Volume 94 — United States Reports

This was an action of assumpsit by the defendant in error, assignee in bankruptcy of Frederick S. Comstock and James M. Wheeler, formerly partners engaged in business as stockbrokers under the firm name of F. S. Comstock & Co., against George M. Wheeler, to recover certain moneys claimed to be due on account of stock operations of. said firm on his account.

Held: in Insurance Company v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 270 , and Railroad Company v. Wiswall, 23 id. 508, “that tbe remedy in such a case was by mandamus to compel action, and not by writ of error to review what has been done.” We have, therefore, jurisdiction of this appeal, but we are clearly of tbe opinion that tbe Circuit Court did not err in-remanding tbe cause.

Ebjroe. to tbe Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. This is a petitory action brought to recover a certain plantation in. Louisiana. The plaintiff (now defendani/'in error) claimed the land under an act of donation from her uncle, Ackley Perkins, passed the 5th of September, 1861. Perkins had purchased the land at sheriff’s sale made Aug. 8, 1861, under a vendor’s lien, and gave a twelvemonth’s bond for the purchase-money.

On the 30th of November, 1872, Hopkins obtained, in the ■Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas, a judgment against the St. Louis, Lawrence, and Denver Railroad Company for $6,385, with interest and costs of suit. Upon this judgment two executions were issued, and returned unsatisfied.

Petition for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri. George E. Ketcham, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others holding third mortgage bonds of the Pacific Railroad, filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri, Nov. 11, 1875, against the Pacific Railroad and certain other defendants, to foreclose a mortgage given to secure the payment of such bonds.

