Volume 173 — United States Reports

Held: that the last agreement was not terminable at the end of any month at the pleasure of the company, but bound it to pay him the wages stipulated, and to furnish him the supplies agreed, so long as his disability to do full work continued; and that, if the company discharged him from its service without cause, he was entitled to *2 elect to treat the contract as absolutely and finally broken by the company, and, in an…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A record <in the Department at Washington of the approval by the President of a deed made by an Indian to convey lands held by him subject to the provision in the treaty of Prairie du Chien that it was never to be leased or conveyed without the permission of-the President, is notice to all concerned from the time it was made, and is similar, in effect, to a patent issued by the President for lands that belong to the Government, which is not required to be recorded in the county where the land is located.</p> <p>The recording of a deed of such land, made without previous approval of the President, is notice of the grantee’s title to subsequent purchasers;- and, when approved, operates to divest the title of the grantor as against a subsequent grantee.</p>

Section 12 of ordinance number 10 of Eureka City, Utah, provided as follows: “No person shall move any building or frame of any building, into or upon any of the public streets, lots or squares of the city, or cause the same to be upon, or otherwise to obstruct the free passage of the streets, without the written permission of the mayor, or president of the city council, or in their absence a councillor.

Held: that the suit, Avhich Avas begun in 1865, Avould lie, and that laches could not prevail ‘as a defence where the relief sought was granted on the ground of secret fraud, and it appeared that the suit Avas commenced a reasonable time after the fraud Avas discovered.

<p>The provisions in the act of March 2, 1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980,-1005, with regard to honorably discharged Union soldiers and sailors were intended only to give them an equal right with others to acquire a homestead within , the territory described by the act, but did not operate to relieve them from the general restriction as to going into the territory imposed upon all persons by the provisions of the act.</p>

Dunlap was, and had been for’ many years, “ engaged in the manufacture of a product of the arts known and described as ‘ stiff hats,’ ” in Brooklyn, New York. Between August 28, 1894, and April 24, 1895, he used 7060.95. proof gallons of dom'estic alcohol to dissolve the shellac required to stiffen hats made at his factory.

<p>Claims for depredations on the Pottawatomie Indians committed by Indians were properly allowed by the Secretary of the Interior under the treaty of August 7, 1868, and are valid claims.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: in Reyburn v. Brackett, 2 Kansas, 227, under a statute containing requirements as to the statements to be made in the affidavit for an attachment like unto those embodied in the statute of Oklahoma now under consideration, that the authority vested in an official to grant the writ imposed a duty simply ministerial in its nature.

The facts which are revelant to the controversy arising on this record are as follows: The Sioux City Terminal Railroad'and Warehouse Company (hereafter "designated as the Terminal Company) was, in 1889, incorporated under the general laws of the State of • Iowa with an authorized capital of one million of dollars.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that after said cattle were domiciled in Colorado their .management must be regulated by the state laws, and not by the act of Congress, and that'the disposition of said cattle afterwards was not within the scope of Federal authority.” It thus appears that if the trial court and the Court of Appeals had been of the opinion that the Secretary’s rules and regulations were within the terms of the authority conferred by…

<p>The provisions in the Revised Statutes of Arizona of 1887, c. 42, § 3, concerning the commencement of process for attachment, are inconsistent with those concerning the same subject contained in the act of March 6, 1891; and although chapter 42 is not expressly repealed by the act of 1891, it must be held to be repealed by the later act on the principle laid down in United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88,92, that “ when there are two acts on the same subject the rule is to give effect to both if possible; but if the two are repugnant in any of their provisions, the latter act without any repealing clause operates, to the extent of the repugnancy, as a repeal of the first.”</p>

Held: necessarily in view of the statutes of Pennsylvania regulating the matter, that the interest vests at the time of the transfer of the assets in trust'. In that case the debtor executed a general assignment'for the benefit of creditors. Subsequently the assignor became entitled to a legacy which was attached by a' creditor, who realized therefrom $2402.^7.

