by this court, of final judgments and decrees given in the circuits,* “upon a writ of error, whereto shall be annexed and returned therewith, at the day and place therein mentioned, an authenticated transcript of the record, an assignment of errors, and prayer for reversal, with a citation to the adverse party,” such party having a notice prescribed in the act.

Held: that the act of giving the plaintiffs charter “ did not declare that the legislature would not permit the erection of another bridge,” &c., and that it might lawfully grant the new charter.

By proclamation of President Lincoln, in April, 1861, a blockade was established along our whole Southern coast, then in possession of rebels against the authority of the Government.

The constitution of Wisconsin ordains that “all county officers shall be elected by the electors of the respective counties.” With this fundamental law in force, and with a county board of supervisors in existence, who, under the constitution and laws, were the ordinary administrators of its affairs, the legislature of the State, by “an act to authorize the County of Sheboygan to aid in the construction of a railroad,” constituted Lewis Curtis, “Billy Williams,” and three…

Held: that an obstruction to the enjoyment of land claimed under a law or regulation of a convention in Oregon, held without the sanction of, the United States, and during the joint occupation of that country by Great Britain and the United States, was not an injury capable of being so' valued as to give jurisdiction to this court; nor, indeed, an-injury of which the courts of the United States could take cognizance at…

Campau sued Lewis in the Supreme Court of Michigan, “ the highest court of law and equity” in that State; and on the hearing there, objection was made to the admissibility of a deed which was offered in evidence, on the ground that the United States revenue stamps attached to it were not sufficient in amount; that is to say, were not proportioned in amount to the value of the land conveyed; as the act of Congress relating to our internal revenue requires that they should be;…

Trout & Son shipped at Memphis, on the Mississippi, a large quantity of cotton, on board a steamer belonging to the Illinois Central Railroad Company, common carriers; which by the terms of the bill of lading was to be delivered' at Boston, Massachusetts, the consignees paying $4.75 per bale, “fire and the unavoidable dangers of the river only excepted” The bill of lading which referred to the cotton as shipped by “Trout ¿-Son” was signed in four; two copies being given to…

As is generally known, champagne wine arrives from France in large quantities into the United States. Some of it is “ imported,” that is to say, persons here purchase it in France and have it brought here. Large quantities, however, are sent here by the manufacturers of the wine resident in France.

beside.. Of course the latter only is reported. Mr. Justice S"WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court The only point of the several objections taken to the ad mission of the letters necessary to be considered is, that thej were res inter alios acta, and hence incompetent.

“ An act to limit the liability of ship-ozwzers and for other purposes,” passed by Congress March 3,1851,* enacts by its first section that no owner or owners, of any ship or vessel, shall be liable to answer for any loss or damage which may happen by reason or means of fire on board said ship or vessel, “ unless such fire is caused by the design or neglect of such owner or owners.” The same section contains a proviso that “ nothing in the act shall prevent the parties from…

The brig “ Thompson,” on her return voyage to Halifax from Nassau, was captured at sea with a cargo of 486 casks of turpentine and 81 bales of cotton, on the 16th of June, 1863, by the government steamer, the United States, and sent into the port of New York for adjudication.