This is a suit by the assignee in bankruptcy of John W. Scruggs to set aside a conveyance of certain real estate made by the latter to his wife, as being in fraud of the rights of creditors. The court below dismissed the bill; whereupon the assignee appealed here. The facts upon which the decision of the court is based are set forth in its opinion.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri.</p> <p>This is an action to recover from Donaldson & Fraley the sum of $15,375, paid to them by the plaintiffs, for fifteen bonds, purporting'to be first mortgage bonds of the Central Pacific Railroad Company, and which subsequently proved to be coun terfeit.</p> <p>The court below found the following facts: —</p> <p>1. On the twenty-fourth day of May, 1871, Newman & Havens, bankers, of Leavenworth, Kansas, telegraphed to St. Louis from Leavenworth to W. Nichols, cashier of the Commercial Bank of St. Louis, as follows: —</p> <p>“ Get rate for 115,000, California Central Pacific R. R.. bonds, delivered to-morrow.”</p> <p>This despatch was, on said day, shown by Nichols to defendants, and defendants made a bid for said bonds, i.e., (100|-) one hundred and one-half. This offer was reported by telegraph to Newman & Havens by Nichols, and was by them accepted by telegraph.</p> <p>2. On the following day, May 25, Nichols received from Newman & Havens a letter, as follows : —</p> <p>“ Leavenworth, Kansas, 24th May, 1871.</p> <p>“ W. Nichols, Esq., Cash., St. Louis, Mo.:</p> <p>“Dear Sir, — ’Your favor of the inst., with inelosure as stated, is received. ‘We, this a.h., telegraphed you as follows, viz.: ‘ Get rate for 115,000, California Central Pacific R. R. bonds, delivered to-morrow.’ Same is hereby confirmed. We herewith hand you bonds. Please close the transaction and telegraph us immediately. The'party selling these bonds is waiting here to get the money for them. This same gentleman is an entire stranger to us, therefore, will you be kind enough to satisfy yourself that the bonds are all right. We desire them sold without any recourse on us. Your early attention will-much oblige, respectfully, yours,</p> <p>“Newman & Havens.”</p> <p>This letter accompanied fifteen papers, purporting to be so many bonds in said letter described.</p> <p>Nichols handed this letter to defendants May 25, with the bonds, and proposed that the defendants should take said bonds without recourse. Defendants refused to take the bonds without recourse, but said they would do this; viz., would give to the Commercial Bank their (defendants’) check for the agreed amount, $15,075, with the understanding that this check was not to be charged' up by the Commercial Bank, where defendants kept their accounts, until defendants had sent the bonds to New York and learned that the bonds were (“ O. K.”) correct. If the bonds were found to be correct, the check was to be charged up against defendants, and Newman & Havens to be advised; if not, the bonds were to be returned to the Commercial Bank, and the check returned to defendants.</p> <p>3. On the 24th of May, defendants having received invitation' to make a bid from Nichols, as requested by Newman & Havens in their despatch, telegraphed to plaintiffs by night despatch as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, May 24,1871.</p> <p>“ To Utley, Dougherty, & Soott :</p> <p>’ “ Make best bid fifteen Central Pacifies, quick.</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>■ After sending this despatch, and before receiving reply thereto, to wit, on the morning of May 25, defendants were shown by Nichols the letter of May 24, from Newman & Havens above recited, and the bonds.</p> <p>Plaintiffs received this despatch, and on the twenty-fifth day of May replied by despatch, as follows: —</p> <p>“ New York, May 25,1871.</p> <p>“To Donaldson & Fraley:</p> <p>“We will buy Central Pacifies át a hundred and two and a .half (102£).</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>Defendants received this despatch on the same day about ten A.M.; and on the same day replied by telegraphic despatch, as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, May 25, 1871.</p> <p>“ To Utley, Dougherty, & Scott, New York:</p> <p>“We accept your offer, fifteen Centrals, one hundred two and a half.</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>4. On the same day plaintiffs wrote and mailed a letter to defendants, as follows: —</p> <p>“ New York, May 25,1871.</p> <p>“Dear Sirs, — Your telegram of to-day received. You have sold us fifteen thousand Central Pacific 6’s at 1021 dt- ... 1 “ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>The fifteen bonds were delivered to defendants by Nichols, cashier of Commercial Bank, May 25, and were by defendants forwarded by express on the same day to the Bank of North America, New York, with a draft on plaintiffs for 115,375, the bonds to be delivered by the bank to plaintiffs on payment of the draft. By mail —mailed by defendants. On the morning of the 25th of May defendants sent to plaintiffs a letter, as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, May 25, 1871.</p> <p>“Messrs. Utley, Dougherty, & Scott:</p> <p>“ Gentlemen, — In accordance with your offer for 15 Central Pac. 1st mort. bonds, 1021, we replied, We accept your offer, and have forwarded them by ex. to Bank North America, with draft attached for $15,375. We would further add, that we have purchased the bonds from a party strange to us; and, not having ever handled any of the Pacific Central, we would sell the bonds without recourse as to their being genuine; consequently, please examine them, and, upon being found correct, telegraph immediately (Central all O. K.). We do not doubt the bonds, but, coming to us through strange parties, we use this as a precaution, and not willing to take any risk.</p> <p>“ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>This letter was received by plaintiffs at New York on Monday, the 29th of May, a short time before the bonds were presented by tbe messenger of the Bank of North America for delivery to plaintiffs, and prior to defendants’ draft for $15,375, which was presented at the same time as the bonds, as hereinafter stated.</p> <p>5. On the 29th of May, Monday, the messenger of the Bank of North America, with the bonds, fifteen in number, and the draft of defendants for $15,375, appeared at the office of plaintiffs in New York, to deliver said bonds and collect said draft.</p> <p>Plaintiffs had, on the said twenty-fifth day of May, sold the bonds “ to arrive ” to, Rasmus & Lissignola, bankers and stock-dealers in New York, engaging to deliver them four days thereafter.</p> <p>When the messenger of the Bank of North America arrived at the office of plaintiffs, with the bonds and draft, it lacked but five or ten minutes of the hour after which, by the rules of the New York stock board, deliveries of bonds and stocks sold could not be made for that day.</p> <p>Utley, therefore, without examining the bonds, went hurriedly with the bank-messenger to the office of Rasmus & Lissignola, to be in time for delivery that day. Arriving there with the messenger of the bank, he asked Rasmus to examine the bonds, saying he had not had time to do so.’ Rasmus opened and briefly examined the bonds; said they seem to be correct; and, at the request of Utley, gave the messenger of the Bank of North America Rasmus & Lissignola’s check for the amount agreed between them and plaintiffs, $15,403.12, which check was paid.’ - ’</p> <p>On the same day, and after the delivery of the bonds as above stated, plaintiffs wrote and mailed letter to defendants as follows : —</p> <p>“New York, May 29, 1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. Donaldson & Fraley, St. Louis:</p> <p>“ Dear Sirs, — Yours of 25th, and 15 thousand Centrals, with draft, received. The Centrals all correct, and we telegraphed you to that effect.</p> <p>“ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>7. On the same day plaintiffs. sent telegraphic despatch to defendants, as follows: —• -</p> <p>“ New York, May 29, 1871.</p> <p>“ To Donaldson & Fraley :</p> <p>“ Centrals all right.</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>. 8. On receipt of this despatch by Donaldson & Fraley, on the 29th or 30th of May, they informed Mr. Nichols, cashier of the Commercial Bank, that the bonds were all correct; whereupon Donaldson & Fraley’s check for $15,075 was charged up, and Newman & Havens were advised by the Commercial Bank, and remittance made to Newman & Havens.</p> <p>9. On. the 12th of June, 1871, information was for the first time received in New York, or elsewhere, that there were counterfeits of these bonds in existence.</p> <p>On that day plaintiffs wrote and mailed a letter to defendants, as follows: —</p> <p>“ June 12, 1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. Donaldson & Fealey, St. Louis, Mo.:</p> <p>“ Dear Sirs, — Yours Of 8th and 9th and 3d, Leavenworth, from Bank North America, 5th from U. & C. received.</p> <p>“Look out for counterfeit Central Pacific 6’s. Some appeared on • market to-day. ...</p> <p>“ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>10. On the next day, June 13,1871, plaintiffs sent telegraphic despatch to defendants, as follows —</p> <p>“New York, June 13, 1871.</p> <p>“ To Donaldson & Fraley :</p> <p>“ Central Pacifies you sold us probably counterfeit. Trace your party. Bonds shipped to Europe; can’t hear from them for several days.</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>11. On the same day, June 13, 1871, plaintiffs wrote to defendants, and mailed letter, as follows, viz.: —</p> <p>- “ June 13, 1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. Donaldson & Fraley, St. Louis,- Mo.:</p> <p>“ Dear Sirs, — Yours of the 10th, &e. ... We feel uneasy with regard to the genuineness of the Central Pacific 6’s you sold us. The bonds have been shipped to Europe, and cannot be heard from for several days. In case your parties are doubtful, it would be well to act at once as if the bonds are not genuine. There has been no suspicion that there were counterfeits out until yesterday.</p> <p>“ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“ Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>12. On June 18, defendants sent a telegraphic despatch to plaintiffs, as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, June 13, 1871.</p> <p>“To Utley, Dougherty, & Scott:</p> <p>“ We refer you to our letter, May 25, in which we sold without risk. Have purchased same day from Commercial Bank, and they from Newman & Havens, Leavenworth, without risk. Will aid you all we can, if counterfeit.</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>The bonds in question were sold by Rasmus & Lissignola, immediately after they purchased them, to parties who sent them to Europe, whence they were returned declared to be counterfeit, and returned to Rasmus & Lissignola, who immediately demanded repayment from Utley, Dougherty, & Scott, plaintiffs; whereupon, on July 12, plaintiffs sent a telegraphic despatch to defendants, as follows: —</p> <p>“New York, July 12,1871.</p> <p>“To Donaldson & Fraley, St. Louis:</p> <p>“ The Central Pacifies bought of you in May are declared counterfeit. We shall look to you for indemnity.