Volume 211 — United States Reports

Frasch applied for a patent for an invention of a new and useful improvement in the art of making salt by evaporation of brine. He expressed his alleged invention in six claims, three of which were for the process of removing incrustation of calcium sulphate from brine heating surfaces, and three of them were for an apparatus for use in the process.

The facts are stated in the opinion. ;The relations between the Government and Ard with respect to this land and Ard’s relation to and connection with the suit were' súch as to render the decree in the case of United States v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. conclusive against Ard as to the equities- now claimed by him. Graham v. Great Water Power Co., 76 Pac. Rep. 811; Norton v. Evans, 82 Fed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. in support of motion to dismiss or affirm: The defendant railroad company should be the complainant in the case — in fact it is the party naturally burdened with the responsibility of applying for relief. It is not made a complainant in express terms, nor is any reason set forth in the bill why it was not made the sole complainant or at least one of the complainants. There is no reason assigned why it is made a defendant.

The facts which involve the constitutionality of the sections of the Forest, Fish and Game Law of the State of New York of 1900, relating to the possession of game or fish during the closed season, are stated in the opinion. The provisions of the Forest, Fish and Game Law aro 'unconstitutional, in. tiuvfc taaey deprive the individual of Ms liberty and property without due process of law.

Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), was a significant case argued before the United States Supreme Court that upheld the rights of states to prohibit private educational institutions chartered as corporations from admitting both black and white students. Like the related Plessy v. Ferguson case, it was also marked by a strongly worded dissent by John Marshall Harlan. The ruling also is a minor landmark on the nature of corporate personhood.

ORIGINAL IN EQUITY.’ The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The United States is the real party in interest as defendant, and as it has not consented to be sued, and cannot be sued without its consent, the bill must be dismissed.. Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373; Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 60; Naganáb v. Hitchcock, 202 U. S. 473; Kansas v. United States, 204 U. S. 331.

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), was a case of the U.S. Supreme Court. In this case, the Court established the Incorporation Doctrine by concluding that while certain rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights might apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination is not incorporated. The Twining decision was overturned by the decision in Malloy v. Hogan in 1964, in which the Court incorporated the right against self-incrimination.

as follows: “The dominion and jurisdiction of a State, bounded by a river, continue as they existed at the time when it was admitted into the Union, unaffected by the action of the forces of nature upon the course of the river.” The above doctrine is sustained by the following cases: Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall. 401 ; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359 , and cases cited. The doctrine of the Nébraska-Iowa case is approved in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 36 .