<p>During the .Southern rebellion, the Louisiana, a large ‘steamer, loaded with sick and wounded soldiers from our army in the South, and bound for Philadelphia, stopped at Fortress Monroe; her purpose in going there having been the twofold one of landing certain of the soldiers who were too sick to proceed on their course, and of taking in supplies of coal. At this time, on a place in Hampton Roads known as Hampton Bar, was a steamer (c) called the Flushing, lying aground. (See map at p. 167.) She had been there seventy-two days, unsuccessful efforts only having been made by her owners to float her. The spot where the vessel lay was-one that had been selected for the location of a buoy to mark the bar and warn vessels off, and the Flushing had gone aground because the buoy had been carried away! Having, lain in this place one hundred and thirty-three days she was finally abandoned by her owners, and was then raised by the .wreck-masters. Under orders of the government, in whose service she was,' the Louisiana proceeded to a wharf (a), called the old wharf; there being a little below another and-much better one (b), called the new one. This old wharf was a narrow projecting pier, having at its extremity toward-the roads a widening; the whole being somewhat in the shape of a T; but even at its front the wharf was but eighty-two feet wide. The steamer laid and fastened herself in the-only way in which vessels could lay and fasten themselves-to this wharf; that is to say, along its front. The Louisiana being, however, a long vessel, two hundred and seventy-five feet long, a small part of her, less in fact than one-third, was capable of being placed in juxtaposition to the wharf. Moreover, as soldiers were to be landed and coal taken in at the same time, it was apparently necessary to have two gangways in operation at once; and, as the after-gangway could not be used in consequence of the narrowness of the front of the wharf, both gangways were rigged forward. This threw the stern part of the boat nearly one hundred and fifty feet distant from the nearest point of the wharf. In addition, owing to the extent to which the wharf ran out into the sea, it was not practicable to fasten the vessel by lines, which should run from.her extremities and at right angles to them to the shore. All that could be done was to fasten her towards her bow (where she lay in juxtaposition to the wharf) by lines running at right angles from her to posts, &c., on the wharf; while from the extremities, and more especially the stern, lines ran to fastenings on the wharf also. These stern-lines, running transversely, operated of course much more to steady the boat than actually to hold her. The diagram, in which from necessity the top of the page is made to represent the east, will elucidate the matter.</p> <p>In the morning, when the Louisiana arrived at the old wharf, the tide was ebb; that is to say, was coming from the west; swinging round the land somewhat to the northeast. On the other hand, the wind, at this time quite gentle, was from the northeast. Tide and wind, in their action on the boat’s fastenings, thus counteracted each other. The vessel was placed with her bow against the tide; that is to say, to the west. She put out three lines, one at the stern and two forward; these being sufficient at this time to hold her. Later in the day the tide changed from ebb to flood; that is, it ran west, or somewhat round the land from the northeast, and the wind rose; coming still from the northeast; tide and wind now acting of course in one direction. Shortly before this time the captain, who was about to leave the boat to go and see the surgeons of the fort in regard to the sick and wounded soldiers on his steamer, gave the boat into the mate’s charge: He and the two mates conversed, however, previously on the subject of the fastenings. They “ did not anticipate the breaking away of the vessel, and thought the lines sufficient to hold Her;” though the captain told the first mate that if he thought it necessary he could put more fastenings still. "With the change of tide and the rising of the wind new ropes were accordingly put out by the mate. Five ropes now ran out front and four aft; the “ bights” of these last going over the same posts. The ropes were seven and nine inch ropes, and all were new. No more ropes in fact could be applied forward than were applied. The cleets being all employed, the capstan was used besides. By degrees the wind increased and became high. It came “ in</p> <p> </p> <p>squalls,” “ a pretty taut breeze ,” “ a little more than ordinary;” “ blowing fresh ” “ blowing half a gale .” In this gale the vessel — snapping her stern-lines first, and then on being forced round with her broadside to the wind, tearing away at the bow — broke off violently from her fastenings. At the stern, as already said, her lines broke; but at the bow the lines were so strong that they did not part. It was only by the cleets and capstan being torn up out of their places and so giving way that the vessel finally at this part got loose. Drifting sideward, to the west, with her bow towards shore, and past the new wharf, the Louisiana came down upon the Flushing, injuring her essentially. The captain and mates considered that “the accident was unavoidable.” Other vessels, of which there were several in the neighborhood, kept to their fastenings; nor was there any other collision or accident of any kind in Hampton Eoads on that day. The mate, under whose charge the vessel had been after the captain left her, said, on examination, “According to my judgment, the vessel was made sufficiently fast to lay at that wharf.” "When asked why he did not change the position of.the boat to meet the change of tide and wind, he said, “ I did not think there was any necessity for the change. We were lying very nice at the wharf; nor did I think it necessary to do more than I had done.”</p> <p>The distance from the old wharf to where the Flushing lay aground was about 800 feet. Testimony tended to show that if ah anchor had been dropped anywhere within the first 400 feet of the distance over which the Louisiana drifted— that is to say anywhere between the two wharves, where the water is shallow — it might perhaps or probably.have brought her .up. No anchor, however, was thrown until she had drifted nearly 700 feet.</p> <p>The testimony in regard to her manoeuvres after she broke •loose was not very clear. It was plain that she had drifted against the Flushing; nor did the witnesses agree as to the movements of her machinery. The captain “ backed” her machinery, though not at immediately on breaking loose, which if he had then done would have cleared the Flushing.</p> <p>The Circuit Court for Maryland, reversing a decree of the District Court in Admiralty, which had held the Louisiana not in fault, decreed against her for the full damage clone, each party to pay his own costs. The case was now here for review,</p> <p>The case shows that the owner of the Flushing had been guilty of neglect in suffering her to remain so long on Hampton Bar. She was a public nuisance. It was because she was improperly there at the time, that she was injured by the collision and did injury to the Louisiana. Even then, if the Louisiana was in fault, as the most favorable result for the Flushing, the damages of both should have been blended and divided. But this rule ought not to apply, in a case of public nuisance, especially as against one who did not wilfully commit injury. The owner of the Flushing might have abandoned the wreck, and would thus have escaped responsibility. But, holding possession, responsibility attached. In Brown v. Mallett,* Maulé, J., delivering the judgment of the C. P., said:</p> <p>“ There seems no doubt that it is the duty of a person using a navigable river with a vessel of which he is possessed and has the control and management, to use reasonable skill and care to prevent mischief to other vessels, . . . and the liability is the same whether his vessel be in motion or stationary, floating or aground, under water or above it. In all these circumstances the vessel may continue to be in his possession and under his ■management.”