Held: in 142 U. S. 254 , at 269-70, that it was necessary that there should be notice of taking while compensation could be had. •' The notice of taking held sufficient in that, case only related to the withdrawing of water from the pond held by the government dam and not to the use of water on the various channels of the river below the dam.

<p>The Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana has jurisdiction of a suit brought in it by a citizen of New York to recover from the city of New Orleans on a number of certificates, payable to bearer, made by the city, although the petition contains no averment that the suit could have been maintained by the assignors of the claims or certificates sued upon.</p> <p>Newgass v. New Orleans, 33 Eed. Rep. 196, approved, in holding that “ A Circuit Court shall have no jurisdiction for the recovery of the contents of promissory notes or other choses in action brought in favor of assignees or transferees except over, (1) suits upon foreign bills of exchange; (2) suits that might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents, if no assignment or transfer had been made; (3) suits upon choses in action payable to bearer, and made by a corporation.”</p>

The petition in this case was filed by the plaintiff in error to set aside certain assessments upon his lots in Des Moines, in •the State of Iowa, which had been imposed thereon for the purpose of paying for the paving of the street upon which the lots abutted, and to obtain a judgment enjoining proceedings towards tbeir sale, and adjudging'that there was no personal liability to pay the excess of the assessment above the amount realized upon the sale of the lots.

This action was brought to restrain the collection of taxes, through or by means of the bank, by the defendant in error, levied under a statute of Ohio, upon certain individual shareholders in the bank, on the ground, as alleged, that the assessments upon such specified shareholders were illegal, as having been made without regard to the debts of such individual owners, contrary to the case of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens whose debts were…

<p>Personal service of a summons, made in the Territory of Arizona upon the general manager of a foreign corporation doing business in that Territory, is sufficient service under the laws of the Territory to give its courts jurisdiction of the case.</p>

Held: any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.” They are in accord also with what was said in Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U. S. 673 , 692, in which,- after referring to Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76 , 80, this court said: “In that case, the right in question being of an action for a penalty under a statute of the United States, the question whether it survived was governed by the laws of the…

Held: like similar property in other cities, subject to taxation, and the special act of May 1, 1886, stands repealed.

<p>CEETIOBABI TO THE OIBCUIT COÜRT OF APPEALS FOE THE EIGHTH CIEOUIT.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Although the bill of exceptions in this ease does not state, in so many words, that it contains all the evidence, it sufficiently appears that it does contain all, and this, court, can inquire on this record whether the Circuit Court erred in giving a peremptory instruction for the defendant.</p> <p>The recitals in the bonds of Gunnison County, the coupons of which are in suit in this case, that they were ‘ ‘ issued by the Board of County .Commissioners. of said Gunnison County in exchange, at par, for valid floating indebtedness of the said county outstanding prior to September 2, 1882, under and by virtue of and in full conformity with the provisions of an act of the general assembly of the State of Colorado, entitled ‘ An act to enable the several counties of the State to fund their floating indebtedness,’ approved February 21, 1881; ‘that all the requirements of law have been fully complied with by the proper officers in the issuing of this bond; ’ that the total amount of the issue does not exceed the limit prescribed by the constitution of the State of Colorado, and that this issue of bonds has been authorized by a vote of a majority of the duly qualified electors of the said county of Gunnison, voting on the question at a general election duly held in said county on the seventh day of November, a.d. 1882,” estop the county from asserting, against a bona fide holder for value, that the bond so issued created an indebtedness in excess of the limit prescribed by the constitution of Colorado.</p> <p>This case is-controlled by the judgment in Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U. S. 355, which the court, declines to overrule.</p> <p>The plaintiff corporation was a bona fide holder, when this suit was brought, of some of the bonds sued for in it.</p>

■ Ik this case complaint was made by affidavit by the dairy commissioner of Ohio against' the appellee, alleging that on March 2, 1897,.he violated the act of the legislature of the State of Ohio, passed in 1895, (92 Ohio'State Laws, 23,) in relation to the use of oleomargarine. ■ Appellee was arrested and brought before a justice of the peace, and declined to plead to the charge on the ground that the act complained of in the affidavit of the compláinant was performed by…

Held: prima facie, to have caused the violation,” is not, in the absence of legislation by Congress on the subject, repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, when applied to interstate trains, carrying interstate commerce through the State of Ohio on the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railway. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. George G. Greene for plaintiff in error. Mr. W. II.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that the goods were still in the possession of the railway company at the time of their destruction; and that that company was liable to their owners for the full value as a . common carrier, and not as a warehouseman. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Rush Taggart and Mr. Arthur H. Masten for plaintiff in error. Mr. Treadwell Cleveland for defendants in error. *349 Me. Justioe HaelaN delivered the

United States v. Johnson, 173 U.S. 363 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case.