</p> <p>“ Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>13. On the same day, July 12, 1871, plaintiffs wrote and mailed to defendants a letter, as follows : —</p> <p>“ New York, July 12,1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. Donaldson & Fraley, St. Louis:</p> <p>“ Gentlemen, — We beg to inform you that the Central Pacific bonds we bought from you on 25th May last have been returned from Europe, and are declared counterfeit. On behalf of the parties for whom we purchased the bonds we shall look to you for indemnity. We do not consider that the terms of your letter of 25th May in any way precludes us from our recourse upon you, especially not, in view of the facts disclosed by your telegram to us of June 13, 1871. We therefore telegraphed you to-day as follows: ‘ The Central Pacifies we bought of you in May are declared counterfeit. We shall look to you for indemnity.’</p> <p>“ Yours truly,</p> <p>“ Utley, Dougherty, & Scott.”</p> <p>•14. On the 12th of July defendants wrote and mailed to plaintiffs a letter,'as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, July 12,1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. Utley, Dougherty, & Scott,</p> <p>“New York City:</p> <p>' “ Gentlemen, — Your telegram received, in which you state that the Central Pacifies are counterfeit, and that you look to us for indemnity. In my former letter on this subject we referred you to our letter of May 25, and again call your attention to it. Will you have the kindness to write to us in detail on what grounds you propose holding or looking to us for indemnity?</p> <p>“An early answer will oblige, very respectfully,</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>On the 3d of August, 1871, defendants wrote and mailed to plaintiffs a letter, as follows : —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, Aug. 3,1871.</p> <p>“Messrs. U., D., & S.:</p> <p>“ Gentlemen, — Mr. Fraley just returned from Madison to-day, hence the delay in answering yours of 25th. We are acting under legal advice, and must refuse to make any assignment of claim, as we are not aware yet that we have any.</p> <p>“ Respectfully yours,</p> <p>“Donaldson & Fraley.”</p> <p>15. On the 8th of August, 1871, plaintiffs wrote and mailed to defendants a letter, as follows : —</p> <p>“ New York, Aug. 8,1871.</p> <p>“Messrs. Donaldson & Fraley, St. Louis, Mo.:</p> <p>“Gentlemen, — We have yours of 3d inst., and regret that you do not give us any more satisfactory information. ’ You will allow us to remind you that we paid your draft for $15,375, and received therefor nothing but counterfeit bonds. In answer to our despatch to you that counterfeit Central Pacifies had appeared in the markets, you sent us a telegram, referring us to your note of 25th May, and saying, at the same time, ‘ Will aid you all we can, if counterfeit.’ Setting aside all questions of legal liability, we submit to your sense of fair dealing, whether you are fulfilling this pledge. You now refuse to make an assignment of any claim you may have against the parties from whom you received the bonds, and assign as the reason for such refusal that you are under legal advice, and do not know whether you have any claim. But we do not ask you to guarantee that you had any claim, and it seems to us that the fact of your being under legal advice is no reason why you should not do every thing in your power to help us in recovering the money you have had from us for worthless bonds, but rather a reason why you should help-us the more readily. We beg to ask from you a full statement of the precise position you occupied in relation to these bonds; and, if this will aid us in our efforts to make good our loss, you ought to be thankful, and also willing, to give us any rights you have against these parties.</p> <p>“ Yours truly,</p> <p>“Utley, Dougherty, & Scott”</p> <p>16. On the 12th of August, 1871, defendants wrote and mailed to plaintiffs a, letter, as follows: —</p> <p>“ St. Louis, Aug. 12, 1871.</p> <p>“ Messrs. U., D., & S. :</p> <p>“ Gentlemen, — In reply to your letter regarding the position we have taken, we can only say, that, when you consider the circumstances connected with same, we think that you or anybody would act likewise; viz., Some time in May the Commercial Bank called on us and offered the bonds, and we made a bid. The cashier then informed us that the inquiry came from Newman & Havens, Leavenworth, and they would telegraph to them the bid we made to the Commercial Bank. In short time answer to Commercial Bank from Newman & Havens, that they would accept the bid, and had forwarded bonds to Commercial Bank. Upon arrival of bonds at the Commercial Bank, they received a letter from Newman & Havens, stating that they had never dealt in like bonds, and they were selling them for strange parties, consequently sell them without recourse. The Commercial Bank tendered us the bonds under same condition; and we refused to purchase bonds in the manner presented, but gave the Commercial Bank a check under the following conditions, — not to charge the check against us until we had been informed by you that the bonds were O. K. We then forwai’ded the bonds, and wrote you precise, that we had not ever handled any of the bonds, and we sell them without recourse, and particularly asked you to examine them, and more distinctly said, we sell without recourse as to genuineness, as they come from strange parties, and use this precaution, not willing to take any risk whatever. Upon receipt of the bonds, you telegraphed us, ‘ Centrals all right,’ and also wrote by mail, confirming your despatch, by saying, received bonds and draft, and found them all correct. "When we received this information, we then informed the Commercial Bank to charge up check, which they did, and at the same time credited Newman & Havens; and we are furthermore informed, the parties of whom Newman & Havens purchased did not' call for the money within ten days after this information of bonds being correct. Now, you see plainly that you are all to blame. Had you used the necessary precaution in examining the bonds, specially when your attention was called by us selling without risk, not only would none of us have any trouble or unpleasantness, but would have caught the thieves and brought them to justice. Now, please inform us what else could we have done. It shows that we acted prudently and with care. It is true, you may say, you received the bonds before the letter; but even and more so should you have examined them, and informed us. You are aware that New York is the market to detect all irregularities in the bonds spoken of, and you could easily have discovered, had you not been careless. Now, you plainly see our position. The Commercial Bank will not take them back from us, unless they are compelled to do so ; and why should Donaldson & Fraley suffer for negligence of yours, when they used all precautions and measures at the time ? It is true, it is hard for you to part with your money, but not more so than us, whilst we are in no manner to blame. Upon your information, confirming the genuineness of the bonds, we parted with the money received for the bonds. Should the Commercial Bank, or Newman & Havens, at any time come forward and offer to redeem the bonds, we certainly would be most happy, and be much better satisfied than the way it is now.</p> <p>“ Regarding our writing, that we would aid you all we could, did not infer that if you made a demand upon us for the money that we would pay same, but meant, that if it was in our power to make parties originally selling them replace them, we would do so; and we are more so willing now than ever; but we cannot concede nor agree to give you any claim against the Commercial Bank, whether we have legal right or not. It would certainly be admitting, on our part, that if we assign claim against Commercial Bank, that you certainly have likewise claim against Donaldson & Fraley, and also right to assign, which we really cannot admit, as we positively do not believe so. We are ready at any time to testify to the facts as they are, and were; and, should the law declare us wrong, we feel confident that Newman & Havens and Commercial Bank will abide by same; but under no circumstances will they refund without action', as they firmly believe, as we do, that your claim is not just, under the circumstances.</p> <p>“ If you were right in your demands, tell us, in the name of the law, justice, or common custom, would we, or any dealer, receive from any stranger or honest party known to us, but not responsible, any securities to be sold on arrival in New York, and the funds to be credited upon sale and delivery in New York, and especially if sold under the conditions'we sold bonds to you ? How would you have proceeded in this or any case ? The sum total is, you have made a mistake, and we are ready to assist you all we can to defend your claim, if you have any. We now refer you to-our last letter, in which we informed you that we would rather you would begin action immediately, in order to have things settled and the suspense removed. What we have written we will enter as evidence, and • has been written with consent of Commercial Bank, as they are fair and honorable.</p> <p>“ Trusting you now plainly see our position, and we feel sanguine, that, were you placed in our position, you certainly would not have acted differently,</p> <p>“Yours, friendly,</p> <p>“ Donaldson & Fkalby.”</p> <p>17. Utley (plaintiff) subsequently, in September, 1871, stated to defendants, when asked, in view of defendants’ letter of May 25, 1871, which he admitted having received, why he did not examine the bonds with care before paying for them, that he received similar letters from the country every day, and that he supposed defendants were cautious only because they had not handled any of these bonds before.</p> <p>18. The money paid by Donaldson & Fraley by their check to the Commercial Bank, and by it to Newman & Havens, was not, according to the statement of Newman & Havens to Nichols, cashier, called for, nor paid by Newman & Havens at Leavenworth, Kansas, to the party who sold the bonds to Newman & Havens, for two or three weeks after it was received by Newman & Havens from the Commercial Bank.</p> <p>19. Before writing the letter of May 25, 1871, hereinbefore set out, and transmitting the bonds to New York, the defendants, who had never seen any Central Pacific bonds, took said bonds, or some of them, to two banking establishments in the city of St. Louis, and asked one of the officials of each of said banks whether they knew about them, but was informed that they did not, as those bonds were not known or dealt in in this mai'ket.</p> <p>20. Both the plaintiffs and defendants were brokers and stock-dealers, the former in New York and the latter in St. Louis, and were business correspondents of each other.</p> <p>21. That the bonds sold by defendants to plaintiffs were spurious.</p> <p>22. That the identical bonds sold by defendants to plaintiffs have been produced upon the trial by the plaintiffs, to be surrendered if they shall recover.</p> <p>' 23. That the defendants, when they sold and delivered the bonds to plaintiffs, did not know or believe that the bonds were forged or spurious, and they did not know this until informed thereof by the plaintiffs on June 12,1871, as hereinbefore stated; and their only knowledge of the bonds prior to the sale and delivery thereof appears from the facts hereinbefore set forth.</p> <p>Upon the foregoing facts the court found as a conclusion of law that the defendants were entitled to judgment; to which finding and conclusion of ’ law the plaintiffs then and there excepted.</p> <p>Judgment having been rendered for the defendants, the plaintiffs sued out this writ of error.</p>

