Volume 96 — United States Reports

<p>1. The powers 'conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and to establish post-offices and post-roads, are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or of the postal service known or in use when the ¡Constitution was adopted, but keep, pace with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances.</p> <p>2. .They were’ intended -for the government of the business to which they relate, at all times and under' all circumstances; and it is not only the right, but the - "duty, of Congress to take care that intercourse among the States and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily encuinbered by State legislation. .</p> <p>3. The act’ of Congress approved July 24,1866 (14 Stat. 221, Rev. Stat., sect. 5263 et seq.), entitled “An Act to aid in the construction of telegraph lines, and to secure to the government the' use of the same for postal, military, and other purposes,” so far as it declares that the erection,of telegraph lines shall, as against State interference, be free to all who aocept its terms and conditions, and -that a telegraph compariy of one State shall not, after accepting them, be excluded by another State from prosecuting its. business within her jurisdiction, is a legitimate regulation of commercial intercourse among the States, and-is appropriate legislation' to execute the powers of - Congress over the postal service'. " '</p> <p>4. Nor is it limited .in its operation to such military and post roads as are upon the public domain. ;</p> <p>5. The statute of Florida approved Dec. 11, 1866, so far as it grants to the Pensacola Telegraph Company the exclusive right of establishing and maintaining lines of electric telegraph as therein specified, is in conflict with that act, and therefore inoperative against a corporation of another State entitled to the privileges which that act confers.</p> <p>6. Without deciding whether, in the absence of that act, the legislation of Florida of 1874 .would have been sufficient to authorize a foreign corporation to construct and operate a telegraph line within the counties of Escambia and Santa Rosa in that State, the court holds that a telegraph company of another State, which has secured a right of way by private arrangement with the- owner of the land, and duly accepted the restrictions and, obligations required by that act, cannot be excluded by the Pensacola Telegraph Company.</p>

<p>1. In an executory contract for the manufacture of goods, and their delivery on a specified day, no right of property passes to the vendee; and, time being of the essence of the contract, he is not hound to accept and pay for them, unless they are delivered or tendered on that day.</p> <p>2. The court below having found that- the goods had not been delivered or tendered at the stipulated time, nor an extension of time for the performance of the contract granted, and there being nothing in the case to warrant the contractor in assuming that any indulgence would he allowed, the United States was not estopped from setting up that when the goods were tendered the contract was at an end.</p>

Held: after the most careful consideration, that the legal title to. the certificates was, by the purchases made by its cashier, *35 vested in the State Bank*. We find no reason to change this view. é The finding of the court shows clearly that Hartwell ' knew when he received the certificates that they did not belong to Mellen, Ward, & Co., and that they did belong to the State. Bank, represented by Smith as its agent.

<p>Appeal from the Court of Claims.</p> <p>This case was, on tbe appeal of the United States, before this court at the last term, and is reported in 94 U. S. 73, where the finding of the Court of Claims is stated.</p> <p>The. judgment below was then reversed, on account of an insufficient finding, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Upon a subsequent trial, the Court of Claims made a further finding, and rendered judgment-for Clark. The United States then brought the case here. As the additional finding is set forth in the opinion of this court, it is not necessary to insert it here.</p>