</p> <p>And this view was approved in a later case, in the Exchequer, by Baron Alderson, speaking also for the court:</p> <p>“ The mere fact that one vessel strikes and damages another does not,” said the late Chief Justice Taney,† “of itself, make her liable for the injury. The collision must, in some degree, be occasioned by her fault. A ship, properly secured, may, by the violence of a storm, be driven from her moorings, and be forced against another vessel, in spite of her efforts to avoid it. Yet she certainly would not be liable for damages, which it was not in her power td prevent.” In The Ligo* Sir C. Robinson said: “The law requires that there should be preponderating evidence to fix the loss on the party charged, before the court can adjudge him to make compensation.” And in The Bolina,† Dr. Lushington decided, that where there is no primd fade evidence of negligence and want of seamanship, the onus does not necessarily attach to the party proceeded against, alleging inevitable accident, to prove it; but, on the party, seeking indemnification, to prove that blame attaches to the other party.</p> <p>The mere fact, therefore, of the Louisiana breaking away fi’om the old wharf is no sufficient evidence of fault.</p> <p>It will be remembered that soldiers had to be landed and coal to be taken in, at the same time. The vessel was laid at the wharf and rigged in the only way practicable; her stern necessarily projecting far past the wharf. Expedition was a duty. It was a time of war. It is not pretended that sufficient fastenings were not made forward. No more ropes could be passed through the cleets, and therefore the capstan also was used; and to show the sufficiency and strength of the fastenings forward, the facts are shown, that the cables forward did not part; that the cleets gave way, and the capstan was broken. It is clearly proved that when the wind increased and the tide changed, additional lines were put out. The argument, therefore, must rest on the alleged insufficiency of the fastenings from the stern of the boat to the wharf. Now, the case shows that, when the vessel first laid at the wharf, she had three lines out; one at the stern, and two forward. Subsequently, the two forward were increased to five; and the one aft was increased to four; and the bights of those lines went over the same posts, which, in effect, doubled the number. There is nothing in the case to show specially that the boat was carried off by any regular action of the reversed tide and increased wind. Against these the captain and mate guarded. We infer that it was some one irregular action of the water — something not to have been foreseen as a result even of the changed conditions of tide and wind, which lifted up the stern of the vessel, slackened the stern fastenings, and thus enabled the storm at one special moment to get hold of the boat, and to cause the lines to snap, the wharf to give way, or the vessel to be torn asunder; no matter how strong the lines were. To consider this result as evidence of neglect,* would destroy the notion of a special and inevitable accident, and would make the owners responsible not only for the storm, but for those hidden perils of the sea, not to be calculated against.</p> <p>Will it be said that seamanship required of the captain to change his position at the wharf when the tide changed; that is to say, to liberate the steamer from her fastenings, and to go out into Hampton Roads, and come back to the wharf, and lay her bow to the eastward, facing the wind and tide ? It is easy to be wise after a catastrophe; easy to avoid perils on which the stern-lights of experience are shining. But the question is, what was obligatory before the accident ? The fact that the captain and mate of this vessel were appointed by the government to the discharge of a most responsible duty raises a presumption of their general capacity and carefulness. A general competency for their office of seamen must be inferred from it; and indeed is otherwise presumable. Now, as a matter of fact, the captain and mates believed that the vessel, fastened as she was, was safe.. They thus thought upon considering the matter and looking at the case with all the evidences of risk before them. It was 'their conclusion super materiem subjeetam, after discussion and advisement upon it. It was no fault of theirs that they thus believed; and as matter of fact, we repeat, they did thus believe. Now, suppose, believing as they thus truly did, that the vessel was safe — that the risks of staying still were greatly less than those of any attempt to relund in a high wind — that they had, nevertheless, cut loose, put out, attempted to reland, and in such attempt had met with some terrible disaster to their sick and wounded charge and cargo, what words, on such a result, would be wanting to express indignation at their rashness and folly ? If in the effort to change the position of the steamer, the captain had been caught by a sudden squall, he would have been without excuse. It would then have been said, that he would have done right if he had remained at the wharf, and that if, in remaining there, he had been driven from its moorings, it would have been a case of inevitable accident. The Juliet Erskine* would have been quoted on him. Dr. Lushington there says: “ Where a collision takes place, when every prudent measure, consistent with ordinary seamanship, has been adopted, and carried into effect by the vessel proceeded against,” it is a case of inevitable accident. So would the language of Taney, C. J., already cited. The argument then would be that the captain had abandoned a sure protection, and had undertaken an unwise and dangerous and improper experiment.</p> <p>Will it be said that the steamer was not properly managed after she broke loose? Even if thiB had been the case, great allowance should be made for any seeming errors, if such appeared, and the remarks in The Genesee Chief† would apply. In that case the court say: “ If in the excitement and alarm of the moment, a different order might have been more fortunate, still, under the special facts, the court will not hold the party who might have given it responsible. He was in a situation where there was no time for thought. If an error had been committed, it would not, under the circumstances have been a fault.” But, to those familiar with Hampton Roads, this mate’s conduct was, in a high degree, judicious, and his orders precisely such as were necessary. When the steamer broke loose, she was drifting sideways and westward, her bows towards the beach. Unless backed she would have grounded; and, even if she had escaped the shoal, she would have come into collision with the vessels at the “ new wharf.” She was, therefore, properly backed, and escaped both. There was no room to work her, unless her bow could be brought to face the wind and tide, both of which were from the east. He cast an anchor — not for the purpose of riding to the anchor — but to produce the effect of changing the position of the steamer. This was the right manoeuvre.</p>

