Volume 231 — United States Reports

. The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of an order of the Railroad Commission of Indiana prescribing maximum railroad freight rates for certain intrastate traffic, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of § 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592, relating to, citizenship and naturalization and the validity of a decree setting aside a certificate of naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently issued, are stated in the opinion.

United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), was a United States Supreme Court case deciding whether the federal government's law prohibiting liquor on the land of Santa Clara Pueblo impermissibly infringed on the State of New Mexico's police power under the equal footing doctrine. In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the law and Congress's ability to recognize and regulate tribes. Citing broad congressional authority in Kagama, recognition of tribes subject to the guardianship of the federal government falls on Congress, not the Court, as long as recognition is not "arbitrary" and actually reflects "distinctly Indian communities." The Supreme Court held the Pueblos to be dependent Indian communities.

The facts, which involve the determination of whether the delivery of securities by a broker, immediately preceding his bankruptcy, to a bank to secure its loan was an illegal preference, are stated in the opinion. The law presumes an agreement or transaction to be legal, when it is capable of a construction which makes it valid. Jones on Evidence (2d ed.), § 85; King v. Hawkins, 10 East, 211; Curtis v. Gokey, 68 N. Y. 300, 304; Ormes v. Dauchy, 82 N. Y. 443.

The facts, which involve the determination of Ü19 question of whether the delivery of securities by a broker immediately preceding his bankruptcy to a bank to secure its loan was an illegal preference, are stated 'in the opinion.

Held: does not apply to corporations which have places of business for the transaction solely of interstate commerce. Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Massachusetts, 239.

<p>MOTION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA TO PROCEED TO A FINAL HEARING.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion,</p>

Held: as we have seen, that § 1024 applied, and this is the conten *100 tion of the Government. Petitioner asserts the applicability of § 43 of the Alaskan Code.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Hours of Service of Railway Employés Act, are stated in the opinion. The Hours- of Service Act imposes a penalty for each act of requiring or permitting employes to work overtime,, whether one or more employés. be involved, and not a penalty for each employé required or permitted to work beyond the hours prescribed.

The facts, which involve the legality of a statute of Vermont imposing a tax on deposits in national banks, are stated in the opinion. The stipulation and the return formulated by the state officials show that in actual operation of the statute it was construed as a tax on the bank itself. The statute, being an attempt to tax national banks, is absolutely void.

The facts, which involve the construction of the Federal Corporation Tax Act and the determination of whether the same imposed a tax upon the income derived from the management of corporate property by receivers appointed by the court, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve questions of negligence in operating an elevator and questions of proximate cause of an injury sustained by a passenger therein, are stated in the opinion.

Held: in effect, that compliance with these statutory provisions was not essential in a constitutional sense to the validity of tax sales and therefore that the territorial legislature was free to declare that non-compliance should not render the sales invalid; and with this as a premise the court further held that the objections could not prevail, because the statute under which the sales were had contained a provision…

Held: in view of the existence of the record title in Alvarado, of his suit to restrain the foreclosure proceeding and its dismissal for want of prosecution, of the steps taken against him as a third possessor and his admissions on the subject and consent to the erasure of the inscription of his title, that the foreclosure proceedings were binding and it was not open to Torres who so far as the record was concerned had…