<p>appeal from the court of claims.</p> <p>The .case is stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: upon the first hearing, 48 La. Ann. 1036 , that Mistress Bettie was entitled to the net proceed of the crop of the Rienzi plantation for the years 1894-1895.

This action was commenced in a justice’s court in Saline Township, Saline County, Arkansas, by Charles Paul against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Arkansas, and owning and operating a railroad within that State, to recover $21.80 due him as a laborer, and a penalty of $1.25 per day for failure to pay him what was due him when he was discharged.

Held: that the receiver, and not the heir, was the person entitled to recover the money from the United States; and that the .case, didnot come-within the prohibitory provisions against assignments of claims against the United States, contained in Bev. Stat. § 3477. The case is stated in the opinion. Mr. John C. Fay and Mr. FlmeV McGhee for plaintiffs in error. .

This was an appeal from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirming a decree of the Supreme. Court of the District, sitting in admiralty, whereby appellees, original libellants in the cause, were awarded damages, and a cross libel filed by appellants was dismissed. 10 D. C. App. 469.

<p>Under the clause in the act of March 3, 1885, c. 341, regarding claims “ on behalf of citizens of the United States, on account of depredations committed, chargeable against any tribe of Indians by reason of any treaty between such tribe and the United States,” no claim can be received ai d considered by the Court of Claims which is presented on behalf of a pe • son who was not a citizen of the United States when the act was passed , but who, a foreigner, had then duly declared his intention to become such citizen, and did subsequently become such.</p> <p>When the language of a statute is clear, it needs no construction.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The case is stated in the opinion.</p>

ORIGINAL. No number. This was an application for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case is ’stated in the opinion.

<p>Under the act of August 13, 1888, c. 866, a Circuit Court of the United States has no jurisdiction, either original, or by removal from a state court, of a suit as one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties, of the United States, unless that appears by the plaintiff’s statement to be a necessary part of his claim.</p> <p>If it does not appear at the outset that a suit is one of which the Circuit. Court, at the time its jurisdiction is invoked, could properly take cognizance, the suit must be dismissed; and lack of jurisdiction cannot be supplied by anything set up by way of defence.</p> <p>When jurisdiction originally depends upon diverse citizenship the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final, though another ground of jurisdiction may be developed in the course of the proceedings.</p>

<p>On a writ of error to a state court this court cannot take jurisdiction undes; the allegation that a contract has been impaired by a decision of that court, when it appears that the state court has done nothing more than construe its own constitution and statutes existing at the time when the bonds were issued, there being no subsequent legislation touching the subject.</p> <p>This court is bound by the decision of a state court in regard to the meaning of the constitution and laws of its own State, and its decision upon such a state of facts raises no Federal question; though other principles obtain when the writ of error is to a Federal court.</p>