Dr. Crawford, of Prince George’s County, Maryland, died intestate, in December, 1859, tbe proprietor of large landed estates there; Greenwood Park, Waring’s Grove, Federal Hill, Westphalia, Banleigh, &e. He left no wife, nor child, nor brother nor sister surviving him. Claimants to such estates, however, were not long wanting.

Held: that the complainant in whose favor a decree had been rendered in a foreclosure case, could not control its execution to the prejudice of other parties interested; and that defendants might apply to the court to have the execution of the decree committed to them, if the complainant unreasonably neglected to proceed to a sale.

In 1812 the State of Maryland incorporated a company to build a turnpike road between Baltimore and Washington. The company by its charter had power to take tolls and was bound to erect bridges and keep them and the road in good repair. In regard to its privileges generally, there ivas nothing special about it.

The schooner Cornelius and her cargo were captured by the government vessel Nestless, and condemned as prize of war by the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for an attempt to run the blockade established by our government, during the Southern rebellion, of the port of Charleston, by putting into a neighboring inlet called Bull’s Bay, from which Charleston was easily to be reached.

Wolcot, as agent of certain persons, shipped on board the schooner Convoy, at Chicago, several thousand bushels of wheat. The master executed a hill of lading for it, which ran thus: “ Shipped in good order, &c., &c., to be delivered unto con signee, as per margin. Freight and charges to be paid as noted below, upon the actual and complete delivery of the said goods and freight to said consignee, or their assigns.” On the margin below was entered: “Acct.

<p>[See, as to the second point of this case — inquiry at a blockaded port— supra, p. 84, The Josephine. — Rep.]</p>

Held: exercised, usurped, and invaded, &c., without any legal warrant, &c. The defendant demurred generally. The District Court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment in his favor. The relator took the case to the Supreme Court of the Territory, where the judgment below was affirmed.

Among the festal anniversaries of the city of Providence, R. I., is that known as “ Commencement Day.” Upon this occasion Brown University gives its degrees; and citizens and strangers throng the town. Upon the anniversary of 1859, Miss Babcock, of Connecticut, visited Providence and was participating in the spectacle.

Held: that as ejectment was in Missouri an actual, as distinguished from a fictitious proceeding, a title decided in it ■could not be reviewed in chancery any more than- any other .matter tried and decided at law. Mr. Hitchcock, for Blanchard, the appellant: The reply to what is argued by Mr. Fuller is twofold. 1st. The suit at law concerned only the legal title. This ■bill to. redeem is based on an equitable one.

<p>[See infra, p. 294, Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 2.—Rep.]</p>

This was an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for Louisiana affirming a decree of the District Court in admiralty in a case of collision between the steamboats Hill and World. The owner of the World filed his libel in the District Court, March 12,1868, setting forth that his vessel, sailing down the Mississippi and laden with a valuable cargo, had been lost by collision with the Hill, and solely through the fault of the Hill.

The controversy was one chiefly of fact; whether, for example, there was any one at all on the steamer’s deck about the time of the collision besides the wheelsman then steering the vessel; whether the steamer showed lights as required; what the courses of the two vessels had been, and how far they properly or improperly held them on their approach to each other, and some others not necessary, in view of the decision, to be mentioned.

Held: that neither by the terms of this statute, nor by certain other statutes, relied on as helping out the lien, nor in any other way, was a lien on the road given to the city as against subsequent mortgagees.

Held: and the bonds were issued by the county. A number of' them passed into the possession of one Havemeyer, and the interest on them being unpaid, he now brought debt in the Circuit Court of "Wisconsin to obtain payment of it. On the trial, the judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion, and sent here a certificate of division accordingly, on the following questions: 1.

Boggs, lessee of Brfemont, brought a suit iu one of the inferior State courts of California against the Merced Mining Company, for the possession of certain mineral lands, with the mines therein, situated in Mariposa County. The case, according to a frequent practice in the courts just named, was submitted to the court, both as to matters of fact and matters of law, without a jury. The recovery was resisted on several grounds.

The steamer Granite State, plying between Hartford and New York, arrived before daybreak of a December morning in the Hudson, with passengers and freight, and was in the act of entering her dock between the city piers Nos. 24 and 25. Across the end of Pier No. 28 lay an old and pretty rotten barge, — the Ranger. The bai’ge’s pier extended many feet further out in the river than the piers in the immediate vicinity above and below.

In December, 1854, Hayden, being tbe inventor of improvements in cotton cleaners, made application to the commissioner for a patent therefor. The improvements consisted in certain described changes made by Hayden in the interior arrangements of an elongated trunk previously in use for cleaning cotton. While this application was still pending, Hayden made another distinct improvement, not in the interior arrangements of the elongated trunk, but in the form of the trunk.

