Volume 85 — United States Reports

Held: that the debt having been discharged by the discharge of the debtor under the Bankrupt Act, was not revived by what was written as above; that the promise to pay it was not clear, distinct, and unequivocal; short of which sort of promise none would revive a debt once discharged. Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

Pacific Ocepm, and to secure the government the use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes,” Congress incorporated certain individuals}.their associates and successors, as the “Union''.

Held: there having been no allegation in any pleadings, nor any proofs that the libelled vessel had sustained injury, thaf'a decree was rightly-entered against her for $7500. 6.

The case was thus: The State of California' was admitted into the.Union on the 9th of September, 1850.

<p>In error to the Circuit Court for tlie District of Iowa; the case being thus:</p> <p>On the 13th of May, A.D. 1869, one Reynolds obtained in the court' just named a judgment against Carroll County, Iowa, for the sum of $19,946. The judgment was for the amount due upon sundry county warrants issued for the ordinary expenditures of the county; all issued after January 1st, 1865. An execution having been awarded upon the judgment and returned “ nulla bona,” Reynolds sued out a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors of the county .to levy a specific tax sufficient to pay the debt, interest, and costs, aud to apply the same, when collected, to the payment. To this writ the supervisors returned, in substance (after averring that the judgment had beeh obtained upon ordinary county warrants issued for the ordinary expenditures of the county), that they had levied a county tax for the current year of four mills on the dollar of the taxable property of'the county, and’that they proposed to levy a similar tax for each succeeding year until the judgment should be paid. They further returned that they had no power to levy a tax at any higher rate. A general demurrer to this return was then interposed, and the Circuit Court sustained it. Hence this writ of error.</p> <p>The question was whether, under the laws of Iowa, the board of supervisors had power to’levy a special tax, beyond four mills on the dollar of the county assessment, in order to pay the relator’s judgment.</p> <p>The solution of this question and the consequent correctness of the action of the Circuit Court depended upon the fact whether that court had rightly interpreted certain sections in the Revised Code of Iowa.</p> <p>Section 710, of the revision of 1860, is as follows:</p> <p>“ The board of supervisors of each county in this State shall annually, as hereinafter provided, levy the following taxes upon the assessed value of the taxable property in the county:</p> <p>“ 1st. For State revenue, one and one-half mills on a dollar, when no rate is directed by the census board, but in no case shall the census board direct a levy to be made exceeding two mills on the dollar.</p> <p>“ 2d. For ordinary county revenue, including the support of the poor, not more than four mills on a dollar, and á poll tax of fifty cents.</p> <p>“ 3d. For support of schools, not less than one nor more than two mills on a dollar.</p> <p>“ 4th. For making and repairing bridges, not more than one mill on the'dollar, whenever the board of supervisors shall deem it necessary.”</p> <p>By an act of April 2d, 1860, which took effect on the 1st of January, 1861, the board of supervisors became the financial agents in place of the county judge.</p> <p>Section 250* is this:</p> <p>“The county judge [or as in consequence of the abovementioned act it now was the board of supervisors] may submit to the people of his county at any regular election, or a special one called for that purpose, the question whether the money may be borrowed to-aid in the erection of public buildings; whether the county will construct or aid to construct any road or bridge which may call for an extraordinary expenditure; whether stock shall bo permitted to run at large, or at what time it shall be prohibited, and the question of any other local or police regulation not inconsistent with the laws of the State. And when the warrants of the county are at a depreciated value, he may in like manner submit the question whether a tax of a higher rate than that provided by law shall be levied, and in all eases when an additional tax is laid' in pursuance of a vote of the people of any county, for the special purpose of repaying borrowed money, or of constructing or aiding to construct any road or bridge, such tax shall be paid in money and in no other manner.”</p> <p>The sections following, to 260, contain the details for the submission of questions, and provide for carrying into effect the propositions mentioned in section 250, which may be adopted by a vote.</p> <p>Section 252 declares:</p> <p>“When a question so submitted involves the borrowing or the expenditure of money, the proposition of the question must be accompanied by a provision to lay a tax for the payment thereof in addition to the usual taxes, as directed in the following section, and no vote adopting the-question proposed will be of effect unless it adopt the tax also.”</p> <p>Sections 3274 and 3275, in a chapter entitled' “ Execution,” are as follows:</p> <p>“ Section 3274. Public buildings owned by the State, or any county, city, school district, or other civil corporation, and any other public property which is necessary and proper for carrying out the general purposes for which any such corporation is organized, are exempt from execution. The property of a private citizen can in no case be levied upon to pay the debt of a civil corporation.</p> <p>“ Section 3275. In case no property is found on which to levy, which is not exempted by the last section, or if the judgment creditor elect not to issue execution against such corporation, he'is entitled to the amount of his judgment and costs in the ordinary evidences of indebtedness issued by that corporation. And if the debtor corporation issues no scrip or evidences of debt, a tax must be levied as early as practicable, sufficient to pay off the judgment with interest and costs.”</p> <p>The Circuit Court in overruling the demurrer considered, of course, that the pi’ovision in italic letters in the above-quoted section 3275- authorized a levy sufficient to pay the judgment.</p>