<p>Decided on the authority of Northern Pacific Railway Company v, Wass, 219 U. S. 426.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of §§ 28 and 29 of the Penal Code (§§ 5421 and 5479, Rev. Stat.), are stated in the opinion. The false writings intended by the third clause of § 5421, Rev. Stat., are not confined to forgeries, but include also writings genuine as to execution but false and fraudulent in substance. United States v. Staats, 8 How. 41; United States v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 294; S. C., 24 Fed.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Union Pacific Land Grant Act of July 1, 1862, the act of June 24, 1912¡ and the extent of rights claimed to have been acquired under the latter act by adverse possession in the railroad right of way, are stated in the opinion. Prior to the act of June 24, 1912, title to the right of way could not have been acquired by adverse possession. Nor. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267; Kindred v. Un. Pac.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the Railroad Land Grant Act of July 1,1862, and the act of June 24,1912, and the extent of rights claimed to have been acquired under the latter act by adverse possession in a railroad right of way, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>Any title which plaintiff or its predecessors ever had in or to the premises in controversy emanated from the act of July 1, 1862, and was a limited or determinable fee conditioned upon the continued use of said right of way for'railroad purposes. Stuart v. Un. Pac. R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 342; M., K. & T. R. Co. v. Kan. P. R. Co., 97 U. S. 491, 494; United States v. Kan. P. R. Co., 99 U. S. 455; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 171 U. S. 260; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 271; Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1; Oregon Short Line v. Quigley, 10 Idaho, 770; Universalist Society v. Boland, 155 Massachusetts, 171; Greenleaf’s Cruise on Real Property, Tit. 13, c. 2, § 64; 2 Blackstone, 155; 4 Kent’s Comm. (13th ed.), 134; D. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. School District, 14 Colorado, 327.</p> <p>Under the allegations contained in the second defense of the answers, the title or. ownership of the land in controversy was claimed by or through adverse possession of the character and duration prescribed by the laws of Colorado, and the Supreme Court of Colorado in these cases held that the allegations of said second defense were sufficient under the state statutes to establish title by adverse possession. Snow v. Un. Pacific R. R. Co., 133 Pac. Rep. 1037; Sides v. Un. Pacific R. R. Co., 133 Pac. Rep. 1040; Laas v. Newkirk, 39 Colorado, 78; Hurd v. McLellan, 1 Colo. App. 327; Latta v. Clifford, 47 Fed. Rep. 614, 619; Elder v. McClaskey, 70 Fed. Rep. 529; Scott v. Mineral Development Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 497; S. C., certiorari denied, 196 U. S. 640; Harending v. Reformed Dutch Church, 16 Pet. 455; Santee River Cyprus Co. v. Jones, 60 Fed. Rep. 360; United States v. One Lot of Land, 178 Fed. Rep. 334; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291.</p> <p>The title acquired by defendants under the adverse-possession statutes of Colorado was precisely equivalent in contemplation of law to such title as they would have acquired had the railroad company expressly granted to them all its right, title, and interest in the premises. Nor. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1; Sharon v. Tucker, 144 U. S. 533, 543; Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 191 U. S. 532, 538; 3 Washburn on Real Property (5th ed.), 176.</p> <p>The implication of a grant from the railroad company arising out of the adverse possession of the defendants is conclusive evidence of a voluntary abandonment of the premises by the railroad company. Stevens v. Norfolk, 42 Connecticut, 377; Livermore v. White, 74 Maine, 452; Myers v. Spooner, 55 California, 257; Davis v. Perley, 30 California, 630; North American Co. v. Adams, 104 Fed. Rep. 404.</p> <p>The act of June 24,' 1912, was equivalent to a reentry or declaration of forfeiture or reverter upon the part of the United States of the land in controversy, because of its abandonment and non-user as a railroad right of way, and had the effect of confirming in the defendants the title acquired by them by adverse possession and under the patent issued by the United States to their predecessor in title on November 5, 1878. Nor. Pacific Ry. Co. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1; Atl. & Pac. R. R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U. S. 413, 430; Schulenberg v. Harriman, 21 Wall. 44; Spokane & B. C. Ry. Co. v. Washington &c. Ry. Co., 219 U. S. 166.</p> <p>A legislative act passed subsequent to the entry of a' judgment in a lower court, and while a case is pending.in an appellate court on appeal or writ of error, may be conspidered and applied by the appellate court. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 430; Nor. Pac. Ry. v. Ely, 197 U. S. 1; United States v. Schooner Peggy, 1 Cr. 103, 110; Am. Sugar Co. v. New Orleans, 119 Fed. Rep. 691; Canal Co. v. Western Md. R. R. Co., 99 Maryland, 570.</p>

<p>Decided on the authority of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Snow, ante, p. 204.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 as amended by the act of 1873, are. stated in the opinion. The bankrupt homestead was set aside by the assignee in bankruptcy, and what has been done by the assignee is equivalent- to compliance with the State’s statutes in assigning homestead or claiming exemption. Ross v. Worsham, 65 Georgia, 622.

