Volume 172 — United States Reports

City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Company, 172 U.S. 1 (1898), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Walla Walla Water Company filed a bill to stop the City of Walla Walla from erecting waterworks, acquiring property to erect waterworks, or using city money to build waterworks.

Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898), was a United States Supreme Court case in which John Andersen was convicted of the murder of William Wallace Sanders, who was his mate on the ship Olive Pecket. Andersen was found guilty and sentenced to death, but petitioned the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus, under the claim that he had been deprived of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the Court affirming the order of the lower court.

The Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway-Company, a corporation of the State of Ohio, owning and operating a railway running through the States of West Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, .Indiana and Illinois, under the laws of those States, and crossing the Ohio River, a navigable stream, forming the boundary between the States of West Virg'inia and Ohio, by means of a bridge built, owned and controlled by the plaintiff, filed in the Circuit Court of the United…

Held: that the promise by the Government contained in the statute to hold money so paid into the Treasury was a continuing promise available to plaintiff at any *49 time she saw fit, to which full force should be given; that there was no cause for a suit until after refusal of an application for a warrant, and that then for the first time a claim for the breach of the contract accrued, and the limitation, prescribed by…

Held: used and enjoyed by said company, etc. *74 By the fourth section, it was enacted that the trustees might on the requisition of said company, proceed to sell the lands granted by Congress in aid of said improvement, and might sell or lease the water powers created by said improvement, in such manner and upon such terms, as to price and time and place of payment, as the company might direct; but that no sales of said…

Held: damnum absque injuria. The court by the Chief Justice said: “The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without 'just compensation.

On March 30, 1871, the general assembly of the State of Yirginia passed an act for the refunding of the public debt. Yirginia Acts Assembly, 1870-71, p. 378. See also act of March 28, 1879; Yirginia Acts Assembly, 1878-79, p. 264.

Held: in the matter of Balfour, Guthrie & Company, that inasmuch as bags made of burlaps were dutiable, except such as are described in paragraph 493, it was the duty of all persons, bringing in goods claimed to be free out of a class otherwise dutiable, to prove affirmatively the facts constituting the exemption, and that they should separate and designate such merchandise accompanied by the evidence required by law.

<p>The facts in the record show that there is no merit in the several objections to the jurisdiction of this court taken by the appellee in this case.</p> <p>Two propositions have been so firmly established by frequent decisions of this court as to require only to be stated: (1) When a state court has entered upon the trial of a criminal case, under a statute not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or to any law or treaty thereof, and where the state court has jurisdiction of the offence and of the accused, no mere error in the conduct of the trial can be made the basis of jurisdiction in a court of the United States to review the proceedings upon a writ of habeas corpus. (2) When a state court and a court of the United States may each take jurisdiction of a matter, the tribunal where jurisdiction first attaches holds it, to the exclusion of the other, until its duty is fully performed and the jurisdiction involved is exhausted ; and this rule applies alike in both civil and criminal cases.</p> <p>A court of equity, although having jurisdiction over person and property in a case pending before it, is not thereby vested with jurisdiction over crimes committed in dealing with such property by a party before the civil suit was brought, and cannot restrain by injunction proceedings regularly brought in a criminal court having jurisdiction of the crime and of the accused.</p> <p>A Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in equity in the administration of civil remedies, has no jurisdiction to stay by injunction proceedings pending in a state court in the name of a State to enforce the criminal laws of such State.</p>

This case was begun by the filing in the district court for Bernalillo County, in the Territory of New Mexico, by the District Attorney for the Territory, of an intervening petition on behalf of the Territory praying for an order against the receiver of the Atlantic and Pacific Eailroad Company, requiring him to pay the amount of taxes claimed to be due upon the improvements on the right of way of said railroad company in the county of Bernalillo, and upon station houses and…

This was a libel m rem by the firm of Charles Clarke & Go., of Galveston, Texas, against the British steamship Elfrida, to recover the sum of $22,000, with interest and costs, claimed to be due them for services rendered in the performance of a salvage contract with the master, to release the Elfrida, then stranded near the mouth of the Brazos River.

Held: upon well-settled principles, to relate back to the date of application. The defendant knew he had no title to the lot or right to cut the timber. The plaintiffs were held entitled to recover. The other case is that of Musser v. McRae, 44 Minnesota, 343.