. The payment is limited by the words of this section to “ officers, volunteers, rangers-, mounted militiamen, or cavalry engaged in the military service of the United States.” The second section is as follows: “That any person who has sustained, or shall sustain, damage by the capture or destruction by an enemy,.or by the abandonment or destruction by thé order of the commanding general, the commanding officer, or quartermaster, of any horse, mule, ox, wagon, cart, boat,…

He bought his hogs of Y. Willett and W. E. Clark, trading as Y. Willett & Co., and there was a pass-book held by Fister in which the debits and credits were entered of the transactions between the parties; the original entries being made on the commercial books of Willett & Co. On Fister’s pass-book, under date of 21st November, 1865, was the following entry; “By cash, on 30th of October, $1500.” And on Willett & Co.’s books: “ 1865, October 30th, by cash, for proceeds of…

Held: that the complainants had a right to proceed in the Circuit Court of the United States to protect their property situated in Texas from seizure, invasion, or disturbance by citizens of that Stale, so soon as that court was opened, whether official proclamation were made or not of the cessation of hostilities.

<p>1. A sale of real estate made under a power contained in a deed of trust executed before the late civil war is valid, notwithstanding the grantors in the deed, which was made to secure the payment of promissory notes, were citizens and residents of one of the States declared to he in insurrection at the time of the sale, made while the war was flagrant.</p> <p>2. This court has never gone further in protecting the property of citizens residing in such insurrectionary States from judicial sale than to declare that where such citizen has been driven from his home by a special military order, and forbidden to return, judicial proceedings against him were void. •</p> <p>3. The property of such citizens found in a loyal State is liable to seizure and sale for debts contracted before the outbreak of the war, as in the case of other non-residents.</p>

In order, however, that the people of the tribe should not be deprived of a home until they should have secured a country to remove to, they were allowed, after the survey and before the first public sale of their lands, to select out of the surveys a reasonable settlement for each family, and to retain these selections as long as they were occupied. After this occupation ceased the selected lands were to be sold and the proceeds paid to the nation.

to enjoin them from making door locks of a certain kind, the exclusive right to make which he alleged belonged by the assignment óf a patent right to him. The ease was one chiefly of fact', involving the question of priority of invention. The court below was of the opinion that the complainant, or rather the person under assignment of whose patent he claimed and was working, had been anticipated in his invention; and dismissed the bill.

On certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan; the case being thus: An Interna] Revenue Act* of 1866 enacts “That any person who shall make . or issue any instrument, document, or paper-, of any kind or description whatsoever, .... for the payment of money, without the same being duly stamped, .... with intent to evade the provisions of this act, shall for every such offence forfeit the sum of $50,” &c.…

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of Iowa; the case being thus:</p> <p>Bartemeyer, the plaintiff' in error, was tried before a justice of the peace on the charge of selling intoxicating liquors, on the 8th of March, 1870, to one Timothy Hickey, in Davenport Township, in the State of Iowa, and was acquitted. On an appeal to the Circuit Court of the State the defendant filed the following plea:</p> <p>“And now comes the defendant, F. Bartemeyer, and for plea to the information in this cause says: He admits that at the time and place mentioned-in said information he did sell and deliver to one Timothy Hickey one glass of intoxicating liquor called whisky, and did then and there receive pay in lawful money from said Hickey for the same. But defendant alleges that he committed no crime known to the law by the selling of the intoxicating liquor hereinbefore described to said Hickey, for the reason that he, the defendant, was the lawful owner, holder, and possessor, in the State of Iowa, of said property, to wit, said one glass of intoxicating liquor, sold as aforesaid to said Hickey, prior to the day on which the law was passed under which these proceedings are instituted and prosecuted, known as the act for the suppression of intemperance, and being chapter sixty-four of the revision of 1860; and that, prior to the passage of said act for the suppression of intemperance, he was a citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa.’"'</p> <p>Without any evidence -whatever the case was submitted to the court on this written plea, the parties waiving a jury, and a judgment was rendered that the defendant was guilty as charged, and he was sentenced to pay a fine of $20 and costs. A bill of exceptions was taken, and the case carried to the Supreme Court of Iowa, and that court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court and rendered a judgment for costs against the defendant, who now brought the case here on error.</p> <p>There was sufficient evidence that the main ground relied on to reverse the judgment in the Supreme Court of Iowa was, that the act of the Iowa legislature on which th.e prosecution was based, was in violation of the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>The opinion of that court was in the record, and, so far as the general idea was involved, that acts for suppressing the use of intoxicating drinks are opposed to that instrument, the court contented themselves with a reference to the previous decisions of that court, namely: Our House, No. 2, v. The State,* Zumhof v. The State,† Santo v. The State;‡ cases in which the negative of the idea is maintained. But, referring to the allegation in the plea that the defendant was the owner of the liquor sold before the passage of the act under which he was prosecuted, they said that the transcript failed to show that the admissions and averments of the plea were all the evidence in the case, and that other testimony may have shown that he did not so own and possess the liquor. [This, however, rather seemed, as the Reporter understood it, to be a mistake; at least the record,§ if he read it correctly, stated, as he has already said, that the plea was all the evidence given and received on the trial.]</p> <p>The ease was submitted on printed arguments some time ago, and when the Slaughter-House Cases, reported in 16th Wallace, 36, were argued; the position of the plaintiff in error in this case being, as it partly was in those, that the act of the State legislature, the maintenance of which by the courts below was the ground of the writ of error, was in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Ccnstitution, which runs thus:</p> <p>“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State where they reside.</p> <p>“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall' abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdict ¡>n the equal protection of the laws.”</p> <p>The judgment was announced at the present term.</p>

Held: 1st. That in virtue of the act of 10th April, 1869 (14 Stat. at Large, 45), regulating the rights of property of married women in the District of Columbia, bv which it is enacted, ‘-that the right of a married woman to any property belonging to her at the time of marriage, or acquired during marriage, in any other way than by gift- or conveyance from her husband, shall be as absolute ns if she were a feme sole, and…

Held: unjustly. It was competent to the court to decree that the defendants should personally pay the costs of such resistance. Judgment affirmed. * Allen v. Brown, 44 New York, 228; Danklessen v. Braynard, 3 Daly, 183 . † Pattison v. Hull, 9 Cowan, 747; Jackson v. Blodget, 5 Id. 202 ; Green v. Hart, 1 Johnson, 580; Martin ex dem.