A statute of the United States,* relating to the Circuit Court for California, enacts that, by consent of parties, “ issues of fact in civil cases may be tried and determined by the said Circuit Court without the intervention of a jury.” Under this statute the court, in giving its decision, is to state the facts found and the conclusions of law separately; and a review by this court is to be limited to a determina tion of the sufficiency of the facts found to support the…

The constitution of Iowa, made in 1846, and which invested the General Assembly with all the legislative power of the State, ordained thus: “ The General Assembly shall not in any manner create any debt or debts, liability or liabilities, which shall singly or in the aggregate, with any previous debts or liabilities, exceed the sum of one hundred thousand dollars, except in the case of war, &c., unless the same shall be authorized by some law for some single object or work…

This case came here by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, and under the name of The Minnesota Mining Company, plaintiff in error, versus The National Mining Company and J. M. Cooper, defendants in error, the action below being for the recovery of real property.

Held: that although the writ of attachment had been wrongfully levied upon the property of a party not named in the writ, the rightful owner could not obtain possession of it by resort to the courts of another jurisdiction.

of the case runs thus: “ A vessel bound to Philadelphia, and having a large sum of specie on board belonging to the defendants, arrived in the… Held: that the defendants were liable to contribute to the charges and expenses incurred after the landing of the specie, as general average.” As in some degree illustrating the subject, we may next refer to Bedford Commercial Insurance Co. v. Parker et al., in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. † In that case, a ship insured was…

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Distinct of Indiana. The case was this: The suit was brought by Brown, the plaintiff in error, to recover against Tarkington and others, defendants, the amount of four promissory notes, and another small sum, in the aggregate exceeding twelve thousand dollars.

A statute of Massachusetts makes it an indictable offence, punishable, with heavy fine and imprisonment, to keep any building for the sale of intoxicating liquors.

A statute of Massachusetts * enacts, that “ all buildings, places, or tenements, used for the illegal keeping or sale of intoxicating , liquors, shall be deemed common nuisances,” and makes the keeping of such nuisance an offence punishable with fine and imprisonment. McGuire kept and maintained such a tenement at No. 6 Derby Square, Salem, Essex County, Massachusetts, and was indicted, in one of the courts of Massachusetts, accordingly.

of the case is thus given by Cranch: “ So long as a qualified executor is capable of exercising the authority with which he is invested by the testator, that authority cannot be conferred either with or without limitation by the court of ordinary or any other person. And if during such capability of the executor the ordinary grant administration either absolute or temporary to another person, that grant is absolutely void.” IT.