<p>Sect. 1007 of the Revised Statutes, which, as amended by the act of Feb. 18, 1875 (18 Stat. part 3, p. 316), provides that, where a writ of error may operate as a supersedeas, execution shall not issue until the expiration of ten days after the rendition of the judgment, has reference only to the judgments of the courts of the United States.</p> <p>On motion to set aside proceedings in execution of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin.</p> <p>On the fifteenth day of August, 1876, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin rendered a judgment ordering that “ a peremptory writ of mandamus do forthwith issue out cf and under the seal of the court, to be directed to the respondent [plaintiff in error], commanding him, and in his absence the assistant secretary of State, forthwith, within twenty-four hours after the service of the writ,” to recall the license given by him to the Continental Insurance Company of the city of New York to do. business in that State. The writ was issued and served on the same day, and on the next, Aug. 16, its command was obeyed. On the 10th October, 1876, this writ of error was sued out in due form, arid bond given to operate as a supersedeas.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error now moves that all the proceedings in execution of the judgment within ten days after its rendition may be vacated and set aside, and that all farther process be stayed'.</p>

Tbis was a suit by Tbomas R. Lovett, trustee of Mrs. Louisa Fletcher, against the United States, to recover the rent of and for damages to certain real estate and premises situated in the District of Columbia, and known as Kalorama.

Held: or on the first day of July, when the bonds were issued. This company was organized in 1860, under the name of *73 the Missouri River Railroad Company, and on the 18th of April, 1865, it consolidated with another company, increased its capital, and changed its name to that of the Leavenworth and Missouri-Pacific Railroad Company. We suppose this to have been authorized by the statutes of Kansas. Laws 1862, p. 768.

On the 12th of April, 1873, Clark filed his petition in the Court of Claims praying relief from responsibility, under the act of May 9, 1866,14 Stat. 44, on account of the loss, by robbery, of funds to the amount of $15,979.87 belonging to the United States, and in his hands as a paymaster in the army. The United States pleaded the general issue and the Statute of Limitations.. The court found the facts as follows: — 1.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was a libel against one hundred and ninety-nine barrels of distilled spirits seized at Galveston, Texas, March 18,1867, as forfeited to the United States. The causes of forfeiture alleged are, — 1. That the spirits, being subject to the payment of internal revenue tax, were removed otherwise than into a bonded warehouse, without the payment of the tax. 2.

This is a bill in equity filed by the Consolidated Fruifc-Jar Company to restrain the alleged infringement by the defendant of letters-patent No. 102,918, issued May 10, 1870, to John L. Mason, for an “ improvement in fruit-jars,” and of which the complainant, by mesne assignments, is the owner. The court below, upon hearing, dismissed the bill; whereupon the complainant appealed here.- The facts are set forth in the opinion of the court.

<p>.Error to the Supreme Court of Washington Territory.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.</p> <p>Th¿ facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the. Western District of Wisconsin.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: and tbe company has built and operated a railroad from Lawrence to tbe Missouri State line, and has exercised tbe usual functions of a railroad corporation. It has been a corporation de facto, at least, if not de jure, from tbe date of its organization. Its corporate existence, therefore, and its ability to contract cannot be called in question in a suit brought upon evidences of debt given to it!

<p>Where a party sued out a writ of error, and obtained the allowance of an appeal, and duly filed a transcript of the record here, the court will not, on motion, dismiss the cause, but, when it comes oh to be heard, will determine whether it is properly here by appeal or by writ of error, and proceed accordingly.</p>

<p>On motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota.</p>

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the power of state governments to regulate private industries that affect "the common good."

<p>1. Railroad companies are carriers for hire. Engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest, they are, unless protected by their charters, subject to legislative control as to their rates of fare and freight.</p> <p>2. The Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Company has, within the scope of the authority conferred by its charter, and subject to the limitations thereby imposed, the power of a natural person to make contracts in reference to its business. Like such person, it, or its assignee, the plaintiff in error, is, under the same circumstances, subject at all times to such laws as the general assembly of the State may from time to time enact.</p> <p>8. A power of government which actually exists is not lost by non-user. The fact, therefore, that the power of regulating the maximum rates of fare and freight was not exercised for more than twenty years after the incorporation of that company is unimportant. Nor does it affect the case, that, before the power was exercised, the company had pledged its income as security for the payment of debts incurred, and had leased its-road to a tenant that relied upon the earnings for the means of paying the stipulated rent. It could neither grant nor pledge more than it had, and its pledgee or tenant took the property subject to the exercise by the State of the same powers of regulation which might have been exercised over the company itseif.</p> <p>4. The act of the general assembly of the State of Iowa, entitled “ An Act to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges for the transportation of freight and passengers on the different roads of this State,” approved March 23, 1874, is not in conflict with sect 4, art. 1, of the Constitution of Iowa, which provides that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation,” and that “ the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens;” nor is it a regulation of interstate commerce.</p>

Held: that the legislature had power to prescribe a maximum of charges to be made by said company for transporting persons or property within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without. 2.