An act of Congress, commonly called the Confiscation Act, passed July 17th, 1862,* during the rebellion, and entitled “An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes,” after providing- in its first section that treason shall be punished with death, and in its second that persons inciting, setting on foot, assisting, or engaging in rebellion, &c¿, shall’ be punished with fine and…

Held: had not exceeded its powers. It therefore directed the writ to issue, accompanied also by a writ of certiorari, to bring before this court the proceedings in the Circuit Court under which the petitioner was restrained of his liberty. From the record of the case in the Circuit Court, and the return of the marshal in whose custody the prisoner was found, ‘the following facts appeared, and were stated, by the learned

Held: that the purpose of the two provisions was to vest in the new company the rights and privileges which the original companies had previously possessed under their separate charters ; the rights and privileges in Maryland which the Maryland company had there enjoyed, and the rights and privileges in Delaware which the Delaware company had there enjoyed; not to transfer to either State and enforce therein the…

The directors of the company, without consulting the stockholders or calling a meeting of them, resolved to increase the capital stock of the company from $1,250,000 to $1,500,000. To this one Allerton, who was a stockholder, objected, and filed a bill praying for an injunction to prevent the increase.

Held: on a suit on the policy-^and the company not having shown that the name of the master or the precise destination were material facts — that the application had no tendency to show that the assured when he made the application did not communicate to the defendants all the material facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and answer truly all questions put to him in regard to those several matters.

Held: that he was not estopped from asserting a right to the premises surveyed and patented to him. *256 Error to the Circuit Court for the District of California. Bissell brought ejectment in the court below against Henshaw and others, to recover one league square of land, situated in the county of Butte, in the State of California.

Held: and to what precise extent the decision goes. The libel was filed in the District of Maryland, charging Almeida with having committed a tort, on board a certain vessel off the Capos of the Chesapeake, in taking therefrom $5000 in specie, and converting it to his own use.

Held: that contracts of the husband concerning the equitable interest of the part allotted to him, made before the act was passed, are binding on the title which comes to his children by reason of a patent issued after the death of both husband and wife.

The legislative power shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the.

<p>1. Under the “act to increase duties on imports.” &c., passed June 30th, 1864,. the collector is under no obligation to give notice to the importer of his liquidation of duties on merchandise imported. The importer who makes the entries is under obligation himself, if he wishes to appeal from it, to take notice of the collector’s settlement of them.</p> <p>2. The right of the importer to complain or appeal begins with the date of the liquidation whenever that is made.</p> <p>3. The ordinary warehouse bond, in the form prescribed by the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, in which the condition provides in the alternative, that the penalty may be avoided by the payment, within one year, of a sum of money fixed, or. by the payment of whatever duties may be ascertained to be due whenever the goods should become subject to duty by withdrawal for consumption, is-hardly an ordinary pecuniary bond, but is rather a bond given to secure the payment of whatever duties may be by law chargeable on the merchandise to which it refers. At all events, if the obligor pay but part of the sum of money fixed as above said, and the whole of the sum thus fixed, proves, on liquidation of the duties for which the bond was given, to be less than the sum with which the goods are rightly chargeable, he cannot come in after the expiration of the year, and when, at law, a forfeiture has occurred, and tender payment of the difference (with interest) between the sum named in the bond and the amount which he' has actually paid. ■ Ho can be relieved from the forfeiture only upon doing complete equity, and that, in such a case, is nothing less than payment of all the duties to secure which he gave the bond.</p>

Held: that the creditors of the depositary, who had become insolvent when such approval was made, could not complain of the transaction, there being no pretence that the property substituted was less valuable than that taken, or that the estate of the bankrupt was less available to his creditors. 4. The trustees of a bankrupt take his property subject to all legal and equitable claims of others.

Error- to the Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; the cáse being thus: Keenan & Co. were residents of Chicago, and commission dealers in live stock there. On the 7th of July they gave "W. L. Tamblyn, then about to go to St. Louis .to buy cattle for them, a letter of introduction to Joseph Mulhall, a similar dealer of that place, and who previously, to this bad had dealing in cattle on his own account with Keenan & Co. The letter was in these words: Mr. Joseph Mulhall.

Held: “in proceedings of this character, where service is attempted in modes different from the course of the common law, that the statute must be strictly pursued to give jurisdiction.