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the- Dis- . trict of Iowa.</p> <p>This action was brought by Cromwell upon four bonds of the County of Sac, in the. State of Iowa, each for $1,000. and four interest coupons attached to them, each for $100. The bonds were issued on the 1st of October, .1860, and made pay- ' able to bearer on the 1st of May, in the years 1868, 1869,1870, and 1871, respectively, at the Metropolitan Bank, in the city of New York, with annual interest at the rate of ten per cent a year. The coupons in suit matured after the 1st of May, 1868. They were, at the option of the holder, payable at that bank, or receivable for county taxes at the officte of the treas- . urer of Sac County.</p> <p>. As a defence, the county relied’ upon the estoppel of a judgment rendered, in its favor in á prior action, brought by one Samuel C.Smith upon certain earlier maturing coupons upon the same bonds,.accompanied with proof that Cromwell was, at the time, the owner of those coupons, and that the action was prosecuted for his benefit. It appears, from the findings in that action, that the County of Sac authorized, by a vote of 'its people, the issue of bonds to the amount of. 110,000, for the erection of a court-house ;■ that they were issued by the county judge, and delivered to one Meserey, with whom he had made a contract for the erection of the court-ho.use; that immediately thereafter the contractor gave one of the bonds as a gratuity to the. county judge; that a court-house was never constructed by tbe contractor or any other person pursuant to the contract; and- that the plaintiff became the holder before maturity of the coupons in controversy, but it does not appear that he gave any value for them. Upon these findings the court below decided. that the bonds were void as against the county, and accordingly gave judgment in its favor upon the coupons, holding that any infirmity of the bonds, by reason ■ of illegality -or fraud in their issue, necessarily affected the coupons attached to them. When that case was brought here on a writ of error, this court held that the facts disclosed Hy the findings were sufficient evidence of fraud and illegality bathe-inception of the bonds to call upon the holder to show, not only that he had received the coupons before maturity, but that he had given value for them ; and, not having done so, the judgment was-affirmed. Smith v. Sac County, 11 Wall. 139.</p> <p>When the present case was first -tried, the court below, holding that the judgment in the Smith case was conclusive against Cromwell, excluded proof of his receipt of the bonds and coupons in this suit before maturity for value, and gave judgment for the county. But when the case was brought here at the last term, this court held that the court below erred in excluding this proof; and that the point adjudged in’ the Smith case was only that the bonds were void as against the county in the hands of parties who had not thus acquired them before maturity and for yalue. The judgment was accordingly reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351.</p> <p>Upon the second trial, the plaintiff proved that he had received, before their maturity, the bonds payable in 1870 and 1871, with coupons attached, and given value for them, without notice of any defence to them on the part' of the county.</p> <p>As to .the bonds payable in 1868 and. 1869, and coupons annexed, it appears that the plaintiff purchased them from one Clark on the 1st of April, 1873, after their maturity, for the consideration of a precedent debt due to him from Clark, amounting to fl,500; that they had previously been held by one Robinson, who had pledged them to a bank in Brooklyn' as collateral security for a loan- of money; that Clark purchased them of .Robinson on the 20th of May, 1863, by paying this loan to the bank, then amounting to $1,192, and applying the excess of the amount of the bonds over the amount thus paid, in satisfaction of a precedent ■ debt -due to him by RobinSon. To each of these bonds there were attached, at the time of Clark’s purchase, -the coupon due May 1, 1863, and all the unmatured coupons. Robinson stated to Clark that the coupons previously matured had. been paid, and that those due on the first of the month would be paid in a few days. Clark had no notice at the time of any defence to the bonds, except such as.may be imputed to him from the fact that one of the coupons attached to each of the bonds was then past due and unpaid. There was a special verdict referring to the judgment in Smith, v. Sac County, and showing the facts above stated as to the purchase of the bonds and coupons.</p> <p>The law of New York allows interest at the rate of seven per cent a year, and any agreement, for a greater rate avoids the whole contract. The' law of Iowa provides that the rate of interest shall be six .per cent a year on money due by express contract, where a different rate is not stipulated, and on judgments and decre.es for the payment of money; but that parties may agree in writing for the payment of interest not exceeding ten per cent a year, and that in such case any judgment dr decree thereon shall draw interest at the rate expressed in the contract.</p> <p>The main questions determined in the court below — such, at - least, as are deemed sufficiently important'to be here noticed— were, in substance, these: 1st, Whether the judgment in Smith v. Sac County barred a recovery by Cromwell; 2d, whether as to the bonds maturing in 1868 and 1869, and the coupons annexed, he had the rights of a holder for value before dishonor, and without notice of any defence to'them ; 3d, whether, if entitled to recover on the bonds and coupons,' he should be allowed interest on them after maturity at the rate prescribed by the law of New York, or by that of Iowa ; and, 4th, whether ■ the jiidgment should bear interest at the rate of ten, or only • , six, per cent a year.</p> <p>The judges of .the Circuit Court were divided in opinion on these questions. Conformably to the opinion of the presiding judge, who held that the bonds which matured in 1868 and 1869, and the coupons-thereto attached, were, when purchased by Clark, dishonored paper, judgment, bearing six per cent interest per annum, was entered in favor of Cromwell, only for the amount mentioned in the bonds which matured in 1870 and 1871, and the coupons annexed, with interest on them at seven per cent .a year after maturity. This judgment is now brought here .for reyiew, each party having sued out a writ of error.</p> <p>A purchaser for value of an unmatured negotiable bond; with ■ an overdue coupon attached thereto, does not take it1 as dishonored paper, subject to all defences good against the original holder. Bass v¡ Hewitt, 20 Wis. 260; National Bank of North America v. Kirby, 108 Mass,. 497; Brooks v. Mitchell, 9 Mee. & W. 15; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343 Murray v. Lardner, 2-Wall. 110; Goodman v.' Harvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870 ; Burnham v. Brown, 23 Me. 400; Oridge v. Sherborne, 11 Mee. & W. 374; Grafton Bank v. 'Doe, 19 Yt. 463; Ferry v. Ferry, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 92; United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 91 U. S. 72; Miller v. Race, 1 Burr. ,452; s. O. 1 Sm. L. C. 597 and notes'.</p> <p>If the rate of interest where the contract is made differs from that at the place of payment, the agreement of the parties for either rate is valid. Miller v. Tiffany, 1 Wall. 298; Depau v. Humphreys, 8 Mart. (La.)" 1; Chapman v. Robertson and Others, 6 Paige (N. Y.), 627; Peck v. Mayo, 14 Yt. 33 ; Butters y. Olds et al., 11 Iowa, 1.</p> <p>Under the Iowa statute which governs this ease, the bonds after maturity bear interest at ten per cent per annum. Hand v. Armstrong, 18 Iowa, 324; Lucas, Thompson, Go. v. Pichel, 20 id. 490. In the States where a similar statute prevails, the decisions are to the same effect. Brannon v. Hursell;112 Mass. 63; Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer, 25 Ohio St. 621; Mouett v. Sturges, id. 384; Kilgore v. Powers, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 22; Phinney v.- Baldivin, 16 111. 108; Ktnyre v. McDaniel, 28 id. 201; Spencer v. Maxfield, 16 Wis. 178, 541; Pruyn v. The City of Mihvaukee, 18 id. 367; Kohler v. Smith, 2 Cal. 597; McLane v. Abrams, 2 Nev. 199; Hopkins v. Crittenden, 10 Tex. 189 , Miller v. Burroughs, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 436; Fim Burén v. Fim Gaasbeck, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 496.</p> <p>The judgment and the bonds bear the same rate of interest. Marietta Iron Works v. Lottimer, supra ;■ ■ McLane v. Abrams, supra; Henry v. Ward, 4 Ark. 150. But if it be otherwise, then the rate of six per cent applies only to so much of the judgment as was rendered on the coupons.</p> <p>Cromwell, as the. purchaser before their maturity of t,he bonds falling due in 1870 and 1871, and without notice of any defences which might impair their validity, and as the purchaser from a bona fide holder of the remaining bonds, who, before they matured, bought them without notice of any infirmity, is not limited to recovering the sum he paid therefor, but is entitled to the full amount due thereon, according to their tenor and effect. Lay v. Wissman, 36 Iowa, 305; National Bank of Michigan v. Green, 33 id. 140; Park Bank v. Watson, 42 N. Y. 49Ó; Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552.</p> <p>Negotiable paper is dishonored by any breach of the engagement which it imports. McClure v. Township of Oxford, 94 U. S. 429; Vinton v. King, 4 Allen (Mass.), 562; Neivell v. Gregg, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) 263;. First National Bank of St. P'aul v. County Commissioners, 14 Minn. 77; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. (Ya.) 750.</p> <p>The past-due coupons attached to the bonds maturing in 1868 and 1869 were notice to Clark)the purchaser, that the paper was dishonored, and the plaintiff did not acquire the-other bonds in the ordinary or usual course of business. Sui-dam v. Williamson et al., 20.How. 428; Vermilye f Go. v. Adams JExpress .Co,, 21 Wall. 138; McClure v. Township of Oxford, supra; Collins v. Gilbert^ - 94 U. S. 753; Shirts v. Overjoh, 60 Mo. 305; Davis, y. Bartlett St. John, 12 Ohio St. 534.</p> <p>The plaintiff, if entitled to recover, is limited to the amount paid by him, with interest. Moore v. Ryder, 65 N. Y. 441; Cardwell v. Hicks, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 458; .Story, Prom. Notes, sect. 191; Daniel, Neg. Ins., sect. 758; Chitty; Bills, 677; Huff v. Wagner, .63 Barb. (N. Y.) 229 ; Todd y: Shelbourne, 8 Hun (N. Y.), 510; Campbell v. Nicholls, 4 Vroom (N. J.), 81.</p> <p>Interest) on the bonds an.d coupons, after maturity and before judgment, was computed at an improper rate. Brewster v. Wakefield? 22 How. 118; Young v. Godbe, 15 Wall. 562; Goddard v. Boiler, 17 id. 123; Ward v. Mo'rrison, Car. & M. 367'.' The judgment bears interest at the true rate.' Hamer v. Kirkwood, 25 Miss. 95; Rogers v. Dee. County, 1 Dill. 529..</p>

Held: That the provision whereby, on the failure of the State, at the expiration of twenty-five years, to refund the original cost of'the road, the company was authorized to continue in the exercise of its franchises until they should be redeemed by paying such cost, extended only to the charter, and not to the supplement of 1861. 2.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

This was ejectment, brought Oct. 9, 1878, by Bernard L. ■Meister, for the possession of certain lots of ground in Pitts-burg, Pa. Both parties claimed under William Mowry, the plaintiff, as the alienee of the alleged wife and daughter of said William, and the defendants, as the vendees of his mother, in whom the title of the property vested, if he died unmarried and without issue.

Held: and in substance instructed the jury, that if Smith was the general agent of the company, and as such had authority to- bind the company by a receipt of the . renewal premium before the tenth day of December, 1869, a payment to him was sufficient, unless previously to such payment the assured had notice that the agent’s authority had been revoked; and that though, as a general rule, a person dealing with an agént…

This action was brought, Sept. 9, 1878, in the District Court; of the third judicial district of the Territory of Utah, by Bertrand Kuhn, against John D. T. McAllister, for the wrongful conversion of certain shares of stock.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the • Western District of Pennsylvania.</p> <p>The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a Louisiana statute that provided for special assessments against property for drainage purposes.

Morrison and others brought this suit to recover the sum exacted from them by Arthur, the collector of the port of New York, in excess of what they protested was the lawful duty upon certain imported veils.

In the years 1872 and 1873, Lahey & Co. imported from France certain articles of silk manufacture, on which Arthur, the collector of the port of New York, imposed and collected a duty of sixty per cent, under the eighth section of.the act. of June 30, 1864l 13 Stat. 210.