<p>A bond given pursuant to the act of August 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, for a contract for building a stone breakwater, under the terms of this contract, covers claims for labor on work at the quarry and for hauling and delivering the stone.</p> <p>Under the circumstances of this case held that the claims of laborers for wages had been properly assigned to the claimant and clothed him with legal right to maintain an action upon the bond given under the act of August 13, 1894.</p> <p>A claim against the surety on the bond of a government contractor will not be rejected as fraudulently excessive wheré it is shown that claimant's books have been destroyed but he offers to allow credits properly shown on the contractor’s books and the records do not disclose an attempt to recover more than the amount actually due.</p> <p>A claimant will not.be charged with laches when the record does hot disclose any delay which affected the relations of the parties or such that should relieve a surety from liability on the contractor’s bond.</p>

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state court resting on other than Federal grounds and tlie construction and application of § 5057, Rev. Stat., are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction.of this court to review a judgment of the state court at the instance of a public official who has no personal interest in the litigation, are stated in the opinion.

Held: under the circumstances of this case, to be a final decree from which an appeal could be taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Held: not a break in the continuity of the transportation, but a plain subterfuge to give the transaction the appearance of a shipment from pier 24. We agree with the Commerce Court and the minority of the Commission in thinking that the change in method after the failure to obtain relief in the first case did not change the substance of the transaction in point of law or fact.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the constitution of Kentucky and also under the Constitution of the United States of the State Railroad Commission Statute of Kentucky and the legality of orders made by the Commission, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Illinois Child Labor Act of 1903, are stated in the opinion.</p> <p>The common-law rule of contributory negligence applies to minors. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 409; Heiman v. Kinare, 190 Illinois, 156.</p> <p>The common-law rule of contributory negligence has not been abolished by child labor statutes. Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Massachusetts, 489-498; Beghold v. Auto Body Co., 149 Michigan; 14; Bromberg v. Evans Laundry Co., 134 Iowa, 38, 46; Braasch v. Michigan Stove Co., 118 N. W. Rep. 366; Burke v. Big Sandy Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 421; Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 Louisiana, 164, 171, 172; Dalm v. Bryant Paper Co., 157 Michigan, 550; Evans v. American Iron Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 519; Gaines Leathers v. Blackwell Tobacco Co., 144 N. Car. 330; Iron & Wire Co. v. Green, 108 Tennessee, 161, 165; Jacobson v. Merrill Mill Co., 107 Minnesota, 74; Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood Co., 39 Washington, 415; Nairn v. National Biscuit Co., 120 Mo. App. 144, 147; Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Indiana, 189, 196; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Co., 68 W. Va. 405; Perry v. Tozer, 90 Minnesota, 431; Peters v. Gille Mfg. Co., 133 Mo. App. 412, 419; Queen v. Dayton Coal Co., 95 Tennessee, 458, 465; Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. Car. 300; Roberts v. Taylor, 31 Ontario, 10; Sharon v. Winnebago Mfg. Co., 141 Wisconsin, 185, 189; Smith v. National Coal Co., 135 Kentucky, 671; Sterling v. Union Carbide Co., 142 Michigan, 284; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Michigan, 438.</p> <p>Corporations are persons within the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Gulf, Col. &c. Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 154; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 88; Minneapolis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U. S. 394.