Louis in 1869, and for many years previously, a person named Darby, originally, as it seemed, -a metpber of the bar, but who afterwards entered into various sorts of business, including, as a chief one, that of an exchange broker, and a so-called “ banker.” He had no capital worth speaking of, when he entered into them, nor any considerable cash means at any time. He was always scheming, and as respected ready money always more or less embarrassed.

Held: as distinguished from the separate interests of the individual stockholders The language of the amendatory act did not qualify this meaning; that only declared that other property of the company should also be deemed capital stock, and the additional provision that it should be vested in the respective shareholders, according to their respective shares, only meant that they should have the interest of shareholders…

Tiffany, trustee of Darby, a bankrupt, brought an action of debt iti the court below against the National .Bank of Missouri, a corporation organized under the National Banking Act of June 3d, 1864, to recover under the provisions of the 'thirtieth section of the act twice the amount of interest paid by the said Darby, on certain loans made by the bank to him before he was adjudged a bankrupt.

a patent for a sawing machine for fourteen years, in other words, till the 23d of May, 1868. About two years after the grant of the patent, that is to say, in April, 1856, the patentees assigned to one Schureman, for himself, his legal representatives, and assigns, all their right, title, and interest in and to the same for, in, and to Hudson County, New Jersey, to the end of the term for which the patent had been granted.

On petition for a mandamus to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Alabama, at Mobile. The case was thus: Between December 14th, 1819, when Alabama was admitted into the Union, and the 3d of March, 1873, various statutes were passed fixing the judicial districts of the State and the powers of District- Courts established for them.

<p>1. "When a collector of internal revenue in a rural district of Mississippi— where, owing to the lawless condition in which the rebellion, then but recently suppressed, had left the region, it was not safe to have gold and silver in one’s house — in vidlation of the provisions of the Independent Treasury Act. but with an apparently good motive — openly and without indirection, añfd because he thought it more safe thus to act than to take gold and silver — took in payment of taxes on cotton, accepted drafts drawn by the shippers of it on consignees of it in New Orleans (which was the place < ? deposit for taxes collected in Mississippi), after-wards (the drafts not-being paid, and he having in his accounts with the government charged himself and been charged by it with the tax as if paid in gold and silver), sued the acceptors, the fact that in taking the drafts instead of gold and silver, he had acted in violation of the statutes of the United States, does not so taint his act with illegality as that he cannot recover on them; the government not having repudiated his act nor called on the shipper to pay, hut on the contrary, leaving the account of the collector open to see if he could not himself get the amount from the acceptor of the drafts.</p> <p>2. As between the parties the collector’s charging himself with the tax and reporting it to the g'overn ment as paid, would be payment by the collector 'of the tax.</p> <p>3. Where a party authorized another to draw different drafts on him upon different consignments to be made, and this other made different consignments and drew different drafts, the party authorizing the drafts accepts them in advance, and should set aside gnd hold enough money from the proceeds of the consignments to pay them, come in for payment when they may. If after such promise to accept, drafts are drawn through a term beginning in October of one year and running into February of another (the drawee as the drafts are drawn being advised of the fact that the drafts have been drawn), it is no excuse when .the drafts do come in, as, ex. gr., in the middle of April of the second year, for the drawee to say that from their not being presented, in due course, he supposed that the drawer hád taken them up, and that on this assumption he had closed accounts with, him and paid over to him the balance found. He is bound to pay the drafts.</p>

• Error to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Boteler, of Prince George County, Maryland, died possessed of considerable real estate and of some personalty; owing to one Warner a debt which the personalty was not sufficient to pay, and leaving a widow and minor children.

Held: shall be the rules of decision as to the competency of witnesses in the courts of the United States. The second assignment of error is, that the court sustained the plaintiff’s objections to certain other depositions offered by the defendant, so far as they tended to prove that Catharine Lucas obtained title to the property in controversy under the will of B-. I).

Held: that if the seizure was not made in the county where the prosecution took place, the justices of that county had no jurisdiction, and that this fact might Jae inquired into in an action for making such seizure brought in New York, notwithstanding the record of a conviction was .produced which stated that the seizure was made within such county.

