Volume 230 — United States Reports

The facts, which involve the question of liability of the United States for damages alleged to have been sustained by the owner of a plantation in the Mississippi River Valley by reason of the improvement of the Mississippi River under direction of the Federal Commission charged with that work, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the question of liability of the United States for damages alleged to have been sustained by the owner of a plantation in the Mississippi • River Vfilley by reason of the improvements of the Mississippi River under direction of the Federal Commission charged with that work, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 21 of the Judicial Code of 1911 and-the jurisdiction of this court to issue writs of mandamus, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the contamination of waters in Arizona by a copper plant constituted a nuisance as to the lower appropriators and, under the circumstances, an injunction .was properly granted, the Supreme Court of the Territory having provided in the decree that the defendant might have the injunction modified on constructing remedial works to prevent contamination.

Held: Pikes Peak Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 105 Fed. Rep. 1 ; C. C. A. 8th Circuit; Detroit Citizens’ Railway v. Detroit, 64 Fed. Rep. 628 , 636; C. C. A. 6th Circuit.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the contract clause of. the Federal Constitution'of an-ordinance of Boise City, Idaho, affecting a franchise for using the streets of the city for water supply purposes and the liability of the city for water supplied to it, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals under the . Judiciary Act of 1891, are stated in the opinion.

of a case decided by the highest court of a State and reported in the official reports of that court than is given thereto in the courts of the State. Held: in this case, not to be an intention to limit the franchise to the corporate existence of the grantee.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from the Circuit Court of Appeals under the Judiciary Act of 1891, are stated in the opinion.

• The facts, which involve the constitutionality of §§ 1 and’2 of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, as applied to vessels of the United States engaged in the coastwise trade, are stated in the opinion. Congress has two kinds of jurisdiction, that dependent upon locality and that dependent upon subject-matter. The first includes jurisdiction over vessels of the United States upon the high seas and the navigable waters of the United States.

The facts, which involve thé title to real estate in Porto Rico and the constitutionality of certain military orders during the military occupation of that Island, are stated in the opinion. The Judicial Order of April 4, 1899,-is not unconstitutional nor is it repugnant to Art. V of, or the Fourteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States. Paragraph 3 of the Judicial Order is not a statute of limitations properly so called.

The facts, which involve the practice of bills of exceptions in the District of Columbia and the extent to which statements made by members of a Board of Education, in regard to qualifications of a school teacher are privileged, arq stated in the opinion. There is no absolute privilege where the libelous matter was knowingly false, and malicious and wantonly made. White v. Nichols, 3 How. 266; see also Masterson v. Brown, 72 Fed. Rep. 136; Merchants Ins.

(11 App. Cas. 98) expresses the view of the. Lord Chancellor, and the order for judgment (p. 126) shows that this view prevailed.

Held: citing Pa. R. R. v. International Co., 173 Fed. Rep. 1 , 9, that, as to this tonnage, the plaintiff was as much a violator of the statute as was the carrier and that no cause of action arising out of this illegal contract would be enforced by the courts. He therefore limited the inquiry to a consideration of the damages in respect to that part of the plaintiff’s shipments on which no rebates had been paid.

Held: one judge dissenting, that the plaintiff had the option of taking the question *312 of jurisdiction by direct writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, or it could take the whole case, including the matter of jurisdiction, to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

The facts, which involve the right, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, of a carrier to pay rebates to a shipper in consideration of a right of way granted by the latter, are stated in the opinion. The contract of August 3, 1905, became invalid as to the rate for transportation of logs when tariffs were filed by the Fourche River Valley & Ind. Terr. R. R. Co. prescribing another and different rate from the contract price.

APPEAL prom the united states commerce court. The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over certain classes of street railway systems, are stated in the opinion. The original and amendatory statute regulating commerce at the time said order was made, did not include street railway companies. The term “railroad ” in said act applies only to commercial railroads as distinct from street'railway companies.