Held: that the articles did not come within the general terms of that section, because, 1st, they were not, by reason of their component materials, silk gloves; 2d, they were commercially known only as “plaited gloves,” or “ patent gloves; ” and, 3d, they did not fall within the concluding clause, silk not being the coniponent part of chief value. 2.

In 1878 and 1874; Zimmerman imported certain goods from France, which were composed of cotton, and commercially known as “ hat braids.” Arthur, the collector of the port of New York, imposed upon them, and collected, under protest, a duty of ninety per cent of thirty-five per cent ad valorem, under the sixth section of the tariff act of/1864 (13 Stat. 209), which imposes that duty upon “ cotton" braids, insertings, "lace trimmings, or bobbinets, and all other manufactures of…

Ebbob to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. This was an actito by A. Stephani & Co., to^ recover an alleged excess of duty .paid upon certain chocolate imported by them from Liverpool/ in 1873, and upon which the collector of the port of New York, holding it to be “ confectionery,” exacted a duty of fifty cents per pound ad valorem, under the first section of .the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 202).

Held: that they were dutiable under the ninth section of that act, which imposes “ on pebbles for spectacles and all manufactures of glass, or of which glass shall be a component material, not otherwise provided for,” a duty of forty per cent ad valorem.

In.March,-1371, A-rnsón & Wilzinski, tbe plaintiffs below, imported into New York a quantity of nitro-benzole, which is obtained by the chemical- action of its constituents — benzole and nitric acid — upon each other. ' It is then refined and cleaned by distillation, arid sold as nitró-benzolé and as “ oil of myrbarié ”, to druggists, soap‘manufacturers, “ and to the trade generally.” The defence introduced testimony, that this is .a well-known article of commerce,…

ew York. In 1873, Davies & Co. imported into the port of New York certain merchandise, on which the collector imposed and collected a duty of fifty per cent, under the eighth section of' the act of July 14, 1862. 12 Stat. 552. The importers insisted that they were liable only to a duty of thirty-five per cent, under the-twenty-second section of the act of March 2, 1861 (id. 191), and the thirteenth section of the act of July 14, 1862 (id.'556).

In 1873, Homer &.Co. imported into the port of New York 'certain'goods, of which linen was the basis, upon which .the collector imposed and collected duties at the fate of forty per cent, under the seventh section of the act of June 30, 1864 (13 Stat. 209). The importers insisted that they were dutiable at thirty-five per cent only, under the twenty-second section of the act of March 2,1861 (12 id. 192), and brought this action to recover the alleged excess of duties.

Held: that, under the last paragraph of the sixth section of the act of June 30,1864 ( 13 Stat. 209 ), they ■were subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem. Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. .In the year 1872, Herman & Co., the plaintiffs, imported from England certain cheap goods, the warp of which was made of cotton, and the filling or woof of cattle hair.

States for the Southern District of New York. In 1874, Rheims; the plaintiff below, imported into the port of New York a quantity of artificial flowers, composed of iron, • paper, wire, and cotton, and on which Arthur, the collector, imposed, under the twelfth section of the act of June 30,1864 (13 Stat. 213), a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem.

Held: that the latter sum was also the invoice value, and that the duty on the two per cent was improperly exacted. Error to the Circuit Court of the United Statés for the Southern District of New York.

York. ■This is an action by John M. Davies & Co. to recover certain duties claimed by them to have been illegally exacted by Arthur, the defendant, a's collector of the port of New York. In April, 1872, they imported from Liverpool certain merchandise, a portion of which is described on the invoice as “ Ducape Eglington ties,” which are manufactured of silk, and used and known as neckties.

<p>Error' to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that the contract only embraced the employment of the vessel when on such voyage oi voyages, and did not extend to demurrage. Appeal from the Court of Claims. The facts are stated in the

<p>1. The act of March 3,1853 (10 Stat. 244), granted for school purposes to Cali- ■ fornia the public lands within sections 16 and 36 in each congressional township in that State, except so much of them whereon an actual settlement had been made before they were surveyed, and the settler claimed the right of pre-emption within' three months after the return of the plats of the surveys to the local land-office. If he failed to make good his claim, the title to the land embraced by his settlement vested in the State as. of the date of th.e completion of the surveys.</p> <p>2. In this case, the title of the State to the demanded premises, being part, of a school section, having become absolute May 19, 1866, a mining company could, under the act of July 20, 1866 (14 Stat. 253), acquire no right, to them.</p>

Held: that the United States was not liable to the contractor for any number of cords beyond the forty delivered." Appeal from the Court of Claims.

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

Held: that when parties in rebellion had occupied and held in a hostile manner a portion of the territory, of the country, declared their independence, .cast off their allegiance, organized armies, and commenced hostilities against the government of the United States, war existed-; that the President -was bound to recognize the fact, and meet it without waiting for the action of Congress; that it was for him to determine…

Held: lv That the order of sequestration, the sale, the transfer on the stock-books of the company, and the new certificates, were void, giving no right to the purchasers or to their assignees, and taking none from the original owners. 2. That the bill was well brought, and the corporation a proper party defendant. 3.

This was a suit in the nature of a bill in equity, commenced July 29, 1876, in a State court of California, by Keyes, the owner of certain agricultural lands situated on Bear River, against the Little York Gobi-Washing and Water Company, and others, the plaintiffs in error, who were engaged in hydraulic mining upon the highlands adjacent to that river and its tributaries, to' restrain them from depositing the tailings and. debris from their several.mines in the channel of…

Error- to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Nebraska. ‘ This was an action brought by George B. Chandler to recover the amount of- certain coupons attached to certain bonds issued by the board of county commissioners of the county of Dodge, 'in the State of Nebraska, on behalf of the precinct of Fremont in said county. Chandler purchased the coupons sued on before maturity, and for a valuable cónsideration.

Held: unless such a construction of the statute is-absolutely necessary, that when the legislature, authorized the county to incur the debt, it intended to deny to the creditor the right to look to the treasury of the county for. its payment; in other words, that the debt was sanctioned, but that k was stripped of the usual incidents, of a debt, and the debtor was relievéd from attendant liabilities. ■And it is not to be…

Circuit Court of the United States fqr the Southern District of New York. This was a bill in chancery by George E; King against Robert Werner for the alleged infringement by the latter of two reissued letters-patent, No. 3000 and .No. 3001, granted to the complainant .June 23, 1868, the first being, for an improvement in fluting-machines.

Morrison, the appellee, a lieutenant in the tenth regiment of cavalry, was appointed regimental quartermaster, and his appointment approved June 30, 1875.

Held: that, by entering into these negotiations, he waived the forfeiture of the original license. The negotiations assumed that the original license was to continue to its termination. The exaction of the forfeiture was in the landlord’s election; and he evinced his election not to enforce it by entering into the negotiations.

The bill in this case was filed. June 1, 1872, by Cochrane Fleming, to restrain the alleged infringement of his trade-mark for liver pills, by Jlimes H. McLean. As early as. 1884, Dr. Charles McLane, of Morgantown, Va., made and sold liver pills, putting them up in wooden boxes, labelled “Dr. McLane’s Liver Pills.” In June, 1844, Jonathan Kidd, having purchased the exclusive .right from him, be- ■ gan, at Pittsburg, Penn., to make and sell them.

'rror to tbe Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe ,ern Dist *ict of Missouri.