<p>These were indictments, independent of each other, for violations of the act of Congress of February 13, 1862,* which declares that if any person shall sell any spirituous liquors “ to any Indian under the charge of any Indian superintendent or Indian agent appointed by the United States, he shall, on conviction thereof before the proper District Court of the United States,” be fined and imprisoned.</p> <p>This act of 1862 was amendatory of an act of June 30, 1834,* declaring that if any person sold liquor to an Indian in the Indian country he should forfeit five hundred dollars.</p> <p>These indictments were both in District Courts of the United States — the one against Haas in the District Court for Minnesota (there not being at the time of the indictment any Circuit Court as yet established in Minnesota), and that against Holliday in the District Court for Michigan,— and under the act of August 8,1846,† authorizing the remission of indictments from the District to the Circuit Courts, they were both removed into the Circuit Courts; the case of Haas, after he had been convicted of the offence charged and while a motion in arrest of judgment was pending and undetermined in the District Court.</p> <p>In Haas’s Case,</p> <p>The indictment charged that the defendant had sold the liquor to a Winnebago Indian, in the State of Minnesota, under the charge of an Indian agent of the United States; but it did not allege that the locus in quo was within the reservation belonging to the Winnebago tribe, or within any Indian reservation, or within the Indian country.</p> <p>Upon this indictment the judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion on the questions:</p> <p>1. Whether, under the act of February 13,1862, the offence for which the defendant is indicted was one of which the Circuit Court could have original jurisdiction ?</p> <p>2. Whether, under the facts above stated, any court of the United States had jurisdiction of the offence ?</p> <p>In Holliday’s Case,</p> <p>The indictment charged the defendant with selling liquor, in Gratiot County, Michigan, to one Otibsko, an Indian under the charge of an Indian agent appointed by the United States.</p> <p>The plea alleged that Gratiot County was an organized county of the State of Michigan; that it was not within the Indian country; that no Indian reservation existed within it; that Otibsko was one of the Chippewa Indians mentioned in certain treaties which were referred to; that Otibsko accepted lands in Michigan, and entered into possession of them under a certificate from the United States; that the tribal organization of the said Chippewa Indians was dissolved by one of the treaties, except in so far as it was necessary to preserve it for the purposes of the same;-- and that Otibsko had voted at elections for county and town officers.</p> <p>The plea set forth also certain provisions of the constitution and laws of Michigan which confer political rights upon civilized male inhabitants oí Indian descent, natives of the United States and not members of any tribes, and also judicial rights and privileges upon all Indians.</p> <p>■ The government, by replication admitting the truth of the matters contained in the plea, alleged that, pursuant to the existing treaties with the said Chippewas, and the regulations and practice of the Interior Department and Indian Bureau, the chiefs and head men of the said Chippewas continued to be the representatives of the tribe; that the Indian agent for Michigan was required to deal with the said chiefs and head men of the said Chippewas as such, and to take the receipts of such chiefs and head men for money and. property delivered to the said Chippewas under the provisions of the treaties.</p> <p>And alleged further, that the said Otibsko recognized and acknowledged the chiefs and head men of the Chippewas of Saginaw, and resided with the' said Indians on the lands in Isabella County, selected by them under the treaty of 1855; and that the Indian agent of the United States annually distributed a sum of money and treaty property for tbe benefit of the said Otibsko.</p> <p>On this state of facts the Circuit Court was divided on the following points:.</p> <p>1. Whether the act of Congress, of February, 1862, does by proper construction extend to a sale of liquor, such as is charged in the indictment, under the circumstances stated in the plea and replication?</p> <p>2. Whether, if construed to so extend, Congress has the constitutional right'to so enact ?</p> <p>3. Whether, under the circumstances stated in the plea and replication, the Indian- named, can be considered as under the charge of an Indian agent within the meaning of the act?</p> <p>4. Whether, upon the facts stated in the plea and replication, the said Otibsko was a civilized Indian, not a member of any tribe within the meaning of the constitution of Michigan, and whether he was a citizen of the State of Michigan ?</p> <p>5. Whether the provisions of the constitution and laws of the State of Michigan, stated in the plea of. the defendant, were, under all the facts and circumstances stated in said plea and replication, and, under the constitution, the said treaties and act of Congress of 1862, a bar to said indictment?</p> <p>The record in this case showed that the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had decided that it was necessary, in order to carry into effect the •provisions of the. treaty referred to and set up by Holliday^ that the tribal organization should be preserved.</p> <p>In both cases the questions were now, by certificate of division, here.</p> <p>The cases in many features are alike. To some extent, the argument for one serves for both; though the first question certified in Haas’s case does not arise in Holliday’s.</p> <p>As respects Holliday the question is, whether the United States can punish, ás a criminal offence, the selling of liquor to an Indian who is connected with a tribal organization only so far as to receive his allowance from the United States, through the chief or head man? who is a land-owner in his own individual right,- and a tax-payer in one of the States of the Union; when the liquor was sold, not on an Indian reserve, but in an organized county of a State; a district as exclusively under the jurisdiction of the State as the city of New York is under the jurisdiction of the State of New York. If so, then if the liquor had been sold to this Indian at the Astor House in New York, the proprietors of that house would be liable, on the same principles, and to the same extent as this defendant.</p> <p>I. On every principle, the act of 1862 is to receive a strict construction. It is a penal act. It is of doubtful constitutionality.</p> <p>No violence is done to the language of the statute, by confining its operation to Indians under the charge of an agent within the Indian country; for it was the evident policy of the act to protect the Indian, within the Indian country; and in addition, that policy is sufficiently sustained by the construction that’ the introduction of liquors into the Indian country shall be illegal.</p> <p>Suppose that a civilized, educated Indian, a citizen of another State, should accept a glass of wine at a military post; would that be an offence under this act? We should think not.</p> <p>H. If the act of 1862 be so construed as to embrace this charge, under the admitted facts of the case, then its enactments are beyond the powers of Congress, in conflict with the rights of the State, and are so far void.</p> <p>As the offence was not committed in any place within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, the right of Congress to legislate for its punishment can be founded only on the notion that it was an offence against Federal sovereignty. Hut Congress has never claimed, and cannot lawfully exercise the power of legislating for Indians, except, as tribes or quasi domestic nations. When they lose this relation and character, and become citizens of a State, or as individuals become separated from their ordinary tribal connections, they pass from the jurisdiction of the United States. The limits of the agency are established, as all know, by tribes or geographical boundaries. The general duty of the agent is to manage and superintend the intercourse with the Indians. This assumes their separate and social condition.</p> <p>The facts show that, in the case of Otibsko, to whom in Holliday’s case the liquor is said to have been sold, the tribal organization was, in fact, dissolved. The lands given to the Chippeways, it is plain, were owned in severalty; and all that remained of the tribal association was connected with the convenience of paying annuities. This Indian, moreover, became a citizen of the State of Michigan.</p> <p>Conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the Indian was a member of a subsisting tribe, and under the charge of an Indian agent; still, after he came within the limits of the State, away from the Indian country, or any Indian reservation, he became subject to the laws of the State, and it was incompetent for the United States to take cognizance of the act charged, and to punish it as a crime against the Federal government. The whole subject of the regulation of the use and sale of liquors, within the State, and away from Indian reservations, is a matter for the State, in the exercise of its police powers. The State of Michigan has exercised this power, and prescribed the penalty, and the offence was within the jurisdiction of that State.*</p> <p>This legislation, as construed by the government m this case, cannot be sustained under the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; for the act of 3862 is not, in any way, a regulation of commercial intercourse.</p> <p>After a thorough argument, contra, by Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton, who went into the whole policy of the government as respects sales of liquor to the Indians, setting forth the statutes regarding them, and the decisions which bore upon them,</p>

The Judiciary Act declares tbat the assignee of a chose in action shall not recover in a suit brought on it in the Federal courts, “ unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such courts, &c., if no assignment had been made .” With this provision in force, a partnership in Pennsylvania, of which a certain Nicholson was one member, and Armstrong and others the remaining partners, made a contract with De Sobry, of Louisiana, “ to build a mill” on his plantation.