Held: That Buckner was entitled to set off against the rent unquestionably due for the undivided half of the plantation for 1891 and 1892 one half the amount paid by him for rent between 1884 and 1891; (2) That he was not precluded from obtaining the benefit of this right ' in the state courts by the fact that the receiver was an officer of the Federal court, or by any proceedings had in that court, as the receiver…

Held: that, as the litigation proceeded on the theory that plaintiffs in error were citizens of Ohio, where they resided, did business, and had offices, that question could not now be considered; and as the manifest purpose of the act was to give to all Tennessee creditors priority over all creditors residing out of that State, without reference to the question whether they were citizens or only residents in some other…

Held: that the assessment was, in itself, an illegal one, because it rested upon a basis that excluded any consideration of benefits; that therefore a decree enjoining the whole assessment was the only appropriate decree; that it was not necessary to tender, as a condition of relief being granted to the plaintiff, any sum as representing what she supposed, or might guess, or was willing to concede was the excess of costs…

These were three cases of indictments, returned and tried in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, for murders committed since the passage of the act of Congress of January 15, 1897, c. 29, by the first section of which, “ in all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder or of rape under sections fifty-three hundred and thirty-nine or fifty-three hundred and forty-five, Revised Statutes, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto ‘…

Prior to February 16, 1891, there were in the State of Washington two cities known as Whatcom and New What-com. On that date they were consolidated in conformity with the general laws of the 'State, the consolidated city taking the title of the “ City of New Whatcom.” In July, 1890, and prior to the consolidation, New Whatcom ordered the improvement of Elk street, between Elk street east and North street. The contract therefor was'let in August, 1890.

Held: that the petitioner’s right of recovery for advance in prices was limited to the prolonged term, and the Court of Claims could not consider advances which took place during the term named in the contract.

Held: that, as he had voluntarily abandoned the entry, he had no cause of action for the sum which he paid to initiate it. United States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136 , examined and shown not to be inconsistent until this decision.

Held: that the plaintiffs in error upon the return of the case to the court could plead over, and hence judgment Avas not final. In Werner v. Charleston, 151 U. S. 360 , the announcement by the Chief Justice Avas: “The Avrit of error is dismissed. Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg.

<p>Under the tarift’ act of October 1, 1890, natural gas is entitled to be admitted free of duty.</p>

Held: that the evidence was admissible. A decoy letter, containing money, addressed to a fictitious person, mailed for the purpose of discovering the frauds of a letter carrier, is to be treated as a real letter, intended to be conveyed by the mail, within the meaning of the statutes on that subject. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. T. C. Campbell for plaintiff in error.

Held: and that such right of redemption after sale was as obligatory on the Federal courts *360 sitting in equity as on the state courts; and that their rules of practice must be made to conform to the law of the State so far as may be necessary to give full effect to the right. The

The Washington Market Company was incorporated by act of Congress, approved May 20,.1870. 16 Stat. 124, c. 108. Authority was conferred upon the company to construct suitable buildings and operate a public market on the site of the “ Centre Market Space,” situated in the northwest section of the city of Washington, between Seventh and Ninth streets and B street and Pennsylvania and Louisiana avenues.

Held: That the contract imposed upon the contractors the obligation to construct the dock according to the specifications within a designated time, for an agreed price, upon a site to be selected by the United States, and contained no statement, or agreement or even intimation that any warranty, express or implied, in favor of the contractor was entered into by the United States concerning the character of the underlying…

Held: That the effect of the codicil was to revoke the bequest of five thousand dollars, made by the will in favor of the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, and to substitute therefor the legatee named in the codicil. Mary E. Ruth died on the 16th of June, 1892, having on the first day of the same month and year executed both a will *384 and a codicil.

Held: the question of the solvency of the firm, and the means which should be used to protect it from failure, were considered, and arrangements were made to retí uce their debts so that they could continue business. After these meetings the firm continued business as before, buying and selling goods for cash and upon credit.

This was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants, who were respectively governor, auditor and secretary of the Territory, acting as loan commissioners, to issue certain bonds in exchange for bonds issued by the county of Pima in aid of the Arizona Narrow Gauge Railroad Company.

This was an action brought by the First National Bank of Cadiz, Ohio, against the Capital National Bank of Lincoln, Nebraska, and Macfarland, the receiver thereof, in the district court of Lancaster County, Nebraska. The petition contained five counts for moneys belonging to plaintiff received by defendant from notes transmitted to it for collection and remittance.