</p> <p>Courts will interfere to correct errors of state tribunals if law is administered so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275-279; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259-273; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 710; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356-373.</p> <p>- Defendant in error Beauchamp was an adult and not a child. Allen v. State, 7 Tex. App. 298; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 263; 51 Am. Reports, 293; Bell v. State, 18 Tex. App. 53; Black’s Law Dict.; Century Diet.; Hurd’s Illinois Stat. 1912, c. 38, Par. 282, p. 818, and § 7, Pars. 279, 280, 281 and 282; Id., c. 3, § 18, p. 11; Id., c. 4, § 4, p. 36; Id., c. 64, §§ 1, 3, p. 1261; McGregor v. State, 4 Tex. App. 599; Quattlebaum v. Triplett, 69 Arkansas, 91.</p> <p>For distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, see Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Massachusetts, 489-497; Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 33 C. C. A. 468; 91 Fed. Rep. 224; Narramore v. Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298-304; Un. Pac. Ry. Co. v. O’Brien, 161 U. S. 451.</p> <p>The judgment of the Illinois courts deprives plaintiff in error of equal protection of the laws. Chicago &c. R. R. v. Westby, 178 Fed. Rep. 619; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Cotting v. Kansas Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Cooley on Const. Lim., 3d ed., p. 391; Gulf, Col. &c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400.</p> <p>The legislature has no power to give civil remedy to one guilty of fraud and deceit. Black on Const. Law, 2d ed., p. 373; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Story on Const., 5th ed., § 1945; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274.</p> <p>Reading into the statute a civil remedy and abolishing common-law defenses are legislative and hot judicial acts and transcends power of court. 26 Amer. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 597; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34-45; St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; United States v. St. Anthony R. R. Co., 192 U. S. 524; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 282.</p> <p>The statute as held and enforced is not within the police power. Chicago v. Gunning System, 213 Illinois, 628; Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661; Ruhstrat v. The People, 185 Illinois, 133; State v. Gaspare, 80 Atl. Rep. 606, 613 (Md.); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370.</p> <p>The maxim “No one acquires a right of action from his own wrong” applies to minors. 16 Amer. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 311; Barham v. Turbeville, 1 Swan. 437; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), p. 606; Commander v. Brazil, 41 So. Rep. 497 (Miss.); Coleman v. Himmelberger Land Co., 79 S. W. Rep. 981; 22 Cyc., Title Infants, p. 512; Ex parte Banking Asso., 3 DeG. & J. 63; Edgar v. Gertison, 112 S. W. Rep. 831; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Mississippi, 121; Hall v. Timmons, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 120; 57 L. R. A. 673, n.; Matthews v. Cowan, 59 Illinois, 341; Munden v. Harris, 134 S. W. Rep. 1076-1080; Pace v. Cawood, 110 S. W. Rep. 414 (Ky.); Parker v. Elder, 11 Humph. 546; Rice v. Boyer, 108 Indiana, 472; Sanger v. Hibbard, 53 S. W. Rep. 330; Vasse v. Smith, 6 Cranch, 226; Vinton v. State, 52 S. E. Rep. 79; Wright v. Snowe, 2 DeG. & Sm. 321; Williamson v. Jones, 27 S. E. Rep. 418; Whittington v. Wright, 9 Georgia, 29.</p> <p>The statute in question is a penal statute to be strictly construed. Bandefield v. Bandfield, 75 N. W. Rep. 287; Field v. United States, 137 Fed. Rep. 6; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657; Sarlls v. United States, 152 U. S. 570, 575; The Ben R., 134 Fed. Rep. 784; United States v. Harris, 177 U. S. 305, 310; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 96; see also Am. Car Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Illinois, 509; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. O’Connor, 189 Illinois, 564; Strafford v. Republic Iron Co., 238 Illinois, 371.</p>