<p>ERROR, TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP KANSAS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the statute of 1905 of the State of Kansas establishing maximum rates for transportation of oil, gasoline, etc., which fixes five hundred dollars as liquidated damages for violations of the act, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The act is, on its face, in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and denies the railway companies the equal protection of the law.</p> <p>When the railroad company is called to account for a violation of the law, it may then, and not until then, question the rates. The Supreme Court of Kansas has so construed the statute. C., M. & St. P. R. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, 458.</p> <p>Violation of this section of the act is not made a misdemeanor, and no public officer (is charged with its enforcement. The unreasonableness of the rates, therefore, cannot be tested or questioned in a comprehensive bill in equity. The company can initiate no affirmative action.</p> <p>The judgment in one case would not be res judicata as against any other shipper seeking to collect the penalty. The statute is void oh its face under Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 146.</p> <p>The statute of Kansas involved in this case is far more drastic, arbitrary and unreasonable than the statute of Nebraska, declared unconstitutional in Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 207, and see also C., M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 460.</p> <p>While the railway company is testing the validity of the law as to one shipment, either .the confiscatory rates are in force or enormous penalties are accruing against the. carrier for non-observance of the statutory schedules. The remedy afforded must be adequate, or it is not due process of law. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, and see also Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 102.</p> <p>The construction placed upon the act by the Supreme Court of Kansas in effect closes all approach to the courts by the carrier for relief from unreasonable and confiscatory legislative rates. To provide a remedy which is unreasonable, and which is so onerous and impracticable as to substantially give none at all, renders the law invalid, although what is termed a remedy is in fact given. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 694; Ex parte Young, supra.</p> <p>The act is class legislation of the rankest character, arbitrary and unreasonable, and denies to railroad companies the equal protection of the law.</p> <p>The rates prescribed by the schedule in the act are unreasonable and confiscatory, and deprive the railroad company of its property without compensation, and without due process of law, and deny to it the equal protection of the law.</p> <p>No violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is shown in the statute involved in this case.</p> <p>There being no showing of any reduction in rates of oil transported, there can be no violation by the legislation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because an article may be carried at a loss the rate is not necessarily unreasonable.</p> <p>Under the rule of commercial necessity, certain commodities are at times transported at a figure below the average of tariffs,'sometimes at an actual habitual loss. The fact that such rate may be prescribed as to a partiallaf commodity will not from that fact alone lay the prescription open to the imputation of unreasonableness. State v. Minn. & St. L. R. Co., 80 Minnesota, 191; S. C., aff’d 186 U. S. 257; State v. Railroad Co., 57 So. Rep. 673; Reagan v. Farmers’ L. & Tr. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 412.</p> <p>In so flagrant a case of discrimination as here shown, public interest, public policy, and public welfare demand adequate means for fixing rates at least as low as those habitually given the most favored shipper, and especially is this applicable to an integral product, the theme of such notorious comment and animadversion as the oil trafile. Ala. & V. R. Co. v. Mississippi R. R. Com., 203 U. S. 496; Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Florida, 203 U. S. 261.</p> <p>Public interest and even custom, under the guise of “ commercial necessity,” may outweigh the usual considerations entering into the fixing of a rate. Carriage at habitual loss is of so common occurrence that the courts take judicial notice of the usual course of business in that regard, and will refuse to condemn as unreasonable a prescription of that nature, when falling within the rule of necessity or demanded by public interest. McCue v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001; S. C., aff’d, 216 U. S. 579; see also cases compelling a road to put on additional trains at a positive loss, whether it be for public safety, or mere personal convenience. Atlantic Coast Line v. North Car. Com., 206 U. S. 1; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262. And as to other requirements, Consumers’ Co. v. Hatch, 224 U. S. 148; Memphis v. Postal Tel Co., 164 Fed. Rep. 342.</p> <p>Legislation fixing rates of transportation is presumptively reasonable, and the burden is on plaintiff in error to show that the rate is unreasonable from every angle. Texas & P. R. Co. v. R. R. Com., 192 Fed. Rep. 280; Railroad Commission v. Cumberland Tel. Co., 212 U. S. 414, see, also, So. Pac. Cov. R. R. Com., 193 Fed. Rep. 699.</p> <p>If the statute be doubtful, the court will presume that the legislature intended the enactment of a valid, sensible and just law, Black on Interpretation, 87, and that the legislature did not attempt to transcend the rightful limits of its authority. Id. 89. Every act is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary is shown. Id. 93, and cases there cited; see also Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; 1 Willoughby on Constitutional Law, 20, 23.</p> <p>Charges must be reasonable, is the requirement of the law, as expressed by the cases. As to the question of reasonableness, the test is not alone if it be compensatory to this or that particular individual. Reagan v. Farmers’ Co., 154 U. S. 362, 412.</p> <p>Reasonableness should be determined from average normal conditions. C. & G. T. R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 680; Covington & L. T. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; Dow v. Biedleman (Ark.), 5 S. W. Rep. 297; S. C., aff’d, 125 U. S. 680; St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Gill, 54 Arkansas, 101; S. C., aff’d, 154 U. S. 649; Purdy v. Erie R. Co. (N. Y.), 48 L. R. A. 669.</p> <p>The legislature is given, under the police power, not only the clear right to fix rates, in which it necessarily is given wide discretion^ but when the legislature shall directly fix the rate, the'rule that the question of reasonableness is a judicial one does not apply, but the rate fixed must be reasonable.' Judicial determination does not precede the execution of the law, but on attempted enforcement it may be invoked in a proper case. Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, and note 5 L. R. A. 559; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.</p> <p>The State is simply farming out the operation of public utilities. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 544, holding -that a railroad corporation maintaining a highway under the authority of the State may not fix its rates with a view solely to its own interests, and ignore the rights of the' public.</p> <p>This exercise of legislative discretion is subject to judicial supervision to no greater extent than is like exercise in any applications of the police power; the occasion for judicial determination does not arise until the law is ap-. plied as effectual.</p> <p>This is an action for damages expressly given by the statute, not a penalty. If it were for a penalty, the only remedy therefor at common law would be an action in debt on the statute. This action would be trespass on the case at common law. This action sounds in tort. Smith v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 49 Wisconsin, 443; Heiserman v. Burlington Ry. Co., 63 Iowa, 736; Graham v. Railway Co., 53 Wisconsin, 473.</p> <p>It is not necessary that the statute to ,be constitutional must be weighted with a clog to its enforcement so as to give to the party affected an opportunity to obtain a judicial annulment of the legislation, not only as to himself, but as to every other person similarly affected.</p> <p>That would mean that every penalty imposed, whether corporal or pecuniary, on behalf of the public, and as well every remedy given private parties damaged through infractions of the law, must be subject to some means of judicial investigation of the reasonableness of the requirement, in depriving the malefactor of property, or the tortfeasor in private injuries, if the one or the other shall be conducting business charged with public use or interest.</p> <p>If that be the law, there is no legislative discretion in the case of business charged with public use and interest.</p> <p>It is the province of the'legislature to provide what the law shall be, and the duty of the court to determine and declare what the law is with reference to a given state of facts. McGehee on Due Process of Law, 77; Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398; Ex parte Young, can be clearly distinguished from this case.</p> <p>The act is not class legislation.</p>