This case was first argued on the 18th of December, 1896. On the 18th of January, 1897, it was restored to the docket for reargument, with leave to submit to the full bench on printed briefs at any time prior to the first Monday of the next March. On the 15th of February, 1897, a motion to fix a day for reargument, made by Solicitor General Conrad on the 1st of that month, was granted, and the case was assigned for argument on the second Monday of the next term.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that no Federal question was disposed of by this decision. This cause ivas argued with No. 91, the preceding case. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Thomas C. Chappell for plaintiff in error. Mr. James M. Ambler and Mr. Randolph Barton for defendant in error. Mr. Shipwith Wilmer and Mr. Randolph Barton, Jr., were on their brief.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.</p> <p>This cause was argued with Nos. 91 and 92, preceding it. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

This was a complaint ia the nature of a bill in equity, filed in the Court of common pleas for Richmond County, South Carolina, by the Columbia Water Rower Company, as plaintiff, to enjoin the Columbia Electric Street Railway, Light and Power Company from using certain water power for the propulsion of its cars, lighting its lamps and furnishing power motors, also from entering upon plaintiff’s lands and erecting thereon its buildings, works and machinery; and also requiring…

<p>In view of the statute giving this court authority to reexamine the final judgment of the highest court of a State, denying a right specially set up or claimed under an authority exercised under the United States, this court has jurisdiction to inquire whether due effect was accorded to the foreclosure proceedings in the Circuit Courts of the United States, under ■which the plaintiff in error claims title to the lands and property in question in this suit.</p> <p>Under the circumstances stated in the finding of facts, Lynde acquired a good title (as between himself and the mortgagor company and the companies which succeeded it by consolidation,) to the thirty-six bonds purchased by him, as well as the right to claim the benefit of the mortgage executed to Parkhurst.</p> <p>The state court having adjudged that there was no rule of law arising out of the public policy of the State, as manifested by state legislation, that required it to deny to the holders of those bonds the rights and privileges pertaining to commercial paper, purchased in good faith, in the ordinary course of business; and in view of the fact that the lien attending the thirty-six bonds purchased by Lynde did not arise after the institution of the foreclosure suits, but had its origin in the execution and delivery of the Parkhurst mortgage and the authentication by the trustee of the bonds named in it; and in view of the further fact that the trustee in the prior mortgage was not made a party to the foreclosure suits, and was not bound by the decree; under the well settled rule that a sale of real estate under judicial proceedings concludes no one who is not, in some form, a party to such proceedings, this court holds, that the pendency of the foreclosure suits did not interfere with the negotiation or transfer of the bonds secured by the prior Parkhurst mortgage; that the decree in those suits did not impair in any degree the lien created by that mortgage; that the purchase of the bonds by Lynde could not be regarded as hostile to the possession taken of the property embraced by the Roosevelt mortgage for the purpose of selling it in satisfaction of the debts secured thereby; and that the state court did hot fail to give due effect to the several decrees in the Circuit Courts in the Roosevelt foreclosure suits, when it held that those decrees did not prevent the defendant in error from claiming the benefit of the lien created by the mortgage to Parkhurst to secure the payment of the bonds purchased by Lynde.</p>

An act of the General Assembly of Alabama, approved February 9, 1895, prescribed certain maximum rates of toll to be charged on the bridge across the Tennessee River between the counties of Colbert and Lauderdale in that State, and known as the Florence bridge.