Held: that the bank was entitled to recover. Error to the Superior Court of the city of New York. This suit was brought by the Union National Bank of Pitts-burg, Pa., against George M. Wheeler, as indorser of two bills of exchange, one dated Jan. 20, 1871, for $10,000, and one dated.

Held: that their legal effect is .precisely what it would have been had the date inserted been. Oct. 15 instead of Sépt. -10, 1872. 4.

This was an action for tbe recovery, of certain real property, described in the petition of. tbe plaintiff, situated in tbe city of New Orleans, and of tbe rents and profits. Tbe plaintiff claimed title to tbe premises by a conveyance from bis father, Charles M. Conrad, made to himself and bis brother on tbe 6th of May, 1862, and a subsequent conveyance to himself of his brother’s interest.

Held: by the unanimous decision of this court, that the purchase of the cotton was illegal and void, and that it gave the puichaser no title whatever.. Mitchel v. United States, 21 Wall. 350 ; Desmare v. United States, 93 U. S. 605 . Whatever interest he had in the property had been seized as forfeited to the United States, and placed, pending the suit, beyond his reach or that of his creditor.

Held: that the city is estopped from denying the verity of the recital, and that the bonds or securities are valid in the hands of a bona fide • purchaser for value before maturity. 3.

This was ejectment by William McGarrahan in the District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District of California in and for Santa Clara County, against the New Idria Mining Company, to recover possession of certain, lands in that State known as the Rancho Panoche Grande. He claimed them under a patent therefor which he alleged had been issued by the United States fco.

Held: that in a suit on the contract the purchaser was entitled to a corresponding reduction in the contract price of the goods, without showing that the decline in gold had affected the general price of merchandise. .Ebbob to tbe Circuit' Court of tbe United States for tbe Western District of Michigan.' Quimby brought an action against Ames & -Sons, upon the following contract, viz.: — “ N. Easton, Jan. 2, 1865. “ Mr.…

Held: That the plea admits the existence of the corporation; and that the State alone can raise the question whether the corporate stock had been properly increased. 2. That the transferee of stock, who caused the transfer to be made to himself on the books • of the corporation, although he holds it as collateral security for a debt of his transferrer, is liable for such balance to such assignee.

, Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. This was a suit in equity, brought June 28, 1869, to redeem certain real property in Wasbington City.

<p>1. Except in cases arising nnder the bankrupt law, a court of the United States cannot enjoin a party from proceeding fn a State court.</p> <p>2. A bill of'foreclosure is had for misjoinder of parties and for multifariousness, where persons are made defendants thereto who claim title adversely to the mortgagor and the complainant, and the latter seeks in that suit to litigate and settle his rights.</p>

Held: that “although there may be a defect df power in a corporation to make a con tract,, yet if a contract made by it is not in, violation of its charter, or of any statute prohibiting it, and the 'corporation has by its promise induced a party relying on the promise and in execution of the contract to expend money and perform his part thereof, -the corporation is, liable on the contract.” See also, substantially to the…

Held: that the contract prohibited him from cutting wood within, the reservation, and that he cannot recover damages for any éxpense he incurred by reason of being compelled to out and haul, from a point outside the reservation, the wood necessary to complete his contract. Appeal from tbe Court of Claims.

Certificate of division between the judges, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New ' York. Simmons was indicted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York for violating sects. 3258, 3259, 3266, and .3281 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The indictment contained four counts, the second of which was drawn under sect. 3266, and the fourth . under sect. 3281.

Held: ' that, as the obligations were payable in goods and hot in money, and the sum. of fifty cents was named merely as the limit' of the value of the goods demand-able, the indictment was bad on demurrer. Certifícate of division in opinion between the judges of ■ the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District jf Michigan. ■ ... The facts are stated in the

<p>A foreign insurance company was doing business in Pennsylvania under a license granted pursuant to a statute, which, among other things, provided that the . company should file a written stipulation, agreeing that process issued in any suit-brought in any court of that Commonwealth having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and served upon the agent specified by the'company to receive service of process for it, should have the same effect as if personally served upori.the company within the State. . Suit was brought in the Circuit. Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by a citizen of that State against the company, and process served, in'accordance with the State law, upon its agent so specified, who resided -within the district. The service of the process was quashed, because the company was not an inhabitant' of..or-found within-the district. Held,-1. That the, Circuit Court .has jurisdiction of the suit, and should-proceed to hear and determine it. 2. That said court is a court of the Commonwealth, within the intent of the statute,</p>

<p>Where Congress has, in the exercise oí its lawful authority, inaugurated or adopted a system for the improvement, of a' harbor, and is, by appropriating the public moneys, carrying.it out, this court has no authority to prescribe the manner in which the work shall be conducted, or to forbid its completion, or to require the undoing of that which has been done. .</p>

This bill, for an account and a distribution' of profits, was filed by Fanny A. Huntington, administratrix, and Frank H. Gassaway, administrator, of William S. Huntington, deceased, against the-National Savings Bank of the District of Columbia, a corporation chartered by an act of Congress approved May 24, 1870 (16 Stat. 187), the provisions of which are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: ■ said the Chief Justice, that inanimate matter can commit no offence. But the ship, as a body, is animated and put. in action by the cfew, who are guided by the master. -The vessel' acts and speaks by the master;' she reports herself -by the master. It is, therefore, not unreasonable that the vessel should be affected by this report.

Held: That while a state of mutual ill-will or hostile feeling may justify a court in removing a trustee, in a case where he has a discretionary power over the rights of the ceMui que trust, and has duties to discharge which necessarily bring the parties into personal intercourse with each other, it is not sufficient -cause where no such intercourse is required and the duties are'merely formal and ministerial, and no…

Held: tliat there- was no privity between the United States and the men employed by him in the execution of his contract.,. Appeal from the Court of Claims. The facts are stated in the

On the twenty-first day of July,- 1869, Edwin 1. Sherburne, Edwin Walker, and Charles B. Farwell entered into a written 'contract with the canal commissioners of the State of Illinois, for the construction of a lock and dam in the Illinois River, near the city of Henry, in which they agreed to commence the work on or before the first day of August, 1869, and complete it by the first day' of September, 1871.

Held: that his receipt of the money was equivalent to an acceptance of it in satisfaction of the claim. 2. Where a party brings an action for a part only of an entire indivisible demand; and recovers judgment, he is estopped from subsequently bringing a,n action for another part of the same demand. Appeal from the Court of Claims.

Held: it is true, that a State has power to tax its own bonds equally with other property, and that, the exercise of such a power involves no violation óf a contract. But it was not held that the State could collect the tax by withholding from the creditor any part of what the State had assumed to pay.