<p>APPEAL' FROM THE SUPREME COURT OP THE TERRITORY OP Hawaii.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The franchise, ratified by Congress and approved by the President,’is an irrevocable'contract, providing in definite terms for the division of the revenue of the company betweén the Territory and the company, and fixing the charges deductible from the income, which charges include taxes on the physical property, but not on the franchise.</p> <p>The term railway as used in the act is defined to be the physical structure and not an intangible right, and hence the “completed and equipped portions liable to taxation” are portions of the physical structure; so that the taxation to \yhich the corporation becomes liable is a tax on the physical structure of the road, thus creating a charge on the income.</p> <p>Taxing the completed and equipped portions as fast as they are completed and equipped is consistent with the taxation of the real and personal property “separately as to each item for its full cash value;” it is inconsistent with the contention that the aggregate value in operation as an enterprise for profit, which would include the franchise, can be so assessed. Nor can the franchise itself be assessed separately; it is not a part of the completed and equipped portion of the road, and although the word “franchise” is to be found in § 1215, which describes the character of personal property to- be taxed, it had long been held to be the policy of Hawaii to tax only tangible property. McBryde v. Kala, 6 Hawaii, 529; Brewer v. Luce, 6 Hawaii, 554;</p> <p>■ Moreover, it would be double .taxation and unconstitutional. Kekaha Sugar Co. v. Hawaiian Government, 8 Hawaii, 293.</p> <p>The franchise was one in which the right to share with the Territory was the only beneficial right which the corporation enjoyed.</p> <p>Where the property itself was taxed which comprised the enterprise, to tax the r;ight to share is double taxation. Kekaha Sugar Co. v. Hawaiian Government, ubi supra; Alexander v. Fornander, 6 Hawaii, 322; Haiku Sugar Co. v. Fomander, 6 Hawaii, 532; Castle v. Luce, 4 Hawaii, 63.</p> <p>' 'While an exemption from taxation must be plainly and unmistakably granted, since in grants from the public nothing passes by implication, the exemption need not be in any particular words, is not implied but is expressed if, from all the language of the grant, there is no doubt of the contract. Gordon v. The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 132, 145; New York v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 1; Piquet, Branch of the State Bank v. Khoop, 16-How. 369; People of New York v. Commissioner of Taxes, 4 Wall. 244; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Shelly, 1 Black; 436; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; Stone v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307; Memphis Cas Light Co. v. Taxing. District, 109 U. S. 398; NewYork, L. E. & W. B. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628.</p> <p>' The power of amendment of charters may be exercised where ,it will not defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant or any rights which have vested under it. But the alterations must be reasonable, must be made in good faith and be consistent with the scope and object of the act of incorporation. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500; Fairhaven & W. R. Co. v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379; Los Angeles v. City Water Co.., 177 U. S. 558; S. C., 124 California, 368; 61 California, 65.</p> <p>The franchise of the- company, granted by the Republic of Hawaii, July 7,1898, ratified by Congress and approved by the President, is not assessable.</p> <p>Whether or not, without Congressional action, the franchise granted by the Republic of Hawaii on the very day of the passage of the resolution of annexation would have been perfect if accepted by the grantees; until accepted, Congress had the power to take away that right, and the approval by Congress and its ratification in the organic act is a part of the contract between the parties. California v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 127 TJ.S.1.</p> <p>The. State has power to levy property tax on a corporation holding a Federal franchise, but has no.power to subject its operations to taxation. Thomson v. Pacific Railroad, 9 Wall. 579; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5. .</p> <p>And it has been held that where there are two franchises, a State may tax its own franchise but not that of the United States. Central Pacific R. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91; Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 167.</p> <p>A similar line of decisions has been followed in reference to telegraph companies which have accepted the provisions of the act of Congress of July 24, 1866. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Attorney General, .Í25 U. S. 530; Attorney General v. Western Union Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Missouri, 190 U. S. 412; Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411; Leloup v. Port of, Mobile, 127 U. S. 640.</p> <p>The franchise of appellant is not a Federal franchise, and even.if it were it would be subject to local taxation. The approval by Congress of the act of the legislature of the Republic of Hawaii, amounts to no more than a prior authorization. It was a ratification only of an act of the Republic of Hawaii and Was not intended to, nor did it, confer a special grant from Congress itself. Miners’ Bank v. State of Iowa, 12 How. 1; Lyons v. Wood, 153 U. S. 661; United States v. Church, 5 Utah, 373 (15 Pac. Rep. 479) ; Atl. & Pac. Ry. v. Lesueur, 1 L. R. A. 244.</p> <p>The terms of the franchise itself grant no immunity from taxation, nor is it exempt under the general laws of Hawaii. Revised Laws of Hawaii, §§851, 1212, 1215, 1216.</p> <p>Within the meaning of the sections above quoted the franchise of appellant was properly considered a part of its property and taxable in connection with the other property of appellant as combined property forming the bas.s of an enterprise for profit, since the franchise, of necessity, was subject to all general laws in force at the time it was granted, unless a contrary intent is. clearly expressed. Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662,672; New Orleans City & Lake Ry. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192; Memphis Gaslight Co. v. Shelby Co., 109 U. S. 398; Chicago, B. <fe K. C. R. R. v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569; Atl. & Pac. Ry.-Co. v. Lesueur, 1 L. R. A. 244; Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 668; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 146; Fordv. Delta & Pine Land Co., 164 U. S. 662, 666; Hoge v. R.. R. Co., 99 U. S. 348, 355</p> <p>As a general rule the franchise, cap'ltl stock, business and profits of all corporations are bable to taxation in the place where they do business and by the State which creates them, and any exemption from such taxation must be given in clear terms. Central Pac. By. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 126; State By. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 603; State Freight Tax Cases, 15 Wall. 232; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 607; Thomson v. Pac. Bailroad Co., 9 Wall. 579, 590; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150; Atl. & Pac. B. B. Co. v. Lesueur, supra.</p> <p>Under the provisions of the act to provide a government for' the Territory of Hawaii, 31 Stat. 141, as is also the case under the organic acts of the other Territories, the power of taxation is general and restricted only by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Peacock v. Prat* 121 Fed. Rep.-772, 776; Talbott v. Bd. of Commissioners, 139 U. S. 438; Atl. & Pac. By. v. Lesueur, 1 L. R. A. 244; Silver Bow Mining Co. v. Davis, 6 Montana, 306.</p> <p>The tax assessed and in controversy here is not upon the franchise of appellant, as such, but upon the combined property of appellant as an enterprise for profit.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE'SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF •' HAWAII.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), was a United States Supreme Court decision that held that under the existing statutory scheme, federal question jurisdiction could not be predicated on a plaintiff's anticipation that the defendant would raise a federal statute as a defense. Instead, such jurisdiction can only arise from a complaint by the plaintiff that the defendant has directly violated some provision of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. This reading of the federal question jurisdiction statute is now known as the well-pleaded complaint rule.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The appeal in this case although arising under the revenue laws is properly brought direct from the Circuit Court and brings with it not only the constitutional question involved, but all the questions arising upon the record.