<p>In order to hold a corporation liable fox- the torts of any of its agents, the act in question must be performed in the course and within the scope of the agent’s employment in the business of the principal.</p> <p>A coi’poration can; however, also be held responsible for acts of its agent, not strictly within its corporate powers, which were assumed to be performed for it by an agent competent to employ the corporate powers actually exercised; but in such case, there must be evidence of some facts from which the authority of the agent to act upon or in relation to the subject-matter involved may be faii-ly and legitimately inferred by the court or jury, though this evidence need not necessarily be in writing.</p> <p>When the only conclusion tq be drawn from such evidence is a want of authority, the question is one for the court to decide without submitting it to the jury.</p> <p>In this case the court should have directed a verdict for the corporation on the ground that there was an entire lack of evidence on which to base a verdict against it.</p> <p>The judgment in this case against Mr. Bailey also should be reversed, as it is not supported by the evidence.</p> <p>In an action in tort brought in the Distinct of Columbia, the common law rule prevails that those defendants who ax-e sued together and found guilty are liable for the whole injury to the plaintiff, without examining the question of the different degrees of culpability; and as evidence of the wealth of the corporation defendant was admitted in evidence against all the defendants as a ground for punitive damages, and as the individual defendants were joined by the voluntary act of the plaintiff, the court is of opinion that it was not admissible as against them.</p> <p>Evidence of the wealth of one of the defendants in an action of tort is inadmissible as a foundation for computing or determining the amount of such damages against all.</p> <p>In a case'of this character, where the line between compensatory and punitive damages is vague, it is impossible to say that, by merely charging the jui'y that punitive damages cannot be recovered, the effect of incompetent evidence received as to the wealth of one of the defendants was thereby removed, or that the verdict of the jury can be held to have been based solely upon the competent evidence in the case.</p> <p>Where a judgment'is based upon a cause of action of such a nature that it might work injustice to one party defendant, 'if it were to remain intact as against him, while reversed for error as to the other defendants, the power exists in the coui't, founded upon such fact of possible injustice, to reverse the judgment in toto, and grant a new trial in regard to all the defendants.</p>

This was an action at law upon a policy of insurance, issued by the plaintiff in error, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Connecticut. The policy was issued in June, 1893, insuring the defendant in error against loss or damage by lire to a certain barn situated in Scotland County, Missouri, in a sum not to exceed $800.

On May 21, 1897,. the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, upon a writ of error from that court to review a judgment rendered by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan in favor of Walter S. Harsha in an action brought by him against the United States, under the act of March 3, 1887, c. 359, to recover fees as clerk of the Circuit Court of the United States for that district, for services rendered during the first quarter of…

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>This was a motion to dismiss or affirm. The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>An appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents in an interference controversy presents all the features of a civil case, a plaintiff, a defendant and a judge, and deals with a question judicial in its nature, in respect of which the judgment of the court is final, so far as the particular action of the Patent Office is concerned; and such judgment is none the less a judgment because its effect may be to aid an administrative or executive body in the performance of duties legally imposed upon it by Congress in execution of a power granted by the Constitution.</p> <p>In deciding whether a patent shall issue or not, the Commissioner of Patents acts on evidence, finds the facts, applies the law and decides questions affecting not only public, but private interests; ancl likewise as to reissues, or extension, or on interference between contesting claimants; in all of which he exercises judicial functions.</p> <p>Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 50, held' to be directly in point, and the language on page 59 held to be also in point in which the court, speaking of that clausd in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which confers upon Congress the power “ to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries,” says: “The legislation based on this provision regards the right of property in the inventor as the medium of the public advantage derived from his invention ; so that in every grant of the limited monopoly two interests are involved — that of the public, who are the grantors, and that of the patentee. There are thus two parties to every application for a patent, and more when, as in case of interfering claims or patents, other private interests compete for preference. The questions of fact arising in this field find their answers in every department of physical science, in every branch of mechanical art; the questions of law necessary to be applied in the settlement of this class of public and private rights have founded a special branch of technical jurisprudence. The investigation of every claim presented involves the adjudication of disputed questions of fact upon scientific or legal principles, and is, therefore, essentially judicial in its character, and requires the intelligent judgment of a trained body of skilled officials, expert in the various branches of science and art, learned in the history of invention and proceeding by fixed rules to systematic conclusions.”</p>

Held: that, although the question submitted by stipulation had been somewhat changed in form, the same result must be reached, and the judgment of the court below be affirmed. This suit involves the validity of a tax levied under the laws of the State of Montana against cei’tain lands lying within the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, made by the act of Congress, approved July 2, 186J, c. 217. 13 Stat. 365 .

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

On September 15, 1897, Freclerich Hoeninghaus and Henry W. Curtiss imported, at the port of New York, certain woven fabrics in the piece, composed of silk and cotton.

<p>As there was no finding of facts by the courts below, and no statement of facts in the nature of a special verdict', this court must assume that the judgment of the court below was justified by the evidence, and affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court. ______ .</p>

This was a bill in equity filed in the Court of Chanoeiy of the State of New Jersey by the inhabitants of the city of Trenton against John McQuade, to enjoin him from interfering with the relaying of a certain pavement, and the resetting of the curb and gutter in front of his premises, in the city of Trenton.