This case arose from a motion by the Indians to dismiss the appeal of the United States for want of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims, upon the ground that the question involved is so frivolous as not to need further argument; and also from a counter motion by the United States for an order upon the Courf of Claims to make a further finding of facts.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>ON May 10, 1898, the appellant, as plaintiff, filed in the Supreme Court of the District of. Columbia his bill, setting forth, besides certain jurisdictional 'matters, the Swamp Land Act of September 28,1850, c. 84, 9 Stat. 519; the. extension of that act to all the States by the act -of March 12, 1860, c. 5, 12 Stat. 3; a selection of lands thereunder by the State of Oregon (evidenced by what is called “ List No. 5,”) and an approval on September 16, 1882, of that selection by the Secretary of the Interior; a purchase in 1880 from the State by H\ C. Owen, of certain of those selected lands, and subsequent conveyances thereof to plaintiff. Then, after showing the appointment of Hon. William F. Yilas, as Secretary of the Interior, the bill proceeds:</p> <p>“ That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, on the 27th day of December, a.d. 1888, the said Secretary of the Interior, then the said William F. Yilas, made and- entered an order annulling, cancelling and revoking the. said ‘List number 5,’ ánd the approval thereof, and annulling and revoking the said judgment and determination so made by his said predecessor in said office, the said Henry M. Teller, whereby his said predecessor had adjudged and determined that the- lands aforesaid were swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the acts .aforesaid, and made and entered an order purporting to adjudge and determine that certain of the lands described in said ‘List number 5,’ including the lands hereinbefore described, were not swamp and overflowed lands within the meaning of the acts aforesaid.</p> <p>“ That thereafter, as plaintiff is informed and believes, divers procéedings were taken before the said Secretary of the Interior and in the general land office of the United States by the State of Oregon and by the grantors of this plaintiff to set aside and have held for naught the ardéis and rulings so made by the said 'William F. Yilas as such Secretary, of the Interior,, which proceedings came to an end within one year last past.</p> <p>“That, as plaintiff is informed and believes, since the said proceedings last aforesaid came to an end, the defendant, as such Secretary of the Interior, is proceeding to put in force and to carry out the orders and rulings so as aforesaid made by the said William F. Yilas as such Secretary of the Interior and to hold the lands hereinbefore described to be public lands of the United States and subject to entry under the laws of the United States, and threatens and intends to receive and permit the officers of the land department'of the United States to receive applications for and allow entries of the lands aforesaid as public lands of the United States.”</p> <p>After alleging the invalidity of these proceedings, the bill goes On to aver that the proceeding thus initiated by Secretary Yilas throws a cloud ,upon appellant’s title, “and is likely to cause many persons to attempt to settle upon the said lands and to enter the same in the land department of the United States as public lands of the United States subject to such entry, and that plaintiff will be unable to remove such persons from said lands .or to quiet his title thereto as against them without a multiplicity of suits, and that therefore this plaintiff is entitled in this court to an order enjoining and restraining the defendant, ás such Secretary of the Interior, and his subordinate officers of the land department of the United States, from in any way carrying said last mentioned orders and rulings into effect, and from permitting any entries upon said lands or holding the same open to entry, and from in any way interfering with or embarrassing the plaintiff in his title and ownership of the lands aforesaid.”</p> <p>Upon these facts plaintiff prayed a decree cancelling the order of December 27, 1888, restraining the officers of the land department from carrying it ijito effect, and forbidding .the defendant and his subordinates from holding the lands to be public lands of the United States or subject to entry under the general land laws. To this bill a demurrer was filed, whieh was sustained, and the bill dismissed. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals' of the District, and upon an affirmance of the decree by that court brought the decision here for review.</p>

This .suit, commenced by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, (the defendant in error here,) against Darwin C. Allen, who is plaintiff in error, was based on eighty-four written contracts entered intp -on the first day of February, 1888. All these contracts' we be made exhibits to the complaint and were exactly alike, except that each contained a description of the particular piece of .land to which it related.

The appellant herein filed her petition in the Court of Claims and sought to recover judgment by virtue of the provisions of the act approved June 16, 1880, c. 244, 21 Stat. 287.

Held: As neither ground went to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court as a court of the United States, the appeal could not be sustained as within any class mentioned in § 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1891; and, if error was committed this was dot the proper mode for correcting it.

ORIGINAL. These cases involve the validity and construction of some of the provisions of section 6, and a portion of schedule “A,” therein referred to, of the act of Congress approved June 13, 1898, c. 448, 30 Stat., entitled “An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes,” commonly spoken of as the-War Eevenue Act.

The President of the United States by proclamation dated March 23, 1889, 26 Stat. 1544, declared that the Territory of Oklahoma would be open for settlement on April 22, 1889, subject to the restrictions of the act, approved March 2,1889, c. 412, 25 Stat. 980,1004.