Motion by Mr. Browning {Mr. Mae, contra) to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. The record showed that no appeal had been prayed or allowed in the Circuit Court. Accompanying the record, however, was a petition addressed to that court, which prayed for an appeal.

An act of Congress* of July 17, 1862, provides that prizes taken by tlie navy at sea, when of equal or superior force to the vessel or vessels making the capture, shall be the sole property of the captors, and when of inferior force shall be divided equally between the United States and the officers and men making the “ capture.” When the United States thus receive prize-money it is passed to the Naval Pension Pund.

The case had come of course to the District Court on an appeal from the Board of Land Commissioners established by the act of^March 3,1851, to settle private land claims in California.

The Internal Revenue Act of 80th June, 1864,* declares by its 99th section as follows: “ All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, &c., and shall also be subject to all the provisions, &c., of the act for making returns, assessments, and collection of the duties.” The…

The “Internal Revenue Act,” of 30th June, 1S64, “to provide ways and means for the support of government, and for other purposes,” declares, by its 99th section, as follows: “ All brokers and bankers doing business as brokers, shall be subject to pay the following duties and rates of duty upon the sales of merchandise, produce, gold and silver bullion, foreign exchange, promissory notes, stocks, bonds, or other securities, and shall also be subject to all the provisions of…

Held: at . this term, in a case from Massachusetts, * that when the Supreme Court renders final judgment, and sends the judgment to a court below for execution, and with the judgment the record, a writ of error to review the judgment may be issued to the latter court.

apply here. 5. Capture at sea of enemy’s property clothes the captor3 with all the rights of the owner which subsisted at the commencement of the voyage; and anything done thereafter, designed to incumber the property or to change its ownership, is a nullity. 6; Cases of prize are usually heard, in the first instance, upon the papers found on board the vessel, and the examinations taken in preparatorio; and it is in the discretion of the court thereupon to make, suá sponie,…

Held: that the secondary evidence of the contents of the letters was wrongly given: the court assuming of course that the search was insufiicient. 8.

Held: that when the attorney-general gave notice that he would not prosecute the appeal, such appeal was for all legal purposes in fact dismissed, and the decree of the board took effect precisely as if no appeal had ever been taken; and an order or decree of the District Court giving leave to the claimant to proceed upon the decree of the board as upon a final decree was a proper disposition of the case. 2.

• The 110th section of the Internal Revenue Act of June 80,1864, enacted as follows: “ There shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of 3*?th of one per cent, each month upon the average amount of the deposits of money subject to payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit, or otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future day, with any person, bank, association, company, or corporation, engaged in the business of banking..... “ And a…

The allegations of the captors were, that the vessel was enemy’s property, and with her cargo — largely composed of munitions of war — had been intending, either directly or by transshipment, to break the blockade, then established by our government, of the southern coast, and that both she and her cargo were, on these and other grounds, subject to be captured and condemned.

The present case came here by appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York; a decree condemning the schooner Hart and her cargo as lawful prize of war. The vessel was claimed below by one Harris; the cargo by Samuel Isaacs.

The Revenue Act of March 3, 1863,* provides that every invoice of goods imported from a foreign country (when obtained otherwise than by purchase and subject to ad valorem duty) shall have indorsed upon it a declaration signed by the owner, agent, &e., setting forth that it contains “ a true and full statement of the actual market value thereof at the time when and the place where they were procured or manufactured;” and further, that if any such owner, agent, consignee,…

The vessel had been captured as prize of war by one of the government steamers, about two hundred miles oft' the port just named, and being brought into the port of New York was there libelled in prize. C. Edwards, Esq., as attorney, filed a claim for certain British subjects, owners of the vessel and cargo.

An act of Congress of 1792* (section 27fh), provides that “ if any certificate of registry or record shall be fraudulently or knowingly used for any ship or vessel not then actually entitled to the benefit thereof, according to the true intent of this act, such ship or vessel shall be forfeited to the United States.” An act of 1793† concerning the enrolment of vessels engaged in domestic commerce, enacts (section 2d) that “in order for the enrolment of any vessel, she shall…

Held: in the New York bank cases, that the tax could not reach the bonds which made a part of the capital, while it is now held that it may be imposed on the shares of the capital invested partly or wholly in these bonds. Surely no argument drawn from new use or price of privilege can be valid for the latter tax which was not valid for the former.

On the 19th April, 1861 — seven days after Foi’t Sumter was fired on, and near the beginning, therefore, of our late civil war — the President of the United States issued a proclamation, by which he declared that an insurrection existed in certain of the Southern States, and that he deemed it advisable “ to set on foot a blockade of the ports within the said States.” “For this purpose,” the proclamation proceeded, “ a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance…

On the 13th July, 1861, Congress passed “An act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports, and for other purposes.” The late rebellion was in its rise at this time, but the act did not refer to it, nor was its operation declared, in any part of it, to be temporary.