Held: as a matter of general law and local practice, that the order of a trial court upon a motion for new trial is discretionary and cannot be revised in error.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The language of the contract is plain. The decision of the engineer in charge was required; not the decision of the chief of the corps; not the decision of the Secretary of War; not obedience to instructions. Mansfield &c. R. Co. v. Veeder, 17 Ohio, 204, 385; 'Baldwin’s Case, 15 C. Cls. 297, 303; King’s Case, 37 C. Cls. 428; Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524,608.

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

in the report of this case below, 28 App. D. C. 498 , on the question of responsibility, is as follows: “ A charge to the jury in a libel ease is correct which in effect states that one who procures the publication of a newspaper article libelous per se, or the circulation of copies of a newspaper containing such an article, is liable to the person defamed, no matter who wrote the article; and that a principal is responsible for a libelous newspaper article written by his…

The facts are stated in the opinion. Regulation of transportation companies, particularly as to intrastate rates is an essential attribute of the State government, a legitimate and necessary part of the police power, to be exercised by such body as the State may select and clothe with the necessary powers.

Held: in Eddy v. O’Hara, supra, that where, the wages of seamen had been obliged to be paid by a decree in admiralty, a party could not again. be charged under attachment proceedings, and the court expressed the opinion that, as the wages were paid upon the judgment upon which trustee process had issued a court of admiralty of the United States would not compel the owners to pay a second time.