Held: That there can be no doubt as to the liability of the steamer, and, as no appeal was taken on her part she is estopped from denying that liability here; (2) That the schooner, also, -was proceeding at an immoderate speed, and was properly condemned therefor; and the cases bearing *541 upon the question of what is immoderate speed in & sailing vessel, under such circumstances, are cited and reviewed; (3) That the…

Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555 (1899), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the final decision of a state court that claimed general jurisdiction over a defendant may be collaterally attacked in federal court on the basis that the state court needed personal jurisdiction instead. Cooper upheld the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1891 under the Full Faith and Credit Clause because that Congress may prescribe the general rules of how federal courts may recognize state court decisions.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH ' CIRCUIT.</p> <p>Ball and Pettit filed their bill in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that Ball was a citizen of Indiana and that Pettit was a citizen of Wisconsin, ánd that defendants were citizens of Indiana and Illinois, which suit war. discontinued as to Ball, leaving Pettit, a citizen of Wisconsin, the sole complainant. Pope was appointed, in substitution for one Fish, receiver of the Chicago and South Atlantic Eailroad Company of Illinois, the order containing, among other things, the following:</p> <p>“And.it is further ordered that the defendant, the said Chicago and South Atlantic Eailroad Company, or whoever may have, possession thereof, do assign, transfer and deliver over to such receiver under the direction of Henry W. Bishop, a master in chancery of this court, all the property, real and personal, wheresoever found in this district, and all contracts for the purchase of land, and all other equitable interests, things in action, and other effects which belonged to, or were held in trust for, said defendant railroad company, or in which it had any beneficial interest, including the stock books of said railroad company, in the same condition they were at the time of exhibiting the said bill of complaint • in this cause, except as far as necessarily changed in the ^proper management of said road, or in which it now has any such interest, and that said defendant, Chicago and South Atlantic Eailroad Company, deliver over, in like manner all books, vouchers, bills, notes, contracts and other evidences relating thereto, and also the stock books of said railroad company.</p> <p>“ And it is further ordered that the said receiver have full power and authority to inquire after, receive and take possession of all such property, debts, equitable interests, things in action, and other effects, and for that purpose to examine said defendant, its officers and such other persons as he may deem necessary on oath before said master from time to time.”</p> <p>Afterwards a further order was entered, nuno pro time, as follows: .</p> <p>“ And now comes the receiver, Charles E. Pope, of said Chicago and South Atlantic Eailroad Company, and on his application it is ordered and directed that said receiver have full power and authority to bring and prosecute any and all necessary suits for the collection of any claims, choses in action and enforcement of any and every kind and nature, and to defend all suits and actions touching the rights or interests of the property or effects of any kind in his possession or under his control as receiver. This order to be entered now as of the date of his appointment and qualification as receiver.”</p> <p>Soon after, Pettit filed his bill in' the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Indiana, averring that he was a citizen of the State of Wisconsin, against “ the said Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the. State of Indiana and State of Illinois, by the consolidation of an Illinois corporation of the -same name of defendant herein, and an Indiana corporation known as ‘ the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company of Indiana.’” Pope.was appointed receiver on that.bill, the order being similar in its terms to that entered in the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. After such appointment, and on July 12, 1881, Pope, as receiver, filed his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, seeking to recover certain property and property rights, held and claimed by certain of the defendants, which appellant claimed belonged to the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company and to the ownership of or right to which he had succeeded as such receiver.</p> <p>The amended bill on which the cause was heard stated that' “Your orator, Charles E. Pope, who is receiver of the Chicago and South Atlantic Railroad Company, and who is a citizen of the State of Illinois, brings this his amended bill of complaint — leave therefor having been granted by this honorable coürt — against” certain companies and individuals, severally citizens- of the States of Indiana, Ohio, New York and Kentucky; that he was appointed receiver of the Atlantic Company by' the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, and also receiver by the Circuit Court of Indiana; and that he was authorized by the express orders of both courts, appointing him receiver, “ to bring all suits necessary and proper to be brought to recover possession of said estate and effects and to enforce all claims,” etc.</p> <p>The cause went to hearing, and a money decree was rendered by the Circuit Court in favor of Pope, receiver, against appellee, which appellee was adjudged by that decree to pay. An appeal having been prosecuted to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a motion was made to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and the motion overruled. On final hearing the decree of hue Circuit Court was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, with instructions to dismiss the amended bill. The opinion of the Circuit Gourt of Appeals was filed June 12, 1897. 53 IT. S. App. 332. Thereafter a petition for a rehearing was filed and denied. Subsequently Pope, receiver, applied to this com ' f0r a writ of certiorari, which application was denied Marc : 7, 1898. 169 TJ. S. 737. On March 23 Pope moved the ( ircuit Court of Appeals for leave to-file a second petition for rehearing, and the motion was overruled. Pope then applied to the Circuit Court of Appeals for an appeal to this court, which was granted, and the appeal having been docketed, this motion to dismiss was made and duly submitted.-</p>