<p>Ebbob to the Circuit Court of the County of Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.</p>

<p>As giving a construction to the State Constitution and statute, this court accepts the decision of the Supx 'me Court of Wisconsin, that the charter of the Milwaukee and Waukesha Railroad Company, granted by the Territory, is subject to repeal or alteration, inasmuch as it was not accepted, nor was the company organized, until after the admission of the State into the Union, under a constitution which continued that act in force, and provided that all laws for the creation of corporations might be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage.</p>

Held: many years ago, that tbe mere application of an old process, machine, or device to a new use was not patentable, — that there must be some new process or some new machinery to produce tbe result, in order that tbe supposed inventor may properly have a patent for tbe alleged improvement. Howe v. Abbot, 2 Story, 194 ; Bean v. Smallwood, 2 id. 411; Glue Co. v. Upton, 6 Off. Gaz. 842; 7 id. 648.

<p>Error to tbe Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in and to the capital stock and property of the corporation ; and mutual releases were exchanged. It is this transaction, and the assignee’s release, which the complainant seeks to have set aside, alleging that the release and conveyance were obtained by fraud. It is obvious, at first sight, that most of the allegations of the bill have little, if any, relevancy to that subject.

This was a suit by the appellee to recover damages for the suspension of his contract,with the United States.

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p>

<p>So much of the act of the legislature of New York, passed May 22,1862, amended April 17, 1865, as requires, with certain exceptions, all ships or vessels which enter the port of New York, or load or unload, or make fast to any wharf therein, to pay a certain percentage per ton, to be computed on the tonnage expressed in the registers of enrolments of such ships or vessels respectively, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void.</p>

<p>Error to theBüpréme Court of the State of Louisiana.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That they had that riglit. 2. That, to enforce it, a mandamus lies from this court. Application for.a mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, to compel the allowance of an appeal from its ■ decision. The New York, Oswego, and Midland Railroad Company, *249 July 1, 1869, executed a mortgage on its railroad, &c., to secure an issue of bonds amounting to 18,000,000.

<p>Motion for leave to set aside an order dismissing an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama, under the ninth rule at the' last term, and for leave to file the record and docket the'cause at the present term.</p>

Error . to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. This was an action of assumpsit on fifty-four coupons cut from certain bonds issued by the township of East Oakland, 111., in payment of its subscription of $75,000 to the capital stock of the Paris and Decatur Railroad Company. The election authorizing the subscription was held Feb.' 1, 1870, and the subscription made Aug. 15 of that year. The bonds bear date April 20, 1871.

United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258 (1877), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that when courts grant a new trial, it vacates the prior judgement, such that higher courts cannot hear appeals of the initial trial and must wait until the new trial completes in the lower court.

Held: upon the authority of Spangler v. Jacoby, that the second appraisal was invalid, and that the parties had the right to purchase under the first. ' In the case of The Supervisors of Schuyler County v. The People, 25 id. 181, which came before the court in 1860, it was objected that the Senate journal did nob show that the bill incorporating the railroad company was read three times in that body before it was put on…

<p>Stipulations between counsel, relative to the course of proceeding in a cause pending in this court, cannot be withdrawn by either party without the consent • of the other, except by leave of the court upon cause shown.</p>

<p>1. A court is not required to submit evidence to the jury, unless it be of such a character as would warrant a verdict for the party producing it, and upon whom the burden of proof is imposed.</p> <p>2. Where the title of the original holder of negotiable instruments, which are infected with fraud, invalidity, or illegality, is destroyed, that of every subsequent holder which rests on that foundation, and no other, falls with it.</p> <p>3. Where the first indorsee, without notice of any prior equities between the original parties, purchases, for value, a negotiable instrument, the second indorsee, who acquires it before it is due, and for value, takes a good title, although he had notice of such equities.</p> <p>4. Bonds issued, pursuant to legislative authority, by a municipal corporation in aid of a railroad company are negotiable instruments.</p> <p>6. Town of Coloma v. Eaves (92 U. S. 486) cited and approved.</p>

<p>■ Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>

<p>1. Reissued letters-patent No. 3,218, granted Dec. 1, 1868, to Henry W. Fuller, assignee, by mesne assignments, of Israel M. Rose, for an improvement in a tuck-creasing attachment in sewing-machines, were not superseded by letters-patent No. 28,633, issued June 5,1860, to Henry W. Fuller and Anthony W. Goodell.</p> <p>2. The court holds that the apparatus constructed, used, and sold by the respondents do not infringe,the complainants’ patent.</p>

This was an action of ejectment for a part of Square No. 3, in the city of Washington. The Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, plaintiff below, proved a complete paper title to the land, and a continuous occupation of it for thirty years prior to 1867. The defendant entered that year.

Held: that bonds issued by a town of that State, to aid in the construction and equipment of a steam custom mill owned by an individual, were authorized by the statute. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas.

Held: “ Upon full consideration of the subject, we are of opinion that the United States have such a capacity to enter into contracts.

Thompson commenced proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy against Hill & Leufestey in the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Hill appeared to show cause against the petition, and, under sect. 5026, Rev. Stat., demanded a trial by jury, “ to ascertain the fact of the alleged bankruptcy.” Pursuant to this demand a trial was had, which resulted in a verdict finding the facts set forth in the petition to be true; and an adjudication was made accordingly.

This was an action of ejectment brought by tbe plaintiff against -tbe city of Keokuk and several railroad companies and a steam-packet company, to recover tbe possession of certain premises occupied by them with railroad tracks, buildings, and sheds on tbe bank of tbe Mississippi River, in the city aforesaid.

Held: where a cheek of the Treasurer of the United States upon a national bank duly designated as a depositary of the public money, having been paid upon an unauthorized indorsement of the name of the payee, suit to recover the amount of the check was brought by its true owner against the bank. 2.