<p>APPEAL PROM THE COURT OP CLAIMS.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the SwampLand Act of 1850 and the title to certain lands in Arkansas, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP SOUTH DAKOTA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the title to land allotted to an Indian of the Sisseton and Wahpeton tribe under the act of February 8, 1887, and the effect of subsequent action by Congress in regard thereto on the restrictions against alienation, are Stated in the opinion.</p>

, The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of the Judicial Code affecting the jurisdiction of this court of appeals from judgments of the Circuit Court of Appeals in eases relating to trade-marks, are stated in the opinion.

Held: however, that the deeds conveying ore, stone and minerals were grants of property and conveyed to Downman title to the mineral with the right to work the same. This title and right was held to be real estate and taxable as such.

<p>The expression — to attempt to introduce into the commerce of the1 United States — includes more than to attempt to enter merchandise, and as used in the act of August 5,1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 97, it covers fraudulent invoices made by consignors in foreign countries.</p> <p>As statutes have no extraterritorial operation, a consignor making a fraudulent invoice in a foreign country cannot be punished therefor,, but the goods being within the protection and subject to the commercial regulations of this country can be subjected to forfeiture for’ the fraudulent attempt to introduce them.</p> <p>While punishment for crime and forfeiture of goods affected by the1 crime are often coincident, they are not necessarily so, and inability to reach the criminal is a reason for subjecting the goods to forfeiture. A foreign consignor is charged with knowledge of the regulations of the: United States in regard to importation of goods and their disposition in case they are not called for after removal from the vessel.</p> <p>When goods are unloaded and placed in General Order they are actually introduced into the commerce of the United States within the meaning of the statute intending to prevent fraud on the customs.</p>

. The facts, which involve the construction of the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act of June 29,1906, are stated in the opinion. The hay in question was not owned by the Railroad Company during the transportation thereof from Black Rock to Scranton. The title to said hay did not pass to the Railroad Company until it accepted the hay after an inspection, thereof at the mines.

Held: is to be exempt from the tax imposed. In construing § 24 the Court of Appeals of New York has held (People ex rel.

Held: that the service rendered in furnishing a list of guaranteed attorneys did not, except incidentally and fortuitously, affect interstate commerce and that it was within the power of the State to subject the business to a license tax. Ficklen v. Shelby County, *395 145 U. S. 1 followed. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 , distinguished. 139 Kentucky, 27, affirmed.

Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), was a case before the U.S. Supreme Court that addressed the question of corporate taxation.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Commerce Court dismissing appellant’s petition in an action brought to have certain regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission relative to the method of keeping the accounts of carriers declared invalid and to enjoin the enforcement thereof. 204 Fed. Rep. 641.

Held: owned, or were acquired for the purpose of accommodating the tracks without expense to appellants, either in the acquisition or maintenance of the lands or tracks. Appellants, it is urged further, are not responsible for cars placed on such tracks nor are appellants required to police them. Team tracks are laid upon the ground acquired by appellants and were constructed and are maintained by them.

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for sale of an unconfirmed Mexican grant, and the relative rights of the parties thereto, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court of appeals under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907,.are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the constitutionality of a statute, of Montana imposing certain taxes on insurance corporations, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the validity of liens claimed by a creditor on accounts receivable assigned to him by the bankrupt, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR, TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE- STATE OF LOUISIANA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the construction and application of the limitation prescribed by § lid of the Bankruptcy Act of 1808, are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of a contract for consignment- of goods to a bankrupt and the rights of the consignor thereunder, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the determination of whether the establishment of a battery in connection with its milir tary fortifications by the United States in the vicinity of claimants’ land amounted under the, circumstances of this case to a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment, are stated in the opinion.

<p>ERROR to the circuit court oe the united states for THE SOUTHERN-DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: will be considered representations unless clearly intended by both parties to be warranties, as to which substantial truth in everything material to the risk is all that is required of the applicant.

The facts, which involve the validity of a verdict and judgment on. a policy of life insurance, are staffed in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state courts, are stated in the opinion,

Held: after noticing the cases of United States v. Boutwell, supra, and United States ex rel. Bernardin v. Butterworth, supra, and other cases, and the statute just referred to, that, in so far as the successor to a territorial district judge was concerned, the statute had authorized substitution. The above cases establish the practice of this court, and until the statute of 1899 the practice was uniformly adhered to.

Held: with respect to the action of the trial court in permitting answers to certain hypothetical questions addressed to physicians, that the mere general objections disclosed by the abstract of record filed under its rules were unavailing and it declined to scrutinize the reporter’s transcript for the purpose of discovering the objections said to have been actually made.

The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court under § 237 of the Judicial Code to review a judgment of the appellate court of a State dismissing an appeal from an inferior court, are stated in the opinion.

The plaintiff, Baker, United States District Attorney for the District of Columbia, sued the defendant, Warner, for libel.

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OE THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.</p> <p>The facts, which involve the. validity of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona establishing title to property in that Territory, are stated in the opinion.</p>

Held: that a partner who had kept alive a lease on property which his firm had acquired from him through another source of title so as to protect the interest of the firm,against attacks from outside parties could not subsequently recover the property under the lease to the detriment of the other partners.

The facts, which, involve the jurisdiction of this court of a writ of error to review the judgment of a state court against a relator who is not the agent of the State, and who has without authority of the State sued out the writ of error, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction of statutes regulating pay and allowances of officers of the army of the United States, are stated in the opinión.