<p>Decided on the authority of Garfield v. Goldsby, ante, p. 249.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OP THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>In order to determine the power of the city of 'Los Angeles, in granting' the franchise in question, to enter upon a contract with the grantee thereof as to rates for telephone service, it is necessary to examine first the nature and scope of the power delegated to make the grant; the express requirements to be complied with in making it, and the extent of the discretion left to the granting body.</p> <p>As bearing upon the question of such power to contract, the Broughton Act of March 11, 1901, and the charter of the -city of Lbs Angeles are to be regarded as concurrent laws. Los Angeles v. Davidson, 150 California, 59, 63. The principle that the right to compensation is an inseparable incident , to every franchise affected with a public use, must be kept in view;</p> <p>• The right to reasonable compensation is an essential and inseparable incident to the exercise , of every franchise and privilege affected with a public use. Stockton Gas Co. v. San Joaquin County, 148 California, 313, 321; Truckee Turnpike Road v. Campbell, 44 California, 89; State v. Boston &c. R. R., 25 Vermont, 433; State v. Laclede Gas Co., 102 Missouri, 472; S. C., 15 S. W. Rep. 383; Water Co. v.Los Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep. 720,731.</p> <p>So vital is this fight and so absolutely incident is -it, that even when it is left to continuous public regulation, unrestrained by contract, it comes under the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 522-526.</p> <p>The Broughton Act is vitally related to the power of the city to contract respecting telephone rates, primarily because it requires the franchise to be publicly sold by the city council and in its discretion. The procedure to sell, prescribed by the .statute, is contractual at every stage.</p> <p>The requirement in § 3 of the act, that the successful bidder and his assigns must, during the life of the franchise, pay the municipality two per cent of the gross receipts, shows that the act contemplates that terms of sale of the franchise may' embrace an agreement as to rates.</p> <p>Every consideration shows that , the Broughton Act conferred power upon the municipalities of the State to contract as to rates for.'teléphone service.</p> <p>The legislature has power to confer this authority. Detroit v. Detroit &c. Ry. Co., 184 U. S. 368; .Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water Works Co., 206 U. S. 495, 508. The Broughton Act more specifically contemplates authority to municipalities to contract than does any statute considered in the following cases, where the power of the municipalities to contract as to rates was upheld. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Water Works Co., 206 U. S. 497; Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 Ü. S. 558, 570; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 Ú. S. 1, 3, 14; Cleveland v. Cleveland R. Co., 194 U. S. 517; Cleveland v. Cleveland E. R. Co., 201 U. S. 529, 540-541; Omaha Water Company v. City of Omaha, 147 Fed. Rep. 1, 5, 12, 13; Santa Ana Water Co. v. Town of San Buena Ventura, 56 Fed. Rep. 339; State v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 102 Missouri, 485; S. C.,. 14 S. Wv. Rep. 974; City of Bessemer v. Bessemer Water Works, 40 So. Rep. 662.</p> <p>The city charter concurs with the Broughton Act in con-iferring power’upon the city of Los Angeles to contract as to rates in the sale of a franchise. It expressly confers the; power to fix,and determine rates for a definite period. It places no limitation upon the period for which the council is so empowered to fix and determine telephone rates. The fixing and determining of rates for a definite period is neither an abandonment nor a suspension of the power to regulate by the exercise of it. Bessemer v. Water Works, 44 So. Rep. 663; Vicksburg v. Water Works Co., 206 U. S.s510; Cal. Reduction Works v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U. S. 306.</p> <p>In California the right of a municipality to make a contract for a term of years, controlling the further exercise of legislative or governmental power over its subject-matter during such term, is judicially established. McBean v. City of Fresno, 112 California, 161; San Francisco Gas Light Company v. Dunn, 62 California, 585; Contra Costa Water Co., v. Breed, 139 Cali-fomia, 432; Dolan v. Clark, 143 California, 176; Los Angeles Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep. 720; Santa Ana Water Co. v. Town of San Buena Ventura, 56 Fed. Rep. 339.</p> <p>The contemporaneous construction of the Broughton Act and of the powers of the city under its charter are controlling, and is in favor of our contention.</p> <p>The ordinance “B,” constituting the grant of complainant’s franchise, embraces a contract as to maximum rates, mutually binding upon complainant and defendant.</p> <p>When all the circumstances preceding, surrounding and entering into this grant of franchise by the ordinance are considered, it will clearly appear that it constitutes a contract, fixing maximum rates of charges for the term of the franchise. Vicksburg v. Water Works Co., 206 U. S. 495; Cleveland v. City By. Co., 194 U. S. 517; Detroit v. City St. By. Co., 184 U. S. 368, 375, 389; Water Co. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. Rep. 1; Detroit v. City By. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 161,171; Bessemerv. Water Works (Ala.), 44 So. Rep. 663; State v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 102 Missouri, 472; Pingree v. Michigan Central B. B. Co., 118 Michigan, 314; State v. Yazoo & V. B. Co., 62 Mississippi, 607, 641.</p> <p>The State has power to regulate charges for telephone service, and this power may be delegated to municipalities. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 44 Iowa, 105; People v. Suburban B. B. Co., 178 Illinois, 594; St. Louis v. Bell Telephone Co., 96 Missouri, 623; McQuillan on Municipal Ordinances, §583; Danville v. Danville Water Co., 180 Illinois, 233. ,</p> <p>The city of Los Angeles did not by the franchise ordinance surrender or suspend its power to regulate appellant’s charges for telephone service. Omaha Water (Ip. v. Omaha, 147 Fed. Rep. 1, 5; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Í24; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; Bogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624, 629; Los Angeles Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 88 Fed. Rep. 721: Walla Walla v. Water Co., 172 U. S. 1,15; Central Trust Co. v. Citizens’ Ry. Co., 82 Fed. Rep. 1, 8; Freeport Water Co. v. Free-port, 180.U. S. 587; Danville Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U. S. 619; Atlantic & Pacific R. R. Co. v. United States, 76 Fed. Rep. 186.</p> <p>The regulating ordinance does not contravene any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United' States. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 California, 556; Moore v. Haddon-field, 62 N. J. Law, ,386; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. St. Bernard, Í9 Ohio C. C. Rep. 299; Water Works v. San Francisco, '82 California, 286, 315; Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport, 180 U. S. 587, 600; Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 168; Hogar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Chicago &c. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 739/748.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Equity has no jurisdiction. Mandamus and not injunction is the remedy to enforce a statutory obligation. Walkley v. City of Muscatine, 0 Wall. 481; Supervisors v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 175; Rees v. City of Watertoim, 19 Wall. 107; People v. Albany & Vermont R. Co., 24 N. Y. 261; Shaekley v. Eastern R. R. Co., 98 Massachusetts, 93; Moundsville v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 37 W. Ya. 92. . In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 556, and 'Chesapeake & Potomac Tel.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The mere fact (if it be a fact) that complainant was formed and this property transferred tb it for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the 'Federal courts, can in no way affect the jurisdiction of those courts. Dickemnan v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U. S. 181, 191; McDonald v. Smalley, 1 Pet. 620; Smith v. Kernochen,-7 How. 198, 216; Barney v. Baltimore, 6 Wall. 280; Morris -v. Gilmer, 129 TJ.