Petition for a writ of mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. Talmadge E. Brown, having a decree in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee against the city of Memphis, made’ application on the law side of .that court .for a mandamus requiring the- city and its mayor and general council to levy and collect a tax for the payment of the amount due him.

Held: that the judgment did not estop the plaintiff, holding other bonds of the same series, and other coupons attached to the same bonds as the coupons in the original action, from showing, in a second action against the county, that he acquired such other bonds and coupons for value before maturity. & The finding in one action that the plaintiff therein is the holder and owner of certain coupons in suit does not estop…

Held: that where the right of action is grounded upon a specific, distinct contract, requiring the assent of both parties, and one of them is incapable of assenting, as in consequence of intoxication, in such a case there can be no binding contract.

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: the rights of the citizens of Virginia, which spring from citizenship, inure, by force of the Federal Constitution, to the benefit of the citizens of other States, even against a limitation in the State statute. Such limitation is void, because in derogation of Virginia’s compact found in the supreme law.

This was a petition filed by Martin against the United States. The court below found the following facts : — 1. In the year 1866 or 1867 the claimant was employed by the foreman of the steam-heating and ga3 works at the Naval Academy, at Annapolis, to work for the defendants at $2.50 a day, with the understanding that during the season of steaming,. which was from the 1st of October to the 1st of June, his time of labor was to be twelve hours a day.

Held: That a redemption of the property from the sale was practically effected by the purchase. 2. That the ownership of the State’s lien and the ownership of the title to the lands being thus united in the same person, the lien was merged in the title. 3.

The relator, the Gallatin National Bank of the, city of New York, was, prior to 1864, a State bank, incorporated under the general banking laws of New York. It surrendered that charter, and was reorganized as a national bank, under the act of Congress of June 3,1864,13 Stat. 99, known as the National Banking Aett and c. 97 of the laws of 1865 of New York, known as the “ Enabling Act,” with a capital of $1,500,000, divided into thirty thousand shares of $50 each.

Petition for a mandamus to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This action was against the defendants, as second indorsers of certain promissory notes, transferred by them to the Ocean National Bank of the cifcy of New York. The bank having failed, the notes came into the possession of the plaintiff, as its receiver. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. The defendants obtained judgment, and the plaintiff brought the case here.

District of Kansas. This was an action by the plaintiff to recover upon twenty overdue interest coupons, detached from bonds held by him and issued by the defendant.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.</p>

<p>1. A depositor in a national bank, when it suspends payment, and a receiver is appointed, is entitled, from the date of his demand, to interest upon his deposit.</p> <p>2. The interest being a liquidated sum at the time of the payment of the deposit, an action lies to recover it, and interest thereon.</p> <p>8. The claims of depositors in a national bank at the time of its suspension for the amount of their deposits are, when proved to the satisfaction of the comptroller of the currency, placed upon the same footing as if they were reduced to judgments.</p>

Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Fox & Howard were adjudged bankrupts by the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, June 5,1875.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>There are no presumptions in favor of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States; but the facts upon which it rests must, in some form, appear in the record of all suits prosecuted before them.</p>

Held: where, subsequently to effecting an insurance by husband and wife, upon their joint lives, payable to the survivor on the death of either, they were divorced a vinculo matrimonii, and she, having thereafter paid the premiums to the time of his death, brought suit on the policy. 8 Any person has a right to procure an insurance on his own life, and assign it to another, provided it be not done by way of cover for a…

<p>1. Where a railroad company issues its bonds, and mortgages its property to secure the. payment of them and of the semiannual instalments of interest thereon, as they respectively fall due, under the authority of an act of the legislature, which declares that the bonds shall not mature at an earlier period than thirty years, a provision in them, that, upon a failure to pay any coupon thereto attached, when presented at the place of payment, and a continued default thereon for six months, tire whole sum mentioned in the bond shall be.ome due and payable, is void.</p> <p>2. In such a case, the mortgage may provide that it shall be foreclosed upon nonpayment of interest. When suit in foreclosure is brought, if the sum ascertained to be due on the coupons be paid within such reasonable time as the court shall appoint, no further proceedings in 'the suit can be had until there is another default; if the sum be not so paid, a sale of the property, with a foreclosure of all the rights subordinate to the mortgage, should be ordered, with a direction to bring the proceeds into court, when, in distributing them, the sums secured by the mortgage must be protected, according to their respective priority of lien.</p>

Held: that he had the right to appeal from that decree. Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois. In the progress of a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage executed by the Gilman, Clinton, and Springfield Railroad Company, Francis E. Hinckley was appointed receiver.

Held: that, in order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act not amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful act, and that • it ought to have been foreseen in the light of the attending circumstances.

Held: that the proceedings and decree in the first suit did not conclude the complainant in the present suit upon the agreement. 2.

<p>This court, where it manifestly has no jurisdiction over the matter in controversy, will entertain a motion to dismiss the writ of error before the return-day thereof.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: in West v. Brashaer, 14 Pet. 51 , that resort might be had to the opinion delivered at the time of the decree. Availing ourselves of this rule, it is easy to see that there could have been no intention to open the case for further hearing upon the issues presented and decided here. There is not an expression of any kind in the opinion indicating any such determination.

<p>In thu distribution of the moneys remaining in the treasury of the Centennial Board of Finance at the close of that corporation, as provided for in sect. 10 of the act of Congress of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 208), the appropriation of $1,500,000, made by the act of Feb. 16, 1876 (19 id. 3), must be paid into the treasury of the United States before any division of assets is made among the stockholders in satisfaction and discharge of the capital stock.</p>

<p>Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe Eastern District of Michigan.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

Held: is not a final judgment in the suit. McComb v. Commissioners, 91 U. S. 1 ; Parcels v. Johnson, 20 Wall. 654 ; Tracy v. Holcomb, 24 How. 427 . After the further proceedings which have been ordered in the Circuit Court, the suit may be again taken to the Court of Appeals, and another judgment rendered there.

In July, 1870, Buckman & Co., having done' work and furnished materials amounting to $3,597.37 in repairing the “ Edith,” while she vras lying in navigable waters in her home port of New York, claimed a lien on the ship for materials and repairs, under an act of the State of New York, entitled “ An Act to provide for the collection of demands against ships and vessels,” passed April 24, 1862. Acts of 1862, p. 456.

Held: also, that the money being received and distributed under the rules of the stock exchange, by reason of the bankrupt having become a member subject to said rules, this was a sufficient defence to the party who so received and distributed it. Judgment affirmed.