The facts, which involve the proper exercise of discretion of. the trial judge in interpreting the mandate of this court in a case remanded for further proceedings, are stated in the opinion. Where a decree of this court has been misunderstood or misconstrued by a lower court, the party complaining can have the error corrected either by an appeal to this court or by a motion for a writ of mandamus. City National Bank v. Hunter, 152 U. S. 512.

The facts, which involve the right and.power of a municipality to represent the residents and citizens having contracts with a public utilities corporation in a suit brought by such corporation to enjoin as confiscatory, rates established by ordinance of the municipality, are stated in the opinion.

<p>Decided on authority of In re Louisville, ante, p. 639.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of provisions of the Food and Drugs Act of 1906 in regard to labelling drugs, are stated in the opinion. •The regulation violated was within the power of the Secretaries to make uniform rules and regulations, and its violation constituted a misbranding within the meaning of the act. Debates in Congress may be looked to in order to show the evil which Congress sought to remedy.

<p>An act of a State will not be construed in such a manner a3 to raise questions concerning relations of state officers to the State if such a construction can be avoided.</p> <p>Quaere, whether in this case the writ of error should not have run to the lower state court, the higher court having refused to transfer the cause for review; but the Chief Justice of the State having allowed the writ prior to the decision of this court in Norfolk Turnpike Go. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, it will not be dismissed.</p> <p>The construction given by the highest court of California to the provisions in the state statute regarding the compensation, of county clerks, followed; and held that the portion of fees retained under the act of Congress of June 29, 1906, c. 3592, 34 Stat. 596, by a county clerk in naturalization proceedings should be accounted for by him to the county as public moneys.</p> <p>The fact that a state or county official may also under an act of Congress be an agent of the National Government does not affect his relations with the county and relieve him from accounting for fees received from such Government if his contract requires him to account for all fees received by him even though, so far as the National Government is concerned, he is entitled to retain them in whole or in part for services rendered.</p>

CIRCUIT. The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety Appliance Acts and their application to tenders of locomotives, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the construction and application of the act of June 21 r 1906, making it unlawful for traders on the Osage Reservation to give credit beyond a certain amount to Indians, are stated in the opinion.

Held: that the imposing of assessments for benefits on property in Seattle leased by the State of Washington is not an unconstitutional impairment of an implied covenant in the lease that the lessor will pay assessments.

<p>Where the principle on which the amount recovered is based is admitted, this court will not go behind well warranted findings of fact in regard to the question of amount.</p> <p>Where it appears'that there may have been an error in computing the amount of the recovery, this court can affirm the judgment without prejudice to reopening the account for the single purpose Of correcting such error if the lower court so permits.</p>

The facts, which involve the validity of a lien for labor and materials on property of a bankrupt, and the necessity for completion of the contract in order to maintain the lien, are stated in the opinion. Nothing is due under the contract. Under the express terms of the contract, payments become due only upon the performance of certain unperformed conditions. Nothing can be recovered under a contract until the contract has been complied with.

<p>ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

The facts, which involve the construction of the acts and rules of court regulating fees of clerks of the Circuit Courts of Appeals for indexing records on appeal, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which involve the immunity of one examined in a bankruptcy proceeding prior to the repeal of § 860, Rev. Stat., from having his testimony tised against him, and the construction of §§ 7 and 21a of the Bankruptcy Act, are stated in the opinion.

The facts, which' involve the effect to be given by the state court to a former judgment in a suit between some of the parties rendered by the Circuit Court of the United States and the extent to which such judgment was res judicata of the matters in controversy, are stated in the opinion. The Federal decision is a bar to this litigation between the plaintiff in error and Col. Myers as to the half of the judgment paid by Luzerne County into the United States court.

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.</p>

<p>Appeal from the United States Commerce Court.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of California.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.</p>

<p>In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Washington.</p>

<p>On petition for writ of mandamus.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi.</p>

<p>In error to the Supréme Court of the State of Illinois.</p>

<p>In error to the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Georgia.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina.</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland.'</p>

<p>In error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.</p>

<p>In error to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia.</p>

<p>In error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.</p>