Held: that the mode adopted by the State board was in substantial conformity to the laws of Illinois. Appeal from tbe Circuit Court of tbe United. States for' tbe Southern District of Illinois'. The facts are stated in tbe opinion of tbe court. Mr. Joseph JE. McDonald and. Mr. It. P. Ranney for tbe appellant. Mr. James K. Edsall, Attorney-General of Illinois, contra.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.</p> <p>This is an appeal from the decree of' the court below in the execution of the mandate of this court in The Lady Pike (21 Wall. 1), where the former decree was reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with' the. opinion.</p> <p>The facts .are stated and the assignment of errors set out in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>cited the follow;ing authorities in support of the respective assignments of error:—</p> <p>First assignment: Dane v. Townsend, 1 Ware, 289; The Ship Empire and Cargo, 1 Ben. 19; The Union, 4 Blatchf. 90; The White Squall, id. 103; Carroll et dl. v. The Steamboat T'. P. Leathers, Newb. Adm. 432; Caines v. Travis, 1 Abb. Adm. 297. Second assignment: The White Squall, supra. Third assignment: Whitwell et al. v. Burnside, 1 Mete. (Mass.) 39; Morgan v. Morgan, 4 Gill & J. (Md.) 395; Me Cluskey-v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Sawyer v. Oakman, 11 Blatchf. 65; Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 681; Smith v. United States, 2 Wall. 219; Leggett et al. v. Humphreys, 21 How. 66; United States v. Boyd et al., 15 Pet. 187; United States v. Boeekér, 21 Wall. 652; Smith v. Huesman, Cent. Law Jour., Dec. 7, 1877, No. 23, p. .492 ;• The Ann Caroline, 2 Wall. 538; The Harriet, 1 Rob. Adm.- 183; Myres et al. v. Parker, 6 Ohio St. 501. Fourth assignment: Carpentier v. Minturn, 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 293, and authorities there cited; Allen v. Malcolm, 12 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 335; Mahaney v. Penman, 4 Duer (N.Y.), 603; Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. 253; Watson v. The Cabot Bank, 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 423; Murray v. Vanderbilt, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 148. ■ Fifth assignment: Me Covney v. The State of Ohio, 20 Ohio, 83; Crant v. Naylor, 4 Cranch, 224.</p> <p>The court declined to hear counsel for the appellees.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.</p> <p>The National New Orleans Banking Association, an organization formed under tbe National Bañking Act of 1864, failed and ' suspended payment on the 4tb of October, 1873, and ón the 27th Of that month was placed in the hands of a receiver, under -the fiftieth section of the act. At or about the time of the failure, Charles Cavaroc, the president of the bank, took therefrom certain bills and notes to the amount of $325,011.26, and delivered the same to his-firm of C. Cavaroc & Son, who claimed to hold them as agents for the Société de Crédit Mobilier of Paris, by way of pledge to secure said society for certain acceptances of bills drawn by the bank in July previous. The bill in this case was filed by the receiver to recover possession of said securities,’ alleging that they were delivered by the bank to Cavaroc & Son, in contemplation of the insolvency of the bank, not by - way of pledge, but with a view to give a preference to Cavaroc & Son and the Credit Mobilier over other creditors of the bank, contrary to tbe provisions of tbe fifty-second section of the banking act. The defendants, Cavaroc & Son and the Credit Mobilier, by their several answers, deny that the securities were delivered by way of preference in contemplation of the insolvency of the bank, and insist that they were actually pledged to the society by virtue of a distinct agreement, as a consideration and security for the acceptance by it of bills drawn by the bank to the amount of one million francs; which bills were drawn in pursuance of .said agreement, and were negotiated by the bank for over $218,000, and were duly accepted by the society upon the faith of the pledged securities. The answers aver that at the time of this transaction the bank was in good credit and standing.'</p> <p>The parties having gone into proofs, the following facts were shown: —</p> <p>'From May, 1873, until the time of its failure the bank was in a weak financial condition, and constantly becoming weaker. The cashier testified that on the 31st of May it had hardly any funds to meet current checks, whilst the amount due to depositors was $680,775. A deposit of $25,000 was oppor-. tunely made by a customer on that day; but the president, Cavaroc, was so apprehensive of immediate suspension, that he refused to let it be used, telling the paying teller that if any thing should happen, he did not want the depositor to lose this money. By getting temporary relief from the other banks of the city, and from the New Orleans Insurance Association, and other large loans, it kept its doors open until the 4th of October, though, in .connection with most of the other banks of New Orleans, it ceased, from and after the 24th of September, to pay cash, except for very small amounts, paying only in clearingdiouse certificates, which it obtained by depositing collaterals with the trustees of the clearing-house. Although it held notes and bills receivable amounting to about a million of dollars, á large portion of these were comparatively worthless, being either protested or renewed at maturity, and the makers constantly failing; and all of them, of any Value, being pledged, or agreed to be pledged, for its various loans. Although this condition of the bank was not generally known, and presumably unknown to the Credit Mobilier, yet suspicion of its solvency began to-be entertained by many of tbe business men of New Orleans as early as June or July, and its stock became almost totally unsalable in tbe market.</p> <p>In tbe early part of July, 1873, Charles Cavaroc, Jr., a member of tbe New Orleans firm of C. Cavaroc & Son, being in Paris on bebalf of tbe New Orleans National Banking Association, entered into negotiation with tbe Credit Mobilier for procuring the acceptance of -the latter for tbe accommodation of -the bank; and; on tbe 11th and 12th of July, the said negotiation was concluded in tbe form of a letter addressed by Cavaroc to tbe society, and of an- answer thereto by tbe latter. Tbe following are the material parts of this correspondence. Cavaroc, in bis lettér dated July 11, 1878; says: —</p> <p>“ The verbal agreements entered into between us- relative to this -operation can, we think, be thus resumed: —</p> <p>“ ‘ In order to benefit by the difference in the rates of exchange between the summer months and end of the year, time when the large shipments commence, the Society of the Credit Mobilier authorizes the New Orleans National Banking Association to draw upon it, and binds, itself to accept these drafts at ninety days, up to 1,000,000 francs.</p> <p>“ ‘The drafts made under these conditions shall be renewable under the-same conditions, but it is expressly specified that, ten days before .maturity, the Society of the Credit Mobilier shall be covered by Mr. Cavaroc, president, to the amount of the payments to be made.</p> <p>“ ‘ The funds realized from these emissions shall be used by the bank against guaranties and securities of the first class, which shall be- deposited by the bank with the firm of Messrs. Cavaroc & Son, which- shall be the depository thereof, and advise the Credit Mobilier of such deposit.</p> <p>“ ‘ The bank shall guarantee the investment of these sums, and the.interest shall be carried to the credit of the joint account, at the rate of seven per cent per annum.</p> <p>“‘This account shall in no manner allow any commission or privileged charge on either'side, — there shall figure only brokerage, stamps, and divers charges, really and honestly incurred by either side. * .</p> <p>“ ‘ The. accounts shall'be stated at-the closing of each operation.</p> <p>“ ‘ Profit and loss shall be equally divided between the Credit Mobilier and the New Orleans National Banking Association.’”'</p> <p>The answer of the society, dated on the 12th of July, 1878, repeats this contract, and accepts its terms.</p> <p>• During the negotiation, on the 11th of July, Cavaroc and the Credit Mobilier, respectively, despatched the following successive telegrams to the bank in New Orleans: —</p> <p>1. “ Bank exchange one million, ninety days’ sight, Soeiété do Crédit Mobilier, giving best securities deposited with house.</p> <p>(Signed) “ Cavaroc.”</p> <p>2. “ Defer drawing, the agreement is not yet completed.</p> <p>(Signed) ' “ Credit Mobilier.”</p> <p>3. “ Draw bank one million, ninety days’ sight, Credit Mobilier accepting our guarantee.</p> <p>(Signed) “Cavaroc.”''</p> <p>In pursuance of these advices, on‘the 12th of July the bank drew its bills on the Credit Mobilier to the aggregate amount of one million francs, and negotiated them through Sehuchardt & Co., of New York, realizing therefrom $218,454.34. The bills were accepted by the society in due course, and were afterwards paid by it, no funds being provided by the bank for that purpose.</p> <p>The answers allege that in this transaction Cavaroc &. Son acted as the agents of both parties. The answers further allege that the securities in question were delivered by the bank to Cavaroc & Son, for' the Credit Mobilier, in pursuance of the agreement; that a portion thereof, to the nominal amount of $220,021.41, a list of which is contained in a schedule annexed to the answer of the society, marked “ Exhibit B,” were,delivered on the day the drafts were drawn, to wit, July 12, 1873; and that these not being deemed sufficient, another deposit, representing about $100,000, was made' a few days afterwards; that some portion of these securities coming to maturity and being paid, Cavaroc & Son allowed the bank to receive the cash paid thereon, upon other securities being given equal thereto, in lieu thereof.