Held: and the amount paid on said shares. The record shows that “ the defendant’s counsel claimed in defence, that, as said bank was organized under the law of Congress referred to in plaintiff’s declaration, the defendant, as such cashier, was amenable to no law but said law of Congress, and that the State legislature had not power to prescribe or define his duties as such cashier,” That this proposition raises what is…

Held: first, upon the general principles of law, that although an individual may lawfully omit to exercise his right to transfer a particular case from the State courts to the Federal courts, and may do this as often as he thinks fit in each recurring case, he cannot bind himself in advance by an agreement which may be specifically enforced thus to forfeit his rights.

Held: 1st, That a lien did not arise from this contract of apportionment, or from the special contract under which the work was done, but from the work itself, which was performed upon the property ; 2d, That the work being done on different parcels of property, the lien claimed on one was to be considered separately from the lien claimed on. the other; 3d, That the notice, so far as the mill was concerned, was filed too…

Held: that the company was liable to the shipper for the value of the goods. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama. The facts are stated in the

Held: where an act is required by statute to be done a certain number of days at least before a given event, that the time must be reckoned, excluding both the day of the act and that of *560 the event. The Queen v. The Justices, 8 Ad. & E. 178; Mitchell v. Foster, 12 id. 172; Zouch v. Empsey, 4 B. & Ald. 522.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>Tbe facts are stated in the opinion of the court,</p>

This is a suit by Joshua Merrill, for an infringement of letters-patent No. 90,284, issued to him May 18, 1869, for improved manufacture of two deodorized heavy hydrocarbon oils. The court below found that there was no infringement by the respondents, and dismissed the bill; whereupon the complainant appealed here.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the ■District of Massachusetts.</p>

<p>1. The rule of equity practice, that when a defendant’s answer under oath ex pressly negatives the allegations of the bill, and the testimony of one person only affirms them, the court will not decree in favor of the complainant, does not extend to so much of the answer as is not directly responsive to the bill.</p> <p>2. Purchases of real or personal property, made during coverture, by the wife of an insolvent debtor, are justly regarded with suspicion. She cannot prevail in contests between his creditors arid her, involving their right to subject property so acquired to the payment of his debts, unless the presumption that it was not paid for out of her separate estate be overcome by affirmative proof.</p> <p>8. The earnings of the wife while cohabiting with her husband are not, by the Revised Statutes relating to the District' of Columbia, made her separate property. She can have them only by his gift, and it Í3 not protected against his creditors.</p>

<p>Eeeoe to the' Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana.</p>

Held: that an internal revenue tax could not he legally assessed May 15, 1873, on B.’s succession. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. The facts are stated in the

<p>1. Where it is not a condition of a policy of life insurance that a statement of the age of the insured should accompany the proofs of his death, the party for whose benefit the insurance was effected, although no previous notice was given to the insurers that such evidence would be offered, is not estopped from proving at the trial of a suit on the policy that a statement of the age of the deceased accompanying such proofs, and differing from that made in the application, is erroneous.</p> <p>2. An entry in the minute-book of a lodge of odd fellows, of which the deceased was a member, made prior to the issue of the policy, and-sliowing his age . as recorded by the secretary of the lodge in the usual manner of keeping its records, is not admissible as evidence of such age. It is merely hearsay.</p>

Held: on appeal here by the owners of the goods, that the decree was conclusive upon the libellant as to the amount of salvage awarded ; that he could not, in the appellate court, claim any thing beyond that amount, since he had not, by any appeal on his part, controverted its sufficiency. Stratton v. Jarvis & Brown, 8 id. 10.

<p>Motion to set aside an order dismissing an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.</p>

Held: th¡at the judgment recovered in the action does not estop the defendant in a suit in equity by the same plaintiff, for an injunction and an accounting for gains and profits, from contesting the validity of the patent, it not appearing by the record, and not being shown by extrinsic evidence, upon which claim the recovery was had.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That he was not liable under the acts of Congress which prohibit a settlement by any person on land belonging, secured, or granted by treaty with the United States, to any Indian tribe. 2.- That they hav.e'a complete title'to their land, and are not an Indian tribe within the meaning of those acts. Erro» to tbe Supreme Court of tbe Territory of New Mexico. Mr. Solicitor Phillips for tbe United States.

This was an action brought by the Milwaukee and St. Paul Bailway Company against Erskine, collector of internal revenue for the First Collection District of the State of Wisconsin, to recover $17,296.12 paid by the company under protest in the year 1870, and by him claimed to be due from it for taxes under the laws of the United States. There was a judgment in favor of the company for $8655.07 and costs.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United-States for the Southern District of Illinois.</p> <p>The facts are' stated in the opinion of the court. .</p>

Held: that, under the statute, this was a sufficiently specific description of the route of the contemplated road, and that it was not necessary to insert the name of the company constructing it. 8.

Held: that the previous adjudication of the court upon the meaning of the statute — that it constituted a contract between the defendant and the State — did not estop the State from denying its constitutionality in the present case, nor conclude the court upon that question, although the point might have been raised and determined in the first instance. Ebbob to the Supreme Court of tbe State of Alabama. Mr. >$.

Error, to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska. Williams, a citizen of Iowa, brought suit, June ,9, 1869, m the District Court of the second judicial district of Nebraska, against Lowe, a citizen of the latter State, and obtained judgment Aug. 4, 1874, for $7,532.42. .

Handley, on the 14th of April, 1873, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia against Crim and Peeples, surviving partners of King, Crim, & Co., on four promissory notes, executed by the firm to Buffington & Co. The defence was payment. Peeples also pleaded his discharge in bankruptcy. When the case was called, no motion was made for a continuance.

Held: that the demurrer ' must be overruled. *661 Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the .Western District of Missouri. This is an action brought by the defendant in error to recover on certain coupons attached to bonds alleged by him to have been issued by the county of Dallas, in the State of Missouri. The pleadings upon which the question of law decided by this court arose are set forth in the opinion.