Orr, a citizen of Mississippi, suing for himself and in behalf of all others, holders of bonds of the county of Lime-, stone, in the State of Alabama (secured by a certain mortgage hereinafter specifically described and which the bill set forth), who might come in and contribute to the expenses of’the suit, filed a bill in the court below against the said county and “ The Nashville and Decatur Railroad Company,” both corporations of Alabama.

Glenn and another, assignees in bankruptcy of George Johnson, who, in 1868, in proceedings instituted on his own petition, had been declared a bankrupt by the District Court of Georgia, filed a bill in the court below against the said Gedrge, his wife, and a certain Flynn, trustee of the wife, to reach .certain real property situated .in the city of Atlanta,' standing in the name of Flynn, as such trustee, and to subject it to the payment of his debts.

■ Error to the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The New Jersey Steamboat Company had a night-line of steamboats which ran between New York and Albany, ,and which paid, tonnage duty in conformity with the laws of the United States. The boats were furnished with berths and state-rooms. But it was not obligatory on passengers going on the boats to take either.

Smith, a merchant of New York, died in June, 1817, leaving a will, which was duly proved on the 11th day of that month. By this will he appointed as his executors Hannah Smith, his widow, Andrew Foster, John Thomson, James Boorman, and Matthew St. Clair Clarke. All of them qualified as trustees except Foster, but before any of the transactions under the will which were the subject of the present suit took place, the acting executors were reduced to Boorman and Clarke.

On certificate of division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court- for the District of Vermont; the case being thus: An act of March 3d, 1863,* entitled “An act relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases,” enacts that “ any order of the President or under his authority,” shall be a defence to any actions, &c., for any search, seizure, or arrest, &e., made, &c., under and by virtue of such order, or under color of any lav) of…

,* thus enacts: “ All goods, wares, merchandise, ... on which duties are imposed tw the provisions of law, which shall be found in the possession or custody, or within the control of any person . . . for the purpose of being sold or removed by Such person ... in fraud of the internal revenue laws, or .with design to avoid payment of said duties, may be seized by any collector . . . who shall have reason to believe that the same are possessed, had, or held for the purpose or…

. . shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.” This provision of law being iu force, Boyce, on the 13th of February, 1861, gave to Tabb a promissory note, as the consideration for the sale of certain slaves. At the time the note was given, as ever before iu Louisiana since it had been settled by the whites, slavery existed, and the sale of slaves was lawful.

, certain direct taxes which had been laid by former law, were specifically charged ou every parcel of land in the rebellious States, according to divis.ions and valuations in the act prescribed. And in default of payment of the tax the statute ordered the land to be advertised for sale and sold.

Marcy brought assumpsit in the court below against the town of Ohio, in Illinois, on the interest warrants of certain bonds which the said town had issued,-and which warrants it neglected to pay. The parties waived a jury in writing and submitted the case to the court. The finding of the court was general, namely, “That upon the matters submitted, the court finds the issue for the plaintiff, and assesses his damages at the sum of $4286.60.” Judgment was rendered for this sum.

Held: applied only to a suit between a citizen of the State in which the suit was brought and a citizen of some other State, and clearly did not apply to a case where a resident defendant was also a party.

On motion by Mr. R: E. Williams (the plaintiff in error himself opposing), to dismiss; a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois; the ground of the motion being that no final judgment or decree had been rendered.

<p>1. A National hank, organized under the National Banking Act of 1864, cannot, even by provisions framed with a direct view to that effect in its articles of association and by direct by-laws, acquire .a lien on its own stock held by persons who are its debtors.</p> <p>2. "Where a thing is against the spirit and policy of a statute (as this sort of lien is hero declared to have been contrary to the spirit and policy of the Banking Act of 1864), a permission in favor of it cannot be implied from general expressions ; even supposing that liberally construed they embraced the case.</p> <p>3. A by-law giving to a bank a lien on stock of its debtors is not “ a regulation of the business of the bank, or a regulation for the conduct of its affairs,” within the meaning of the National Banking Act of 1864, and, therefore, not such a regulation as under the said act National banks have a right to make.</p>

•Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York; this being the case: Among the numerous ferries between Brooklyn and New York is that known (from the name of its New York dock) as the Catharine Street Ferry.