Held: in view of the special facts appearing, that the margin of error in the estimates and calculations was not sufficient to affect the result.

The facts are stated in the opinion. These cases were argued simultaneously with the other Missouri Rate Cases, ante, p. 474 by the same counsel and on the same briefs. Memorandum opinion by direction of the court.

The facts áre stated in the opinion. These cases were argued simultaneously with the other Missouri Rate Cases, ante, p. 474 by the same counsel and on the same briefs. Memorandum opinion by direction of the court.

Held: . “By the institution of a suit to determine whether such a statute is confiscatory in its operation in a particular case, such corporation alters its status from that of a mere corporation engaged in the public service, to that of a contestant of the legislative claim of right to take its property without due process of law; and, in the absence of expression of intent to the contrary, it is presumed the legislature…

The facts, which involve the validity and -constitutionality of an order made by the Railroad Commission of Oregon on April 22, 1908, prescribing máximum freight rates on railroads, are stated in the opinion. The State has exclusive jurisdiction over its .internal commerce. Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463; Milnor v. New Jersey Ry. Co., 17 Fed. Cas. 412; Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 867; Allen v. O. R. & N. Co., 106 Fed.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of an order of the Railroad Commission of Oregon of September 21, 1910, prescribing railroad freight rates, are stated in the opinion. The constitutionality of the Railroad Commission Act having been sustained by the Supreme Court of Oregon, State v. Corvallis R. R. Co., 117 Pac. Rep. 980, that construction is binding upon this court. Mo. Pac. Ry.

These - two suits were brought to restrain the enforcement of the act of the legislature passed February 9, 1907, fixing the maximum fare for passengers at two cents a mile, and also the-orders of the Railroad Commission made June 4, 1908, -prescribing maximum freight and passenger rates. . The facts involved in both eases are stated in the opinion.