' This is a bill in equity, filed Jan. 12, 1872, by I. C. Plant & Son, against Joseph E. Murray, trustee in bankruptcy of James H. Woolf oik, bankrupt, and Daniel F. Gúnn, guardian, to restrain Murray, the trustee, from applying money in bis bands arising from tbe sale of certain lands of tbe bankrupt to tbe payment of a judgment in favor of Gunn, and asking that a debt in their favor, secured by a mortgage upon the lands sold, and for which they had obtained a decree of…

<p>1. Where an appeal has been duly taken, the supersedeas which follows from a compliance by the appellant with the act of Congress in that behalf operates to stay the execution of the decree.</p> <p>2. Where the subject-matter of litigation is the funds in the possession of a receiver, the court below may, notwithstanding the supersedeas, give him the requisite orders for their preservation; but it cannot place them beyond the control of a decree that may be made here.</p> <p>3. Should that court, by mistake or otherwise, proceed to carry its decree into effect, its action may be restrained by the appropriate writ from this court.</p>

This was an action at law, brought in this court by the receiver of the New Orleans National Banking Association, to enforce tbe individual liability of the defendant as a stockholder of that institution. The defendant is a subject of the kingdom of Italy, and its vice-consul at the city of Philadelphia.

Held: That the power of the county to subscribe for stock in the Alexandria and Bloomfield Railroad Company was the right and privilege of the company, and passed, with its other rights and privileges, into the new conditions of existence which it assumed under the consolidation. 2. That the subscription made by the court was the act of the county, and binding upon it, and that the bonds so issued are valid. 8.

<p>1. This court, in affirming the validity of the letters-patent No. 15,687, granted to Joseph D. Cawood Sept. 9, 1856, for “ an improvement in the common anvil or swedge-block for the purpose of welding up and re-forming the ends of railroad rails when they have been exfoliated, or become shattered from unequal wear occasioned by the inequalities of the road,” &c., which were before it in Turrill v. Michigan Southern, Spa. Railroad Co., 1 Wall. 491, holds, in addition to what was declared in that case, that they embrace a bottom support for the rail on the anvil; and that they are infringed. by the machines known as the “Illinois Central,” the “Etheridge,” and the “ Whit-comb,” but not by those known as the “Bayonet vise,” the “Michigan Southern,” and the “Beebe and Smith.”</p> <p>2. Where an account for the infringement of letters-patent is prayed for and decreed, the record filed here should set it forth. This court should not be called upon to perform the duties of a master.</p> <p>3 Considering the number of feet of rails mended by the respondents in the use of the machines covered by said letters-patent, and of those which infringe them, the gain in mending, compared with the cost of mending on the common anvil, and the saving- in fuel and labor, the damages decreed by the courf below are not excessive.</p> <p>4 In settling an account between a patentee and an infringer of his letters-patent, the question is not what profits the latter made in his business, or from his manner of conducting it, but what advantage he derived from his use of the patented invention.</p>

Held: p. 213, that the joint resolution passed contemporaneously with the approval of the act, 12 Stat. 627 , was “ intended for the benefit of his heirs exclusively, to enable them to take the inheritance after his death.” As to him, the forfeiture was complete and absolute; but the ownership, after his death, was in no wise affected, p. 209, except by placing it beyond his control while living.

Held: I. That the court had the right to set aside the judgment of March 2, during the-term at which it was rendered, and to re-enter it as of the date when the motion to 6et it aside was made. 2. That the writ of error was properly sued out on the re-entered judgment, and is a supersedeas. On motion, 1. To dismiss a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee. 2.

The Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Company was incorporated in the year 1868, by the action of joint commissioners of Virginia and West Virginia, in pursuance of the legislation of those States. The object of the incorporation was to construct a railroad from Covington in Virginia, through their territory, to the Ohio River.

Held: that, in the absence of proof to show how much of that profit was due to such other patents, and how much was a manufacturer’s profit, he is entitled to nominal damages only against the respondent. Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York. The facts are stated in the

■ Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case is fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: that the parties to this suit are bound by that decree. 2. The fact that one of the parties then appeared as a trustee for the bondholders does not render the decree less conclusive in a suit where his individual rights in the same subject-matter are involved. If he, at that time, owned any such bonds or coupons, he is bound, because he was representing himself.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. A negotiable.instrtiment, payable to bearer, or indorsed in blank, produced by a transferee suing to recover its contents, is, when received in evidence, clothed with the prima facie presumption that he became the holder of it for value at its date in the usual course of business, without notice of any thing to impeach his title.</p> <p>2. The title of a bona fide holder for value of an accepted draft, indorsed in blank, is not affected by the fact that the party from whom he received it before its maturity had possession of it for certain-purposes, and misappropriated it.</p>

<p>Appeal’from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe District of Nevada.</p> <p>Tbe case is stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

<p>A conveyance of lands in Alabama to a married woman, “ to have and to hold to the sole and proper use, benefit, and behoof of her, her heirs and assigns for ever,” vests in her, under the laws of that State, a statutory separate estate; and a mortgage of the lands, executed by her and her husband to secure the payment of his debts, is void.</p>

Held: place the final judgment in ejectment upon the same footing as judgments in other actions; but there is no trace of authority, either in State legislation or in judicial decision, to show that the provision abolish ing such fictions in the action of ejectment converts the action into a writ of right, or that the action, when commenced in the name of the real party against the owner or the party in possession, falls…

Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a process transforming grain meal into purified flour was patentable. This decision provided significant guidance on the patentability of processes and helped to shape the understanding of what constitutes a patentable invention in the United States. In this case, the plaintiff, Cochrane, alleged that Deener infringed on his patented process for manufacturing purified flour. Deener argued that the patent was invalid because the process was not a patentable subject matter. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court, which was tasked with determining whether the process in question was eligible for patent protection.

<p>Ebbob to tbe Supreme Court of tbe State of Indiana.</p> <p>Tbe case is stated in tbe opinion of tbe court.</p>

Held: where the question below was, whether a party, when he purchased property, had reasonable cause to believe that his vendor was insolvent, and was making the sale in fraud of the bankrupt law. *797 Eeeoe to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. Rice sued Melendy and others in the Marshall County, Iowa, District Court, for wrongfully and forcibly entering his store and carrying away goods.

Held: that, inasmuch as the mortgagee had not taken possession, his claim to the earnings and income on ■ hand at the time of filing his bill must be postponed to that of B. 2. Galveston Railroad v. Cowdrey, 11 Wall. 459 ,' and Gilman et al. v. Illinois $• Mi* souri Telegraph Co., 91 U. S. 003 , cite(d and approved, *799 Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansks.

Held: that the statute makes such a majority^vote equivalent to, and a substitute for, a subscription by the town upon the books of the company. 8.

Held: That there is no privity between the complainants and the new corporation. 2. That there was no privity between the holders of the certificates under the first mortgage and the preferred stockholders. 3. That the defence of the Statute of Limitations not having been set up by plea or answer, the case in that aspect cannot be considered. 4.

Held: in regard to the effect of certain conveyances of land in New York, set out in the