Volume 72 — United States Reports

Held: that the commerce of Bremen, though neutral, could not be carried on through the Weser. This, he admitted, was a great inconvenience to the neutral city, which had no other outlet to the sea; but it was an incident of her situation and of war. It happened in that case that a relaxation of the blockade,in favor of Bremen warranted restitution.

Held: that a husband as administrator of his wife, whose death was caused by the act of another,, and who had no children, and no near relatives-but sisters, could not recover-for damages resulting by her death to him, and only for pecuniary damages sustained by her next-of kin.

Held: that the latter, being to be regarded as mere limitations in trust, the former was a limitation in trust also; not a common law condition. 3.

Held: that this preliminary testimony warranted restoration. 3.

Held: that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to restrain or regulate judgments, or suits at law, in the same court, and thereby prevent any injustice or inequitable advantage, under mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but ancillary and dependent; supplementary merely to the original suit, out of which it had arisen.

Held: that even under an act of Congress which directed an adjudication to bo made, among other ways, on principles of natural justice, the claim could not after such a lapse of time, and so considerable a failure to com *213 ply with the conditions on which the grant was made, be sustained against the United States. 6.

Held: as the act expressly declares, that the record, when duly authenticated, shall have in every other court of the United States the same faith and credit as it has in the State court from whence it was taken. * Repeated decisions made since that time have affirmed the same rule, which is applicable in all similar cases where it appears that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the defendant was duly…

Held: is not the subject of seizure and sale under judgment and execution against the trustee, whether that trustee be a natural or an artificial person. Judgment affirmed. Note.

Held: that while the share of the enemy was good prize, the interest of the neutral Spanish house could not be subjected to condemnation.

Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1866), was a case brought before the United States Supreme Court in 1866 over the issue of prisoners' rights. The court ruled that prisoners have no constitutional rights, not even Eighth Amendment rights. This was the first case stating the "hands off" policy that allowed states to run their prisons without federal interference. The application of the Bill of Rights to state action did not come until later and then only in part. At that time in history, the Bill of Rights was seen as a bar to federal interference with state actions, and therefore a means of ensuring federal restraint.

Held: in relation to the title and possession, as of no effect and void, as it respected the vendor and all claiming under or through him.

Held: that the creditor of the insuring trustee was entitled to recover on the policy; the case showing that the insurance in the form in which it was made, was made with the assent of all the trustees, and it being a matter immaterial to the company (supposing the risk to be the same) whether the person appointed by the insuring trustee to receive the money retained it to his own use or paid it to the trustees.' Error to…

Held: that the charter-party did not create any lien in respect of that part of the freight which was payable two months after the vessel’s inward report, although the charter-party contained the stipulation that the owners of the ship .should “have ail absolute lien on the cargo for all freight, dead freight, and demurrage.” Latter clause w7as intended, as the court held, not to enlarge the right of lien for freight, as…

Held: that the decision in the State court was “an authoritative adjudication, denying that there is an obligation imposed by law on the City of Chicago to remove obstructions., from its river arid harbor,” and that it was thus decisive, against the libellants, of the present action.

Held: That the decree of the governor constituted only a naked license to occupy the land provisionally ; and that the instrument issued pursuant to the decree did not pass any title to or interest in the land; that this license was a personal privilege of the parties, and upon their death did not extend to their heirs ; that a claim for land, resting upon a license of this character, is not entitled to confirmation under…

Held: too, in accordance with Lord Stowell, and in accordance with universal .public Jaw, that such restoration, in .consequence of . improper or irregular indulgence on the part of a blockading force, or in consequence of a more regular and formal license, did not have the effect to vitiate a blockade.

Held: and well held-, that there was nothing left for that part of the section which directed the payment of the excess into the treasury to operate upon, except the sums received from rent and storage.

Held: that the evidence was rightly excluded. Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Riggs & Co. were bankers in the District of Columbia: Thompson was a business man there, keeping a bank account with them, depositing specie, treasury notes, bank notes, bills for collection, in, the ordinary way of bank customers.

In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state of Kansas was not authorized to levy taxes on, and seize for forfeiture, lands which are set aside for Indian tribes by the United States government, under treaty or otherwise.

Held: that as all the subsequent proceedings were regular, t-he error in calling the election did *776 not invalidate the bonds in the hands of bond fide holders. The same question was again raised, and decided the same way, in Bissell et al. v. City of Jeffersonville; * a nd other cases since, are in harmony with these. † 2.

Held: that after the passage of the second act there was no authority for the sale or purchase of salt-marsh or tide lands within five miles of the city of San Francisco.

to this case, adjudged some terms since in the reporter’s absence, he is indebted to the courtesy of the learned Justice by whom the opinion of the court was delivered. Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court. This is au. appeal from a decree of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California, confirming the survey of a private land claim.