</p> <p>It was proved that the securities were delivered, or pretended to be delivered, as stated; but the evidence as to the time and manner of the delivery, and the manner in which the securities were afterwards treated, presented serious questions for the consideration of the'court. It was evident that the identical securities specified in- “Exhibit B ” could not have been delivered as early as the 12th of July, because they were dated and discounted after that day, and “ Exhibit B ” itself was not made out until the nineteenth day of August. There was some evidence that securities to the amount of this. schedule had been delivered to Cavaroc & Son at or soon after the twelfth day of July, ánd that those named in . the exhibit had been' substituted for them as they severally became due, and were renewed, or paid, as stated in the answer. The other securities, amounting to about $100,000, • could not have been added until' after Aug. 19, when Exhibit B ” was made out, or they would have been included therein. This list, contained in “Exhibit B,” was made out for the purpose of being transmitted to -the. Credit Mobilier. A letter from C. Cavaroc & Son to the society, bearing date ■ Aug. 19, 1873, was exhibited in evidence, with which, as Cavaroc, Sen., testified, a copy of the list “ Exhibit B ” was forwarded to the society. It contained the following passage:—</p> <p>“If we have not sent you, at first, the memorandum of the valuables we have. received from the ■ bank, to guarantee our house and yourselves, it is because the subsequent despatch of our son gave' us to understand that the operation was' made under our guaranty; and we had ourselves taken these valuables. But we think it more just that we should not only transfer you this deposit, but that we should give you the-details of these notes, which are all of the first class'.</p> <p>“ As soon as certain of them will mature, we will take care to replace them by others, and will advise you.”</p> <p>A letter from the society to the bank, dated Sept. 5,'acknowl-edges the receipt of this letter of Cavaroc & Son, in .the following terms: —</p> <p>“ By their letter of the 19th of the same month, Messrs. Cavaroc & Son, pf yoiir city, have-sent us the memoranda of the valuables Which you deposited with them to secure your drafts on us. Said valuables amount together to $220,021.41, which is well.”</p> <p>Precisely when the additional $100,000 of securities were ■ added to the first lot does not appear; but Charles Cavaroc, the president of the bank, testified that it was a few days after the delivery of the latter. ■</p> <p>But a-more serious question related to the manner in which the securities were delivered .and disposed of. The evidence on this point was to the following effect: Charles Cavaroc, Sen., the president of the bank, acting as agent of both parties; directed the discount clerk of the bank, who had charge of its portfolio-of notes and bills discounted, to select the securities for the Credit ■ Mobilier. They were selected accordingly to the amount of $220,021.41, a,nd placed in an envelope by themselves, and handed to Mr. Cavaroc, for Cavaroc & Son He handed them' to the cashier of the bank for safe-keeping. But, as some of the securities soon matured, they had to be. taken out of ■ the envelope for collection; and Cavaroc had them collected, or renewed, in the usual manner by the discount clerk. The trouble of going to the cashier whenever a note became due, to get it out of the envelope, after a few days induced a change, and the securities were, handed back to the discount clerk, in the envelope, in order that he might more conveniently attend to their collection- and renewal. When any of them were paid, the money was taken and used by the bank, and other notes were substituted' in their place. When ' renewed, the new note took the place of the old. On one occasion, quite a large amount of the notes was exchanged for others, because more, available in some other transaction of the bank. The entire lot, however, subject to this exchange of individual securities, appears to have been kept in the envélope by itself. In this manner the notes were kept in the bank until its failure on the 4th of October, when Mr., Cavaroc took possession .of the package, and thereafter it was kept in the office of his firm. At the same time, the indorsement of the bank was placed on the several securities, which had not been done before. Lists of the securities contained in the envelope had been made out from time to time, — the last being made oh he 4th of. October-,-when they were fiually removed from the bank. A copyóf this-list is annexed to the Credit Mo* bilier’s answer as “ Exhibit C.”</p> <p>• No entry was made on the books of the bank of this transac-. tion with the Credit Mobiliér, except that the bills drawn on it were duly entered amongst bills payable; and the Credit Mobiliér was credited with the amount, which was put down amongst the liabilities of the bank, , and so appeared in. all the monthly statements, beginning with' the 1st of August. The . pledge of securities was not noticed. . These- all' remained on the portfolio of bills discounted, as before, and their .amount continued to be represented -in the daily and monthly state- ■ ments, without-' any note or memorandum to. show that they had.been .pledged.- So. far as the. public, -and those with whom the- bank dealt, could perceive, the bank continued to have possession arid control of all the securities in'-its .own right, and they all appeared to be equally liable with the other assets to -the Claims of all the. creditors.</p> <p>The Circuit Court rendered a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, and from that decree, the receiver appealed.</p> <p>1., The pledge is valid, and, being of negotiable paper, no other formality-than delivery is required. A°t V?f La., 1852, p. 15, sect. 1; .re-enacted 1855; ,p. 348; Rev. Civil Code, 3158; Rev. Stat-., sect. 2905. The effect of revisory legislation is stated with clearness in State v. Holmes, 11 La. Ann. 439, State v. Brewer, 22 id. 273, and State v. MeCort, 23 id. 326.,</p> <p>From these decisions, it follows that the provisions of the ■Revised Statutes of 1870 retained in force sect. 2905, in reference to the limitation of formalities in pledges of negotiable instruments, notwithstanding the Revised Code of the . same year contained the provisions of the old code alongside of the amendment of. 1852. \ One article of the Code requires certain formalities, 3160; the other article, 3158, dispenses with them, and ..the Revised Code" contains the dispensing- article. So neither an act before a -notary, nor an indorsement by the pledgor, is required to constitute a valid pledge.</p> <p>2. Informalities in a pledge cannot enable the pledgor to impeach it, Partee, 'Syndic, v.. Corning, 9 La. Ann. -539; Brother v. Saul, 11 id. 225 ; although they may. be required -as against third persons, Matthews v. Rutherford, 7 id. 225.-</p> <p>3. The syndic,^ receiver, or assignee of a debtor has no greater authority than the debtor, except as the statute provides. Partee, Syndic, v. Corning,-9 La. Ann. 539 ; Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall. .244 ; Cook v. Tullis, 18 id. 332; Mitford v. Mitford, 9 Ves. Jr. 86.</p> <p>Assignees' in bankruptcy are subject to the same equities affecting the bankrupt’s rights-which could have been enforced against him. Grant y. Mills, 2 Ves. & Beá.- 308; Ex parte Hanson, 12 Ves. 349 ; Turner v. Harvey, Jacob, 174; Campbell y. Slidell, 5 La. Ann. 274; Gibson v. Warden, 14 Wall. 244; Yeatman v. Savings Institution, 95 U. S. 764.</p> <p>.4. It is lawful to constitute the pledgor an agent to collect the negotiable instruments pledged, and to replace those collected by others, or to change the securities. Clark, A'ssigneg, y. Iselin, 21 Wall. 360; White v. Platt, 5 Den. (N. Y.) 269.</p> <p>5. Sect. 52 of the statutes of 1864 measures the power of setting aside transfers, &c., at the instance of a receiver. This case has. none of the elements prescribed. The'interdiction of that section has the same purpose as that of sect. 35 of the • Bankrupt Act, and operates ■ on sales or . pledges or transfers for a fraudulent object, not on those with an honest purpose.</p> <p>Two things must concur to bring the transaction within the inhibitions of the law: the fraudulent design of the bankrupt, and the knowledge of it upon the part of the transferee. Tiffany v. Lucas, 15 Wall. 410'; Wager - v. Hall, 16 id. 584; Wilson v.. City Bank, 17 id. 473; Cook v. Tullis, 18 id. .332; Mays v. Eritton, 20 id. 414.</p> <p>Advances may be made in good faith to a debtor to carry on-his business, no -matter what his' condition may be, and the party making these advances can lawfully take securities ■ at the- time for their repayment. Tiffany v. Boatman's Institution, 18 Wall. 376; Mays y. Eritton, 20 id. 414;- Clark v. Iselin, 21 id. 360; Watson v. Taylor, id. 378; Burnhisel v. Firman, 22 id. 170; Sawyer ,v. Turpin, ¿•c., 91 U. S. 114; Jerome v. McCarter, 94 id. 734..</p> <p>6. The fact that the senior member of the firm of Cavaroc & Son was president of the bank is immaterial, for he acted' as stakeholder in his individual capacity. The contract was between the Credit Mobilier and the bank. In holding the pledge, the Cavarocs, like all stakeholders, were agents of both parties. There was no inconsistency in this position arising from the fact that one of the partners was president of the bank. He did not. stand as contracting on both sides. He said to the bank-and' to the Credit Mobilier, distinct persons from- himself, I will hold these stakes. He made the contract not with himself, but with two other parties.</p> <p>7. The contract was made with the authority of the corpora^tion, through its board of directors; and the institution, having reeeivéd the .benefit of the loan, cannot avoid its liability by denying the authority of those who contracted in its behalf. Ottawa Plank Road v. Murry, 19T11. 336 ;• Bissell v. Michigan Southern f Northern Indiana Railroad Co., 22 N. Y. 258; Township of Pine drove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 666; Bank of the United States v. Bandridge, 12 Wheat. 64; Bezou v. Pike, 23 La. Ann. 788.</p> <p>' 8. The contract-was within the ordinary action of banks and bankers, and not in contravention of the policy or the provisions of the banking act.</p>