North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that no hearing was necessary prior to the seizure, condemnation, and destruction of food which was unwholesome and unfit for use.

The parties to this proceeding agreed upon a case, without action, containing the facts upon which a controversy had arisen between them, and submitted the same to the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii;, conformably to the laws of that Territory. The court heard the case and made a decree therein, from which those named above as plaintiffs in the submission have appealed to this court, but the defendant executors have not appealed.

The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate of Robert G. Ingersoll, deceased, sued the respondents and certain other persons, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, to subject certain interests in the estate of Andrew J. Davis to a lien which is alleged to have accrued to her intestate by the agreement which is set out in the opinion, and by the laws of Montana, in which State the services were rendered.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The charge against defendants of conspiracy to defraud the United States is specifically made a crime by § 5440, Rev. Stat. Arguments that, because the coal .land laws do not expressly make it a crime for an individual to obtain lands in excess of the designated quantity, it is not criminal to do so, are fallacious.

Held: without destroying that section, that the obtaining of such mere right of preference authorized the making, not only of an *404 entry which the statute permitted, but as well one which the statute forbade.

<p>Decided, on the authority of United States v. Keitel, ante, p. 370, and United States v. Forrester, ante, p. 399.</p>

<p>Decided on the authority of United States v. Keitel, ante, p. 370.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. Congress has conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to investigate, and in connection therewith compel the testimony of witnesses, only in aid of its duty to execute and enforce the provisions of the act to regulate commerce. The commission is a body of limited powers derived exclusively from the act to regulate commerce.

<p>An appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii dismissed because not final. Cotton v. Hawaii, ante, p. 162.</p>

<p>It'is too late to raise the Federal question for the first time in petition for rehearing in the state court of last resort, unless, and it must so appear, that court actually entertains the motion and passes upon the Federal question; where the order is merely a denial of the motion the writ of error will be dismissed.</p>

<p>The jurisdiction of this court can only be invoked by a party having a personal interest in the litigation. Smithy. Indiana, 191 U. S. 138.</p> <p>A writ of error will not lie to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, dismissing the bill in a suit brought by a taxpayer to enjoin the land commissioner from an alleged unauthorized use of public lands where it does not appear that complainant would be personally injured by the threatened use.</p> <p>Qu(ere and not decided, whether any citizen and taxpayer has a right to maintain a suit in the courts of Hawaii to enjoin the land commissioner from acts involving unauthorized use of public lands, or whether if that right exists a personal loss to complainant must appear.</p> <p>Qucere and not decided, whether the land laws of Hawaii are Federal statutes within the meaning, and by virtue of § 83 of the organic act of April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. 141,c. 339, so that their construction, involves a Federal question.</p>

<p>Long settled habits of the community play an important part in determining questions of constitutional law and the fact that a method of taxation was in force for many years from a time antedating the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is a reason for not considering that it was overthrown thereby.</p> <p>Notwithstanding the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment land, subject to mortgage may be taxed for its full value without deduction of the mortgage debt from the valuation either of the land or of the owner's personal property.</p> <p>In New York a tax on land operates in rem, at least without regard to the interests of different persons in the land.</p> <p>A constitution cannot be carried out' with mathematical nicety to logical extremes.</p> <p>Qucere and not decided, whether one disputing only the amount of a tax has any remedy except proceedings for an abatement.</p>

The facts are stated in the opinion. By leave of court, Mr. Attorney General Bonaparte and Mr. Robert A. Howard filed a brief as amici curia on the question of constitutionality of the Alabama statute.