A statute of Texas, relating to the registry of deeds, &e., provides as follows :* “ Every instrument of writing which is permitted or required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court, and which has been, or may be so recorded after being proven or acknowledged in the manner provided for by the laws in force at the.time of its registration, shall be admitted as evidence, without the necessity of proving its execution; provided, the party who…

Held: that the former act is limited to the prevention of resistance to the draft, and the latter to preventing resistance to the enrolment. Comparing the two acts together, the latter one is to be regarded as a legislative construction of the first, by which a service in relation to the draft, is not a service in relation to the enrolment.

An act of Congress, passed during the late rebellion, entitled “An act for enrolling and calling out the national forces, and for other purposes,” and which has numerous provisions tending to prescribe a mode of giving effect to its purpose, provides in its 23d section, that “ If any-person shall resist any draft of men enrolled under this act into the service of the United States, or shall counsel, or aid any person to resist any such draft, or shall assault or obstruct any…

Held: in the case of Middleton v. Alleghany Co., † that the issuing of their bonds as a means of making the payment was borrowing money for that purpose, within the meaning of the provision conferring the power, especially as it appeared that the bonds had been received in payment of the subscription.

Held: that though its appellate powers were given by the Constitution, they were limited and regulated by the judicial act and such other acts as had been passed on the subject. “ When the first legislature of the Union,” said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the

Merriam filed his bill in equity in the Federal court for Minnesota, for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by Haas and wife for $6000, with interest at 15 per cent.

“A levy by virtue of an execution is not always a satisfaction of the judgment; though the property levied on be of sufficient value to satisfy the execution, and the defendant be not guilty of… Held: and rightly of course, that such a levy — no levy whatever — was not a satisfaction.

These were appeals from decrees of the Circuit Court for Wisconsin, sustaining demurrers to two bills of complaint. Both bills and the essential question in each were the same; certain small differences between the bills being noted further on.

Held: in the last opinion delivered in the case of the Wheeling bridge, * that the power in that behalf, was surrendered under the Constitution to the Federal Government, and left to Congress.

<p>1. An acknowledgment on the day of its date, before a master of chancery, . in New York, of a deed executed 3d March, 1818 — probate being made by a subscribing witness personally known to the master, of the identity of the party professing to grant with the party presenting himself to acknowledge — and the record of acknowledgment certifying that the grantor “consented that the deed might be recorded where necessary” — was a sufficient acknowledgment of the deed, by the laws of New York regulating the subject, at the date when the deed was made.</p> <p>2. Having been so', and conveying land in Illinois, such deed was entitled to be recorded in Illinois; the laws of that State allowing deeds for lands in the State, executed out of it but within the United States, to be recorded when acknowledged or proved in conformity with the law of the State where executed ; and when so recorded, it was properly read without other proof of execution.</p> <p>3. Reputation being sufficient to establish death and heirship, a statement of them in a deposition, by an ancient witness, .long and intimately acquainted with the family about which he testifies, and who says that certain children (“as appears from entries in the family Bible, and which I believe to be true,”) died at such a time, and another child at another time, “as I am informed and believe,” — is not subject to exception at the trial.</p> <p>4. When a decree finds that due legal notice of intended proceedings in partition had been given to all the heirs of a decedent, the finding is, in Illinois, primd facie though not conclusive evidence of the fact.</p> <p>6. Jurisdiction of a court being once established, its proceedings cannot be . questioned collaterally by one not a party to them, and who seeks no rights under them.</p> <p>6. By the' laws of Illinois, a copy of a will proved in one State, and with its probate and letters duly authenticated under the act of Congress for the authentication of records to be used in others, may, after certain formalities gone through, be recorded in the county courts of a county of Illinois, where the testator had property. And when so recorded, certified copies of such county court records are evidence; being so under the general laws of the State.</p>

This was an appeal, by the United States, from a decree of the District Court for Southern California, under the act of March 3, 1851, to settle private land claims in California, reversing a decision of the Boai’d of Land Commissioners, and confirming to one Vincente Gomez a claim for a tract or rancho called the Panocho Grande.

The case was thus: On the 27th April, 1861, President Lincoln, reciting the insurrectionary action which had been for some time going on in the South,* and the blockade which he had, on the 19th previous, announced of ports of South Carolina, &c.; reciting also insurrection in North Carolina and Virginia, proclaimed that “ An efficient blockade of the ports of those States will also be established.” And on the 30th of the same month Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the Home…

<p>1. When the United States and the claimant to whom a Mexican grant has: been confirmed are both satisfied with its location, any other person! who seeks to contest such a location must Bhow some title, legal or' equitable, to some part of the land covered by the survey, before the. court will disturb it at his instance, or in his alleged interest.</p> <p>2. When all the elements of location prescribed by a decree of the District' Court cannot possibly be complied with, and a survey conforms as much with the decree confirming the grant as it can well be made to do, this court will not disturb it.</p>