<p>A Circuit Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to review a decree of a Circuit Court when that decree, as in this case, was not a final one.</p>

This is an action to quiet title to the northwest quarter of section number three, in township number sixty-one, north ff range number fifteen west of the fourth P. M., State of Minnesota. It was brought in the district court of the eleventh judicial listrict of the State against the plaintiff in error and one John VTegins. One Moses D. Kenyon was afterwards made a party.

<p>This court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the state court in this case, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it deprived the defendants of any right,' privilege or immunity set up by them under the Constitution of the United States.</p> <p>The city of Henderson had authority to tax .so much of the property of. the Henderson Bridge Company as was permanently between low-water mark on the Kentucky shore and low-water mark on the Indiana shore of the Ohio River, it being settled that the boundary of Kentucky extends to low-water mark on the Indiana shore.</p> <p>The declaration of the state court that Kentucky intended by its legislation to confer upon the city of Henderson a power of taxation for local purposes coextensive with its statutory boundary is binding in this court.</p> <p>In order to bring taxation imposed by a State within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment of the National Constitution, the case should •be so clearly and palpably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to. leave no doubt that such taxation, by its necessary operation, is really, spoliation under the guise of exerting the power to tax.</p> <p>The taxation by the city as property of the Bridge Company, of the bridge and its appurtenances within the fixed boundary of the city, between lowcwater mark on the tw:o sides of the Ohio River, was not a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Constitution of the' United StatesC</p> <p>The Bridge Company did not acquire by contract an exemption from local taxation in respect of its bridge situated between low-water mark on the two shores of the Ohio River.</p> <p>The provision in the city’s charter that “no land embraced within the city’s limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the city council, unless the same is divided or laid- out into lots of five acres or- less, and unless the same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes,” has no reference to bridges, their approaches, piers, etc.</p> <p>The power of Kentucky to tax-this bridge is not affected by the fact that it was erected under the authority or with the consent of Congress.</p>

This was an action originally instituted in the district court for the second judicial district of Minnesota, by the Security Trust Company, as assignee of the D. D. Merrill Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota, against the firm of Dodd, Mead & Company, a partnership resident in New York, to recover the value of certain stereotyped and electrotyped plates for printing books, upon the ground that the defendants had unlawfully converted the same to…

<p>Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

Held: by the same majority of the court which. subsequently overruled it, that there existed in the Hewitt Act “every element of a contract between the State and the banks and, with such a consideration as will uphold it, no reasonable doubt can be entertained that such was the purpose of the parties to it.” “We are satisfied,” said the court, “after a careful consideration of this question, that the parties making the…

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>This case was argued with the Citizens’ Savings Bank case.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.</p> <p>This case was argued with the Citizens' Savings Bank case.</p>

Held: because the property of the bank was distinct and separate from the shares of stock in the names of the shareholders, therefore the latter were not entitled to deduct exempt property belonging to the bank from the assessment on their shares.

May 21,1891, by act No. 90 of that year, the general railroad law of the State of Michigan was amended by the legislature, a portion of the ninth section of which amendment reads as follows: “. . .

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee.</p>

<p>Error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas.</p>

<p>Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>Error to the; United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.</p>

<p>Second Circuit.</p>