<p>The ruling in Casey v. Cavaroc (supra, .p. 467), as to what constitutes a valid pledge of securities, so far as third persons are concerned, applied to this case.</p>

' Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. This case arises upon a bill filed by Casey,- receiver of the New Orleans National Banking Association, to recover from' Schuchardt & Sons and C. Cavaroc & Son certain securities claimed by them to be held by way of pledge for certain advances made to that institution by Schuchardt & Sons. A decree was made by the Circuit Court dismissing the bill, and from that decree he appealed.

<p>Under the statute of Louisiana relating to pledges of negotiable and other securities, which was in force in the year 1873, when the .transaction in this case took place, the actual delivery of such securities was sufficient to constitute a pledge.</p>

An act of the legislature of Maine, passed in 18X4, provides for a tax upon the corporate franchise of every railroad company in that State, at the rate of one and^one-half per cent upon, its estimated value, ■ determined in this wise: The governor and council of the State are each year required to ascertain the true market value of its shares, and estimate therefrom the fair cash valuation of all the shares' constituting its capital -stock, on the first day of the preceding…

<p>1. No right of pre-emption can he established by a settlement and improvement on a tract, of public land where the claimant forcibly intruded upon the possession of one who had already settled upon, improved, and enclosed\bat tract.</p> <p>2. Such an intrusion, though made under pretence of pre-empting the land, is but , a naked, unlawful trespass, and cannot initiate a right of pre-emption.</p>

• Error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of, Virginia.

<p>1.- A patent for public land, when issued by the Land Department, aeting within the scope of its authority, and delivered to and accepted by the grantee, passes the legal title to the land. All control of the Executive Department of the government over the title thereafter ceases.</p> <p>2. If there' be any lawful reason why the patent should be cancelled or rescinded, the appropriate remedy is by a bill in chancery, brought by the United States, but no executive officer is authorized to reconsider the facts on .which 'it was issued, and to recall pr rescind it, or to issue one to another party for the same tract.</p> <p>3. But when fraud or mistake or. misconstruction of the law of the case exists, the United States, or any contesting claimant for the land, may have relief in a court of equity.</p> <p>4. .Under sect. 14 of the act of 1841 (6 Sta*.467), and the act of March 3,1853 (10-id. 244), no pre-emption claim was of any avail against a purchaser of the land at the public sales ordered by the proclamation of the President, unless, before they commenced, the claimant had proved up his settlement and paid for the land.</p> <p>5. The decision of the Secretary of the Interior, against a purchaser at the public sales, in favor of a pre-emption claimant who had failed to make the required proof and payment, was erroneous, as a misconception of the law, ind the equitable title should be decreed to belong to the purchaser</p>

The Tenth National Bank of New-York, having an uúdisputed debt against the firm of Sanger & Co., of about' $10,000, endeavored to obtain its money by persuasion, but received only fair words in return. After pursuing this policy for several months, it brought suit against the debtors, Nov. 3, 1870. They received delay and indulgence in its prosecution, and judgment was rendered against them oñ the 12th of January, 1871.

Held: That upon the face ’ of the'record proper no Federal-question was raised. 2. That the action .upon the subsequent petition di$. not place the petitioner in a better position to invoke the jurisdiction of. this court. Motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Mr. Josiah Patterson, for the defendant in error, in support of the motion. Mt. William M. Randolph, contra. Me.

This was an action by Daniel 'A. Mowry, upon a. policy of insurance for the sum of $10,000, issued to him, for his sole benefit, by the-Union Mutual Life Insurance Company, — a corporation created by the laws of Maine, — upon the life of Nelson H. Mowry. The facts of the case and the instructions, to the jury are stated-in the opinion of the court.

This is a suit by George B. Cornell, against. Eilert Schumacher and William Johnson, for an injunction, and for damages claimed for the alleged infringement by them of reissued letters-patent No. 5026, granted Aug. 6, 1872, to John Laeéy and George B. Cornell, for an improvement in wrenches for extracting bung-bushes; said letters being a r'eissue of original letters No. 118J517, dated Au 29,187 The defendants justified under letters-patent No. 133,536, issued to Johnson…

Held: that the finding of the jury upon the question of acceptance being final and conclusive, the contract was executed in New York, and was by the laws thereof valid. •Error to tbe' Circuit Court of tbe United States for tbe Eastern ■ District of Michigan. This was an action by Paris, Allen, & Co., of New York, against.

Held: That the allowance made by the commissioner, unless it be impeached in some appropriate form by the United States, is conclusive. 2. That the' Court of Claims has jurisdiction of a suit by the brewer against the United States to recover the amount, and' that he is entitled to judgment therefor. ' Appeal from the Court of Claims.

Held: that A., in view . • of the company’s dealings with him, had reasonable cause .to expect, and rely on receiving, notice, where and to whom to pay the premium, and that the company was estopped from setting up that the .policy was forfeited by .' the non-payment, on Nov. 11, of the premium then' due. 8. Insurance Company v. Davis (95 TJ.

the United States for the District of South Carolina. William C. Heyward, who was seised .in fee of certain lands in the State of South Carolina, made his last will’and testament, bearing date Jan. 20, 1852. .

Appeal -from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland. The facts are stated in the opinion of. the court.