Espy, Heidelbach & Co., were brokers in the same city, dealing in government bonds and gold. On the 26th of April, 1870, a well-looking stranger entered the office of these last, and proposed to purchase of them certain bonds and a specified quantity of gold. They agreed to sell both to him at a price named, $3920. He then told them that he would go to Stall & Meyer, with whom he represented that he had dealings, get their check for the amount, and return in about two hours.

<p>A builder’s lien held not to have attached where a builder took a real security for payment of the work which he was to do, and afterwards, the work being all done, gave it up and took a more note.</p>

Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873), is a US corporate law case concerning the derivative suits in Delaware.

The county of St. Clair, in Illinois, sued Lovingston in the Circuit Court of the county, and got judgment against him. The Supreme Court of 'Illinois reversed this judgment, and remanded the cause “ for such other and further proceedings as to law and justice shall appertain.” To that judgment the county took this writ of error.

Held: that this was not a case for set-off within the Bankrupt Act, the two obligations'havipg been contracted without any reference to each other.

writ .of error was taken had been entered below, being in substance thus: Kintzing & Co. (a firm composed of one Kintzing and a certain Lindsley) were grocers in St. Louis, and kept a bank account with Bartholow & Co., bankers in the same city. On the 15th of January, 1869, these last discounted a note for $2500 of their^customers, the said Kintzing & Go., indorsed by J. B. Wilcox, aud maturing on the 15-18th of March, 1869.

By different Internal Revenue Acts a tax. was laid on brewers, by which they were made liable thus: From September, 1862, to March 1st, 1863, . . . $1. 00 per bbl.* From March 1st, 1863, to March 31st, 1864, ... 60 per bbl-† From April 1st, 1864,........ 1 00 per bbl.‡ And after the 30th of June, 1864, a penalty of SO cents was added where the return was erroneous because of refusal of neglect.

, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined than according to the rules of the common law.” An early statute of the United States, the statute commonly known as the Process Act of 1792,* an act still ■ in force, enacts: “ That the forms of writs, executions, and other process, . . . and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits— “In those of the common law shall be the same as are now used in tho said courts,…

<p>Griffith sued Starr in one of the District Territorial courts of Montana, on a mortgage on certain property; the suit being brought under the Civil Practice Act, quoted in the preceding case; an act passed under circumstances there set forth, and which it is necessary for the reader to possess himself of in order to understand at all this case. One Hershfield intervened, asserting that he had a mortgage on the property, of a date prior to that sued on by Griffith. The court gave judgment in favor of Griffith, and'Hershfield took the case to the Supreme Court of the Territory, which affirmed the judgment below. Hershfield now brought the case here by appeal, assigning among other errors the blending of equity and common-law jurisdiction.</p>

A mechanic’s lieu law of the Territory, just named, enacts: “Section 8.

Jones, Ramsay, and Lauterman, as sureties for one Quillian, were sued by the United States on á bond executed on 13th June, 1867, conditioned that the said Quillian should faithfully discharge the duties of postmaster at Milledgeville, Georgia, and “faithfully, once in three months, or oftener, if thereto required, render account of his receipts and expenditures, and pay the' balance of all moneys that shall c6me to his hands, and keep safely all the public money collected…

Held: that the making of the second contract was no infringement of the first. Held, further,.that the fact that B. and 0. had borrowed from the quar- ■ termaster at Port Leavenworth some of the corn which they delivered at Port Union, under their contradi (they having afterwards repaid it in kind)’, did not show that the government in making the second contract meant to evade its obligations-under the first.

Hicks obtained a patent for an improved wagon-reach, and filed a bill against Kelsey, charging infringement and praying the usual relief. The defendant answered, denying the novelty of the alleged invention, and also denying infringement.