Held: as matter of law, to understand, appreciate and assume the risk of it. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U. S. 51 ; Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 155 Massachusetts, 155. The visible conditions may have been of''recent origin, and the danger arising from them may have been obscure.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Extradition between States, Territories' and countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States depends solely on the provisions of. the Constitution of the.United States and the acts of Congress. There is no reserve power in the State to surrender a fugitive as a matter of favor or comity. Corkran v. Hyatt, 172 N. Y‘. 183; S. C., aff’d, 188 U. S. 691.

The appellants are gaugers of coal and coke, appointed by the State of Louisiana. The appellee is a corporation organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, engaged in mining bituminous coal outside the State of Louisiana and transporting it to that and other States for sale. The transportation to Louisiana is in coal boats or barges.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The provisions of the amended statute, requiring the spreading upon the town records of a notice of intention to sell, seven days before the sale, were in violation of the Constitution of the United States, as abridging and depriving the plaintiff in error of his-liberty, or property or his contract rights, as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Case below, 79 Connecticut 434, see dissenting opinion of Hammersley, J.; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; People v. Gill-son, 109. N. Y. 389; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Ya. 179, S. C., 6 L. R. A. 621; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137; Colon v. Lisk, 153 N. Y.. 188; People v. Arensburg, 103 N. Y. 399; Health Department v. Rector, 145 N. Y. 32, 39.</p> <p>The statute cannot be justified as an exercise of the police power. No legislative enactment can impute a crime, under the guise of police power, to any person while pursuing the exercise of a constitutional right. Tynoler v. Warden, 157 N. Y. 116; State v. Julow, 129 Missouri, 163; Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Massachusetts, 117; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; Ramsey v. People, 142 Illinois, 380; State v. Missouri Tie Co., 65 L. R. A. 5,88; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98; People ex rel. Rodgers v. Color, 166 N. Y. 1; State v. Dalton (R. I.), 48 L. R. A. 775; People ex rel. Cossey v. Grout, 179 N. Y. 417.</p> <p>The following cases appear to involve the precise principles upon which the statute here'complained of is based: Bloch v. Schwartz, 7.6 Pac. Rep. 22; S. C., 65 L. R. A. 308; Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330; Neas v. Borchesj 109 Tennessee, 398; S. C., 71 S. W. Rep. 50, dissenting opinion; McDaniels v. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Washington, 549; S. C., 60 L. R. A. 947; Squire & Co. v. Tellier, 69 N. E. Rep. 312.</p> <p>The amended statute violates § 1, of Art. XIV, of the Amend- • ments to' the Constitution of the United States, because it denies to the plaintiff in error as the vendee of said Hendrick, and to persons placed in a position similar to that of the plaintiff in error, the equal protection of the laws of Connecticut, and abridges their respective privileges and immunities as citizens of the United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31; Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Illinois, 183; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150,159; Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Matter of Pell, 171 N. Y. 48; McPihe v. Van DeCarr, 178 N. Y. 425; Ballard v. Mississippi River Bill Co., 81 Mississippi, 507.</p> <p>The heed or wisdom of such legislation as the act here in question is a matter of legislative discretion, and this court will not consider that question. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 685.</p> <p>■ This act was' clearly within the police power of the State under the reasoning and'within the decisions cited by the court in its opinion. Statutes upon the same subject, but with much more rigorous and burdensome conditions, have been held to be constitutional. Squire & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Massachusetts, 18.</p> <p>The fact that property may be destroyed through the enforcement. of a statute, and the right of contract either prohibited or restricted, is not decisive on the question of constitutionality. ' Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 165; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 709; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 429; Otis v. Parker, 187. U. S. 606; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 • U. S. 27; Ah Sin v. Williamson, 198 U. S. 500; Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U. S. 318.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

of the opinion in the case below: An indictment under Rev. Stat. § 5440 for conspiracy to defraud the United States, which sets out a number of overt acts on different dates, is either bad for duplicity, as charging more than one conspiracy, or if held to charge a single continuing conspiracy, the offense was consummated when the first overt a'ftt was committed, and from that date the statute of limitations began to run. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court.