Held: that such cost he taxed against the appellant. Motion to tax the expense of printing the record as part of the costs in this case. . Mr. James K. JEdsall in support of the motion. Mr. Joseph JJ. McDonald and Mr. R. P. Ranney, contra.

<p>The remedy subsisting in a State when and where a contract is made, and is to be performed, is a part of its obligation; and any subsequent law of the State, which so affects that remedy as substantially to impair and lessen the value of the contract, is forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, void.</p>

Held: that he is entitled to' no relief. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.

EBBOB-to the.Supreme Court of Wyoming Territory. On Feb. 26, 1873, W. A. Morris and A. J. Gregory executed a written contract at Austin, Tenías, for the sale to the latter, in accordance with a schedule of prices in gold, of a large number of cattle.' The contract provided that Morris was to retain- a lien on the cattle until the purchase-money, amounting to nearly $8,000, should be paid; and it, for the purpose of preserving, said lien, authorized him to designate some…

Held: that, because the statute conferred a hew and additional right on one of the parties to the contract, which impaired its obligation, it was for that reason forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, ar?'1 void as to that contract.

<p>Erbob to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Colorado. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: t'o distinguish'the case from one where the vessel is technically lost,.as in case of abandonment.

Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Alabama. The facts- are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That B. acquired a vested right to demand and receive the bonds of the county, in payment of the original subscription to A. • and that such right was not defeated or impaired by the Constitution of Missouri of 1865. 2.

Held: that, as A. was hound to take notice of the fact that the assistant superintendent had no power to vary the contract, he is only entitled to recover according to its terms. 2. The question of agency discussed. Appeal from tbe Court of Claims. The facts are stated in the

<p>Error to the Circuit' Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.</p> <p>. The sixteenth section of . the act of July 20, 1868, imposing taxes on distilled spirits (15 Stat. 131), provides, among other things, that the owner, -agent, or -superintendent of any distillery'shall erect in'a room or building, to be provided-and used solely for that purpose, two or more, receiving cisterns; each to be at least of sufficient capacity to hold all the spirits distilled during twenty-four hours, into which shall be conveyed all the spirits produced in the distiliery; and that each cistern shall be connected with the outlet of the worm or condenser by suitable pipes or other apparatus, so as to prevent the abstraction of spirits while passing from the outlet of the worm or condenser back to the still or doubler.- The ninety-sixth section provides (id.. 164) that if- any distiller shall “ knowingly and wilfully ” omit, neglect, or refuse to do or cause to. be done any thing required' by law in conducting his business, or shall do any thing by that act prohibited, if-there be no specific penalty or punishment imposed, by any other section, he'shall pay a penalty, of $1,000; and all distilled spirits or liquors owned by him, ór in which he has. any interest as owner, shall be forfeited to the United States.'</p> <p>This action was brought, by the -United States, against Felton & Stone, distillers of spirits,, to recover the penalty of $1,000 prescribed by,this act, upon the alleged ground that they “knowingly and.-wilfully” omitted,.neglected, and refused to construct .and maintain pipes and other apparatus connecting the receiving cisterns in their distillery with the outlet of the worm and'condenser, in such manner as to prevent the abstraction of spirits while passing from the outlet back to the still and doubler, contrary to the form of the statute,in such case provided. The defendants pleaded .not guilty, in. “manner and form as alleged,” and • denied every allegation of the declaration.</p> <p>On the trial it appeared that, the still of. the defendants having' become worn and defective, a new one was made and ■ placed in .their distillery, which proved, to be too large for the capacity of the low-wine receiver; and that bn the 18th’ of June, 18.72, the. low wines in' it began to ovferflow; that the-defendants and. their servants were ignorant of this want of capacity of the receiver until it was too late to remedy it for the distillation then taking place, and that there was no. course left fbr them but to let the wines overflow .and run to waste, or to catch them, and secure their benefit to the government and themselves by dumping them into the vats for redistillation.' The receiver, was a part of the'apparatus by,’which the-low wines were carried from the try-box back tb the doubler.</p> <p>The superintendent of the distillery, on the morning of the 18th of June, .1872, apprehensive of the overflow, called upon the' assessor of the district, and asked permission to draw off from the receiver ■ a portion of the low wines, and ’ dump them, into vats for redistillation; and. failing to' obtain' such permission from him,' induced him to telegraph tb the. commissioner of internal revenue to' grant it for a few days, until a new cistern could be built. The answer of the com-' missioned was a. refusal to grant the permission, and a direction' that the defendants must .build new cisterns. After this dispatch was sent, and before the answer was received, the super-' inténdent arrived at.the.distillery.; and, finding that the wines had overflowed the .receiver, he permitted a portion of the contents to be drawn off. This was . effected by withdrawing a plug from a pipe in the side of the' receiver, about nine inches from its top. About four hundred gallons of low wines were .thus drawn off, and dumped into a vat, from which material for distillation was at the time being pumped for redistillation. The record states that this was done in good faith, for the purpose of saving, the property for the defendants and the government. The evidence showed that the wines were worthless, or next to worthless,, e&cept for redistillation, and were not marketable. Among other instructions to the jury, the court was requested to give the following: “ That if the inadequacy of the low-wine cistern was unknown to the defendants and their superintendent .until too late to prevent the overflow, and that then the superintendent, in the exercise of his best judgment, acting in good faith, drew off the wines and dumped the same into the vats for redistillation, the 'defendants were not.liable.”</p> <p>The court refused to' give this instruction; but charged the . jury that the defendants must be held accountable for the acts of theii superintendent in the management of the distillery, and, if they found that he had violated the law by designedly opening the low-wine, receiver, and withdrawing the plug from ’the pipe, so that the spirits could be and were abstracted while passing from the outlet of the worm back to' the still or doubler, they were authorized to find against the defendants. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and assessed their damages at the sum of f1,000; but they accompanied their verdict with a finding that there was only a technical violation of the law, and that there was clearly no intention to defraud the government thereby. Judgment having been entered upon the verdict, the case was brought here on writ of error.</p>

Held: or by the creation (in- some legal' mode) of a superior title, cease to be rightful. The right of possession may, in some of these modes, come into another. It is then that laches begins, if the person who has thus acquired the.better right, neglects to assert it.

<p>Motion. 1, To dismiss the- appeal. 2. To vacate the supersedeas.</p>

This1 suit was commenced by a bill filed by Morgan against-the Chicago and Alton. Railroad Company. It involves- the ownership of two strips of land adjoining that over which that company has the right of way, and forming part of its depot grounds in'the town of Dwight, .'in the State of Illinois, which it claims to own as "grantee of all the rights and property of the Chicago and'Mississippi Railroad Company.

. Motion to dismiss an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of -Mississippi. This is an appeal by O’Reilly, assignee in bankruptcy, from the decree of the court below, affirming, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the decree, of the District Court, whereby the appellees, who were defendants, recovered against him, by reason of. the -matters set up in their cross-bill, $5,050.

Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), was a United States Supreme Court ex parte decision. The case decided that the United States Post Office may open and inspect mail to limit the transmission of circulars on lotteries. It also extended Fourth Amendment protections to private letters, holding that letters and sealed packages sent through the mail required warrants to be searched through.

<p>1. Even though an appeal is asked'for in open court, if the security is not taken until after the term, a citation must be issued to bring in the parties, unless they voluntarily appear.</p> <p>2. .The ruling in O’Reilly v. Edrington (supra, p. 724), that a.judge or justice cannot delegate to the clerk the power to approve the security upon writs of error and appeals, approved, and applied to this case.</p>