Volume 210 — United States Reports

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Where the trustee can only sell a lease subject to the claim of the lessors that the transfer of the bankrupt’s interest in the lease gives a right of reentry under a condition therein, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction of a proceeding, initiated by the trustee and to which the lessors are parties, to determine the validity of the lessor’s claim and remove the cloud caused by the lessor’s claim.</p> <p>The passage of a lease from the bankrupt to the trustee is by operation of law and not by the act of the bankrupt nor by sale, and a sale by the trustee of the bankrupt’s interest is not forbidden by, nor is it a breach of, a covenant for reentry in case of assignment by the lessee or sale of his interest under execution or other legal process, where, as in this case, there is no covenant against transfer by operation of law. •</p> <p>147 Fed. Rep. 678, affirmed.</p>

The appellants filed their bill in equity in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that: “1. The plaintiffs are citizens of the United States, and members of the Sioux tribe of Indians of the Rosebud Agency, in the State of South Dakota, and bring this suit in their own right as well as for all other members of the Sioux tribe of Indians of the Rosebud Agency. ‘‘2.

<p>The full faith and credit clause of the Federal Coñstitution does not' preclude the courts, of a State in which the judgment of a sister State is presented from inquiry as to jurisdiction of the court by which the judgment is rendered, nor is this inquiry precluded by a recital in the record of jurisdictional facts.</p> <p>Every State has exclusive jurisdiction over property within its borders, and where testator has .property in more than one State each State has jurisdiction over the property within its limits and can, in its own courts, provide for the disposition thereof in conformity with its laws.</p> <p>There is no privity between the executor and an administrator with the will annexed appointed in another State which makes-a decree in a court of ■ such State against the latter binding under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution upon the former in the courts of the State in which such executor is appointed.</p> <p>Where a party dies pending a suit which is subsequently revived against an administrator with the will annexed appointed in the State in the courts of which the suit is pending, the judgment is binding only upon the parties against which it is revived and who are within the jurisdiction of the court, and the courts of another State are not- bound under the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution to give effect to such judgment against the executors of such deceased party; and this applies to a judgment entered on an arbitration had in pursuance of a stipulation that it should be conducted under control of the court and that it should continue notwithstanding the decease of either party.</p> <p>Qucere as to the effect of the death of either party on an arbitration under a contract of submission made independently of judicial proceedings where the contract provides that the arbitration shall in such event continue and the award be binding upon the representatives, of the deceased party.</p> <p>146 Michigan, 401, affirmed.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: however, that the act of 1866 did not apply to the case of an adulterous intercourse, and that the offspring of such intercourse ’ could not inherit.from the father.

Held: to be sufficient. The plaintiff below, who is respondent in this court, was in the service of the railroad company, petitioner, and in November, 1901, was injured by being knocked off a freight, car at a place called Lyndon, in the county of Caledonia and District of Vermont.

<p>The provisions of § 1088, Rev.- Stat., relative to new trials in Court of Claims cases are applicable to cases brought under the Indian Depredations Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 851.</p> <p>The motion for new trial on behalf of the United States in Court of Claims cases under the provisions of § 1088, Rev. Stat., may be made any time within two years after final disposition of the claim, and, if so made, the motion may be decided by the court after the expiration of the two years period.</p> <p>While ordinarily a court has no power to grant a new trial after the adjournment of the term if no application was made previous to the adjournment, the power so to do can be given by statute, and where a government consents to be sued, as the United States has in the Court of Claims, it may attach whatever conditions it sees fit to the consent and give to itself distinct advantages, such as right to apply for new trial after the term, although such right is not given to claimants.</p>

This case involves the legality of a tax for street improvements imposed on the property of plaintiff in error, herein called the railway company. The tax was imposed under a law of the State called the Barrett law.

Held: in view of the fact, that the roads would otherwise be parallel and competing roads, that the legislature could not relieve from it without violating § 87 of the’ constitution of the State. The court expressed the law of the State to be that parallel and competing roads could not consolidate, and that other roads could only consolidate with the consent of the Railroad Commission.

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: however, that the tax here involved is an occupation tax, there remain four propositions, three of which at least must be decided against the contention of plaintiffs in error before this tax can be sustained. : 1.

Held: at one time, at present the essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it, and .the technical rules which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment' as implying a promise by the defendant to pay, do not preclude a court to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose…

<p>CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This suit was commenced by the Roman Catholic Church in Porto Rico through the Bishop of that diocese against the municipality of Ponce. The complaint fully set forth the facts by reason of which relief was demanded. A demurrer was interposed, which was overruled, and leave to answer granted, which defendant having failed to do, judgment was entered by default.

The plaintiff in error was organized as a corporation under the laws of the State of Missouri on January 18, 1901, for the following purposes stated in its articles of association: “The purposes for which this corporation is formed are to encoürage and promote agriculture and the improvement of stock, particularly running, trotting and pacing horses, by giving exhibitions of agricultural products and exhibitions of contests of speed and races between horses, for premiums,,…

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), was a United States Supreme Court decision concerning the scope of rights accorded owners of a copyright versus owners of a particular copy of a copyrighted work. This was a case of first impression concerning whether the copyright laws permit an owner to control a purchaser's subsequent sale of a copyrighted work.

Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352 (1908), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held copyright holders did not have the statutory right to control the price of subsequent resales of lawfully purchased copies of their work. The court decided this case immediately after Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, which featured the same defendants, Isador Straus and Nathan Straus, being accused of copyright infringement for the same reason by a different company. The result of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus held sway here.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Walker, 210 U.S. 356 (1908), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that, because Congress has provided a remedy for those whose copyrights in maps are infringed, a civil action at common law for money damages cannot be maintained against the infringers.

Held: nevertheless, in cases like the one under consideration, involving the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, the ultimate determination of such question is for this court aloné. This doctrine finds illustration in the case of Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194 , in which the subject is discussed by Mr. Justice Jackson, delivering the opinion .of the court.

Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that due process rights under the U.S. Constitution attach to administrative agency hearings that involve adjudication, but not to those that involve legislation.[1]

This is an appeal directly to this court from a judgment of the Circuit Court upon a writ of habeas corpus, remanding the petitioner, now appellant, to the custody of the respondent, now appellee.

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States established the principle that patent holders have no obligation to use their patent.[1]

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.</p> <p>Dismissed with costs on the authority of Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Evans, 175 U. S. 723; Mason v. United States, 136 U. S. 581; Eastland v. Jones, Minor (Ala.), 275 (1824). See act of February 7, 1818, Toulmin’s Digest, 448.</p>

<p>Rule discharged and petition dismissed without prejudice. In re Rice, 155 U. S. 396, 402; In re N. Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Company, 155 U. S. 523; In re Alix, 166 U. S. 136.</p>

<p>error to the district court of the united states for the DISTRICT OF PORTO RICO.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>