The facts are stated in the opinion. The indictment contains no charge of a crime., in that it charges the plan or alleged conspiracy of. defendants to have been simply an Agreement or plan to obtain indirectly lands for a,corporation that could not, according to the indictment, have been directly purchased by the said corporation. A plan to obtain indirectly lands from the Government may or may not be a plan to defraud the Government.

<p>Decided on the authority of United States v. Biggs, ante, p. 507.</p>

Held: it sold to defendant [plaintiff in error] an interest in the lands which was liable to be divested.” And the court sustained the bill and ordered a decree to be entered in accordance with its prayer. Judgment affirmed.

Held: to embrace that, merely on the strength of words general enough to include it, when the policy of the repealing law, and the policy of the law alleged to be repealed, have such different directions, and when it appears that the general policy *539 of the latter still is maintained.

THE .SUPREME COURT OP THE SjTATE OP ARKANSAS. The facts, which involved the constitutionality of the Arkansas coal miners' wages act, are stated in the ODinion. The act violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution by restricting the right to contract, by taking property without due process of law, by unlawful discrimination and by denying to certain operators and workers in coal mines the fight of civil liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts are' stated in the opinion. The bankrupt’s actual possession of this property at the inception of the bankruptcy, proceedings, and its. delivery thereof to the receiver, as a part of its property, rendered it the duty of the receiver not only to take but to hold the property pending an order of the Federal court as to its disposition. In re Sckermerhorn, 1'6 Am. B. R. 507; White v. Schloerb, 178 U. S. 542; S. G-, 4 4-ta. B. R. 178; Sharpe v. Doyle, 102 IJ.

Held: under the circumstances of this case, to be a preferential payment within the meaning of the bankruptcy law. The amount of fees to which counsel for the trustee in bankruptcy is entitled is a matter for the bankruptcy court and in this case this court will not interfere with the amount fixed. 149 Fed. Rep. 194 , affirmed on these points.

<p>Findings of fact made by the Circuit Court which were not objected to and which accompanied the questions certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals, held in this case to be sufficient to justify entering judgment thereon after this court had responded to the questions certified.</p> <p>The issuing of bonds in payment of a subscription to railroad stock by an officer, charged with the duty of ascertaining whether conditions precedent had been fulfilled, raises a presumption of their fulfillment and of the proper issuing of the bonds upon which a lawful holder of the bonds is entitled to rely until it is-overcome by evidence to the contrary. In this case nothing in the findings overcomes such presumption.</p> <p>In construing written instruments the entire instrument will be considered and not single words or phrases, and the intent reached even if technical meanings be disregarded; and so “on condition” interpreted as meaning a covenant or agreement.</p> <p>Although county bonds may have been authorized “upon condition” that the railroad company assisted expend the proceeds as specified, if the condition is in fact merely a covenant or agreement, as in this case, the subsequent failure of the corporation to perform cannot be pleaded by the county against a bona fide holder for value.</p> <p>In the absence of clearest proof coupoil bonds intended for the market will not be presumed to have been issued under such conditions as would destroy their salability.</p>

<p>CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A corporation organized by citizens of one State in'another State simply for the purpose of bringing suits on causes of action against citizens of the former State in the Federal courts where jurisdiction would not otherwise exist, is a sham and, under § 5 of the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat. 470, a suit brought by such a corporation does not really and substantially involve a dispute within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and should be dismissed, as soon as such facts have been ascertained.</p>

<p>In this case held that the court below correctly charged the jury as to the law governing the duty of the master to furnish a safe place, machinery and tools, and the duty of the employé to take reasonable care of himself, and the judgment in favor of the employé affirmed.</p>

On September 15, 1906, the Larabee Flour Mills Company (hereinafter called the mill company) filed its application in the Supremfe Court of Kansas for an alternative writ of mandamus, compelling the Missouri Pacific Railway Company (hereinafter called the Missouri Pacific) to restore, resume and make transfer of cars between the lines of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (hereinafter called the Santa Fe) and the mill and elevators of the plaintiff, situated…

<p>EBKOB TO THE COURT OP APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p> <p>The facts arc stated in the opinion.</p>